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HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY
r
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THE INFLUENCE
OF
SEA POWER UPON HISTORY
1 660- 1 783
BY
CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L, LL.D.
UNITED 8TATB8 KAYT
ADTHOB OF "THB UfFLDBMCB OP 88A POWBR UPON THB FBBHCH RBTOLUTIOIT
ABD BMPIBB, 1793-1819,** BTa
rirTSBNTH EDITION
BOSTON
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
1898
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c?i5. 5"
BT <UrTAnt X. T. Mahak.
, 'harvard'.
UNWERSJTri
JoHir WiLsoir akd Soh, Gambbidob.
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PREFACE.
^HE definite object proposed in this work is an ex-
amination of the general history of Europe and
America with particular reference to the elBect of sea
power upon the course of that history. Historians
generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of
the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor
special knowledge ; and the profound determining in-
fluence of maritime strength upon great issues has con-
sequently been overlooked. This is even more true
of particular occasions than of the general tendency
of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way,
that the use and control of the sea is and has been a
great factor in the history of the world ; it is more
troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing
at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done,
the acknowledgment of general importance remains
vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should,
upon a collection of special instances in which the
precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of
the conditions at the given moments.
A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight
the bearing of maritime power upon events may be
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iv
PREFACE.
drawn from two writers of that English nation which
more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea.
" Twice," says Arnold in his History of Rome, " Has
there been witnessed the struggle of the highest indi-
vidual genius against the resources and institutions of
a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victo-
rious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against
Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against Eng-
land ; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of
the second in Waterloo." Sir Edward Creasy, quoting
this, adds ; " One point, however, of the similitude be-
tween the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt
on ; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman
general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian,
and the English general who gave the last deadly over-
throw to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington
both held for many years commands of high importance,
but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The
same country was the scene of the principal military
career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wel-
lington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly
all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being
opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself.
Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen's
confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses,
and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a
complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader
and the chosen veterans of the foe."
Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more
striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of
the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of
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PREFACE.
V
the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous march
through Gaul in which more than half his veteran
troops wasted away ; it enabled the elder Scipio, while
sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to inter-
cept Hannibal's communications, to return in person
and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the
war the legions passed by water, unmolested and un-
wearied, between Spain, which was Hannibal's base, and
Italy ; while the issue of the decisive battle of the Me-
taurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of
the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Has-
drubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact
that the younger brother could not bring his succor-
ing reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route
through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two
Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of
Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action
of the Roman generals.
On the other hand, naval historians have troubled
themselves little about the connection between general
history and their own particular topic, limiting them-
selves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of
naval occurrences. This is less true of the French
than of the English; the genius and training of the
former people leading them to more careful inquiry
into the causes of particular results and the mutual
relation of events.
There is not, however, within the knowledge of the
author any work that professes the particular object
here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea
power upon the course of history and the prosperity of
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PREFACE.
nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics,
social and economical conditions of countries, touching
upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally
unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting
maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing
them, however, from their surroundings of cause and
effect in general history, but seeking to show how they
modified the latter, and were modified by them.
The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-
ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun,
to 1783, the end of the American Revolution. While
the thread of general history upon which the successive
maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the
effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate
outline. Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy
with his profession, the author has not hesitated to di-
gress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and
tactics ; but as technical language has been avoided, it
is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be
found of interest to the unprofessional reader.
A. T. MAHAN.
DbobmbbBi 1889.
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CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTOEY.
History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore
largely military • . • . 1
Permanenoe of the teachings of history 2
Unsettled condition of modern naval opinion 2
Contrasts between historical classes of war-ships 2
Essential distinction between weather and lee gage 6
Analogoos to other offensive and defensive positions 6
Consequent effect npon naval policy 6
Lessons of history apply especially to strategy 7
Less obviously to tactics, but still applicable 0
Illubtrations :
The battle of the Nile, a.d. 1708 10
Trafalgar, a.d. 1805 11
Siege of Gibraltar, a.d. 1770-1782 12
Actium, B.C. 31, and Lepanto, a.d. 1571 18
Second Panic War, b.o. 218-201 . . . : ; 14
Kaval strategic combination^ surer now than formerly 22
Wide scope of naval strategy 22
CHAPTER I.
Discussion of the Elbhbmts of Sea Power.
The sea a great common 25
Advantages of water-carriage over that by land 25
Navies exist for the protection of commerce 20
Dependence of commerce npon secure seaports 27
Development of colonies and colonial poets 28
Links in the chain of Sea Power: production, shipping, colonies . . 28
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General oondifcioDS affecting Sea Power :
I. Geographical position . 20
ir. Physical conformation 35
III. Extent of territory 42
lY. Number of population 44
y. National character 50
VI. Character and policy of goyemments 58
England 50
Holland. 67
France 60
Influence of colonies on Sea Power 82
The United States :
Its weakness in Sea Power 88
Its chief interest in internal development 84
I>anger from blockades 85
Dependence of the navy upon the shipping interest .... 87
Conclusion of the discussion of the elements of Sea Power ... 88
Purpose of the historical narrative 80
CnAPTER II.
State of Europe in 1660. — Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665-
1667. — Sea Battles op Lowestoft and of the FopR Days.
Accession of Charles II. and Louis XIV 00
Followed shortly by general wars 01
French policy formulated by Henry IV. and Richelieu 02
Condition of France in 1660 03
Condition of Spain 04
Condition of the Dutch United Provinces 06
Their commerce and colonies 07
Character of their government 08
Parties in the State 00
Condition of England in 1660 00
Characteristics of French, English, and Dutch ships 101
Conditions of other European States 102
Louis XIV. the leading personality in Europe 103
His policy 104
Colbert's administrative acts 105
Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665 107
Battle of Lowestoft, 1665 108
Fire-ships, compared with torpedo-cruisers 100
The group formation 112
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CONTENTS. ix
Paob
The order of battle for iailing-shipe 116
The Four Day8» Battle, 1686 117
Military merits of the opposing fleets 126
Soldiers oommaDdtng fleets, discoBsion 127
Ruyter in the Thames, 1667 182
Peace of Breda, 1667 182
Military value of commerce-destroying 132
CHAPTER IIL
War op England and France in Alliance against the United
Provinces, 1672-1674. — Finally, op France against Com-
bined Europe, 1674-1678. — Sea Battles op Solebat, the
Texel, and Stromboll
Aprgressions of Louis XIV. on Spanish Netherlands ..... 180
Policy of the United Provinces 189
Triple alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden .... 140
Anger of r-K)ui8 XIV 140
Leibnitz proposes to Louis to seize Egypt 141
His memorial « 142
Bargaining between Louts XIV. and Charles II 148
The two kings declare war against the United Provinces . • • • 144
Military character of this war 144
Naval strategy of the Dutch 144
Tactical combinations of De Ruyter 145
Inefficiency of Dutch naval administration 145
Battle of Solebay, 1672 146
Tactical comments 147
Effect of the battle on the course of the war 148
Land campaign of the French in Holland 140
Murder of John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland .... 150
Accession to power of William of Orange 150
Uneasiness among European States 150
Naval battles off Schoneveldt^ 1678 151
Naval batUe of the Tezel, 1678 152
Effect upon the general war 154
Equivocal action of the French fleet 155
General ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions 156
Military character of De Ruyter 157
Coalition against France 158
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Peace between England and the United Provinces 158
Sicilian revolt against Spain 160
Battle of Stromboli, 1676 161
Illustration of Clerk's naval tactics 168
De Rnyter killed off Agosta 165
England becomes hostile to France 166
Sufferings of the United Provinces 167
Peace of Nimeguen, 1678 168
Effects of the war on France and Holland 169
Notice of Comte d'£str<$es 170
CHAFPEE IV.
English REYOLimoN. — War of the League of Augsbubg, 1688-
1697. — Sea Battles of Beachy Head and La Hougue.
Aggressive policy of Louis XIV 173
State of French, English, and Dutch navies 174
Accession of James 11 175
Formation of the League of Augsburg 176
Louis declares war against the Emperor of Germany 177
Bevolution in England 178
Louis declares war against the United Provinces 178
William and Mary crowned 178
James II. lands in Ireland 179
Misdirection of French naval forces 180
William m. lands in Ireland 181
Naval battle of Beachy Head, 1690 182
Tourville's military character 184
Battle of the Boyne, 1690 186
End of the struggle in Ireland 186
Naval batUe of La Hougue, 1692 189
Destruction of French ships 190
Influence of Sea Power in this war 191
Attack and defence of commerce 193
Peculiar characteristics of French privateering 195
Peace of Ryswick, 1697 197
Exhaustion of France : its causes 198
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xi
CHAFTER V.
War of thb Spanibh Suocession, 1702-1713. — Sea Battle of
Malaga.
Pam
Failare of the Spaiiiah line of the House of AnstrU .'201
King of Spain wills the suooession to the Duke of Anjoa .... 202
Death of the King of Spain 202
Ix>ui8 XIV. aooepts the bequests 208
He seizes towns in Spanish Netherlands 208
Offensive alliance between England, Holland, and Austria . . . 204
Declarations of war 205
The allies proclaim Carlos III. King of Spain 200
Affair of the Vigo galleons 207
Portugal Joins the allies 208
Character of the naval warfare 200
Capture of Gibraltar by tibe English 210
Naval battle of Malaga, 1704 211
Decay of the French navy 212
Progress of the land war 218
Allies seize Sardinia and Minorca • • • . • 215
Disgrace of Marlborough . . • • 210
England offers terms of peace 217
Peace of Utrecht, 1718 218
Terms of the peace 210
Results of the war to the different belligerents 219
Commanding position of Great Britain 224
Sea Power dependent upon both commerce and naval strength . • 225
Peculiar position of France as regards Sea Power 220
Depressed condition of France 227
Commercial prosperity of England 228
Ineffectiveness of commerce-destroying • • 220
Duguay-Trouin's expedition against Kio de Janeiro, 1711 • • • • 280
War between Russia and Sweden • « • . • 281
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CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VI.
Ths Regenct in France. — Albbboni in Spain. — Policies of
Walpolb and Fleuri. — War of the Polish Succession. —
English Contraband Trade in Spanish Akerica. — Great
Britain declares War against Spain. — 1715-1789.
Paob
Death of Qaeen Anne and Louis XIY 232
Accession of Geoi^ge 1 232
Regency of Philip of Orleans 233
Administration of Alberoni in Spain 234
Spaniards invade Sardinia 235
Alliance of Austria, England, Holland, and France 285
Spaniards invade Sicily , . 230
Destruction of Spanish navy off Cape Passaro, 1718 287
Failure and dismissal of Alberoni 230
Spain accepts terms 230
Great Britain interferes in the Baltic 239
Death of Philip of Orleans ' 241
Administration of Fleuri in France 241
Growth of French commerce . • . . 242
France in the East Indies 243
Troubles between England and Spain 244
English contraband trade in Spanish America 245
Illegal search of English ships 246
Walpole's struggles to preserve peace 247
War of the Polish Succession 247
Creation of the Bourbon kiogdom of the Two Sicilies 248
Bourbon family compact 248
France acquires Bar and Lorraine 249
England declares war against Spain 250
Morality of the English action toward Spain 250
Decay of the French navy 252
Death of Walpole and of Fleuri 253
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CHAPTER VIL
War bktween Grbat Britain and Spaik, 1789. — War of the
Austrian Succession, 1740. — France joins Spain against
Grkat Britain, 1744. — Sea Battles or Matthews, Anson,
AND Hawke. — Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.
Piaa
Characteristics of the wars from 1780 to 1788 254
Neglect of the nmj by French goverDment 2&4
Ck>loiiial possessions of the French, English, and Spaniards . . . 255
« Dupleix and La Boardonnais in India 258
Condition of the contending nayies 259
Expeditions of Vernon and Anson 261
Outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession 262
England allies herself to Austria 262
Naval affairs in the Mediterranean 263
Influence of Sea Power on the war 264
Naval battle off Toulon, 1744 265
Causes of English faUure 267
Courts-martial following the action 26d
Ineflicient action of English navy . . . / 269
Capture of Louisbnrg by New England colonists, 1745 . • . • 269
Causes which concurred to neutralize England's Sea Power . • • 269
France overruns Belgium and invades Holland 270
Naval actions of Anson and Hawke 271
Brilliant defence of Commodore I'fitendu^re 272
Projects of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in the East Indies • . . 278
Influence of Sea Power in Indian affairs 275 .
La Bourdonnais reduces Madras 276
Peace of Aix-la-ChapeUe, 1748 277
Madras exchanged for Louisbnrg 277
Results of the war 278
Effect of Sea Power on the issue 279
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CHAPTER VHL
Sbybn Ybabs' War, 1756-1768. England's OysRWHELHiNa
Power and Conquests on the Seas, in North America,
Europe, and East and West Indies. — Sea Battles : Byno
OFF Minorca; Hawke and Conflans; Pocock and D'Ach^
in East Indies.
Paqb
Peace of Aiz-la-Chapelle leaves many questions unsettled . . . 281
Dupleiz pursues his aggressive policy 281
He is recalled from India 282
His policy abandoned by the French 282
Agitation in North America 288
Braddock's expedition, 1765 281
Seizure of French ships by the English, while at peace . • • . 285
French ezpedition against Port Mahon, 1756 285
Byng sails to relieve the place 286
Byng's action off Port Mahon, 1756 286
Characteristics of the French naval policy 287
Byng returns to Gibraltar - 200
He is relieved, tried by court-martial, and shot 290
Formal declarations of war by England and France 201
England's a])preciation of the maritime character of the war . . . 201
France is drawn into a continental struggle 202
The Seven Years' War (1756-1768) begins 208
Pitt becomes Prime Minister of England 203
Operations in North America 203
Fall of Louisburg, 1758 201
Fall of Quebec, 1750, and of Montreal, 1760 204
Influence of Sea Power on the continental war 205
English plans for the general naval operations 206
Choiseul becomes Minister in France 207
He plans an invasion of England 207
Sailing of the Toulon fleet, 1750 208
Its disastrous encounter with Boscawen 200
Consequent frustration of the invasion of England 800
Project to invade Scotland 800
Sailing of the Brest fleet 800
Hawke falls in with it and disperses it, 1750 802
Accession of Charles ITI. to Spanish throne 304
Death of George II 304
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Clive in India 805
Battle of Plassey, 1757 806
Decisive ioflaenoe of Sea Power upon the issaes in India .... 807
Naval actions between Pooook and D^Ach^ 1758, 1750 807
Destitute condition of French naval stations in India 809
The French fleet abandons the struggle 810
Final fall of the French power in India 810
Ruined condition of the French navy 311
Alliance between France and Spain • • 813
England declares war against Spain 818
Rapid conquest of French and Spanish colonies 814
French and Spaniards invade Portugal 816
The invasion repelled by England 816
Severe reverses of the Spaniards in all quarters 816
Spain sues for peace 817
Losses of British mercantile shipping 817
Increase of British commerce 818
Commanding position of Great Britain 810
Relations of England and Portugal 820
Terms of the Treaty of Paris 821
Opposition to the treaty in Great Britain 822
Results of the maritime war 828
Results of the continental war 824
Influence of Sea Power in countries politically unstable .... 824
Interest of the United States in the Central American Isthmus . . 825
Effects of the Seven Tears' War on the later history of Great Britain 826
Subsequent acquisitions of Great Britain 827
British success due to maritime superiority 828
Mutual dependence of seaports and fleets 829
CHAPTER IX.
CouRSB OF Etents frok thb Peace of Paris to 1778. — Mari-
TiKB War Consequent upon the American Retolution. — Sea
Battle off Ushant.
French discontent with the Treaty of Paris 880
Revival of the French navy 881
Discipline among French naval officers of the time 832
ChoiseuPs foreign policy 838
Domestie troubles in Great Britain . . . ; 884
Controversies with the North American colonies 884
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Genoa oedas Corsica to France 331
Dispute between £ngland aud Spain about the Falkland Islands • 835
Choiseui dismissed . . 836
Death of Louis XY. 380
Kaval policy of Louis XYI 887
Characteristics of the maritime war of 1778 838
Instructions of Louis XYI. to the French admirals 889
Strength of English navy 841
Charactenstios of the military situation in America 841
The line of the Hudson 842
Burgoyne's expedition from Canada 843
Howe carries his army from New York to the Chesapeake . . • 843
Surrander of fiurgoyne, 1777 843
American privateering 844
Clandestine support of the Americans by France 845
Treaty between France and the Americans 846
Yital importance of the French fleet to the Americans 847
The military situation in the different quarters of the globe . . . 847
Breaoh between France and England 850
Sailing of the British and French fleets 850
Battieof Ushaut, 1778 851
Position of a naval commander-in-chief in battle 858
CHAPTER X.
Maritime War in North Ambrioa. and Wrst Indies, 1778-178L
— Its Influence upon tue Course or the Aherican Revo-
lution. — Fleet Actions off Grenada. Dominica, and Chesa-
peake Bat.
D'Estaing sails from Toulon for Delaware Bay, 1778 859
British ordered to evacuate Philadelphia 860
Rapidity of Lord Howe's movements 860
D'Estaing arrives too late 860
Follows Howe to New York 860
Fails to attack there and sails for Newport 861
Howe follows him there . . . 862
Both fleets dispersed by a storm 862
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Boston 868
Howe's activity foils D'Estaing at all points 863
D'Estaing sails for the West Indies 865
The English seize Sta. Lucia 865
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Ineffectaol aiiempte of D'Estaing io dislodge them 806
D'Estaihg capfcares Grenada 867
Naval batUe of Grenada, 1770 ; English ships crippled .... 867
D'Estaing fails to improve his advantages 870
Reasons for his neglect ' . . . . . 871
French naval policy 872
English operations in the Southern States 876
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Savannah 875
His fruitless assault on Savannah 876
D'Estaing returns to France 876
Fall of Charleston 876
De Guichen takes command in the West Indies 876
Rodney arrives to command English fleet 877
His military character 877
First action between Rodney and De Guichen, 1780 878
Breaking the line 880
Subsequent movements of Rodney and De Guichen 881
Rodney divides his fleet 881
Goes in person to New York 881
De Guichen returns to France 881
Arrival of French forces in Newport 882
Rodney returns to the West Indies 882
War between England and Holland 882
Disasters to the United States in 1780 882
De Grasse sails from Brest for the West Indies, 1781 ..... 888
Engagement with English fleet off Martinique 888
Cornwallis overruns the Southern States 884
He retires upon Wilmington, N. C, and thence to Vii-ginia . . . 886
Arnold on the James River 886
The French fleet leaves Newport to intercept Arnold . . . « . 885
Meets the English fleet off the Chesapeake, 1781 886
French fleet returns to Newport 887
Cornwallis occupies Yorktown 887
De Grasse sails from Hayti for the Chesapeake 888
Action with the British fleet, 1781 889
Surrender of Cornwallis, 1781 890
Criticism of the British naval operations 890
Energy and address shown by De Grasse 892
Difficulties of Great Britain^s position in the War of 1778 .... 802
The military policy best fitted to cope with them 898
Position of the French squadron in Newport, R. I., 1780 .... 894
Great Britain's defensive position and inferior numbers .... 896
Consequent necessity for a vigorous initiative 896
Washington's opinions as to the influence of Sea Power on the
American contest 807
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CONTENTS.
CHAFrER XL
Maritimb War in Europe, 1779-1782.
Paqi
Objectives of the allied operations in Europe 401
Spain declares war against England 401
Allied fleets enter the English Channel, 1770 402
Abortive issue of the cruise 403
Rodney sails with supplies for Gibi-altar 403
Defeats the Spanish squadron of Langara and relieves the place 404
The allies capture a great British convoy 404
The armed neutrality of the Baltic powers, 1780 405
England declares war against Holland 406
Gibraltar is revictualled by Admiral Derby . ; 407
The allied fleets again in the Channel, 1781 408
They retire without effecting any damage to England 408
Destruction of a French convoy for the West Indies 408
Fail of Port Mahon, 1782 400
The allied fleets assemble at Algesiras 400
Grand attack of the allies on Gibraltar, which fails, 1782 .... 410
Lord Howe succeeds in revictualling Gibraltar 412
Action between his fleet and that of the allies 412
Conduct of the war of 1778 by the English government .... 412
Influence of Sea Power 416
Proper use of the naval forces 416
CHAPTER XII.
EvEins IN THE East Ikdies, 1778-1781. — Suffrem sails from
Brbst for India, 1781. —-His Brilliant Naval Campaign
IN THE Indian Seas, 1782, 1788.
Neglect of India by the French government 410
England at war with Mysore and with the Mahrattas 420
Arrival of the French squadron under Comte d'Orves 420
It effects nothing and returns to the Isle of France 420
Suffren sails from Brest with Ave ships-of-the-line, 1781 ... . 421
Attacks an English squadron in the Cape Verde Islands, 1781 . . 422
Conduct and results of this attack 424
DisUngnishing merits of Suffren as a naval leader 425
Suffren saves the Cape Colony from the Knglish 427
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He reaches the Isle of France 427
Sacoeeds to the chief command of the French fleet 427
Meets tlie British sqaadron under Hughes at Madras 427
Analysis of the naval strategic situation in India 428
The first hattle between Suftren and Hughes, Feb. 17, 1782 ... 480
Suffren's views of the naval situation in India 488
Tactical oversights made by Suffren 484
Inadequate support received by him from his captains 485
Suffren goes to Pondicherry, Hughes to Trincomalee 486
The second battle between Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782 . . 487
Suffren's tactics in the action 489
Relative injuries received by the opposing fleets 441
Contemporaneous English criticisms upon Hughes's conduct . . 442
Destitute condition of Suffren's fleet 448
His activity and success in supplying wants . « 448
He communicates with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore 448
Firmness and insight shown by Suffren 445
His refusal to obey orders from home to leave the Indian Coast • 446
The third battle between Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782 . . . 447
Qualities shown by Hughes . . . . , 440
Stubborn fighting by the British admiral and captains 440
Suffren deprives three captains of their commands 440
Dilatory conduct of Admiral Hughes 450
Suffren attacks and takes Trincomalee 450
Strategic importance of this success 451
Comparative condition of the two fleets in material for repairs . . 451
The English government despatches powerful reinforcements . . 452
The French court fails to support Suffren 452
The fourth battle between Suffren and Hughes, Sept. 8, 1782 . • 458
Mismanagement and injuries of the French 455
Contrast between the captains in the opposing fleets 456
Two ships of Suffren's fleet grounded and lost 457
Arrival of British reinforcements under Admiral Bickerton . • . 458
Approach of bad-weather season ; Hughes goes to Bombay . . . 458
Military situation of French and English in India 450
Delays of the French reinforcements under Bussy 460
Suffren takes his fleet to Achem, in Sumatra 460
He returns to the Indian coast 461
Arrival of Bussy 461
Decline of the French power on shore 461
The English besiege Bussy in Cuddalore by land and sea .... 462
Suffren relieves the place 462
The fifth battle between Suffren and Hughes, Jun6 20, 1788 ... 468
Decisive character of Suffren's action 468
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News of the peace received at Madras 408
Suffren sails for France 404
His flattering reception everywhere 404
His distinguishing military qualities 405
His later career and death 400
CHAPTER XIII.
Events in thb West Indies afteb the Surrender op York-
town. — Encounters of De Grasse with Hood. — The Sea
Battle of the Saints. — 1781-1782.
Maritime struggle transferred from the continent to West Indies . 408
De Grasse sails for the islands 409
French expedition against the island of St Christopher, January,
1782 400
Hood attempts to relieve the garrison 470
Mancsuvres of the two fleets 471
Action between De Grasse and Hood .472
Hood seizes the anchorage left by De Grasse 478
De Grasse attacks Hood at his anchorage 474
Hood maintains his position 476
Surrender of the garrison and island 475
Merits of Hood's action 470
Criticism upon De Grasse's conduct 477
Rodney arrives in West Indies from England . 479
Junction of Rodney and Hood at Antigua 479
De Grasse returns to Martinique 479
Allied plans to capture Jamaica 479
Rodney takes his station at Sta. Lucia 480
The French fleet sails and is pursued by Rodney 480
Action of April 9, 1782 481
Criticism npon the action 483
The chase continued ; accidents to French ships 484
The naval battle of the Saints, April 12, 1782 485
Rodney breaks the French line 488
Capture of the French commander-in-chief and Ave ships-of-the-line 489
Details of the action 489
Analysis of the effects of Rodney's manoBuvre 491
Tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment 493
Lessons of this short naval campaign 495
Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet 490
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Examination of his reasons and of the actual conditions .... 407
Probable effect of this failure upon the conditions of peace . . . 408
Rodney's opinions upon the battle of April 12 400
Successes achieved by Rodney during his command 600
lie is recalled by a new ministry 500
Exaggerated view of the effects of this batUe upon the war . . . 500
Subsequent career of De Grasse 501
* Court-martial ordered upon the officers of the French fleet .... 502
Findings of the court 502
De Grasse appeals against the finding 508
He is severely rebuked by the king 503
Deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Uood 504
CHAPTER XIV.
Critical Discussion of the Maritimb War or 1778.
The war of 1778 purely maritime 505
Peculiar interest therefore attaching to it 506
Successive steps in the critical study of a war 607
Distinction between " object " and « objective " 507
Parties to the war of 1778 607
Objects of the different belligerents 508
Foundations of the firitisli Empire of tlie seas 510
Threatened by the revolt of the colonies 510
The British fleet inferior in numbers to the allies 511
Choice of objectives 511
The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere . . . 513
Elements essential to an active naval war 514
The bases of operations in the war of 1778 : —
In Europe 515
On the American continent 516
In the West Indies 516
In the East Indies 518
Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons 518 .
The bases abroad generally deficient in resources 510
Consequent increased importance of the communications .... 519
The navies the guardians of the communications ....... 520
Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India 520
Inquiry into th^ disposition of the naval forces 521
Diflicnlty of obtaining information at sea 521
Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition 522
Disadvantages of the defensive 528
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England upon the defensive in 1778 628
Consequent necessity for wise and yigorous action 624
The key of the situation 625
British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars 625
British navai policy in the Seven Years' War 627
Difficulties attending this policy 627
Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778 628
Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions 628 •
Effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases 629
The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being out-
numbered at many points 681
The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared . • . 632
Naval policy of the allies 636
Divergent counsels of the coalition 630
•< Ulterior objects " 537
The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude . . . 638
Dangers of this line of action 638
Glamour of commerce-destroying 630
The conditions of peace, 1783 640
Indkx 543
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
LIST OF MAPS-
Paob
I. Mediterranean Sea 16
II. English Channel and North Sea . . ^ 107
III. Indian Peninsula and Ceylon 257
IV. North Atlantic Ocean 532
PLANS OF NAVAL BATTLES.
In (htm piant, when the ee^ntal letten A, B, C, and D are ir«f</, all poeUiana marked
bff the earns capital are timultaneaue.
L Foar Days' Battle. 1666 119
ir. Four Days' Battle, 1666 124
III. Battie of Solebay, 1672 146
IV. Battie of the Texel, 1678 ........... 163
V. Battle of Sti-omboli, 1676 161
V a. Pocock and D'Achd, 1758 161
VI. Battle of Beachy Head, 1690 183
VI a. Battle of Hongne, 1692 188
VII. Matthews's Action off Toulon, 1744 265
VII a. Byng's Action off Minorca, 1756 . • • -266
VIII. Hawke and Gonflans, 1759 803
IX. Battle of Ushant, 1778 851
X. D'Estaing and Byron, 1779 868
XI. Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 878
XII. Arbnthnot and Destonches, 1781 886
XITI. Suffren at Porto Praya, 1781 423
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Paob
XIV. 8uilren and Hughes, February 17, 1782 481
XV. Suffreu and Hughes, April 12, 1782 438
XYI. Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782 447
XVII. Suflfreu and Hughes, September 8, 1782 454
XVIH. ^ Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 470
XIX. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 472
XX. Rodney and De Grasse, April 9, 1782 482
XXi. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486
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INFLUENCE
OF
SEA POWER UPON fflSTORY.
INTRODUCTORY.
THE history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means
solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mu-
tual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The
profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and
strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true
principles which governed its growth and prosperity wore
detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate
share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude
others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of mo-
nopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by
direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings
roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger
share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and
of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. On
the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been
greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of
the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing
in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon
the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history ; and it is
in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively,
regarded in the following pages.
A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is
enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas
1
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INTRODUCTORY.
and to the skilful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon
names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring
soldier, those of Alexander, Hannibal, and Csesar, to whom
gunpowder was unknown ; and there is a substantial agree*
ment among professional writers that, while many of the con-
ditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of
weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history
which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal ap-
plication, can be elevated to the rank of general principles.
For the same reason the study of the sea history of the past
will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general
principles of maritime wai*, notwithstanding the great changes
that have been brought about in naval weapons by the 8cien«
tific advances of the past half century, and by the introduction
of steam as the motive power.
It is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history
and experience of naval warfare in the days of sailing-ships,
because while these will be found to afford lessons of present
application and value, steam navies have as yet made no his-
tory which can be quoted as decisive in its teaching. Of the
one we have much experimental knowledge; of the other,
practically none. Hence theories about the naval warfare of
the future are almost wholly presumptive ; and although the
attempt has been made to give them a more solid basis by
dwelliug upon the resemblance between fleets of steamships
and fleets of galleys moved by oars, which have a long and
well-known history, it will be well not to be carried away by
this analogy until it has been thoroughly tested. The resem-
blance is indeed far from superficial. The feature which the
steamer and the galley have in common is the ability to move
in any direction independent of the wind. Such a power
makes a radical distinction between those classes of vessels
and the sailing-ship ; for the latter can follow only a limited
number of courses when the wind blows, and must remain
motionless when it fails. But while it is wise to observe
things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that
differ ; for when the imagination is carried away by the de*
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INTRODUCTORY.
tection of points of resemblance, — one of the most pleasing of
mental pursuits, — it is apt to be impatient of any divergence
in its new-found parallels, and so may overlook or refuse to
recognize such. Thus the galley and the steamship have in
common, though unequally developed, the important charac-
teristic mentioned, but in at least two points they differ ; and
in an appeal to the history of the galley for lessons as to
fighting steamships, the differences as well as the likeness
must be kept st^ily in view, or false deductions may be
made. The motive power of the galley when in use neces-
sarily and rapidly declined, because human strength could
not long maintain such exhausting efforts, and consequently
tactical movements could continue but for a limited time ; ^
and again, during the galley period offensive weapons were
not only of short range, but wore almost wholly confined to
hand-to-hand encounter. These two conditions led almost
necessarily to a rush upon each other, not, however, without
some dexterous attempts to turn or double on the enemy, fol-
lowed by a hand-to-hand miUe. In such a rush and such a
milSe a great consensus of respectable, even eminent, naval
opinion of the present day finds the necessary outcome of
modern naval weapons, — a kind of Donny brook Fair, in which,
as the history of milSe$ shows, it will be hard to know friend
from foe. Whatever may prove to be the worth of this opin-
ion, it cannot claim an historical basis in the sole fact that
galley and steamship can move at any moment directly upon
the enemy, and carry a beak upon their prow, regardless of
the points in which galley and steamship differ. As yet this
opinion is only a presumption, upon which final judgment
may well bo deferred until the trial of battle has given fur-
ther light. Until that time there is room for the opposite
1 Thus Hermocrates of Syracuse, adTocatmg the policy of thwarting the
Athenian expedition 4igain«t his city (b.o. 418) by going boldly to meet it, and
keeping on the flank of ito line of adTance, mid : " Ab their advance must be slow,
we BhaU have a thooaand opportunities to attack them; bat if they clear their
ships for action and in a body bear down expeditionsly npon ns, they most p^
hard at their oars, and when spent with tail we can fall npon them.''
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INTRODUCTORY.
view, — that a m6lSe between numerically equal fleets, in which
skill is reduced to a minimum, is not the best that can be done
with the elaborate and mightjr weapons of this age. The
surer of himself an admiral is, the finer the tactical develop-
ment of his fleet, the better his captains, the more reluctant
must he necessarily be to enter into a milSe with equal forces,
in which all these advantages will be thrown away, chance
reign supreme, and his fleet be placed on terms of equality
with an assemblage of ships which have never before acted
together.^ History has lessons as to when mSUei are, or are
not, in order.
The galley, then, has one striking resemblance to the steamer,
but differs in other important features which are not so im-
mediately apparent and are therefore less accounted of. In
the sailing-ship, on the contrary, the striking feature is the
difference between it and the more modern vessel ; the points
of resemblance, though existing and easy to find, are not so
obvious, and therefore are less heeded. This impression is
enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in the sailing-ship
as compared with the steamer, owing to its dependence upon
the wind; forgetting that, as the former fought with its
equals, the tactical lessons are valid. The galley was never
reduced to impotence by a calm, and hence receives more
respect in our day than the sailing-ship ; yet the latter dis-
placed it and remained supreme until the utilization of steam.
The powers to injure an enemy from a great distance, to
manoeuvre for an unlimited length of time without wearing
out the men, to devote the greater part of the crew to the
offensive weapons instead of to the oar, are common to the
sailing vessel and the steamer, and are at least as important,
tactically considered, as the power of the galley to move in
a calm or against the wind.
^ The writer miut gnard himself from appearing to advocate elaborate tactical
morementa iasoiiig in barren demonstrationa. He believes that a fleet seelKing
a decisive result most dose with its enemy, bat not until some advantage has been
obtained for the collision, which will osoally be gained by manoenvring, and will
fall to the best drilled and nuinaged fleet. In troth, barren results have as often
foUowed upon headlong, close encounters as upon the most timid tactical trifling.
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INTRODUCTORY.
In tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to
overlook points of difference, but to exaggerate points of like-
ness, — to be fanciful. It may be so considered to point out
that as the sailing-ship had guns of long range, with compar-
atively great penetrative power, and carronades, which were
of shorter range but great smashing effect, so the modern
steamer has its batteries of long-range guns and of torpedoes,
the latter being effective only within a limited distance and
then injuring by smashing, while the gun, as of old, aims at
penetration. Yet these are distinctly tactical considerations,
which must affect the plans of admirals and captains ; and
the analogy is real, not forced. So also both the sailing-ship
and the steamer contemplate direct contact with an enemy's
vessel, — the former to carry her by boarding, the latter to
sink her by ramming ; and to both this is the most difficult of
their tasks, for to effect it the ship must be carried to a single
point of the field of action, whereas projectile weapons may be
used from many points of a wide area.
The relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with
reference to the direction of the wind involved most important
tactical questions, and were perhaps the chief care of the
seamen of that age. To a superficial glance it may appear
that since this has become a matter of such indifference to
the steamer, no analogies to it are to be found in present con-
ditions, and the lessons of history in this respect are value-
less. A more careful consideration of the distinguishing
characteristics of the lee and the weather " gage," * directed
to their essential features and disregarding secondary details,
will show that this is a mistake. The distinguishing feature
of the weather-gage was that it conferred the power of giving
1 A ship was laid to have the w«ather-gage, or *' the advaotage of the wind,"
or " to be to windward," when the wind allowed her to steer for her opponent,
and did not let the latter head straight for her. The extreme case was when the
wind blew direct from one to the other ; hot there was a large space on either
side of this line to which the term " weather-gage ** applied. If the lee ship be
taken as the centre of a circle, there were nearly three eighths of its area in
which the other might be and still keep the advantage of the wind to a greater
or less degree. Lee is the opposite of weather.
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6 INTRODUCTORY.
or refusing battle at will, which in turn carries the usual
advantage of an offensive attitude in the choice of the method
of attack. This advantage was iBtccompanied by certain
drawbacks, such as irregularity introduced into the order,
exposure to raking or enfilading cannonade, and the sacrifice
of part or all of the artillery-fire of the assailant, — all which
were incurred in approaching the enemy. The ship, or fleet,
with the lee-gage could not attack ; if it did not wish to re-
treat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to receiv-
ing battle on the enemy's terms. This disadvantage was
compensated by the comparative ease of maintaining the
order of battle undisturbed, and by a sustained ai*tillery-fire
to which the enemy for a time was unable to reply. Histori-
cally, these favorable and unfavorable characteristics have
their counterpart and analogy in the offensive and defensive
operations of all ages. The offence undertakes certain risks
and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy ;
the defence, so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of
advance, holds on to a careful, well-orderod position, and
avails itself of the exposure to which the assailant submits
himself. These radical differences between the weather and
the lee gage were so clearly recognized, through the cloud of
lesser details accompanying them, that the former was ordi-
narily chosen by the English, because their steady policy was
to assail and destroy their enemy ; whereas the French sought
the lee-gage, , because by so doing they were usually able to
cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive
encounters and preserve Uieir ships. The French, with rare
exceptions, subordinated the action of the navy to other
military considerations, grudged the money spent upon it, and
therefore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a de-
fensive position and limiting its efforts to Uio repelling of
assaults. For this course the lee-gage, skilfully used, was
admirably adapted so long as an enemy displayed more cour-
age than conduct ; but when Rodney showed an intention to
use the advantage of the wind, not merely to attack, but to
make a formidable concentration on a part of the enemy's
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INTRODUCTORY.
7
line, his wary opponent, De Ouichen, changed his tactics. In
the first of their three actions tlie Frenchman took tlie lee-
gage ; but after recognizing Rodney's purpose he manoeuvred
for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse
action except on his own terms. The power to assume tlie
offensive, or to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind,
but with the party which has the greater speed ; which in a
fleet will depend not only upon the speed of the individual
ships, but also upon their tactical uniformity of action.
Henceforth the ships which have the greatest speed will have
the weather-gage.
It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to
look for useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well
as in that of galleys. Both have their points of resemblance
to the modern ship ; both have also points of essential differ-
ence, which make it impossible to cite their experiences or
modes of action as tactical precedent to be followed. But a
precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle.
The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply
through change of circumstances; the latter has its root
in the essential nature of things, and, however various its
application as conditions change, remains a standard to which
action must conform to attain success. War has such prin-
ciples ; their existence is detected by the study of the past,
which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same
from age to age. Conditions and weapons change; but to
cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect
must bo had to these constant teachings of history in the
tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war
which are comprised under the name of strategy.
It is however in these wider operations, which embrace a
whole theatre of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a
large portion of the globe, that the teachings of history have
a more evident and permanent value, because the conditions
remain more permanent. The theatre of war may be larger
or smaller, its difficulties more or less pronounced, the con-
tending armies more or less great, the necessary movements
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8 INTRODUCTORY.
more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale,
of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness giyes place to
civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads
are opened, rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the
operations of war become easier, more rapid, more exten-
sive; but the principles to which they must be conformed
remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced by
carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place
to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you
will, the scale of time diminished ; but the principles which
dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated,
the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's
position which it should assail, the protection of communi-
cations, were not altered. So, on the sea, the advance from
the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the sailing-
ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from
the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased
the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without neces-
sarily changing the principles which should direct them ; and
the speech of Hermocrates twenty-three hundred years ago,
before quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, which is as
applicable in its principles now as it was then. Before hos-
tile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which
perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line
between tactics and strategy), there are a number of ques-
tions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations
throughout tlie theatre of war. Among these are the
proper function of the navy in the war ; its true objective ;
the point or points upon which it should be concentrated;
the establishment of depots of coal and supplies ; the main-
tenance of communications between these depots and the
home base ; the military value of commerce-destroying as a
decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon
which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted,
whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some
vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass.
All these are strategic questions, and upon all these history
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INTRODUCTORY.
has a great deal to saj. There has been of late a valuable
discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative
merits of the policies of two great English admirals, Lord
Howe and Lord St Vincent, in the disposition of the English
navy when at war with France. The question is purely
strategic, and is not of mere historical interest ; it is of vital
importance now, and the principles upon which its decision
rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent's policy saved
England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his
brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.
It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that
the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree
lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of
principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative
permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as
to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point
to which strategic considerations have brought them. The
unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the
weapons ; and with that must come a continual change in
the manner of fighting, — in the handling and disposition of
troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency
on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think
that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former
experiences ; that time so used is wasted. This view, though
natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strate*
gic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which
direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and
will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-
sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past
succeeded or failed according as they were fought in con-
formity with the principles of war ; and the seaman who care-
fully studies the causes of success or failure will not only
detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also
acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical
use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe
also that changes of tactics have not only taken place <rfUr
changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the
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INTRODUCTORY.
interral between such changes has been undaly long. This
doubtiess arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons
is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tac-
tics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class ; bat *
it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recog-
nition of each cliangCi by careful study of the powers and
limitations of tiie new ship or weapon, and by a consequent
adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it pos-
sesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it
is rain to hope that military men generally will bo at tlie pains
to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with
a great advantage, — a lesson in itself of no mean value.
We may therefore accept now the words of a French tacti-
cian, Morogues, who wrote a century and a quarter ago:
Naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief causes
of which, namely the arms, may change ; which in turn causes
necessarily a change in the construction of ships, in the man-
ner of handling them, and so finally in the disposition and
handling of fleets.'* His further statement, that it is not
a science founded upon principles absolutely invariable," is
more open to criticism. It would be more correct to say
that the application of its principles varies as the weapons
change. The application of the principles doubtless varies
also in strategy from time to time, but the variation is far
less ; and hence the recognition of the underlying principle
is easier. This statement is of sufficient importance to our
subject to receive some illustrations from historical events.
The battle of the Nile, in 1798, was not only an overwhelm-
ing victory for the English over the French fleet, but had also
the decisive effect of destroying the communications between
France and Napoleon's army in %ypt. In the battle itself
the English admiral. Nelson, gave a most brilliant example of
grand tactics, if that be, as has been defined, ^Uhe art of
making good combinations preliminary to battles as well as
during their progress." The particular tactical combination
depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the
inability of the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the
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11
help of the weather ones before the latter were destroyed ; but
the principles which underlay the combination, namely, to
choose that part of the enemy's order which can least easily
be helped, and to attack it with superior forces, has not passed
away. The action of Admiral Jervis at Gape St. Vincent,
when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven,
was dictated by the same principle, though in this case the
enemy was not at anchor, but under way. Yet men's minds
are so constituted that they seem more impressed by the
transiency of the conditions than by the undying principle
which coped with them. In the strategic effect of Nelson's
victory upon the course of the war, on the contrary, the prin-
ciple involved is not only more easily recognized, but it is at
once soon to be applicable to our own day. The issue of the
enterprise in Egypt depended upon keeping open the com-
munications with France. The victory of the Nile destroyed
the naval force, by which alone the communications could bo
assured, and determined the final failure ; and it is at once
seen, not only that the blow was struck in accordance with the
principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication,
but also that the same principle is valid now, and would be
equally so in the days of the galley as of the sailing-ship or
steamer.
Nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for the past, sup-
posed to be obsolete, combines witli natural indolence to blind
men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close
to the surface of naval history. For instance, how many look
upon the battle of Trafalgar, the crown of Nelson's glory and
the seal of his genius, as other than an isolated event of
exceptional grandeur ? How many ask themselves the stra-
tegic question, How did the ships come to be just there ? '^
How many realize it to be the final act in a great strategic
drama, extending over a year or more, in which two of the
greatest leaders that ever lived. Napoleon and Nelson, were
pitted against each other ? At Trafalgar it was not Yilleneuve
that failed, but Napoleon that was vanquished ; not Nelson
that won, but England that was saved ; and why ? Because
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Napoleon's combinations failed, and NeIson*8 intuitions and
activity kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy,
and brought it up in time at the decisive moment.^ The tac-
tics at Trafalgar, while open to criticism in detail, were in
their main features conformable to the principles of war, and
their audacity was justified as well by the urgency of the case
as by the results ; but the great lessons of efficiency in prepa-
ration, of activity and energy in execution, and of thought
and insight on the part of the English leader during the
previous months, are strategic lessons, and as such they still
remain good.
In these two cases events were worked out to their natural
and decisive end. A third may be cited, in which, as no such
definite end was reached, an opinion as to what should have
been done may be open to dispute. In the war of the Ameri-
can Revolution, France and Spain became allies against Eng-
land in 1779. The united fleets thrice appeared in the
English Channel, once to the number of sixty-six sail of the
line, driving the English fleet to seek refuge in its ports be-
cause far inferior in numbers. Now, the great aim of Spain
was to recover Gibraltar and Jamaica; and to the former end
immense efforts both by land and sea were put forth by the
allies against that nearly impregnable fortress. They were
fruitless. The question suggested — and it is purely one of
naval strategy — is this : Would not Gibraltar have been more
surely recovered by controlling the English Ohannel, attacking
the British fleet even in its harbors, and threatening England
with annihilation of commerce and invasion at home, than by
far greater efforts directed against a distant and very strong
outpost of her empire ? The English people, from long im-
munity, were particularly sensitive to fears of invasion, and
their great confidence in their fleets, if rudely shaken, would
have left them proportionately disheartened. However de-
cided, the question as a point of strategy is fair ; and it is
proposed in another form by a French officer of the period,
who favored directing the great effort on a West India island
> See note at end of Introductoiy Chapter, page 28.
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which might be exchanged against Gibraltar. It is not, how*
ever, likelj that England would have given up the key of the
Mediterranean for any other foreign posBCSsion, though she
might have yielded it to save her firesides and her capital.
Napoleon once said that he would reconquer Pondicherry on
the banks of the Vistula. ' Gould he have controlled the Eng-
lish Ghannel, as the allied fleet did for a moment in 1779,
can it be doubted that he would have conquered Gibraltar on
the shores of England ?
To impress more strongly the truth that history both sug*
gests strategic study and illustrates the principles of war by
the facts which it transmits, two more instances will be taken,
which are more remote in time than the period specially con-
sidered in this work. How did it happen that, in two great
contests between the powers of the East and of the West in
the Mediterranean, in one of which the empire of the known
world was at stake, the opposing fleets met on spots so near
each other as Actium and Lepanto ? Was this a mere coin-
cidence, or was it due to conditions that recurred, and may
recur again ? ^ If the latter, it is worth while to study out the
reason ; for if there should again arise a great eastern power
of the sea. like that of Antony or of Turkey, the strategic
questions would be similar. At present, indeed, it seems that
the centre of sea power, resting mainly with England and
France, is overwhelmingly in the West; but should any
chance add to the control of the Black Sea basin, which Bus«
sia now has, the possession of the entrance to the Mediterra-
nean, the existing strategic conditions affecting sea power
would all be modified. Now, were the West arrayed against
the East, England and France would go at once unopposed to
the Levant, as they did in 1854, and as England alone went in
1878; in case of the change suggested, the East, as twice
before, would meet the West half-way.
At a very conspicuous and momentous period of the world's
history. Sea Power had a strategic bearing and weight which
1 The battle of Nararino (1827) between Turkey and the Wettem Powera
was fonght In this neighborhood.
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has received scant recognition. There cannot now be had
the full knowledge necessary for tracing in detail its influence
upon the issue of the second Punic War ; but the indications
which remain are sufficient to warrant the assertion that it
was a determining factor. An accurate judgment upon this
point cannot be formed by mastering only such facts of the
particular contest as have been clearly transmitted, for as
usual the naval transactions have been slightingly passed
over ; there is needed also familiarity with the details of gen-
eral naval history in order to draw, from slight indications,
correct inferences based upon a knowledge of what has been
possible at periods whose history is well known. The con-
trol of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's
single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port,
cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make
harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-
line, enter blockaded harbors. On the contrary, history has
shown that such evasions are always possible, to some ex-
tent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of
naval strength. It is not therefore inconsistent with the gen-
eral control of the sea, or of a decisive part of it, by the Roman
fleets, that the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar in .the fourth
year of the war, after the stunning defeat of Gannsd, landed
four thousand men and a body of elephants in south Italy ;
nor that in the seventh year, flying from the Roman fleet off
Syracuse, he again appeared at Tarentum, then in HannibaFs
hands ; nor that Hannibal sent despatch vessels to Carthage ;
nor even that, at last, he withdrew in safety to Africa with
his wasted army. None of these things prove that the govern-
ment in Carthage could, if it wished, have sent Hannibal
the constant support which, as a matter of fact, he did not
receive ; but they do tend to create a natural impression that
such help could have been given. Therefore the statement,
that the Roman preponderance at sea had a decisive effect
upon the course of the war, needs to be made good by an ex-
amination of ascertained facts. Thus the kind and degree of
its influence may be fairly estimated.
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At the beginning of the war, Mommsen says, Rome con«
trolled the seaa. To whatever cause, or combination of
causes, it be attributed, this essentially non-maritime state
had in the first Punic War established over its sea-faring
rival a naval supremacy, which still lasted. In the second war
there was no naval battle of importance, — a circumstance
which in itself, and still more in connection with otiier well-
ascertained facts, indicates a superiority analogous to that
which at other epochs has been marked by the same feature.
As Hannibal left no memoirs, the motives are unknown
which determined him to the perilous and almost ruinous
march through Gaul and across tlie Alps. It is certain, how-
ever, that his fleet on the coast of Spain was not strong
enough to contend with that of Rome. Had it been, he might
still have followed the road he actually did, for reasons that
weighed with him ; but had he gone by the sea, he would not
have lost thirty-three thousand out of the sixty thousand
veteran soldiers with whom he started.
While Hannibal was making this dangerous march, the
Romans were sending to Spain, under the two elder Scipios,
one part of their fleet, carrying a consular army. This made
the voyage without serious loss, and the army established
itself successfully north of the Ebro, on Hannibal's line of
communications. . At the same time another squadron, with
an army commanded by the other consul, was sent to Sicily.
The two together numbered two hundred and twenty ships.
On its station each met and defeated a Carthaginian squad-
ron with an ease which may be inferred from the slight
mention made of the actions, and which indicates the actual
superiority of the Roman fleet.
After the second year the war assumed the following
shape : Hannibal, having entered Italy by the north, after a
series of successes had passed southward around Rome and
fixed himself in southern Italy, living off the country, —
a condition which tended to alienate the people, and was es<-
pecially precarious when in contact with the mighty politi-
cal and military system of control which Rome had there
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established. It was therefore from the first urgently neces*
sary that he should establish, between himself and some
reliable base, that stream of supplies and reinforcements
which in terms of modem war is called communications."
There were three friendly regions which might, each or all,
serve as such a base, — Gai-thage itself, Macedonia, and Spain.
With the first two, communication could be had only by sea.
From Spain, where his firmest support was found, he could
be reached by both land and sea, unless an enemy barred the
passage ; but the sea route was the shorter and easier.
In the first years of the war, Rome, by her sea power, con-
trolled absolutely the basin between Italy, Sicily, and Spain,
known as the Tyrrhenian and Sardinian Seas. The sea-
coast from the Ebro to the Tiber was mostly friendly to her.
In the fourth year, after the battle of Gannaa, Syracuse for-
sook the Boman alliance, the revolt spread through Sicily, and
Macedonia also entered into an offensive league with Hannibal.
These Qhanges extended the necessary operations of the Ro-
man fleet, and taxed its strength. What disposition was made
of it, and how did it thereafter infiuence the struggle ?
The indications are clear that Rome at no time ceased to
control the Tyrrhenian Sea, for her squadrons passed un-
molested from Italy to Spain. On the Spanish coast also
she had full sway till the younger Scipio saw fit to lay up
the fleet. In the Adriatic, a squadron and naval station
were established at Brindisi to check Macedonia, which per-
formed their task so well that not a soldier of the phalanxes
ever set foot in Italy. ^^The want of a war fleet/' says
Mommsen, paralyzed Philip in all his movements." Here
the effect of Sea Power is not even a matter of inference.
In Sicily, the struggle centred about Syracuse. The fleets
of Oarthage and Rome met there, but the superiority evi-
dently lay with the latter ; for though the Carthaginians at
times succeeded in throwing supplies into the city, they
avoided meeting the Roman fleet in battle. With. Lilybsoum,
Palermo, and Messina in its hands, the latter was well based
in the north coast of the island. Access by the south was
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left open to the CarthaginianS) and thej were thus able to
maintain the insurrection.
Putting these facts together, it is a reasonable inference,
and supported by the whole tenor of the history, that the
Roman sea power controlled the sea north of a line drawn
from Tarragona in Spain to Lilyb»um (the modern Mar-
sala), at the west end of Sicily, thence round by the north
side of the island through the straits of Messina down to
Syracuse, and from there to Brindisi in the Adriatic. This
control lasted, unshaken, throughout the war. It did not
exclude maritime raids, large or small, such as have been
spoken of ; but it did forbid the sustained aud secure com-
munications of which Hannibal was in deadly need.
On the other hand, it seems equally plain that for the first
ten years of the war the Roman fleet was not strong enough
for sustained operations in the sea between Sicily and Car-
thage, nor indeed' much to the south of the line indicated.
When Haimibal started, he assigned such ships as he had to
maintaining the communications between Spain and Africa,
which the Romans did not then attempt to disturb.
Tlio Roman sea power, therefore, threw Macedouia wholly
out of the war. It did not keep Carthage from maintaining a
useful and most harassing diversion in Sicily ; but it did pre-
vent her sending troops, when they would have been most use-
ful, to her great general in Italy. How was it as to Spain ?
Spain was the region upon which the father of Hannibal
and Hannibal himself had based their intended invasion of
Italy. For eighteen years before this began they had occu-
pied the country, extending and consolidating their power,
both political and military, with rare sagacity. They had
raised, and trained in local wars, a large and now veteran
army. Upon his own depiarture, Hannibal intrusted the
government to his younger brother, Ha«drubal, who pre-
served toward him to the end a loyalty and devotion which
he had no reason to hope from the faction-cursed mother-city
in Africa.
At the time of his starting, the Carthaginian power in
%
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INTRODUCTORY.
Spain was secured from Cadiz to the river Ebro. The re-
gion between this river and the Pyrenees was inhabited by
tribes friendly to the Romans, but unable, in the absence
of the latter, to oppose a successful resistance to Hannibal.
He put them down, leaving eleven thousand soldiers under
Hanno to keep military possession of the country, lest the
Romans should establish themselves there, and thus disturb
his communications with his base.
Gna9us Scipio, however, arrived on the spot by sea the
same year with twenty thousand men, defeated Hanno, and
occupied both the coast and interior north of the Ebro. The
Romans thus held ground by which they entirely closed the
road between Hannibal and reinforcements from Hasdrubal,
and whence they could attack the Carthaginian power in
Spain ; while their own communications with Italy, being by
water, were secured by their naval supremacy. They made
a naval base at Tarragona, confronting that of Hasdrubal
at Cartagena, and then invaded the Carthaginian dominions.
The war in Spain went on under the elder Scipios, seem*
ingly a side issue, with varying fortune for seven years; at
the end of which time Hasdrubal inflicted upon them a
crushing defeat, the two brothers were killed, and the Car-
thaginians nearly succeeded in breaking through to the
Pyrenees with reinforcements for Hannibal. The attempt,
however, was checked for the moment ; and before it could
be renewed, the fall of Capua released twelve tliousand
veteran Romans, who were sent to Spain under Claudius
Noro, a man of exceptional ability, to whom was due later
the most decisive military movement made by any Roman
general during the Second Punic War. This seasonable
reinforcement, which again assured the shaken grip on
HasdrubaPs line of march, caine by sea, — a way which,
though most rapid and easy, was closed to the Carthaginians
by the Roman navy.
- Two years later the younger Publius Scipio, celebrated
afterward as Africanus, received the command in Spain, and
captured Cartagena by a combined military and naval attack ;
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19
after which he took the mo0t extraordinary stop of breaking
up his fleet and transferring the seamen to the army. Not
contented to act merely as the containing " ^ force against
Hasdrubal by closing the passes of the Pyrenees^ Scipio
pushed forward into southern Spain, and fought a severe
but indecisive battle on the Ouadalquivir ; after which
Hasdrubal slipped away from him, hurried north, crossed the
Pyrenees at their extreme west, and pressed on to Italy,
where Hannibal's position was daily growing weaker, the
natural waste of his army not being replaced.
The war had lasted ten years, when Hasdrubal, having met
little loss on the way, entered Italy at the north. The troops
he brought, could they be safely united with those under the
command of the unrivalled Hannibal, might give a decisive
turn to the war, for Rome herself was nearly exhausted ; the
iron links which bound her own colonies and the allied Stetes
to her were strained to the utmost, and some had already
snapped. But the military position of the two brothers was
also perilous in the extreme. One being at the river
Meteurus, the other in Apulia, two hundred miles apart, each
was confronted by a superior enemy, and both these Roman
armies were between their separated opponente. This false
situation, as well as the long delay of Hasdrubal's coming,
was due to the Roman control of the sea, which throughout
the war limited the mutual support of the Carthaginian
brothers to the route through Gaul. At the very time that
Hasdrubal was making his long and dangerous circuit by
land, Scipio had sent eleven thousand men from Spain by sea
to reinforce the army opposed to him. The upshot was that
messengers from Hasdrubal to Hannibal, having to pass over
so wide a belt of hostile country, fell into the hands of Clau-
dius Nero, commanding the southern Roman army, who thus
learned the route which Hasdrubal intended to teke. Nero
correctly appreciated the situation, and, escaping the vigilance
> A " containing " force is one to which, in a militarj combination, it awigned
the dntj of stopping, or delajing the adranoe of a portion of the enemy, while
the main eilort of the axmj or armies is being exerted in a different quarter.
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of Hannibal, made a rapid march with eight thousand of his
best troops to join t)ie forces in the north. The junction
being effectedi the two consuls fell upon Hasdrubal in over-
whelming numbers and destroyed his army ; the Carthaginian
leader himself falling in the battle. Hannibal's first news of
the disaster was by the head of his brother being thrown into
his camp. He is said to have exclaimed that Rome would
now be mistress of the world ; and the battle of Metaurus is
generally accepted as decisive of the struggle between the two
States.
The military situation which finally resulted in the battle
of the Metaurus and the triumph of Rome may be summed up
as follows : To overthrow Rome it was necessary to attack her
in Italy at the heart of her power, and shatter the strongly
linked confederacy of which she was the head. Tliis was the
objective. To reach it, the Carthaginians needed a solid base
of operations and a secure line of communications. The for-
mer was established in Spain by the genius of the great Barca
family ; the latter was never achieved. There were two lines
possible, — the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through
OauL The first was blocked by the Roman sea power, the
second imperilled and finally intercepted through the occupa-
tion of northern Spain by the Roman army. This occupation
was made possible through the control of the sea, which the
Carthaginians never endangered. With respect to Hannibal
and his base, therefore, Rome occupied two central positions,
Rome itself and northern Spain, joined by an easy interior
line of communications, the sea; by which mutual support
was continually given.
Had the Mediterranean been a level desert of land, in
which the Romans held strong mountain ranges in Corsica and
Sardinia, fortified posts at Tarragona, Lilybaeum, and Messina,
the Italian coast-line nearly to Genoa, and allied fortresses In
Marseilles and other points ; had they also possessed an armed
force capable by its character of traversing that desert at will,
but in which their opponents were very inferior and therefore
compelled to a great circuit in order to concentrate their
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21
troops, the military situation would have been at once recog-
nized, and no words would have been too strong to express
the value and effect of that peculiar force. It would have
been perceived, also, that the enemy's force of the same
kind might, however inferior in strength, make an inroad,
or raid, upon the territory thus held, might burn a village
or waste a few miles of borderland, might even cut off a
convoy at times, without, in a military sense, endangering
the communications. Such predatory operations have been
carried on in all ages by the weaker maritime belligerent, but
they by no means warrant the inference, irreconcilable with ^
the known facts, that neither Rome nor Carthage could be
said to have undisputed mastery of the sea," because Roman
fleets sometimes visited the coasts of Africa, and Carthaginian
fleets in the same way appeared off the coast of Italy." In
the case under consideration, the navy played the part of such
a force upon the supposed desert; but as it acts on an
element strange to most writers, as its members have been
from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets
of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood,
its immense determining influence upon the history of that *
era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has
been overlooked. If the preceding argument is sound, it is
as defective to omit sea power from the list of principal
factors in the result, as it would be absurd to claim for it an
exclusive influence.
Instances such as have been cited, drawn from widely
separated periods of time, both before and after that specially
treated in this work, serve to illustrate the intrinsic interest
of the subject, and the character of the lessons which history
has to teach. As before observed, these come more often
under the head of strategy than of tactics ; they bear rather
upon the conduct of campaigns than of battles, and hence are
fraught with more lasting value. To quote a great authority
in this connection, Jomini says: ^'Happening to be in Paris
near the end of 1861, a distinguished person did me the honor
to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire-
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INTRODUCTORY.
akrms would cause any great modifications in the way of mak-
ing war. I replied that they would probably have an influence
upon the details of tactics, but that in great strategic operations
and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as
ever, result from the application of the principles which had
led to the success of great generals in all ages ; of Alexander
and Cadsar, as well as of Frederick and Napoleon." This study
has become more than ever important now to navies, because of
the great and steady power of movement possessed by the mod-
ern steamer. Tlie best-planned schemes might fail through
stress of weather in the days of the galley and the sailing-ship;
but this difficulty has almost disappeared. The principles which
should direct great naval combinations have been applicable to
all ages, and are deducible from history ; but the power to carry
them out with little regard to the weather is a recent gain.
The definitions usually given of the word strategy " con-
fine it to military combinations embracing one or more fields
of operations, either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but
always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of war. How*
ever this may be on shore, a recent French author is quite
right in pointing out that such a definition is too narrow for
naval strategy. ^^This," he says, differs from military
strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. Indeed,
in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying
in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions
which would perhaps hardly be got by war. It learns to
profit by all opportunities of settling on some chosen point of
a coast, and to render definitive an occupation which at first
was only transient." A generation that has seen England
within ten years occupy successively Cyprus and Egypt, under
terms and conditions on their face transient, but which have
not yet led to the abandonment of the positions taken, can
readily agree with this remark; which indeed receives con-
stant illustration from the quiet persistency with which all
the great sea powers are seeking position after position, less
noted and less noteworthy than Cyprus and Egypt, in the
different seas to which their people and their ships penetrate.
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Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and
increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a
country ; " and therefore its study has an interest and value
for all citizens of a free country, but especially for those who
are charged with its foreign and military relations.
The general conditions that either are essential to or
powerfully affect the greatness of a nation upon the sea will
now be examined ; after which a more particular considera-
tion of the various maritime nations of Europe at the middlo
of the seventeenth century, where the historical survey begins,
will serve at once to illustrate and give precision to the
conclusions upon the general subject.
Note. — The brilliancy of Nelson's fame, dimming as it does that of all
his contemporaries, and the implicit trust felt by England in him as the one
man able to save her from the schemes of Napoleon, should not of course
obscure the fact that only one portion of the field was, or could be, oc-
cupied by him. Napoleon's aim, in the campaign which ended at Trafal-
gar, was to unite in the West Indies the French fleets of Brest, Toulon, and
Rochefort, together with a strong body of Spanish ships, thus forming an
overwhelming force which he intended should return together to the English
Channel and cover the crossing of the French army. lie naturally ex*
pected that, with England's interests scattered all over the world, confusion
and distraction would arise from ignorance of the destination of the French
squadrons, and the English navy be drawn away from his objective point.
The portion of the field committed to Nelson was the Mediterranean, where
he watched the great arsenal of Toulon and the highways alike to the East
and to the Atlantic. This was inferior in consequence to no other, and as-
sumed additional importance in the eyes of Nelson from his conviction that
the former attempts on Egypt would be renewed. Owing to this persuasion
he took at first a false step, which delayed his pursuit of the Toulon fleet
when it sailed under the command of Villeneuve ; and the latter was further
favored by a long continuance of fair winds, while the English had head
winds. But while all this is true, while the failure of Napoleon's comUnations
must be attributed to the tenacious grip of the English blockade off Brest, as
well as to Nelson's energetic pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it escaped to
the West Indies and again on its hasty return to Europe, the latter is fairly
entitled to the eminent distinction which history has accorded it, and which
is asserted in the text Nelson did not, indeed, fathom the intentions of
Napoleon. This may have been owing, as some have said, to lack of insight;
but it may be more simply laid to the usual disadvantage under which the
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defence lies before the blow has fallen, of ignorance as to the point threat,
ened by the offence. It is insight enough to fasten on the key of a situation ;
and this Nelson rightly saw was the fleet, not the station. Consequently,
his action has afforded a striking instance of how tenacity of purpose and
untiring energy in execution can repair a first mistake and baffle deeply
laid plans. Ills Mediterranean command embraced many duties and cares *,
but amid and dominating them all, he saw clearly the Toulon fleet as the
controlling factor there, and an important factor in any naval combination
of the Emperor. Hence his attention was unwaYcringly fixed upon it ; so
much so that he called it ^ his fleet," a phrase which has somewhat vexed
the sensibilities of French critic^ This simple and accurate view of the
military situation strengthened him in taking the fearless resolution and
bearing the immense responsibility of abandoning his station in order to
follow « his fleet" Determined thus on a pursuit the undeniable wisdom
of which should not obscure the greatness of mind that undertook it, he
followed so vigorously as to reach Cadiz on his return a week before
Villeneuve entered Ferrol, despite unavoidable delays arising from false in>
formation and uncertainty as to the enemy's movements. The same untir-
ing ardor enabled him to bring up his own ships from Cadiz to Brest in
time to make the fleet there superior to Villeneuve's, had the latter persisted
in his attempt to reach the neighborhood. The English, very inferior in
aggregate number of vessels to the allied fleets, were by this seasonable re-
inforcement of eight veteran ships put into the best possible position strate-
gically, as will be pointed out in dealing with similar conditions in the war
of the American lievolution. Their forces were united in one great fleet in
the Bay of Biscay, interposed between the two divisions of the enemy in
Brest and Ferrol, superior in number to either singly, an<l with a strong
probability of being able to deal with one before the other could come up.
This was due to able action all round on the part of the English authori-
ties ; but above all other factors in the result stands Nelson's single-minded
pursuit of "his fleet."
This interesting series of strategic movements ended on the 14th of
August, when Villeneuve, in despair of reaching Brest, headed for Cadiz,
where he anchored on the 20th. As soon as Napoleon heard of this, after
an outburst of rage against the admiral, he at once dictated the series of
movements which resulted in Ulm and Austcrlitz, abandoning his purposes
against England. The battle of Trafalgar, fought October 21, was there-
fore separated by a space of two months from the extensive movements of
which it was nevertheless the outcome. Isolated from them in point of
time, it was none the less the seal of Nelson's genius, afiixed later to the
record he had made in the near past With equal truth it is said that
England was saved at Trafalgar, though the Emperor had then given up
his intended invasion ; the destruction there emphasized and sealed the
strategic triumph which had noiselessly foiled Napoleon's plans.
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CHAPTER !•
Discussion of the Elbmbnts of Sba Powbb.
'HE first and most obvious light in which the sea presents
itself from the political and social point of view is that
of a great highway ; or better, perhaps, of a wide common,
over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some
well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them
to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These
lines of travel are called trade routes ; and the reasons which
have determined them are to be sought in the history of the
world.
Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers
of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been
easier and cheaper than by land. The commercial greatness
of Holland was due not only to her shipping at sea, but also
to the numerous tranquil water-ways which gave such cheap
and easy access to her own interior and to that of Germany.
This advantage of carriage by water over that by land was
yet more marked in a period wlien roads were few and very
bad, wars frequent and society unsettled, as was the case two
hundred years ago. Sea traffic then went in peril of robbers,
but was nevertlieless safer and quicker than that by land. A
Dutch writer of that time, estimating the chances of his coun-
try in a war with England, notices among other things that
the water-ways of England failed to penetrate the country suf-
ficiently ; therefore, the roads being bad, goods from one part
of the kingdom to the other must go by sea, and be exposed
to capture by the way. As regards purely internal trade^ this
danger has generally disappeared at the present day. In most
civilized countries, now, the destruction or disappearance of
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DISCUSSION OF THE
the coasting trade would only be an inconvenience, although
water transit is still the cheaper. Nevertheless, as late as tlie
wars of the French Republic and the First Empire, those who
are familiar with the history of tlie period, and the light naval
literature that has grown up around it, know bow constant is
the mention of convoys stesJing from point to point along the
French coast, although the sea swarmed with English cruisers
and there were good inland roads.
Under modern conditions, however, home trade is but a
part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. For-
eign necessaries or luxuries must be brought to its ports,
either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return,
bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether
they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men's hands ;
and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business
sliould be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus sail
to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and
must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their
country throughout the voyage.
This protection in time of war must be extended by armed
shipping. The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of
the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful
shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation
which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely
as a branch of the military establishment. As the United
States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its mer-
/ chant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed
fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical con-
sequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to
pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel
the revival of the war fleet. It is possible that when a canal
route through the Central-American Isthmus is seen to be a
near certainty, the aggressive impulse may be strong enough
to lead to the same result. This is doubtful, however, be-
cause a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and
far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparatioui
especially in these days.
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
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Asa nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launcheR
forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon
which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and
supplies. In the pi*esent day friendly, though foreign, ports
are to be found all over the world ; and their shelter is enough
while peace prevails. It was not always so, nor does peace
alwayii endure, though the United States have been favored
by so long a continuance of it. In earlier times the merchant
seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions,
made his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or
hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full
and profitable freight. He therefore mtuitively sought at the
far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to
him by force or favor^ where he could fix himself or his agents
in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and
where the merchantable products of the land could be con-
tinually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which
should carry them to the mother-country. As there was im-
mense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such
establishments naturally multiplied and grew tititil they became
colonies ; whose ultimate development and success depended
upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they
sprang, and form a very great part of the history, and particu-
larly of the sea history, of the world. All colonies had not
the simple and natural birth and growth above described.
Many were more formal, and purely political, in their concep-
tion and founding, the act of the rulers of the people rather
than of private individuals ; but the trading-station with its
after expansion, the work simply of the adventurer seeking
gain, was in its reasons and essence the same as the elabo-
rately organized and chartered colony. In both cases the
mother-country had won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking
a new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its ship-
ping, more employment for its people, more comfort and
wealth for itself.
The needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for
when safety had been secured at the far end of the road.
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The voyages were long and dangerous, the seas often beset with
enemies. In the most active days of colonizing there prevailed
on the sea a lawlessness the very memory of which is now
almost lost, and the days of settled peace between maritime
nations were few and far between. Thus arose the demand
for stations along the road, like the Gape of Good Hope, St.
Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defence
and war ; the demand for the possession of posts like Gibral-
tar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Law-
rence, — posts whose value was chiefly strategic, though not
necessarily wholly so. Colonies and colonial posts were
sometimes commercial, sometimes military in their character;
and it was exceptional that the same position was equally
important in both points of view, as New York was.
In these three things — production, with the necessity of ex-
changing products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried
on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations
of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of
safety — is to be found the key to much of the history, as well
as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea. The policy
has varied both with the spirit of the age and with the char-
acter and clear-sightedness of the rulers ; but the history of
the seaboard nations has been less determined by the shrewd-
ness and foresight of governments than by conditions of posi-
tion, extent, configuration, number and character of their
people, — by what are called, in a word, natural conditions. It
must however be admitted, and will be seen, that the wise or
unwise action of individual men has at certain periods had a
great modifying influence upon the growth of sea power in
the broad sense, which includes not only the military strength
afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms,
but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which
alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and
on which it securely rests.
The principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations
may be enumerated as follows : I. Geographical Position,
n. Physical Oonformation, including, as connected therewith,
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
iiakiral prodnotions and climate. III. Extent of Territory,
ly. Number of Population. V. Character of the People.
VI. Character of the Government, including therein the
national institutions.
I. OeograpMeal Pontion. — It may be pointed out, in the
first place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither
forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension
of its territory by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of
its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared with
a people one of whose boundaries is continental. This has
been a great advantage to England over both France and
Holland as a sea power. The strength of the latter was early
exhausted by the necessity t)f keeping up a large army and
carrying on expensive wars to preserve her independence;
while the policy of France was constantly diverted, sometimes
wisely and sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects
of continental extension. These military efforts expended
wealth ; whereas a wiser and consistent use of her geographical
position would have added to it.
The geograpliical position may be such as of itself to pro-
mote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the
naval forces. Here again the British Islands have an advan-
tage over France. The position of the latter, touching the
Mediterranean as well as the ocean, while it has its advan-
tages, is on the whole a source of military weakness at sea.
The eastern and western French fleets have only been able to
unite after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, in at-
tempting whioh they have often risked and sometimes suffered
loss. The position of the United States upon the two oceans
would be eittier a source of great weakness or a cause of enor-
mous expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts.
England, by her immense colonial empire, has sacrificed
much of this advantage of concentration of force around her
own shores ; but the sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain
was greater than the loss, as the event proved. With the
growth of her colonial system her war fleets also grew, but
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ber merchant shipping and wealth grew yet faster. Still, in
the wars of the American Revolution, and of the French Re-
public and Empire, to use the strong expression of a French
author, England, despite the immense development of her
navy, seemed ever, in the midst of riches, to feel all the em-
barrassment of poverty." The might of England was suffi-
cient to keep alive the heart and the members ; whereas
the equally extensive colonial empire of Spain, through her
maritime weakness, but offered so many points for insult and
injury.
The geographical position of a country may not only favor
the concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic
advantage of a central position and a good base for hostile
operations against its probable enemies. This again is the
case with England ; on the one hand she faces Holland and
the northern powers, on the other France and the Atlantic.
When threatened with a coalition between France and the
naval powers of the North Sea and the Baltic, as she at times
was, her fleets in the Downs and in the Channel, and even
that off Brest, occupied interior positions, and thus were
readily able to interpose their united force against either one
of the enemies which should seek to pass through the Channel
to effect a junction with its ally. On either side, also. Nature
gave her better ports and a safer coast to approach. Formerly
this was a very serious element in the passage through the
Channel ; but of late, steam and the improvement of her har-
bors have lessened the disadvantage under which France
once labored. In the days of sailing-ships, the English fleet
operated against Brest making its base at Torbay and Ply-
mouth. The plan was simply this : in easterly or moderate
weather the blockading fleet kept its position without diffi-
culty ; but in westerly gales, when too severe, they bore up
for English ports, knowing that the French fleet could not
get out till the wind shifted, which equally served to bring
them back to their station.
The advantage of geographical nearness to an enemy, or to
the object of attack, is nowhere more apparent than in that
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
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form of warfare which has lately received the name of com-
merce-destroying, which tlie French call guerre de course.
This operation of war, being directed against peaceful mer-
chant vessels which are usually defenceless, calls for ships
of small military force. Such ships, having little power to
defend themselves, need a refuge or point of support near
at hand ; which will be found either in certain parts of the
sea controlled by the fighting ships of their country, or in
friendly harbors. The latter give the strongest support,
because they are always in the same place, and the approaches
to them arc more familiar to the commerce-destroyer than to
his enemy. The nearness of France to England has thus
greatly facilitated her guerre de eaurse directed against the
latter. Having ports on the North Sea, on the Channel, and
on the Atlantic, her cruisers started from points near the
focus of English trade, both coming and going. The distance
of these ports from each other, disadvantageous for regular
military combinations, is an advantage for this irregular
secondary operation ; for the essence of the one is concentra-
tion of effort, whereas for commerce-destroying diffusion of
effort is the rule. Commerce-destroyers scatter, that they
may see and seize more prey. These truths receive illustra-
tion from the history of the great French privateers, whose
bases and scenes of action were largely on the Channel and
North Sea, or else were found in distant colonial regions,
where islands like Guadaloupe and Martinique afforded simi-
lar near refuge. The necessity of renewing coal makes tlie
cruiser of the present day even more dependent than of old
on his port. Public opinion in the United States has great
faith in war directed against an enemy's commerce ; but it
must be remembered that the Republic has no ports very near
the great centres of trade abroad. Her geographical position
is therefore singularly disadvantageous for carrying on suc-
cessful commerce-destroying, unless she find bases in the
ports of an ally.
If, in addition to facility for offence. Nature has so placed a
country that it has easy access to the high sea itself, while at
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DISCUSSION OF THE
the same time it controls one of the great thoroughfares of
the world's traffic, it is evident that the strategic yalue of its
position is very high. Such again is, and to a greater degree
was, the position of England. The trade of Holland, Sweden,
Bussia, Denmark, and that which went up the great rivers to
the interior of Germany, had to pass through the Channel
close by her doors ; for sailing-ships hugged the English coast.
This northern trade had, moreover, a peculiar bearing upon
sea power ; for naval stores, as they are commonly called, were
mainly drawn from the Baltic countries.
But for the loss of Gibraltar, the position of Spain would
have been closely analogous to that of England. Looking at
once upon the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with Cadiz on
the one side and Cartagena on the other, the trade to the
Levant must have passed under her hands, and that round the
Cape of Good Hope not far from her doors. But Gibraltar
not only deprived her of the control of the Straits, it also
imposed an obstacle to the easy junction of the two divisions
of her fleet.
At the present day, looking only at the geographical posi-
tion of Italy, and not at the other conditions affecting her sea
power, it would seem that with her extensive sea-coast and
good ports she is very well placed for exerting a decisive
influence on the trade route to the Levant and by the Isthmus
of Suez. This is true in a degree, and would be much more
so did Italy now hold all the islands naturally Italian ; but
with Malta in the hands of England, and Corsica in those of
France, the advantages of her geographical position are largely
neutralized. From race affinities and situation those two
islands are as legitimately objects of desire to Italy as Gibral-
tar is to Spain. If the Adriatic were a great highway of com-
merce, Italy's position would be still more influential. Tlieso
defects in her geographical completeness, combined with
other causes injurious to a full and secure development of
sea power, make it more than doubtful whether Italy can for
some time be in the front rank among the sea nations.
As the aim here is not an exhaustive discussion, but merely
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
an attempt to show, by illustration, bow vitally the situation
of a country may affect its career upon tbe sea, this division
of the subject may be dismissed for the present ; the more so
as instances which will further bring out its importance will
continually recur in the historical treatment. Two remarks^
however, are here appropriate.
Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play
a greater part in the history of the world, both in a com-
mercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of
water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to
control it, and the strife still goes on. Therefore a study of
the conditions upon which preponderance in its waters has
rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values of
different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than
the same amount of effort expended in another field. Fur-
thermore, it has at the present time a very marked analogy in
many respects to the Caribbean Sea, — an analogy which will
be still closer if a Panama canal-route ever be completed. A
study of the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, which
have received ample illustration, will be an excellent prelude
to a similar study of the Caribbean, which has comparatively
little history.
The second remark bears upon the geographical position
of the United States relatively to a Central- American canal*
If one be made, and fulfil the hopes of its builders, the Carib*
bean will be changed from a terminus, and place of local
traffic, or at best a broken and imperfect line of travel, as it
now is, into one of the great highways of the world. Along
this path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interests
of the other great nations, the European nations, close albng
our shores, as they have never been before. With this it will y
not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international
complications. The position of the United States with refer-
ence to this route will resemble that of England to the Chan-
nel, and of the Mediterranean countries to the Suez route. As
regards influence and control over it, depending upon geograph-
ical position, it is of course plain that the centre of the national
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power, the permanent base,^ is much nearer than that of other
great nations. Tiie positions now or hereafter occupied by
them on island or mainland, however strong, will be but out-
posts of their power ; while in all tlie raw materials of mili-
tary strength no nation is superior to the United States. She
is, however, weak in a confessed unpreparedness for war ; and
her geographical nearness to the point of contention loses
some of its value hj the character of the Gulf coast, which is
deficient in ports combining security from an enemy with
facility for repairing war-ships of the first class, without which
ships no country can pretend to control any part of the sea.
In case of a contest for supremacy in the Caribbean, it seems
evident from the depth of the South Pass of the Mississippi,
the nearness of New Orleans, and the advantages of the Mis-
sissippi Valley for water transit, that the main effort of the
country must pour down that valley, and its permanent base
of operations be found there. The defence of the entrance to
the Mississippi, however, presents peculiar difficulties ; while
the only two rival ports. Key West and Pensacola, have too
little depth of water, and are much less advantageously placed
with reference to the resources of the country. To get the
full benefit of superior geographical position, these defects
must be overcome. Furthermore, as her distance from the
Isthmus, though relatively less, is still considerable, the
United States will have to obtain in the Caribbean stations
fit for contingent, or secondary, bases of operations ; which
by their natural advantages, susceptibility of defence, and
nearness to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets
to remain as near the scene as any opponent. With ingress
and egress from the Mississippi sufiiciently protected, with
such outposts in her hands, and with the communications
between them and the home base secured, in short, with
proper military preparation, for which she has all necessary
means, the preponderance of the United States on this field
1 By a bue of permaneDt operations " ia nndentood a conntry whence come
all the resources, where are united the great Unea of commouication by land and
water, where are the onenals and armed posta."
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
follows, from her geographical position and her power, withy
mathematical certainty.
II. Phyncal Ccf^ormation. — The peculiar features of the
Qulf coast, just alluded to, come properly under the head of
Physical Conformation of a country, which is placed second
for discussion among the conditions which affect the develop-
ment of sea power.
The seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers ; and the
easier the access offered by the frontier to the region beyond,
in this case the sea, the greater will be the tendency of a
people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by it.
If a country be imagined having a long seaboard, but entirely
without a harbor, such a country can have no sea trade of its
own, no shipping, no navy. This was practically the case
with Belgium when it was a Spanish and an Austrian province.
The Dutch, in 1648, as a condition of peace after a successful
war, exacted that the Scheldt should be closed to sea com-
merce. This closed the harbor of Antwerp and transferred
the sea trade of Belgium to Holland. The Spanish Nether-
lands ceased to be a sea power.
Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and
wealth, and doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable
streams, which facilitate the concentration in them of a coun-
try's internal trade ; but by their very accessibility they be-
come a source of weal^ness in war, if not properly defended.
The Dutch in 1667 found little difficulty in ascending the
Thames and burning a large fraction of the English navy
within sight of London ; whereas a few years later the com*
bined fleets of England and France, when attempting a land-
ing in Holland, were foiled by the difficulties of the coast as
much as by the valor of the Dutch fleet In 1778 the harbor
of New York, and with it undisputed control of the Hudson
River, would have been lost to the English, who were caught
at disadvantage, but for the hesitancy of the French admiral.
With that control. New England would have been restored to
close and safe communication with New York,* New Jersey,
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DISCUSSION OF THE
and Pennsylvania; and this blow, following so closely on
Burgoyne's disaster of the year before, would probably have
led the English to make an earlier peace. The Mississippi is
a mighty source of wealth and strength to the United States ;
but the feeble defences of its mouth and the number of its
subsidiary streams penetrating the country made it a weak-
ness and source of disaster to the Southern Confederacy.
And lastly, in 1814, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the
destruction of Washington gave a sharp lesson of the dangers
incurred through the noblest water-ways, if their approaches be
undefended ; a lesson recent enough to be easily recalled, but
which, from the present appearance of tlie coast defences,
seems to be yet more easily forgotten. Nor should it be
thought that conditions have changed ; circumstances and de-
tails of offence and defence have been modified, in these days
as before, but the great conditions remain the same.
Before and during the great Napoleonic wars, France had
no port for ships-of-the-line east of Brest. How great the
adyantage to England, which in the same stretch has two
great arsenals, at Plymouth and at Portsmouth, besides other
harbors of refuge and supply. This defect of conformation
has since been remedied by the works at Cherbourg.
Besides the contour of the coast, involving easy access to
the sea, there are other physical conditions which lead people
to the sea or turn them from it. Although France was
deficient in military ports on the Channel, she had both there
and on the ocean, as well as in the Mediterranean, excellent
harbors, favorably situated for trade abroad, and at the
outlet of large rivers, which would foster internal trafiic. But
when Richelieu had put an end to civil war, Frenchmen did
not take to the sea with the eagerness and success of the
English and Dutch. A principal reason for this has been
plausibly found in the physical conditions which have made
France a pleasant land, with a delightful climate, producing
within itself more than its people needed. England, on the
other hand, received from Nature but little, and, until her
manufactures were developed, had little to export. Their
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
many wants, combined with their restless activity and other
conditions that favored maritime enterprise, led her people
abroad ; and they there found lands more pleasant and richer
than their own. Their needs and genius made them merchants
and colonists, then manufacturers and producers ; and between
products and colonies shipping is the inevitable link. So their
sea power grew. But if England was drawn to the sea, Hol-
land was driven to it ; without the sea England languished,
but Holland died. In the height of her greatness, when she
was one of the chief factors in European politics, a competent
native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not
support more than one eighth of her inhabitants. The manu-
factures of the country were then numerous and important,
but they had been much later in their growth than tiie ship-
ping interest. The poverty of the soil and the exposed nature
of the coast drove the Dutch first to fishing. Then the dis-
covery of the process of curing the fish gave them material
for export as well as home consumption, and so laid the
corner-stone of their wealth. Thus they had become traders
at the time that the Italian republics, under the pressure of
Turkish power and the discovery of the passage round the
Cape of Good Hope, were beginning to decline, and thoy fell
heirs to the great Italian trade of the Levant Further
favored by their geographical position, intermediate between
the Baltic, France, and the Mediterranean, and at the mouth
of the German rivers, they quickly absorbed nearly all the
carrying-trade of Europe. The wheat and naval stores of the
Baltic, the trade of Spain with her colonies in the New World,
the wines of Franco, and the French coasting-trade were, little
more than two hundred years ago, transported in Dutch
shipping. Much of the carrying-trade of England, even, was
then done in Dutch bottoms. It will not be pretended that
all tliis prosperity proceeded only from the poverty of Hol-
land's natural resources. Sometliing does not grow from
nothing. What is true, is, that by the necessitous condition
of her people they were driven to the sea, and were, from
their mastery of the shipping business and the size of their
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DISCUSSION OF THE
fleets, in a poBition to profit hy the sudden expansion of com-
merce and the spirit of exploration which followed on the dis-
covery of America and of the passage round the Cape. Other
causes concurredi but their whole prosperity stood on the
sea power to which their poverty gave birth. Their food,
their clothing, the raw material for their manufactures, the
very timber and hemp with which they built and rigged their
ships (and they built nearly as many as all Europe besides),
were imported; and when a disastrous war with England
in 1658 and 1654 had lasted eighteen months, and their
shipping business was stopped, it is said ^'the sources of
revenue which had always maintained the riches of the State,
such as fisheries and commerce, were almost dry. Work-
shops were closed, work was suspended. The Zuyder Zee
became a forest of masts ; the country was full of beggars ;
grass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred
houses were untenanted." A humiliating peace alone saved
them from ruin.
This sorrowful result shows the weakness of a country de-
pending wholly upon sources external to itself for the part
it is playing in the world. With large deductions, owing to
differences of conditions which need not here be spoken of,
the case of Holland then has strong points of resemblance
to that of Great Britain now; and tliey are true prophets,
though they seem to be having small honor in their own
country, who warn her that the continuance of her prosperity
at home depends primarily upon maintaining her power
abroad. Men may be discontented at the lack of political
privilege ; they will be yet more uneasy if they come to lack
bread. It is of more interest to Americans to note that the
result to France, regarded as a power of the sea, caused by
the extent, delightfulness, and richness of the land, has been
reproduced in the United States. In the beginning, their
forefathers held a narrow strip of land upon the sea, fertile
in parts though little developed, abounding in harbors and
near rich fishing-grounds. These physical conditions com-
bined with an inborn love of the sea, the pulse of that English
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
blood which still beat in their yeins, to keep alive all those
tendencies and pursuits upon which a healthy sea power
depends. Almost every one of the original colonies was on
the sea or on one of its great tributaries. All export and
import tended toward one coast. Interest in the sea and
an intelligent appreciation of the part it played in the public
welfare were easily and widely spread ; and a motive more
influential than care for the public interest was also active,
for the abundance of ship-building materials and a relative
fewness of other investments made shipping a profitable
private interest How changed the present condition is, all
know. The centre of power is no longer on the seaboard*
Books and newspapers vie with one anotiier in describing the •
wonderful growth, and the still undeveloped riches, of the
interior. Oapital there finds its best investments, labor its
largest opportunities. The frontiera are neglected and politi-
cally weak ; the Qulf and Pacific coasts actually so, the At- ^
lantic coast relatively to the central Mississippi Valley. When
the day comes that shipping again pays, when the three sea
frontiers find that they are not only militarily weak, but
poorer for lack of national shipping, their united efforts may
avail to lay again the foundations of our sea power. Till
then, those who follow the limitations which lack of sea
power placed upon the career of France may mourn that
their own country is being led^ by a like redundancy of home
wealth, into the same neglect of that great instrument.
Among modifying physical conditions may be noted a form
like that of Italy, — a long peninsula, with a central range of
mountains dividing it into two narrow strips, along which the
roads connecting the different ports necessarily run. Only
an absolute control of the sea can wholly secure such commu^
nications, since it is impossible to know at what point an
enemy coming from beyond the visible horizon may strike \
but still, with an adequate naval force centrally posted, there
will be good hope of attacking his fleet, which is at once his
base and line of communications, before serious damage has
been done. The long, narrow peninsula of .Florida, with Key
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DISCUSSION OF THE
West at its extremity, though flat and thinly populated, pre-
sents at first sight conditions like those of Italy. The resem-
blance may be only superficial, but it seems probable that if
the chief scene of a naval war were the Qulf of Mexico, the
communications by land to the end of the peninsula might
be a matter of consequence, and open to attack.
When the sea not only borders, or surrounds, but also separ
rates a country into two or more parts, the control of it
becomes not only desirable, but vitally necessary. Such a
physical condition either gives birth and strength to sea
power, or makes the country powerless. Such is the condi-
tion of the present kingdom of Italy, with its islands of Sar-
dinia and Sicily ; and hence in its youth and still existing
financial weakness it is seen to put forth such vigorous and
intelligent efforts to create a military navy. It has even been
argued that, with a navy decidedly superior to her enemy's,
Italy could better base her power upon her islands tlian
upon her mainland ; for the insecurity of the linos of commu-
nication in the peninsula, already pointed out, would most
seriously embarrass an invading army surroimded by a hostile
people and threatened from the sea.
The Irish Sea, separating the British Islands, rather resem-
bles an estuary than an actual division ; but history has shown
the danger from it to the United Kingdom. In the days of
Louis XIV., when the French navy nearly equalled the com-
bined English and Dutch, the gravest complications existed
in Ireland, which passed almost wholly under the control of
the natives and the French. Nevertheless, the Irish Sea was
rather a danger to the English — a weak point in their com-
munications — than an advantage to the French. The latter
did not venture their ships-of-the-line in its narrow waters,
and expeditions intending to land wore directed upon the
ocean ports in the south and west. At the supreme moment
the great French fleet was sent upon the south coast of Eng-
land, where it decisively defeated the allies, and at the same
time twenty-five frigates were sent to St. George's Channel,
against the English communications. In the midst of a hos-
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tile people, Uie English army in Ireland was Beriously imper-
illed, bat was saved by the battle of the Boyne and Uie flight
of James II. This movement against the enemy's communi-
cations was strictly strategic, and would be just as dangerous
to England now as in 1690.
Spain, in the same century, afforded an impressive lesson of
tiie weakness caused by such separation when the parts are not
knit together by a strong sea power. She then still retained,
as remnants of her past greatness, the Netherlands (now
Belgium), Sicily, and other Italian possessions, not to speak
of her vast colonies in the New World. Yet so low had the
Spanish sea power fallen, that a well-informed and sober-
minded Hollander of the day could claim that " in Spain all
the coast is navigated by a few Dutch ships ; and since the
peace of 1648 their ships and seamen are so few that they
have publicly begun to hire our ships to sail to the Indies,
whereas they were formerly careful to exclude all foreigners
from there. ... It is manifest," he goes on, that the West
Indies, being as the stomach to Spain (for from it nearly all
the revenue is drawn), must be joined to the Spanish head by
a sea force ; and that Naples and the Netherlands, being like
two arms, they cannot lay out their strength for Spain, nor
receive anything thence but by shipping, — all which may
easily be done by our shipping in peace, and by it obstructed
in war." Half a century before. Sully, the great minister of
Henry IV., had characterized Spain as one of those States
whose logs and arms are strong and powerful, but the heart
inrmitoly weak and feeble." Since his day the Spanish navy
had suffered not only disaster, but annihilation ; not only
humiliation, but degradation. The consequences briefly were
that shipping was destroyed ; manufactures perished with it.
The government depended for its support, not upon a wide-
spread healthy commerce and industry that could survive
many a staggering blow, but upon a narrow stream of silver
trickling through a few treasure-ships from America, easily
and frequently intercepted by an enemy's cruisers. The' loss
of half a dozen galleons more than once paralyzed its move*
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DISCUSSION OF THE
menta for a year. While the war in the Netherlands lasted,
the Dutch control of the sea forced Spain to send her troops
by a long and costly journey oyerlaud instead of by sea ; and
the same cause reduced her to such straits for necessaries
that, by a mutual arrangement which seems very odd to mod-
ern ideas, her wants were supplied by Dutch ships, which
thus maintained the enemies of their country, but received
in return specie which was welcome in the Amsterdam ex-
change. In America, the Spanish protected themselves as
best they might behind masonry, unaided from home ; while
in the Mediterranean they escaped insult and injury mainly
through the indifference of the Dutch, for the French and
English had not yet begun to contend for mastery there. In
the course of history the Netherlands, Naples, Sicily, Minorca,
Havana, Manila, and Jamaica were wrenched away, at one
time or another, from this empire without a shipping. In
short, while Spain's maritime impotence may have been pri-
marily a symptom of her general decay, it became a marked
factor in precipitating her into the abyss from which she has
not yet wholly emerged.
Except Alaska, the- United States has no outlying posses-
sion,— no foot of ground inaccessible by land. Its contour is
such as to present few points specially weak from their sa-
liency, and all important parts of the frontiers can be readily
attained, — cheaply by water, rapidly by rail. The weakest
frontier, the Pacific, is far removed from the most dangerous
of possible enemies. The internal resources are boundless as
compared with present needs ; we can live off ourselves indefi-
nitely in our little corner," to use the expression of a French
officer to the author. Yet should that little corner be invaded
by a new commercial route through the Isthmus, the United
States in her turn may have the rude awakening of those who
have abandoned their share in the common birthright of all
people, the sea.
III. JExtent of Territory. — The last of the conditions
affecting the development of a nation as a sea power, and
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touching the country itself as distinguished from the people
who dwell there, is Extent of Territory. This may be dismissed
with comparatively few words.
As regards the development of sea power, it is not the total
number of square miles which a country contains, but the
length of its coleist-line and the character of its harbors that
are to be considered. As to these it is to be said that, the
geographical and pliysical conditions being the same, extent
of searcoast is a source of strength or weakness according as
the population is large or small. A country is in this like a
fortress; the garrison must be proportioned to the enceinte.
A recent familiar instance is found in the American War of
Secession. Had the South had a people as numerous as it
was warlike, and a navy commensurate to its other resources
as a sea power, the great extent of its sea-coast and its nu-
merous inlets would have been elements of great strength.
The people of the United States and the Government of that
day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness of the block-
ade of the whole Southern coast. It was a great feat, a very
great feat ; but it would have been an impossible feat had the
Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen.
What was tliere shown was not, as has been said, how such
a blockade can be maintained, but that such a blockade is
possible in the face of a population not only unused to the
sea, but also scanty in numbers. Those who recall how the
blockade was maintained, and the class of ships that block-
aded during great part of the war, know that tho plan, correct
under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in
the face of a real navy. Scattered unsupported along the
coast, the United States ships kept their places, singly or in
small detachments, in face of an extensive network of inland
water communications which favored secret concentration of
the enemy. Behind the first line of water communications
were long estuaries, and here and there strong fortresses,
upon either of which the enemy's ships could always fall
back to elude pursuit or to receive protection. Had there
been a Southern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the
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scattered condition of the United States ships^ the latter
could not have been distributed as they were; and being
forced to concentrate for mutual support^ many small but
useful approaches would have been left open to commerce.
But as the Southern coast, from its extent and many inlets,
might have been a source of strength, so, from those very
characteristics, it became a fruitful source of injury. The
great story of the opening of the Mississippi is but the most
striking illustration of an action that was going on inces-
santly all over the South. At every breach of tlie sea fron-
tier, war-ships were entering. The streams that had carried
the wealth and supported the trade of the seceding States
turned against them, and admitted their enemies to their
hearts. Dismay, insecurity, paralysis, prevailed in regions
that might, under happier auspices, have kept a nation alive
through the most exhausting war. Never did sea power play
a greater or a more decisive part than in the contest which
determined that the course of the world's history would be
modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of
several rival States, in the North American continent. But
while just pride is felt in the well-earned glory of those days,
and the greatness of the results due to naval preponderance
is admitted, Americans who understand the facts should never
fail to remind the over-confidence of their countrymen that
the South not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring
people, but that also its population was not proportioned to
the extent of the sea-coast which it had to defend.
IV. Number of Population. — After the consideration of
the natural conditions of a country should follow an exami-
nation of the characteristics of its population as affecting
the development of sea power ; and first among these will bo
taken, because of its relations to tlie extent of the territory,
which has just been discussed, the number of the people who
live in it. It has been said that in respect of dimensions it
is not merely the number of square miles, but the extent and
character of the sea-coast that is to be considered with refer-
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
ence to sea power ; and so^ in point of population^ it is not
only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at
least readily available for employment on ship-board and for
the creation of nayal material, that must be counted.
For example, formerly and up to the end of the great wars
following the French Revolution, the population of France
was much greater than that of England; but in respect of
sea power in general, peaceful commerce as well as military
efficiency, France was much inferior to England. In the
matter of military efficiency this fact is the more remarkable
because at times, in point of military preparation at the out-
break of war, France had the advantage; but she was not
able to keep it. Thus in 1778, when war broke out, France,
through her maritime inscription, was able to man at once
fifty shipcH)f-the-line. England, on the contrary, by reason of
the dispersal over the globe of that very shipping on which
her naval strength so securely .rested, had much trouble
in manning forty at home; but in 1782 she had one hun-
dred and twenty in commission or ready for commission,
while France had never been able to exceed seventy-one.
Again, as late as 1840, when the two nations were on the
verge of war in the Levant, a most accomplished French offi-
cer of the day, while extolling the high state of efficiency of
the French fleet and the eminent qualities of its admiral,
and expressing confidence in the results of an encounter with
an equal enemy, goes on to say : ^ Behind the squadron of
twenty-one ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble,
there was no reserve ; not another ship could have been com-
missioned within six months." And this was due not only
to lack of ships and of proper equipments, though both were
wanting. *^Our maritime inscription," he continues, "was
so exhausted by what we had done [in manning twenty-one
ships], that the permanent levy established in all quarters
did not supply reliefs for the men, who were already more
than three years on cruise."
A contrast such as this shows a difference in what is called
staying power, or reserve force, which is even greater than
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DISCUSSION OF THE
appears ou the surface; for a great shipping afloat neces-
sarily employs, besides the crews, a large number of people
engaged in the various handicrafts which facilitate the mak-
ing and repairing of naval material, or following other callings
more or less closely connected with the water and with craft of
all kinds. Such kindred callings give an undoubted aptitude
for the sea from the outset. There is an anecdote showing
curious insight into this matter on the part of one of Eng-
land's distinguished seamen, Sir Edward Pellew. When the
war broke out in 1798, the usual scarceness of seamen was
met Eager to get to sea and unable to fill his complement
otherwise than with landsmen, he instructed his officers to
seek for Cornish miners ; reasoning from the conditions and
dangers of their calling, of which he had personal knowledge,
that they would quickly fit into the demands of sea life. The
result showed his sagacity, for, thus escaping an otherwise
unavoidable delay, he wasi fortunate enough to capture the
first frigate taken in the war in single combat ; and what is
especially instructive is, that although but a few weeks in
commission, while his opponent had been over a year, the
losses, heavy on both sides, were nearly equal.
It may be urged that such reserve strength has now nearly
lost the importance it once had, because modern ships and
weapons take so long to make, and because modern States
aim at developing the whole power of their armed force, on
the outbreak of war, with such rapidity as to strike a dis-
abling blow before the enemy can organize an equal effort.
To use a familiar phrase, there will not be time for the whole
resistance of the national fabric to come into play ; the blow
will fall on the organized military fleet, and if that yield, the
solidity of the rest of the structure will avail nothing. To a
certain extent this is true; but then it has always been true,
though to a less extent formerly than now. Granted the
meeting of two fleets which represent practically the whole
present strength of their two nations, if one of them be de-
stroyed, while the other remains fit for action, there will be
much less hope now than formerly that the vanquished can
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
restore his navy for that war ; and the result will be disas*
trous jast in proportion to the dependence of the nation upon
her sea power. A Trafalgar would have been a much more
fatal blow to England than it was to France, had the English
fleet then represented, as the allied fleet did, the bulk of the
nation's power. Trafalgar in such a case would have been to
England what Austerlitz was to Austria, and Jena to Prus-
sia ; an empire would have been laid prostrate by the destruc-
tion or disorganization of its military forces, which, it is said,
were the favorite objective of Napoleon.
But does the consideration of such ezoeptiohal disasters in
the past justify the putting a low value upon that reserve
strength, based upon the number of inhabitants fitted for a
certain kind of military life, which is here being considered ?
The blows just mentioned were dealt by men of exceptional
genius, at the head of armed bodies of exceptional training,
eiprit-de-^sorps^ and prestige, and were, besides, inflicted upon
opponents more or less demoralized by conscious inferiority
and previous defeat. Austerlitz had been closely preceded by
Ulm, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms
without a battle ; and the history of the previous years had
been one long record of Austrian reverse atid French success,
Trafalgar followed closely upon a cruise, justly called a cam-
paign, of almost constant failure ; and farther back, but still
recent, were the memories of St. Vincent for the Spaniards,
and of the Nile for the French, in the allied fleet. Except the
case of Jena, these crushing overthrows were not single
disasters, but final blows ; and in the Jena campaign there
was a disparity in numbers, equipment, and general prepara-
tion for war, which makes it less applicable in considering
what may result from a single victory.
England is at the present time the greatest maritime nation
in the world ; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority
she had in the days of sail and wood. France and England
are the two powers that have the largest military navies;
and it is so far an open question which of the two is the more
powerful, that they may be regarded as practically of equal
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48 DISCUSSION OF THE
strength in material for a sea war. In the case of a collision
can there be assumed such a difference of peraonneU or of
preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality
will result from one battle or one campaign? If not, the
reserve strength will begin to tell; organized reserve first,
then reserve of seafaring population, reserve of mechanical
skill, reserve of wealth. It seems to have been somewhat
forgotten that England's leadership in mechanical arts gives
her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily familiarize them-
selves with the appliances of modern iron-clads ; and as her
commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the sur-
plus of seamen and mechanics will go to tlie armed shipping.
The whole question of the value of a reserve, developed or
undeveloped, amounts now to this : Have modern conditions
of warfare made it probable that, of two nearly equal adver-
saries, one will be so prostrated in a single campaign that a
decisive result will be reached in that time? Sea warfare
has given no answer. The crushing successes of Prussia
against Austria, and of Germany against France, appear to
have been those of a stronger over a much weaker nation,
whether the weakness were due to natural causes, or to offi-
cial incompetency. How would a delay like that of Plevna
have affected the fortune of war, had Turkey had any reserve
of national power upon which to call ?
If time be, as is everywhere admitted, a supreme factor in
war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not
military, whose people, like all free people, object to pay for
large military establishments, to see to it that they are at
least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the
spirit and capacity of their subjects into tlie new activities
which war calls for. If the existing force by land or sea is
strong enough so to hold out, even though at a disadvantage,
the country may rely upon its natural resources and strength
coming into play for whatever they are worth, — its numbers,
its wealth, its capacities of every kind. If, on the other hand,
what force it has can be overthrown and crushed quickly, the
most magnificent possibilities of natural power will not save
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49
it from humiliating conditions, nor, if its foe be wise, from
guarantees which will postpone revenge to a distant future.
The story is constantly repeated on the smaller fields of war :
If so-and-so can hold out a little longer, this can be saved
or that can be done;'' as in sickness it is often said : If
the patient can only hold out so long, the strength of his
constitution may pull him through."
England to some extent is now such a country. Holland
was such a country ; she would not pay, and if she escaped,
it was but by the skin of her teeth. Never in time of
peace and from fear of a rupture," wrote their great states-
man, De Witt, will they take resolutions strong enough to
lead them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. The character
of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the
face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own do-
fence. I have to do with a people who, liberal to profusion
where they ought to economize, are often sparing to avarice
where they ought to spend."
That our own country is open to the same reproach, is pa-
tent to all the world. The United States has not that shield
of defensive power behind which time can be gained to develop
its reserve of strength. As for a seafaring population ade-
quate to her possible needs, where is it ? Such a resource,
proportionate to her coast-line and population, is to be found
only in a national merchant shipping and its related industries,
which at present scarcely exist. It will matter little whether
the crews of such ships are native or foreign born, provided
they are attached to the flag, and her power at sea is sufiicient
to enable the most of them to get back in case of war. When
foreigners by tiiousands are admitted to the ballot, it is of little
moment that they are given fighting-room on board ship.
Though the treatment of the subject has been somewhat
discursive, it may be admitted that a great population follow-
ing callings related to the sea is, now as formerly, a great
element of sea power ; that the United States is deficient in
that element ; and that its foundations can be laid only in a
large commerce under her own flag.
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DISCUSSION OF THE
Y. National Character. — The effect of national character
and aptitudes upon the development of sea power will next
be considered.
If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensiye
commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a dis-
tinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or
another been great upon the sea. History almost without
exception affirms that this is true. Save the Romans, there
is no marked instance to the contrary.
All men seek gain and, more or less, love money ; but the
way in which gain is sought will have a marked effect upon
the commercial fortunes and the history of the people inhabit-
ing a country.
If history may be believed, the way in which the Spaniards
and their kindred nation, the Portuguese, sought wealth, not
only brought a blot upon the national character, but was also
fatal to the growth of a healthy commerce ; and so to the
industries upon which commerce lives, and ultimately to that
national wealth which was sought by mistaken paths. The
desire for gain rose in them to fierce avarice ; so they sought
in the new-found worlds which gave such an impetus to the
commercial and maritime development of the countries of
Europe, not new fields of industry, not even the healthy
excitement of exploration and adventure, but gold and silver.
They had many great qualities ; they were bold, enterprising,
temperate, patient of suffering, enthusiastic, and gifted with
intense national feeling. When to these qualities are added
the advantages of Spain's position and well-situated points, the
fact that she was first to occupy large and rich portions of
the new worlds and long remained without a competitor, and
that for a hundred years after tlio discovery of America she
was the leading State in Europe, she might have been ex-
pected to take the foremost place among the sea powers.
Exactly the contrary was the result, as all know. Since the
battle of Lepanto in 1671, though engaged in many wars, no
sea victory of any consequence shines on the pages of Spanish
history ; and the decay of her commerce sufficiently accounts
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
for the painful and sometimes ludicrous inaptness shown on
the decks of her ships of war. Doubtless such a result is not
to be attributed to one cause onlj. Doubtless the govern*
ment of Spain was in many ways such as to cramp and blight
a free and healthy deyelopment of private enterprise; but
the character of a great people breaks through or shapes the
character of its government, and it can hai*dly be doubted
that had the bent of the people been toward trade, the action
of government would have been drawn into the same current.
The great field of the colonies, also, was remote from the
centre of that despotism which blighted the growth of old
Spain. As it was, thousands of Spaniards, of the working
as well as the upper classes, left Spain ; and the occupa-
tions in which they engaged abroad sent home little but
specie, or merchandise of small bulk, requiring but small
tonnage. The mother-country herself produced little but
wool, fruit, and iron ; her manufactures were naught ; her
industries suffered ; her population steadily decreased. Both
she and her colonies depended upon the Dutch for so many
of the necessaries of life, that the products of their scanty in-
dustries could not suffice to pay for them. ^^So that Holland
merchants,'* writes a contemporary, who carry money to
most parts of the world to buy commodities, must out of
this single country of Europe carry home money, which they
receive in payment of their goods.** Thus their eagerly
sought emblem of wealth passed quickly from their hands.
It has already been pointed out how weak, from a military
point of view, Spain was from this decay of her shipping.
Her wealth being in small bulk on a few ships, following
more or less regular routes, was easily seized by an enemy,
and the sinews of war paralyzed; whereas the wealth of
England and Holland, scattered over thousands of ships in
all parts of the world, received many bitter blows in many
exhausting wars, without checking a growth which^ though
painful, was steady. The fortunes of Portugal, united to
Spain during a most critical period of her history, followed
the same downward path ; although foremost in the begin*
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ning of the raco for development bj sea, she fell utterly
behind. The mines of Brazil were tlie ruin of Portugal, as
those of Mexico and Peru had been of Spain ; all manufac-
tures fell into insane contempt; ere long the English sup*
plied the Portuguese not only with clothes, but with all mer*
chandise, all commodities, even to salt-fish and grain. After
their gold, the Poi*tuguese abandoned their very soil; the
vineyards of Oporto were finally bought by the English with
Brazilian gold, which had only passed through Portugal to
be spread throughout England." We are assured that in fifty
years, five hundred millions of dollars were extracted from
tlie mines of Brazil, and that at the end of the time Portugal
had but twenty-five millions in specie,'' — a striking example
of the difference between real and fictitious wealth.
The English and Dutch were no less desirous of gain than
the southern nations. Each in turn has been called a na-
tion of shopkeepers ; but the jeer, in so far as it is just, is
to the credit of tlieir wisdom and uprightness. They were no
less bold, no less enterprising, no less patient Indeed, they
were more patient, in that they sought riches not by the sword
but by labor, which is the reproach meant to be implied by
the epithet ; for thus they took the longest, instead of what
seemed the shortest, road to wealth. But these two peoples,
radically of the same race, had other qualities, no less impor-
tant than those just named, which combined with their sur-
roundings to favor their development by sea. They were by
nature business-men, traders, producers, negotiators. There-
fore both in their native country and abroad, whether settled
in the ports of civilized nations, or of barbarous eastern
rulers, or in colonies of their own foundation, they every-
where strove to draw out all the resources of the laud, to
develop and increase them. The quick instinct of the born
trader, shopkeeper if you will, sought continually new articles
to exchange ; and this search, combined with the industrious
character evolved through generations of labor, made them
necessarily producers. At home they became great as manu-
facturers ; abroad, where they controlled, the land grew richer
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
63
continually, products multiplied, and the necessary exchange
between home and the settlements called for more ships.
Their shipping therefore increased with these demands of
trade, and nations with less aptitude for maritime enterprise,
even France herself, great as she has been, called for their
products and for the service of their ships. Thus in many
ways they advanced to power at sea. This natural tendency
and growth were indeed modified and seriously checked at
times by the interference of other governments, jealous of a
prosperity which their own people could invade only by the
aid of artificial support, — a support which will be considered
under the head of governmental action as aifecting sea
power.
The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the produc-
tion of something to trade with, is the national characteristic
most important to the development of sea power. Granting
it and a good seaboard, it is not likely that the dangers of the
sea, or any aversion to it, will deter a people from seeking
wealth by the paths of. ocean commerce. Where wealth is
sought by other means, it may be found ; but it will not ne-
cessarily lead to sea power. Take France. France has a fine
country, an industrious people, an admirable position. The
French navy has known periods of great glory, and in its
lowest estate has never dishonored the military reputation so
dear to the nation. Yet as a maritime State, securely resting
upon a broad basis of sea commerce, France, as compared
with other historical sea-peoples, has never held more than a
respectable position. The chief reason for this, so far as
national character goes, is the way in which wealtli is sought
As Spain and Portugal sought it by digging gold out of the
ground, the temper of the French people leads them to seek
it by thrift, economy, hoarding. It is said to be harder to
keep than to make a fortune. Possibly ; but the adventurous
temper, which risks what it has to gain more, has much in
common with the adventurous spirit that conquers worlds for
commerce. The tendency to save and put aside, to venture
timidly and on a small scale, may lead to a general diffusion
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DISCUSSION OF THE
of wealtli on a like small Bcale^ but not to the risks and de-
velopment of external trade and shipping interests. To illus-
trate^ — and the incident is given only for what it is worth, —
a French officer, speaking to the author about the Panama
Canal, said : I have two shares in it. In France we don't
do as you, where a few people take a great many shares each.
With us a large number of people take one share or a very
few. When these were in the market my wife said to me,
< You take two shares, one for you and one for me.' " As
regards the stability of a man's personal fortunes this kind
of prudence is doubtless wise ; but when excessive prudence
or financial timidity becomes a national trait, it must tend to
hamper the expansion of commerce and of the nation's ship-
ping. The same caution in money matters, appearing in an-
other relation of life, has checked the production of children,
and keeps the population of France nearly stationary.
The noble classes of Europe inherited from the Middle Ages
a supercilious contempt for peaceful trade, which has exer-
cised a modifying influence upon its growth, according to the
national character of different countries. The pride of the
Spaniards fell easily in with this spirit of contempt, and co-
operated with that disastrous unwillingness to work and wait
for wealth which turned them away from commerce. In
France, the vanity which is conceded even by Frenchmen to
be a national trait led in the same direction. The numbers
and brilliancy of the nobility, and the consideration enjoyed
by them, set a seal of inferiority upon an occupation which
they despised. Rich merchants and manufacturers sighed for
the honors of nobility, and upon obtaining them, abandoned
their lucrative professions. Therefore, while the industry of
the people and the fruitfulnoss of the soil saved commerce
from total decay, it was pursued under a sense of humiliation
which caused its best representatives to escape from it as
soon as they could. Louis XIY., under the influence of
Colbert, put forth an ordinance authorizing all noblemen to
take an interest in merchant ships, goods and merchandise,
without being considered as having derogated from nobility,
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
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provided thej did not sell at retail ; " and the reason given
for this action was, ^ that it imports the good of our subjects
and our own satisfaction, to efface the relic of a public opin-
ion, universally prevalent, that maritime commerce is incom-
patible with nobility." But a prejudice involving conscious
and open superiority is not readily effaced by ordinances,
especially when vanity is a conspicuous trait in national char-
acter; and many years later Montesquieu taught that it is
contrary to the spirit of monarchy that the nobility should
engage in trade.
In Holland there was a nobility ; but the State was repub-
lican in name, allowed large scope to personal freedom and
enterprise, and the centres of power were in the great cities.
The foundation of the national greatness was money — or
rather wealth. Wealth, as a source of civic distinction, car-
ried with it also power in the State ; and with power there
went social position and consideration. In England the same
result obtained. The nobility were proud; but in a repre-
sentative government the power of wealth could be neither
put down nor overshadowed. It was patent to the eyes of all,
it was honored by all ; and in England, as well as Holland,
the occupations which were the source of wealth shared in
the honor given to wealth itself. Thus, in all the countries
n«m«d« social sentiment, the outcome of national character-
i^Ue»^ had % loaurV^ xuftu^i^ up^is^ mttoft^il %UxtM(A^
toward trade.
In yet another way does the national genius affect the
growth of sea power in its broadest sense ; and that is in so far
as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies. Of
colonization, as of all other growths, it is true that it is most
healthy when it is most natural. Therefore colonies that
spring from the felt wants and natural impulses of a whole
people will have the most solid foundations ; and their sub-
sequent growth will be surest when they are least trammelled
•from home, if the people have the genius for independent
action. Men of the past three centuries have keenly felt the
value to the mother-country of colonies as outlets for the
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DISCUSSION OF THE
home products and as a nursery for commerce and shipping ;
but efiforts at colonization have not had the same general
origin, nor have different systems all had the same success.
The efforts of statesmen, however far-seeing and careful,
have not been able to supply the lack of strong natural im-
pulse; nor can the most minute regulation from home pro-
duce as good results as a happier neglect, when the germ of
self-development is found in the national character. There
has been no greater display of wisdom in the national ad-
ministration of suc-cessful colonies than in that of unsuc-
cessful. Perhaps there has been even less. If elaborate
system and supervision, careful adaptation of means to ends,
diligent nursing, could avail for colonial growth, the genius
of England has less of this systematizing faculty than the
genius of France; but England, not France, has been the
great colonizer of the world. Successful colonization, with
its consequent effect upon commerce and sea power, depends
essentially upon national character; because colonies grow
best when they grow of themselves, naturally. The char-
acter of the colonist, not the care of the home government, is
the principle of the colony's growth.
This truth stands out the clearer because the general atti-
tude of all the home governments toward their colonies was
entirely selfish. However founded, as soon as it was recog-
nized to be of consequence, the colony became to the home
country a cow to be milked ; to be cared for, of course, but
chiefly as a piece of property valued for the returns it gave.
Legislation was directed toward a monopoly of its external
trade ; the places in its government afforded posts of value
for occupants from the mother-country ; and the colony was
looked upon, as the sea still so often is, as a fit place for
those who were ungovernable or useless at home. The mili-
tary administration, however, so long as it remains a colony, is
the proper and necessary attribute of the home government.
The fact of England's unique and wonderful success as a
great colonizing nation is too evident to be dwelt upon ; and
the reason for it appears to lie chiefly in two traits of the
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national character. The English colonist naturally and readily
settles down in his new country, identifies his interest with
it, and though keeping an affectionate remembrance of the
home from which he came, has no restless eagerness to re-
turn. In the second place, the Englishman at once and in-
stinctively seeks to develop the resources of the new country
in the broadest sense. In the former particular he differs
from the French, who were ever longingly looking back to the
. delights of their pleasant land; in the latter, from the
Spaniards, whose range of interest and ambition was too
narrow for the full evolution of the possibilities of a new
country.
The character and the necessities of the Dutch led them
naturally to plant colonies ; and by the year 1650 they had in
the East Indies, in Africa, and in America a large number,
only to name which would be tedious. They were then far
ahead of England in this matter. But though the origin of
these colonies, purely commercial in its character, was natural,
there seems to have been lacking to them a principle of
growth. In planting them they never sought an extension
of empire, but merely an acquisition of trade and commerce.
They attempted conquest only when forced by the pressure of
circumstances. Qenerally they were content to trade under
the protection of the sovereign of the country." This placid
satisfaction with gain alone, unaccompanied by political ambi-
tion, tended, like the despotism of France and Spain, to keep
the colonies mere commercial dependencies upon the mother-
country, and so killed the natural principle of growth.
Before quitting tliis head of the inquiry, it is well to ask
how far the national character of Americans is fitted to de-
velop a great sea power, should other circumstances become
favorable.
It seems scarcely necessary, however, to do more than
appeal to a not very distant past to prove that, if legislative
hindrances be removed, and more remunerative fields of
enterprise filled up, the sea power will not long delay its
appearance. The instinct for commerce, bold enterprise in
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the pursuit of gain, and a keen scent for the trails that lead
to it, all exist ; and if there be in the future any fields calling
for colonization, it cannot be doubted that Americans will
carry to them all their inherited aptitude for self-goyornment
and independent growth.
YI. Character of the Q-overnment. — In discussing the ef-
fects upon the development of a nation's sea power exerted by
its government and institutions, it will be necessary to avoid a
tendency to over-philosophizing, to confine attention to obvious
and immediate causes and their plain results, without prying
too far beneath the surface for remote and ultimate influences.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular foims of
government with their accompanying institutions, and the
character of rulers at one time or another, have exercised a
very marked influence upon the development of sea power.
The various traits of a country and its people which have so
far been considered constitute the natural characteristics
with which a nation, like a roan, begins its career ; the con-
duct of the government in turn corresponds to the exercise
of the intelligent will-power, which, according as it is wise,
energetic and persevering, or the reverse, causes success or
failure in a man's life or a nation's history.
It would seem probable that a government in full accord
with tlie natural bias of its people would most successfully
advance its growth in every respect ; and, in the matter of
sea power, the most brilliant su9cesses have followed where
there has been intelligent direction by a government fully
imbued with the spirit of the people and conscious of it« true
general bent. Such a government is most certainly secured
when the will of the people, or of their best natural exponents,
has some large share in making it ; but such free govern-
ments have sometimes fallen short, while on the other hand
despotic power, wielded with judgment and consistency, has
created at times a great sea commerce and a brilliant navy
with greater directness than can be reached by the slower
processes of a free people. The difficulty in the latter case
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is to insure perseverance after the death of a particular
despot.
England having undoubtedly reached the greatest height of
sea power of any modern nation, the action of her government
first claims attention: In general direction this action has
been consistent, though often far from praiseworthy. It
has aimed steadily at the control of the sea. One of its
most arrogant expressions dates back as far as the reign of
James I., when she had scarce any possessions outside her
own islands ; before Virginia or Massachusetts was settled.
Here is Richelieu's account of it : —
^ The Duke of Solly, minister of Henry IT. [one of the most
chivalroiiB princes that ever lived], having embarked at Calais in a
French ship wearing tlie French Hag at the main, was no sooner in
the Channel than, meeting an English despatch-boat which was there
to receive him, the commander of the latter ordered the French ship
to lower her flag. The Dake, considering that his quality freed him
from such an affront, boldly refused ; but this refusal was followed
by three cannon-shot, which, piercing his ship, pierced the heart like-
wise of all good Frenchmen. Might forced hhn to yield what right
forbade, and for all the complaints he made he coald get no better
reply from the Englbh captain than this: 'That just as his duty
obliged him to honor the ambassador's rank, it also obliged him to
exact the honor due to the flag of his master as sovereign of the sea.'
If the words of King James himself were more polite, they neverthe-
less had no other effect than to compel the Duke to take counsel of
his prudence, feigning to be satisfied, while his wound was all the
time smarting and incurable. Henry the Great had to practise mod«
eration on this occasion ; but with the resolve another time to sustain
the rights of his crown by the force that, with the aid of time, he
should be able to put upon the sea."
This act of unpardonable insolence, according to modem
ideas, was not so much out of accord with the spirit of nations
in that day. It is chiefly noteworthy as the most striking, as
well as one of the earliest indications of the purpose of Eng-
land to assert herself at all risks upon the sea ; and the insult
was offered under one of her most timid kings to an ambassa-
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DISCUSSION OF THE
dor immediately representing the bravest and ablest of French
sovereigns. This empty honor of the flag, a claim insignifi-
cant except as the outward manifestation of the purpose of a
government, was as rigidly exacted under Cromwell as under
the kings. It was one of the conditions of peace yielded by
the Dutch after their disastrous war of 1654. Cromwell, a
despot in everything but name, was keenly alive to all that
concerned England's honor and strength, and did not stop
at barren salutes to promote them. Hardly yet possessed of
power^ the English navy sprang rapidly into a new life and
vigor under bis stern rule. England's rights, or reparation
for her wrongs, were demanded by her fleets throughout the
world, — in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, against the Bar-
bary States, in the West Indies ; and under him the conquest
of Jamaica began that extension of her empire, by force of
arms, which has gone on to our own days. Nor were equally
strong peaceful measures for the growth of English trade and
shipping forgotten. Cromwell's celebmted Navigation Act de-
clared that all imports into England or her colonies must be
conveyed exclusively in vessels belonging to England herself,
or to the country in which the products carried were grown or
manufactured. This decree, aimed specially at the Dutch, the
common carriers of Europe, was resented throughout the com-
mercial world ; but the benefit to England, in those days of
national strife and animosity, was so apparent that it lasted
long under the monarchy. A century and a quarter later we
find Nelson, before his famous career had begun, showing his
zeal for the welfare of England's shipping by enforcing this
same act in the West Indies against American merchant-ships.
When Cromwell was dead, and Charles II. sat on the throne
of his father, this king, false to the English people, was yet
true to England's greatness and to the traditional policy of
her government on the sea. In his treacherous intrigues with
Louis 'XIY., by which he aimed to make himself independent
of Parliament and people, he wrote to Louis : " There are two
impediments to a perfect union. The first is the great care
France is now taking to create a commerce and to be an im-
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posing maritime power. This is so great a cause of suspicion
with us, who can possess importance only by our commerce
and our naval force, that every step which France takes in
this direction will perpetuate i^e jealousy between the two
nations." In the midst of the negotiations which preceded
the detestable attack of the two kings upon the Dutch repub-
lic, a warm dispute arose as to who should command the
united fleets of France and England. Charles was inflexible
on this point. ^* It is the custom of the English," said he,
to command at sea ; " and he told the French ambassador
plainly that, were he to yield, his subjects would not obey
him. In the projected partition of the United Provinces he
reserved for England the maritime plunder in positions that
controlled the mouths of the rivers Scheldt and Meuse. The
navy under Charles preserved for some time the spirit and
discipline impressed on it by Cromwell's iron rule; though
later it shared in the general decay of morale which marked
this evil reign. Honk, having by a great strategic blunder
sent off a fourth of his fleet, found himself in 1666 in pres-
ence of a greatly superior Dutch force. Disregarding the
odds, he attacked without hesitation, and for three days main-
tained the fight with honor, though with loss. Such conduct
IS not war ; but in the single eye that looked to England's
naval prestige and dictated his action, common as it was to
England's people as well as to her government, has lain
the secret of final success following many blunders through
the centuries. Charles's successor, James 11., was himself
a seaman, and had commanded in two great sea-fights.
When William III. came to the throne, the governments of
England and Holland were under one hand, and continued
united in one purpose against Louis XIV. until the Peace of
Utrecht in 1718 ; that is, for a quarter of a century. The
English government more and more steadily^ and with con-
scious purpose, pushed on the extension of her sea dominion
and fostered the growth of her sea power. While as an open
enemy she struck at France upon the sea, so as an artful
friend, many at least believed, she sapped the power of Hoi*
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DISCUSSION OF THE
land afloat. The treaty between the two countries provided
that of the sea forces Holland should furnish three eighths,
England five eighths, or nearly double. Such a provision,
coupled with a further one which made Holland keep up
an army of 102,000 against England's 40,000, virtually threw
the land war on one and the sea war on the other. The
tendency, whether designed or not, is evident; and at the
peace, while Holland received compensation by land, Eng-
land obtained, besides commercial privileges in France,
Spain, and the Spanish West Indies, the important maritime
concessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon in the Meditcrra*
nean ; of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay in
North America. The naval power of France and Spain had
disappeared; that of Holland thenceforth steadily declined.
Posted thus in America, the West Indies, and the Medi-
terranean, the English government thenceforth moved firmly
forward on the path which made of the English kingdom the
British Empire. For the twenty-five years following the
Peace of Utrecht, peace was the chief aim of the ministers
who directed the policy of the two great seaboard nations,
France and England ; but amid all the fluctuations of conti-
nental politics in a most unsettled period, abounding in petty
wars and shifty treaties, the eye of England was steadily fixed
*on the maintenance of her sea power. In the Baltic, her
fleets checked the attempts of Peter the Great upon Sweden,
and so maintained a balance of power in that sea, from which
she drew not only a great trade but the chief part of her naval
stores, and which the Czar aimed to make a Russian lake.
Denmark endeavored to establish an East India company aided
by foreign capital ; England and Holland not only forbade their
subjects to join it, but threatened Denmark, and thus stopped
an enterprise they thought adverse to their sea interests. In
the Netherlands, which by the Utrecht Treaty had passed to
Austria, a similar East India company, having Ostend for
its port, was formed, with the emperor's sanction. This step,
meant to restore to the Low Countries the trade lost to them
through their natural outlet of the Scheldt, was opposed by
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the sea powers England and Holland ; and their greediness
for the monopoly of trade, helped in this instance hj France,
stifled this company also after a few years of struggling life.
In the Mediterranean, the Utrecht settlement was disturbed
by the emperor of Austria, England's natural ally in the then
existing state of European politics. Backed by England, he,
having already Naples, claimed also Sicily in exchange for
Sardinia. Spain resisted ; and her navy, just beginning to
revive under a vigorous minister, Alberoui, was crushed and
anniliilated by the English fleet off Gape Passaro in 1718 ;
while the following year a French army, at the bidding of
England, crossed the Pyrenees and completed the work by
destroying the Spanish dock-yards. Thus England, in addi-
tion to Gibraltar and Hahon in her own hands, saw Naples
and Sicily in those of a friend, while an enemy was struck
down. In Spanish America, the limited privileges to English
trade, wrung from the necessities of Spain, were abused by an
extensive and scarcely disguised smuggling system ; and when
the exasperated Spanish government gave way to excesses in
the mode of suppression, both the minister who counselled
peace and the opposition which urged war defended their
opinions by alleging the effects of either uiion England's sea
power and honor. While England's policy thus steadily aimed
at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway upon the
ocean, the other governments of Europe seemed blind to the
dangers to be feared from her sea growth. The miseries re-
sulting from the overweening power of Spain in days long
gone by seemed to be forgotten ; forgotten also the more re-
cent lesson of the bloody and costly wars provoked by the
ambition and exaggerated power of Louis XIV. Under the
eyes of the statesmen of Europe there was steadily and visibly
being built up a third overwhelming power, destined to be
used as selfishly, as aggressively, though not as cruelly, and
much more successfully than any that had preceded it. This
was the power of the sea, whose workings, because more
silent than the clash of arms, are less often noted, though
lying clearly enough on the surface. It can scarcely be denied
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DISCUSSION OF THE
that England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas, during
almost the whole period chosen for our subject, was by long
odds the chief among the military factors that determined the
final issue.^ So far, however, was this influence from being
foreseen after Utrecht, that France for twelve years, moved
by personal exigencies of her rulers, sided with England
agamst Spain ; and when Fleuri came into power in 1726,
though this policy was revei*sed, the navy of France received
no attention, and the only blow at England was the establish-
ment of a Bourbon prince, a natural enemy to her, upon the
throne of the two Sicilies in 1786. When war broke out with
Spain in 1789, the navy of England was in numbers more
than equal to the combined navies of Spain and France ; and
during the quarter of a century of nearly uninterrupted war
that followed, this numerical disproportion increased. In
these wars England, at first instinctively, afterward with con-
scious purpose under a government that recognized her oppor-
tunity and the possibilities of her great sea power, rapidly built
up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations were already
securely laid in tlie characteristics of her colonists and the
strength of her fleets. In strictly European affairs her wealth,
the outcome of her sea power, made her play a conspicuous
part during the same period. The system of subsidies, which
began half a century before in the wars of Marlborough and
received its most extensive development half a century later
in the Napoleonic wars, maintained the efforts of her allies,
which would have been crippled, if not paralyzed, without
them. Who can deny that the government which with one
hand strengthened its fainting allies on the continent with
the life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own
enemies off the sea and out of their chief possessions, Canada,
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Havana, Manila, gave to its country
1 An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of Great
Britain by a great military anthority will be found in the opening chapter of
Jomini'a " History of the Wars of the French Revolution." He lays down, as a
fundamental principle of European policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval
force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by
landj — a description which can apply only to Great Briuiin.
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the foromoBt rdle in European politics ; and who can fail to
see that the power which dwelt in that government, with a
land narrow in extent and poor in resources. Sprang directly
from the sea 7 The policy in which the English government
carried on the war is shown by a speech of Pitt, the master-
spirit during its course, though he lost office before bringing
it to an end. Condemning the Peace of 1768, made by his
political opponent, he said : France is chiefly, if not exclu-
sively, formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power.
What we gain in this respect is valuable to us, above all,
through the injury to her which results from it. You have
left to France the possibility of reviving her navy.*' Yet Eng-
land's gains were enormous ; her rule in India was assured,
and all North America east of the Mississippi in lier hands.
By this time the onward path of her government was dearly
marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was
consistently followed. The war of the American Revolution
was, it is true, a great mistake, looked at from the point of
view of sea power ; but the government was led into it in-
sensibly by a series of natural blunders. Putting aside polit-
ical and constitutional considerations, and looking at the
question as purely military or naval, the case was this : Tlie
American colonies were large and growing communities at a
great distance from England. So long as they remained at-
tached to the mother-country, as they then were enthusiasti-
cally, they formed a solid base for her sea power in that part
of the world ; but their extent and population were too great,
when coupled with the distance from England, to afford any
hope of holding them by force, if any powerful nations were
willing to help them. This ** if," however, involved a noto-
rious probability ; the humiliation of France and Spain was so
bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and
it was well known that France in particular had been care-
fully and rapidly building up her navy. Had the colonies
been thirteen islands, the sea power of England would quickly
have settled the question ; but instead of such a physical bar-
rier they were separated only by local jealousies which a com-
6
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DISCUSSION OF THE
mon danger sufficiently overcame. To enter deliberately on
Buch a contest, to try to hold by force so extensiye a territory,
with a large hostile population, so far from home, was to
renew the Seven Years' War with France and Spain, and with
the Americans, against, instead of for, England. The Seven
Years' War had been so heavy a burden that a wise govern-
ment would have known that the added weight could not be
borne, and have seen it was necessary to conciliate the colo-
nists. The government of the day was not wise, and a large
element of England's sea power was sacrificed ; but by mis-
take, not wilfully ; through arrogance, not through weakness.
This steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubt-
less made specially easy for successive English governments
by the clear indications of the country's conditions. Single-
ness of purpose was to some extent imposed. The firm main-,
tenance of her sea power, the haughty determination to make
it felt, the wise state of preparation in which its military ele-
ment was kept, were yet more due to that feature of her
political institutions which practically gave the government
during the period in question, into the hands of a class, — u
landed aristocracy. Such a class, whatever its defects other
wise, readily takes up and carries on a sound political tradition,
is naturally proud of its country's glory, and comparatively
insensible to the sufferings of the community by which that
glory is maintained. It readily lays on the pecuniary burden
necessary for preparation and for endurance of war. Being
as a body rich, it feels those burdens less. Not being com-
mercial, the sources of its own wealth are not so immediately
endangered, and it does not share that political timidity which
characterizes those whose property is exposed and business
threatened, — the proverbial timidity of capital. Yet in Eng-^
land this class was not insensible to anything that touched her
trade for good or ill. Both houses of Parliament vied in
careful watchfulness over its extension and protection, and to
the frequency of their inquiries a, naval historian attributes
the increased efficiency of the executive power in its manage-
ment of the navy. Such a class also naturally imbibes and
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keeps up a spirit of military honor, which is of the first im«
portance in ages when militarj institutions have not yet pro-
vided the sufficient substitute in what is called esprit^te-^orps.
But although full of class feeling and class prejudice, which
made themselves felt in the navy as well as elsewhere, their'
practical sense left open the way of promotion to its highest
honors to the more humbly born ; and every age saw admirals
who had sprung from the lowest of the people. In this tlie
temper of the English upper class differed markedly from that
of the French. As late as 1789, at the outbreak of the Revo-
lution, the French Navy List still bore the name of an official
whose duty was to verify the proofs of noble birth on the part
of those intending to enter the naval school.
Since 1815, and especially in our own day, the government
of England has passed very much more into the hands of the
people at large. Whether her sea power will suffer there-
from remains to be seen. Its broad basis still remains in a
great trade, large mechanical industries, and an extensive
colonial system. Whethera democratic government will have
the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and
credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by adequate
outpouring of money in times of peace, all which are necessary
for military preparation, is yet an open question. Popular
governments are not generally favorable to military expendi-
ture, however necessary, and there are signs that England
tends to drop behind.
It has already been seen that the Dutch Republic, even
more than the English nation, drew its prosperity and its
very life from the sea. The character and policy of its gov-
ernment were far less favorable to a consistent support of sea
power. Composed of seven provinces, with the political name
of the United Provinces, the actual distribution of power may
be roughly described to Americans as an exaggerated example
of States Rights. Each of the maritime provinces had its own
fleet and its own admiralty, with consequent jealousies. This
disorganizing tendency was partly counteracted by the great
preponderance of the Province of Holland, which alone con-
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DISCUSSlON^ OF THE
tributed fiy'e sixths of tho fleet and fifty-eight per cent of the
taxes, and consequently had a proportionate shai-e in directing
the national policy. Although intensely patriotic, and capa-
ble of making the last sacrifices for freedom, the commercial
spirit of the people penetrated the government, which indeed
might be called a commercial aristocracy, and made it averse
to war, and to the expenditures which are necessary in prepar-
ing for war. As has before been said, it was not until danger
stared them in the face that the burgomasters were willing
to pay for their defences. While the i*epublican government
lasted, however, this economy was practised least of all upon
the fleet ; and until the deaUi of John De Witt, in 1672, and
the peace with England in 1674, the Dutch navy was in point
of numbers and equipment able to make a fair show against
the combined navies of England and France. Its efficiency at
this time undoubtedly saved the country from the destruction
planned by the two kings. With De Witt's death the repub-
lic passed away, and was followed by the practically monarchi-
cal government of William of Orange. The life-long policy of
this prince, then only eighteen, was 'resistance to Louis XIY.
and to the extension of French power. This resistance took
shape upon the land rather than the sea, — a tendency pro^
moted by England's withdrawal from the war. As early as
1676, Admiral De Buyter found the force given him unequal
to cope with the French alone. With the eyes of the govern-
ment fixed on the land frontier, the navy rapidly declined.
In 1688, when William of Orange needed a fleet to convoy
him to England, the burgomasters of Amsterdam objected
that the navy was incalculably decreased in strength, as well
as deprived of its ablest commanders. When king of Eng^
land, William still kept his position as stadtholder, and with
it his general European policy. He found in England the sea
power he needed, and used the resources of Holland for the
land war. This Dutch prince consented that in the allied
fleets, in councils of war, the Dutch admirals should sit below
the junior English captain ; and Dutch interests at sea wei'e
sacrificed as readily as Dutch pride to the demands of Eng^
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land. When William died, his policy was still followed by
the government which succeeded him. Its aims were wholly
centred upon the land, and at the I'eacd of Utrecht, which
closed a series of wars extending over forty years, Holland,
having established no sea claim^ gained nothing in the way
of sea resources, of colonial extension, or of commerce.
Of the last of these wars an English historian says : Thb
economy of the Dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their
trade. Their men-of-war in the Mediterranean were always
victualled short, and their convoys w^re so weak and ill-
provided that for one ship that we lost, they lost five, which
begat a general notion that we were the safer carriers, which
certainly had a good effect. Hence it was that our trade
rather increased than diminished in this war."
From that time Holland ceased to have a great sea power,
and rapidly lost the leading position among the nations which
that power had built up. It is only just to say that no pol-
icy could have saved from decline this small, though deter-
mined, nation, in face of the persistent enmity of Louis XIV^
The friendship of France, insuring peace on her landward
frontier, would have enabled her, at least for a longer time, to
dispute with England the dominion of the seas i and as allies
the navies of the two continental States might have checked
the growth of the enormous sea power which has just been
considered. Sea peace between England and Holland was
only possible by the virtual subjection of one or the other, for
both aimed at the same object Between France and Holland
it was otherwise; and the fall of Holland proceeded, not
necessarily from her inferior size and numbers, but from
faulty policy on the part of the two governments. It does
not concern us to decide which was the more to blame.
France, admirably situated for the possession of sea powef ,
received a definite policy for the guidance of her government
from two great rulers^ Henry IV. and Richelieu. With cer-
tain Well-defined projects of extension eastward Upon the land
were combined a steady resistance to the House of Austria,
whicli then ruled in both Austria and Spain, and an equal
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70 DISCUSSION OF THE
purpose of resistance to England upon the sea. To further
this latter end, as well as for other reasons, Holland waa
to be courted as an ally. Commerce and fisheries as the
basis of sea power were to be encouraged, and a military
navy was to be built up. Richelieu left what he called his
political will, in which he pointed out the opportunities of
France for achieving sea power, based upon her position and
resources ; and French writers consider him the virtual founder
of the navy, not merely because he equipped ships, but from
the breadth of his views and his measures to insure sound in-
stitutions and steady growth. After his death, Mazarin inher-
ited his views and general policy, but not his lofty and martial
spirit, and during bis rule the newly formed navy disappeared.
When Louis XIY. took the government into his own hands,
in 1661, there were but thirty ships of war, of which only
three had as many as sixty guns. Then began a most aa-
tonishing manifestation of the work which can be done by
absolute government ably and systematically wielded. That
part of the administration which dealt with trade, manufac-
tures, shipping, and colonies, was given to a man of great
practical genius, Colbert, who had served with Richelieu and
had drunk in fully his ideas and policy. He pursued his aims
in a spirit thoroughly French. Everything was to be organ-
ized, the spring of everything was in the ministei-'s cabinet
To organize producers and merchants as a powerful army,
subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure
an industrial victory for France by order and unity of efforts,
and to obtain the best products by imposing on all workmen
the processes recognized as best by competent men. ... To
organize seamen and distant commerce in large bodies like
the manufactures and internal commerce, and to give as a
support to the commercial power of France a navy established
on a firm basis and of dimensions hitherto unknown,'' — such,
we are told, were the aims of Colbert as regards two of the
three links in the chain of sea power. For the third, the col-
onies at the far end of the line, the same governmental
direction and organization were evidently purposed ; for the
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iSLEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
government began by buying back Canada, Newfoundland,
Nova Scotia, and the French West India Islands from the
parties who then owned them. Here, then, is seen pure, ab-
solute, uncontrolled power gathering up into its hands all the
reins for the guidance of a nation's course, and proposing so to
direct it as to make, among other things, a great sea power.
To enter into the details of Colbert's action is beyond our
purpose. It is enough to note the chief part played by the
government in building up the sea power of the &tato, and
that this very great man looked not to any one of the bases
on which it rests to the exclusion of the others, but embraced
them all in his wise and provident administration. Agricul-
ture, which increases the products of the earth, and manufac-
tures, which multiply the products of man's industry ; internal
trade routes and regulations, by which the exchange of prod-
ucts from the interior to the exterior is made easier; ship-
ping and, customs regulations tending to throw the carrying-
trade into French hands, and so to encourage the building of
French shipping, by which the home and colonial products
should be carried back and forth ; colonial administration and
development, by which a far-off market might be continually
growing up to be monopolized by the home trade ; treaties
with foreign States favoring French trade, and imposts on
foreign sliips and products tending to break down that of
rival nations, — all these means, embracing countless details,
were employed to build up for France (1) Production ; (2)
Shipping; (8) Colonies and Markets, — -in a word, sea power.
The study of such a work is simpler and easier when thus done
by one man, sketched out by a kind of logical process, than
when slowly wrought by conflicting interests in a more com-
plex government. In the few years of Colbert's administra-
tion is seen the whole theory of sea power put into practice
in the systematic, centralizing French way ; while the illus-
tration of the same theory in English and Dutch history is
spread over generations. Such growth, however, was forced, .
and depended upon the endurance of the absolute power
which watched over it ; and as Colbert was not king, his con«
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DISCUSSION' OF THE
trol lasted onlj till he lost the king's favor. It is, however,
most interesting to.note the results of his labors in the proper
field for governmental action ^ in the navy. It has been said
that in 1661, when he took office, there were but thirty armed
ships, of which, tliree only had over sixty guns. In 1666
there were seventy, of which fifty were ships of the line and
twenty were fire-ships ; in 1671, from seventy the number had
increased to one hundred and ninety-six. In 1683 there were
one hundred and seven ships of from twenty-four to one hun-
dred and twenty guns, twelve of which carried over seventy-
six guns, besides many smaller vessels. The order and
system introduced into the dock-yards made them vastly
more efficient than the English. An English captain, a pris-
oner in Franco while the effect of Colbert's work still lasted
in the hands of his son, writes : —
When I was first broaght prisoner thither, I lay four months in a
hospital at J^rest for care of my wounds. While there I was aston-
bhed at the expedition used in manning and fitting out their ships,
which till then I thought could be done nowhere sooner than in Eng-
land, where we have ten times the shipping, and consei]uent]y ten
times the seamen, they have in France ; but there I saw twenty sail
of ships, of abont sixty guns each, got ready in twenty days' time ;
they were brought in and the men were discharged; and upon an
order from Paris they were careened, keeled up, rigged, victualled,
manned, and ont again in the said time with the greatest ease iniagi-
nable« I likewise saw a ship of one hundred guns that had all her
guns taken out in fonr or five hours' time ; which I never saw done
in England in twenty-four hours, and this with the greatest ease and
less hazard than at home. This I saw under my hospital window."
A French naval historian cites certain performances which
are simply incredible, such as that the keel of a galley was
laid at four o'clock, and that at nine she left port, fully armed.
These traditions may be accepted as pointing, with the more
serious statements of the English officer, to a remarkable de-
gree of system and order, and abundant facilities for work.
Yet all this wonderful growth, forced by the action of the
government, withered away like Jonah's gourd when the gov-
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 73
ernment's favor was withdrawn. Time was not allowed for
its roots to strike down deep into the life of the nation. Col-
bert's work was in the direct line of Bichelien's policy^ and
for a time it seemed there would continue the course of action
which would make France great upon the sea as well as pre-
dominant upon the land. For reasons which it is not yet
necessary to give, Louis came to have feelings of bitter enmity
against Holland ; and as these feelings were shared by
Charles 11., the two kings determined on the destruction of
the United Provinces. This war, which broke out in 1672,
though more contrary to natural feeling on the part of Eng-
land, was less of a political mistake for her than for France,
and especially as regards sea power. France was helping to
destroy a probable, and certainly an indispensable, ally ;
England was assisting in the ruin of her greatest rival on
the sea, at this time, indeed, still her cottunercial superior.
France, staggering under debt and utter confusion in her
finances when Louis mounted the throne, was just ieeing her
way clear in 1672, under Colbert's reforms and their happy
results. The war, lasting six years, undid the greater part of
his work. The agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce,
and the colonies, all were smitten by it ; the establishments
of Colbert languished, and the order he had established in the
finances was overthrown. Thus the action of Louis — and he
alone was the directing government of France — struck at the
roots of her sea power, and alienated her best sea ally. The
territory and the military power of France were increased,
but the springs of commerce and of a peaceful shipping had
been exhausted in the process; and although the military
navy was for some years kept up with splendor and effi-
ciency, it soon began to dwindle, and by the end of the reign
had practically disappeared. The same false policy, as re*
gards the sea, marked the rest of this reign of fifty-four years.
Louis steadily turned his back upon the sea interests of
Franco, except the fighting-ships, and either could not or
would not see that the latter were of little use and uncertain
life, if the peaceful shipping and the industries, by which they
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DISCUSSION OF THE
were supported, perished. His policy, aiming at supreme
power in Europe by military strength and territorial exten-
sion, forced England and Holland into an alliance, which, as
has before been said, directly drove France off the sea, and
indirectly swamped Holland's power thereon. Colbert's navy
perished, and for the last ten years of Louis' life no great
French fleet put to sea, though there was constant war. The
simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus brought out
strongly how great the influence of government can be upon
both the growth and the decay of sea power.
The latter part of Louis' life thus witnessed that power fail-
ing by the weakening of its foundations, of commerce, and of
the wealth tliat commerce brings. The government that fol-
lowed, likewise absolute, of set purpose and at the demand
of England, gave up all pretence of maintaining an effective
navy. The reason for this was that the new king was a
minor; and the regent, being bitterly at enmity with the
king of Spain, to injure him and preserve his own power,
entered into alliance with England. He aided her to estab-
lish Austria, the hereditary enemy of France, in Naples and
Sicily to the detriment of Spain, and in union with her de-
stroyed the Spanish navy and dock-yards. Here again is
found a personal ruler disregarding the sea interests of
France, ruining a natural ally, and directly aiding, as Louis
Xiy. indirectly and unintentionally aided, the growth of a
mistress of the seas. This transient phase of policy passed
away with the death of the regent in 1726; but from that
time until 1760 the government of France continued to dis-
regard her maritime interests. It is said, indeed, that owing
to some wise modifications of her fiscal regulations, mainly
in the direction of free trade (and due to Law, a minister of
Scotch birth), commerce with the East and West Indies won-
derfully increased, and that the islands of Guadeloupe and
Martinique became very rich and thriving; but both com-
merce and colonies lay at the mercy of England when war
came, for the navy fell into decay. In 1756, when things
were no longer at their worst, France had but forty-five ships*
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 7B.
of-the-liney England nearly one hundred and thirty; and
when the forty-five were to be armed and equipped, there was
found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies; not
even enough artillery. Nor was this all.
^'Lack of system in the govemmenty'' says a French writer,
*^ brought about indifference, and opened the door to disorder and lack
of discipline. Never had unjust promotions been so frequent ; so also
never had more universal discontent beeii seen. Money and intrigue
took the place of all else, and brought in their train commands and
power. Nobles and upstarts, with influence at the capital and self-
sufficiency in the seaports, thought themselves dispensed with merit
Waste of the revenues of the State and of the dock-yards knew no
bounds. Honor and modesty were turned into ridicule. As if the
evils were not thus great enough, the ministry took pains to efface the
heroic traditions of 'the past which had escaped the general wreck.
To the energeUc fights of the great reign succeeded, by order of the
court, ^affairs of circumspection.' To preserve to the wasted material
a few armed ships, increased opportunity was given to the enemy.
From this unhappy principle we were bound to a defensive as advan,
tageons to the enemy as it was foreign to the genius of our people.
This circumspection before the enemy, laid down for us by orders,
betrayed in the long run the national temper ; and the abuse of the
system led to acts of indiscipline and defection under fire, of which a
single instance would vainly be sought in the previous century.''
A false policy of continental extension swallowed up the
resources of the country, and was doubly injurious because,
by leaving defenceless its colonies and commerce, it exposed
the greatest source of wealth to be cut off, as in fact hap-
pened. The small squadrons that got to sea were destroyed
by vastly superior force; the merchant shipping was swept
away, and the colonies, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe,
India, fell into England's hands. If it did not take too much
space, interesting extracts might be made, showing the woful
misery of France, the country that had abandoned the sea,
and the growing wealth of England amid all her sacrifices
and exertions. A contemporary writer has thus expressed
his view of the policy of France at this period : —
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76
DISCUSSION OF THE
^'France, by engaging so heartily as she has done in the German
war, has drawn away so much of her attention and her revenue from
her navy that it enabled ns to give such a blow to her maritime
strength as possibly she may never be able to recover. Her engage-
ment in the German war has likewise drawn her from the defence of
her colonies, by which means we have conquered some of the most
considerable she possessed. It has withdrawn her from the protec-.
tion of her trade, by which it is entirely destroyed, while that of
England has never, in. the profonndest peace, been in so flourishing a
condition. So that, by embarking in this German war, France has
suffered herself to be undone, so far as regards her particular and
immediate quarrel with England."
In the Seven Years' War France lost thirty-seven ships-of-
tke-Iine and fifty-six frigates, — a force three times as numer-
ous as the whole navy of the United States at any time in the
days of sailing-ships. For the first time since the Middle
Ages," says a French historian, speaking of the same war,
England had conquered France single-handed, almost with-
out allies, France having powerful auxiliaries. She had con-
quered solely by the superiority of her government.'^ Yes ; but
it was by the superiority of her government using the tremen-
dous weapon of her sea power, — the reward of a consistent
policy perseveringly directed to one aim.
The profound humiliation of France, which reached its
depths between 1760 and 1768, at which latter date sho mado
peace, has an instructive lesson for the United States in this
our period of commercial and naval decadence. We have been
spared her humiliation ; let us hope to profit by her subsequent
example. Between the same years (1760 and 1763) the French
people rose, as afterward in 1798, and declared they would
have a navy. " Popular feeling, skilfully directed by the
government, took up the cry from one end of France to the
other, <The navy must be restored.' Gifts of ships were
made by cities, by corporations, and by private subscriptions.
A prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent ports ;
everywhere ships were building or repairing." This activity
was sustained ; the arsenals were replenished, the material
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
of every kind was put on a Batisfactory footiiig, the artillery
reorganized, and ten thousand trained gunners drilled and
maintained.
The tone and action of the naval officers of the day in-
stantly felt the popular impulse, for which indeed some lof-
tier spirits among them had been not only waiting but working.
At no time was greater mental and professional activity found
among French naval officers than just then, when their ships
had been suffered to rot away by governmental inaction.
Thus a prominent French officer of our own day writes : —
The sad condition of the navy in the reign of Loaia XV., by
closing to officers the brilliant career of bold enterprises and sncoess-
ful battles, forced them to fall back upon themselves. They drew
from study the knowledge they were to put to the proof some years
later, thus putting into practice tliat fine saying of Montesquieu,
'Adversity is our mother. Prosperity our step-mother.' ... By the
year 17G9 was seen in all its splendor that brilliant galaxy of officers
whose activity stretched to the ends of the earth, and who embraced
in their works and in their investigations all the branches of human
knowledge. The Acad^mie de Marine, founded in 1752, was re-
organized.*' ^
The Academic's first director, a post-captain named Bigot
de Morogues, wrote an elaborate treatise on naval tactics, the
first original work on the subject since Paul Hoste's, which it
was designed to supersede. Morogues must have been study-
ing and formulating his problems in tactics in days when
France had no fleet, and was unable so much as to raise her
head at sea under the blows of her enemy. At the same time
England had no similar book ; and an English lieutenant, in
1762, was just translating a part of Hoste's great work, omit-
ting by far the larger part It was not until nearly twenty
years later that Clerk, a Scotch private gentleman, published
an ingenious study of naval tactics, in which he pointed out
to English admirals the system by which the French had
thwarted their thoughtless and ill-combined attacks.* The
1 0<Migeard: La Marine de Guerre; Richeliea et Colbert
> Whatever may be thought of Clerk's claim to originality in constmcting a
qrttem of naval tactics, and it has been seriooslj impugned, there can be no donbt
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DISCUSSION OF THE
researches of the Acad^mie de Marine, and the energetic im-
pulse which it gave to the labors of officers, were not, as we
hope to show later, without influence upon the relatively
prosperous condition in which the navy was at the beginning
of the American wan*'
It has already been pointed out that the American War of
Independence involved a departure from England's traditional
and true policy, by committing her to a distant land war,
while powerful enemies were waiting for an opportunity to
attack her at sea. Like France in the then recent German
wars, like Napoleon later in the Spanish war, England, tlirough
undue self-confidence, was about to turn a friend into an
enemy, and so expose the real basis of her power to a rude
proof. The French government, on the other hand, avoided
the snare into which it had so often fallen. Turning her
back on the European continent, having the probability of
neutrality there, and the certainty of alliance with Spain by
her side, France advanced to the contest with a fine navy and
a brilliant, though perhaps relatively inexperienced, body of
officers. On the other side of the Atlantic she had the sup-
port of a friendly people, and of her own or allied ports, both
in the West Indies and on the continent. The wisdom of this
policy, the happy influence of this action of the government
upon her sea power, is evident ; but the details of the war
do not belong to this part of the subject.- To Americans, the
chief interest of that war is found upon the land ; but to naval
officers upon the sea, for it was essentially a sea war. Tlie
intelligent and systematic efforts of twenty years bore their
due fruit ; for though the warfare afloat ended with a great
disaster, the combined efforts of the French and Spanish fleets
undoubtedly bore down England's strength and robbed her
of her colonies. In the various naval undertakings and
battles the honor of France was upon the whole maintained ;
though it is difficult, upon consideration of the general
that hiB critidsms on the past were aomid. So far as the aathor knows, he in
this respect deserres credit for an originality remarkable in one who had the
training neither of a seaman nor of a miUtary man.
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
79
Bubjecty to avoid the conclusion that the inexperience of
French seamen as compared with English^ the narrow spirit
of jealousy shown by the noble corps of officers toward those
of different antecedents, and above all, the miserable tradi-
tions of three quarters of a century already alluded to, the
miserable policy of a government which taught them first to
save thoir ships, to economize the material, prevented French
admirals from reaping, not the mere glory, but the positive
advantages that more than once were within their grasp.
When Monk said the nation that would rule upon the sea
must always attack, he set the key-note to England's naval
policy; and had the instructions of the French government
consistently breathed the same spirit, the war of 1778 might
have ended sooner and better than it did. It seems ungra*
cious to criticise the conduct of a service to which, under God,
our nation owes tliat its birth was not a miscarriage ; but
writers of its own country abundantly reflect the spirit of the
remark. A French officer who served afloat during this war,
in a work of calm and judicial tone, says: —
"What mast the young officers have thoaght who were at Sandy
Hook with D'Estaing, at St. Christopher with De Grasse, even those
who arrived at Rhode Island with De Temay, when they saw that
these officers were not tried at their return?"^
Again, another French officer, of much later date, justifies
the opinion expressed, when speaking of the war of the
American Revolution in the following terms : —
"It was necessary to get rid of the unhappy prejudices of the
days of the regency and of Louis XV. ; but the mishaps of which they
were full were too recent to be forgotten by oar ministers. Thanks
to a wretched hesitation, fleets, which had rightly alarmed England,
became reduced to ordinary proportions. Intrenching themselves in
a false economy, the ministry claimed that, by reason of the excessive
expenses necessary to maintain the fleet, the admirals must be ordered
to maintain the *greaie$t circumspeeiionf* as though in war half
measures have not always led to disasters. So, too, the orders given
to our squadron chiefs were, to keep the sea as long as possible, with*
> La Serre : Essafs Hist, et Crit lar la Marine Franfaifle.
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80
DISCUSSION OF THE
out engaging in actions which might cause the loss of vessek difficnlt
to replace ; so that more than once complete victories, which would
have crowned the skill of our admirals aud the courage of oar cap-
tains, were changed into successes of little importance. A system
which laid down as a principle that an admiral should not use the
force in his hands, which sent him against the enemy with the fore-
ordained purpose of receiving rather than making die attack, a sys-
tem which sapped moral power to save material resources, must have
unhappy results. • • . It is certain that this deplorable system was
one of the causes of the lack of discipline and startling defections
which marked the periods of Louis XVI., of the [first] Republic, and
of the [first] Empire." ^
Within ten years of the peace of 1783 came the French
BevQlutioa ; but that great upheaval which shook the founda-
tions of States, loosed the ties of social order, and drove out
of the navy nearly all the trained officers of the monarchy
who were attached to the old state of things, did not free the
French navy from a false system. It was easier to overturn
the form of government than to uproot a deep-seated tradition.
Hear again a third French officer, of the highest rank and
literary accomplishments, speaking of the inaction of Yille-
neuve, the admiral who commanded the French rear at the
battle of the Nile, and who did not leave his anchors while
the head of the column was being destroyed : —
A day was to come [Trafalgar] in which Yilleneuve in his turn,
like De Grasse before him, and like Duchayla, would complain of
being abandoned by part of his fleet. We have come to suspect
some secret reason for this fatal coincidence. It is not natural that
among so many honorable men there should so often be found ad-
mirals and captains incurring such a reproach. If the name of some
of them is to this very day sadly associated with the memory of our
disasters, we may be sure the fault is not wholly their own. We
must rather blame the nature of the operations in which they were
engaged, and that system of defensive war prescribed by the French
government, which Pitt, in the English Parliament, proclaimed to be
the forerunner of certain ruin. That system, when we wbhed to
renounce it, had already penetrated our habits ; it had, so to say,
^ Lapeyroa8e.BoDiUs : Hist de la Marine FmnqiiM.
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
81
weakened oar arms and paraljied onr self-reliance. Too often did
our squadrons leave port with a special mission to falflli and witli tlie
intention of avoiding tlie enemy ; to bdl in with him was at once a
piece of had lack. It was thos that oar ships went into action ; they
sabmitted to it instead of forcing it • . • Fortane woald have hesi-
tated longer between the two fleets, and not have borne in the end so
heavily against oars, if Braeys, meeting Nelson half way, could have
gone oat to fight him. This fettered and timid war, which Yillaret
and Martin had carried on, had lasted long, thanks to the circamspeo
Uon of some English admirals and the traditions of the old tactics.
It was with these traditions that the battle of the Nile had broken ;
the hoar for decisive action had come."
Some yean later came Trafalgar, and again the government
of France took up a new policy with the navy. The author
last quoted speaks again : —
''The emperor, whose eagle glance traced plans of campaign for
hu fleets as for his armies, was wearied by these anezpected reverses.
He turned his eyes from the one field of battle in which fortane was
faithless to him, and decided to pursue England elsewhere than upon
the seas ; he undertook to rebuild hb navy, but without giving it any
part in the struggle which became more furious than ever. • • . Never*
theless, far from slackening, the activity of our dock-yards redoubled.
Every year ships of-the-line were either laid down or added to the
fleet. Venice and Genoa, under his control, saw their old splendors
rise again, and from the shores of the Elbe to the head of the Adriatic
all the ports of the continent emulously seconded the creative thought
of the emperor. Numerous squadrons were assembled in the Scheldt,
in Brest Roads, and in Toulon. • . . But to the end the emperor
refused to give this navy, full of ardor and self-reliance, an oppor-
tunity to measure its strength with the enemy. . • . Cast down by
constant reverses, he had kept up our armed ships only to oblige our
enemies to blockades whose enormous cost must end by exhausting
their finances.'*
When the empire fell, France had one hundred and three
shipa-of-the-lino and fifty-five frigates.
To turn now from the particular lessons drawn from the
history of the past to the general question of the influence of
> JnrieD de la Qravi^re : Qnerra MaHtimes.
6
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DISCUSSION OF THE
goyernment upon the sea career of its people^ it is seen that
that influence can work in two distinct but closely related
ways.
First, in peace: The government by its policy can favor
the natural growth of a people's industries and its tendencies
to seek adventure and gain by way of the sea ; or it can try
to develop such industries and such sea-going bent, when they
do not naturally exist ; or, on the other hand^ the government
may by mistaken action check and fetter the progress which
the people left to themselves would make. In any one of
these ways the influence of the government will be felt, mak-
ing or marring the sea power of the country in the matter of
peaceful commerce ; upon which alone, it cannot be too often
insisted, a thoroughly strong navy can be based.
Secondly, for war : The influence of the government will
be felt in its most legitimate manner in maintaining an
armed navy, of a size commensurate with the growth of its
shipping and the importance of the interests connected with
it More important even than the size of the navy is the
question of its institutions, favoring a healthful spirit and
activity, and providing for rapid development in time of war
by an adequate reserve of men and of ships and by measures
for drawing out that general reserve power which has before
been pointed to, when considering the character and pursuits
of the people. Undoubtedly under this second head of war-
like preparation must come the maintenance of suitable naval
stations, in those distant parts of the world to which the
armed shipping must follow the peaceful vessels of commerce.
The protection of such stations must depend either upon
direct military force, as do Gibraltar and Malta, or upon a
surrounding friendly population, such as the American colo-
nists once were to England, and, it may be presumed, the
Australian colonists now are. Such friendly surroundings
and backing, joined to a reasonable military provision, are
the best of defences, and when combined with decided pre-
ponderance at sea, make a scattered and extensive empire,
like that of England, secure; for while it is true that an
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
anexpected attack may cause disaster in some one quarter,
the actual superioritj of naval power pi*events such disaster
from being general or irremediable. History has sufficiently
proved this. England's naval bases have been in all parts
of the world; and her fleefcs have at once protected them,
kept open the communications between them, and relied upon
them for shelter.
Colonies attached to the mother-country afford, therefore,
the surest means of supporting abroad the sea power of a y
country. In peace, the influence of the government should
be felt in promoting by all means a warmth of attachment
and a unity of interest which will make the welfare of one
the welfare of all, and the quarrel of one the quarrel of all ;
and in war, or rather for war, by inducing such measures
of organization and defence as shall be felt by all to be a fair
distribution of a burden of which each reaps the benefit.
Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely
to have. As regards purely military naval stations, the
feeling of her people was probably accurately expressed by
an historian of the English navy a hundred years ago, speak-
ing then of Gibraltar and Port Mabon. Military govern-
ments," said he, agree so little with the industry of a
trading people, and are in themselves so repugnant to the
genius of the British people, that I do not wonder that men of
good sense and of all parties have inclined to give up these,
as Tangiers was given up." Having therefore no foreign es-
tablishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of
the United States, in war, will be like land birds, unable to
fly far from their own shores. To provide resting-places for
them, where they can coal and repair, would be one of the
first duties of a government proposing to itself the develop-
ment of the power of the nation at sea.
As the practical object of this inquiry is to draw from the
lessons of history inferences applicable to one's own country
and service, it is proper now to ask how far the conditions of
the United States involve serious danger, and call for action
on the part of the government, in order to build again hei*
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sea power. It will not be too much to say that the action of
the government since the Oivil War, and up to this day, has
been effectively directed solely to what has been called the
first link in the chain which makes sea power. Internal
development, great production, with the accompanying aim
and boast of self-sufficingness, such has been the object, such
to some extent the result. In this the government has faith-
fully reflected the bent of the controlling elements of the
country, though it is not always easy to feel that such con-
trolling elements are truly representative, even in a free
country. However that may be, there is no doubt that,
besides having no colonies, the intermediate link of a peaceful
shipping, and the interests involved in it, are now likewise
lacking. In short, the United States has only one link of
the three.
The circumstances of naval war have changed so much
within the last hundred years, that it may be doubted whether
such disastrous effects on the one baud, or such brilliant
prosperity on the other, as were seen in the wars l>etween
England and France, could now recur. In her secure and
haughty sway of the seas England imposed a yoke on neu-
trals which will never again be borne ; and the principle that
the flag covers the goods is forever secured. The commerce
of a belligerent can therefore now be safely carried on in
neutral ships, except when contraband of war or to blockaded
ports ; and as regards the latter, it is also certain that there
will be no more paper blockades. Putting aside therefore the
question of defending her seaports from capture or contribu-
tion, as to which there is practical unanimity in theory and
entire indifference in practice, what need has the United
States of sea power ? Her commerce is even now carried on
by others ; why should her people desire that which, if pos-
sessed, must be defended at great cost? So far as this ques-
tion is economical, it is outside the scope of this work ; but
conditions which may entail suffering and loss on the country
by war are directly pertinent to it. Granting therefore that
the foreign trade of the United States, going and coming, is
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
86
on board shipd which an enemy cannot touch except when
bound to a blockaded port, what will constitute an efficient
blockade? The present definition is, that it is such as to
constitute a manifest danger to a vessel seeking to enter or
leave the port. This is evidently very elastic. Many can re-
member that during the Civil War, after a night attack on the
United States fleet off Charleston, the Confederates next morn-
ing sent out a steamer with some foreign consuls on board,
who so far satisfied themselves that no blockading vessel
was in sight that they issued a declaration to that effect.
On the strength of this declaration some Southern authorities
claimed that the blockade was technically broken, and could
not be technically re-established without a new notification.
Is it necessary, to constitute a real danger to blockade-
runners, that the blockading fleet should be in sight ? Half
a dozen fast steamers, cruising twenty miles off-shore between
the New Jersey and Long Island coast, would be a very real
danger to ships seeking to go in or out by the principal
entrance to New York; and similar positions might effeo-
tively blockade Boston, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake.
The main body of the blockading fleet, prepared not only to
capture merchant>ships but to resist military attempts to
break the blockade, need not be within sight, nor in a posi-
tion known to the shore. The bulk of Nelson's fleet was fifty
miles from Cadiz two days before Trafalgar, with a small
detachment watching close to the harbor. The allied fleet
began to got under way at 7 A.M., and Nelson, even under
the conditions of those days, knew it by 9.80. The English
fleet at that distance was a very real danger to its enemy. It
seems possible, in these days of submarine telegraphs, that
the blockading forces inH9hore and off-shore, and from one
port to another, might be in telegraphic communication with
one another along the whole coast of the United States,
readily giving mutual support; and if, by some fortunate
military combination, one detachment were attacked in force,
it could warn the others and retreat upon them. Oranting
that such a blockade off one port were broken on one day, by
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DISCUSSION OF THE
fairly driving away the ships maintaining it, the notification
of its bemg re-established could be cabled all oyer the world
the next. To avoid such blockades there must be a military
force afloat that will at all times so endanger a blockading
fleet that it can by no means keep its place. Then neutral
ships, except those laden with contraband of war, can come
and go freely, and maintain the commercial relations of the
country with the world outside.
It may be urged that, with the extensive sea-coast of the
United States, a blockade of the whole line cannot be effec-
tively kept up. No one will more readily concede this than
officers who remember how the blockade of the Southern
coast alone was maintained. But in the present condition of
the navy, and, it may be added, with any additions not ex*
ceeding those so far proposed by the governmeut,^ tlie attempt
to blockade Boston, New York, the Delaware, the Chesapeake,
and the Mississippi, in other words, the great centres of
export and import, would not entail upon one of the large
maritime nations efforts greater than have been made before.
England has at the same time blockaded Brest, the Biscay
coast, Toulon, and Cadiz, when there were powerful squadrons
lying within the harbors. It is true that commerce in neutral
ships can then enter other ports of the United States than
those named ; but what a dislocation of the carrying traffic of
the country, what failure of supplies at times, what inadequate
means of transport by rail or water, of dockage, of lighterage,
of warehousing, will be involved in such an enforced change
of the ports of entry! Will there be no money loss, no
suffering, consequent upon this ? And when with much pain
and expense these evils have been partially remedied, the
enemy may be led to stop the new inlets as ho did the old.
The people of the United States will certainly not starve, but
they may suffer grievously. As for supplies which are con-
traband of war, is there not reason to fear that the United
1 Since the aboTe wm written, the aecretaiy of the nary, in his report for
1889^ hae recommended ft fleet which would make ench a blockade aa here eug-
geBted very hasardona.
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
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States ifl not now able to go alone if an emergency ehould
arise?
The question is eminently one in which the influence of the '
government should make itself felt, to build up for the nation
a navy which, if not capable of reaching distant countries,
shall at least be able to keep clear the chief approaches to its
own. The eyes of the country have for a quarter of a cen-
tury been turned from the sea ; the results of such a policy
and of its opposite will be shown in the instance of France
and of England. Without asserting a narrow parallelism be^
tween tlie case of the United States and either of these, it
may safely be said tliat it is essential to the welfare of the
whole country that the conditions of trade and commerce
should remain, as far as possible, unaffected by an external
war. In order to do this, the enemy must bo kept not only
out of our ports, but far away from our coasts.^
Can this navy be had without restoring the merchant skip-
1 The word "defence" in wmr inroWeB two ideas, which for the sake of pre-
cision in thought should be kept separated in the mind. There is defence pnre
and simple, which strengthens itself and awaits attack. This may be called
passive defence. On the other hand, there is a yiew of defence which asserts
that safety for one's self, the real object of defensire preparation, is best secored
by attacking the enemy. In the matter of sespcoost defence, the former method
is exemplified by stationary fortifications, submarine mines, and generally aU
immobile works destined simply to stop an enemy if he tries to enter. The
second method comprises all those means and weapons which do not wait for
attack, but go to meet the enemy's fleet, whether it be but for a few miles, or
whether to his own shores. Such a defence may seem to be reaUy ofEensire war,
but it is not; it becomes offensive only when its object of attack is changed
from the enemy's fleet to the enemy's country. England defended her own
coasts and colonies by stationing her fleets oflp the French ports, to flght the
French fleet if it came out The United States in the CItU War stationed her
fleets off the Southern ports, not because she feared for her own, but to break
down the Confederacy by isolation from the rest of the world, and ultimately by
attacking the ports. The methods were the same; but the purpose in one case
was defensire, in the other offensive.
The confusion of the two ideas leads to much unnecessary wrangling as to
the proper sphere of army and navy in coast^efence. Passive defences belong
to the army; everything that moves in the water to the navy, which has the
prerogative of the offensive defence. If seamen are used to garrison forts, they
become part of the land forces, as surely as troops, when embarked as part of
the complement, become part of the sea forces.
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DISCUSSION OF THE
ping ? It is doubtful. History has proved that such a pureijr
military sea power can be built up by a despot, as was done
by Louis XIY. ; but though so fair seeming, experience
showed that his navy was like a growth which having no root
soon withers away. But in a representative government any
military expenditure must have a strongly represented in-
terest behind it, convinced of its necessity. Such an interest
in sea power does not exist, cannot exist here without action
by the government. How such a merchant shipping should
be built up, whether by subsidies or by free trade, by constant
administration of tonics or by free movement in the open air,
is not a military but an economical question. Even had the
United States a great national shipping, it may be doubted
whether a sufficient navy would follow ; the distance which
separates her from other great powers, in one way a protec*
tion, is also a snare. The motive, if any there be, which will
give the United States a navy, is probably now quickening in
the Central American Isthmus. I4et us hope it will not come
to the birth too late.
Here concludes the general discussion of the principal
elements which affect, favorably or unfavorably, the growth
of sea power in nations. The aim has been, first to consider
those elements in their natural tendency for or against, and
then to illustrate by particular examples and by the ex-
perience of the past. Such discussions, while undoubtedly
embracing a wider field, yet fall mainly within the province
of strategy, as distinguished from tactics. The considera-
tions and principles which enter into them belong to the
unchangeable, or unchanging, order of things, remaining the
same, in cause and effect, from age to age. They belong,
as it were, to the Order of Nature, of whose stability so
much is heard in our day; whereas tactics, using as its
instruments the weapons made by man, shares in the change
and progress of the race from generation to generation.
From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be
altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of
strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock. There
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ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
will next be examined the general history of Europe and
America, with particular reference to the effect exercised
upon that history, and upon the welfare of tlie people, by
sea i)ower in its broad sense. From time to time, as occasion
offers, the aim will be to recall and reinforce the general
teaching, already elicited, by particular illustrations. The
general tenor of the study will therefore be strategical, in
that broad definition of naval strategy which has before
been quoted and accepted : Naval strategy has for its end
to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war,
the sea power of a country.'' In the matter of particular
battles, while freely admitting that the change of details y
has made obsolete much of their teaching, the attempt will
be made to point out where the application or neglect of
true general principles has produced decisive effects; and,
other things being equal, those actions will be preferred
which, from their association with the names of the most
distinguished officers, may be presumed to show how far
just tactical ideas obtained in a particular age or a particular
service. It will also be desirable, where analogies between
ancient and modem weapons appear on the surface, to derive
such probable lessons as they offer, without laying undue
stress upon the points of resemblance. Finally, it must be
remembered that, among all changes, the nature of man
remains much the same; the personal equation, though
uncertain in quantity and quality in the particular instancci
is sure always to be found.
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8tatb or EuROFB in 1660. — Skcond Anglo-Dutch War, 1666-1667.
Sea Battlss or Lowsbtoft and or The Foub Days.
^HE period at which our historical suryej is to begin has
been loosely stated as the middle of the seventeenth
century. The year 1660 will now be taken as the definite
date at which to open. In May of that year Charles IL
was restored to the English throne amid the general rejoic-
ing of the people. In March of the following year, upon
the death of Cardinal Mazariny Louis XIY. assembled his
ministers and said to them : I have summoned you to tell
you that it has pleased me hitherto to permit my affairs
to be governed by the late cardinal; I shall in future be
my own prime minister. I direct that no decree be sealed
except by my orders, and I order the secretaries of State
and the superintendent of tlie finances to sign nothing with-
out my command." The personal government thus assumed
was maintained) in fact as well as in name, for over half a
century.
Within one twelvemonth then are seen, setting forward upon
a new stage of national life, after a period of confusion more
or less prolonged, the two States which, amid whatever in*
equalities, have had the first places in the sea history of modern
Europe and America, indeed, of the world at large. Sea history,
however, is but one factor in that general advance and decay
of nations which is called their history ; and if sight be lost
of the other factors to which it is so closely related, a dis-
torted view, either exaggerated or the reverse, of its im-
portance will be formed. It is with the belief that that
importance is vastly underrated, if not practically lost sight
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STATE OF EUROPE JN 1660.
91
of 9 by people unconnected with the eea, and particularly by
the people of the United States in our own day, that this
study has been undertaken.
The date taken, 1660, followed closely another which
marked a great settlement of European affairs, setting the
seal of treaty upon the results of a general war, known to
history as the Thirty Tears' War. This other date was that
of the Treaty of Westphalia, or Munster, in 1648. In this
the independence of the Dutch United Provinces, long before
practically assured, was formally acknowledged by Spain ; and
it being followed in 1659 by the Treaty of the Pyrenees be*
tween France and Spain, the two gave to Europe a state of
general external peace, destined soon to be followed by a
series of almost universal wars, which lasted as long as
Louis XIV. lived, — wars which were to induce profound
changes in the map of Europe; during which new States
were to arise, others to decay, and all to undergo large
modifications, either in extent of dominion or in political
power. In these results maritime power, directly or indi*
rectly, had a great share.
We must first look at the general condition of European
States at the time from which the narrative starts. In the
struggles, extending over nearly a century, whose end is
marked by the Peace of Westphalia, the royal family known
as the House of Austria had been the great overwhelm-
ing power which all others feared. During the long reign
of the Emperor Charles Y., who abdicated a century before,
the head of that house had united in his own person the
two crowns of Austria and Spain, which carried with them,
among other possessions, the countries we now know as Hoi-
land and Belgium, together with a preponderating influence
in Italy. After his abdication the two great monarchies of
Austria and Spain were separated; but though ruled by
different persons, they were still in the same family, and
tended toward that unity of aim and sympathy which marked
dynastic connections in that and the following century. To
this bond of union was added that of a common religion.
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.
During the centurj before the Peace of Westphalia, tlie ex«
tension of family power, and the extension of the religion
professed) were the two strongest motives of political action.
This was the period of the great religious wars which arrayed
nation against nation, principality against principality, and
often, in the same nation, faction against faction. Religious
persecution caused the revolt of the Protestant Dutch Prov-
inces against Spain, which issued, after eighty years of more
or less constant war, in the recognition of their independ-
ence. Religious discord, amounting to civil war at times,
distracted France during the greater part of the same
period, profoundly affecting not only her internal but her
external policy. These were the days of St. Bartholomew,
of the religious murder of Henry lY., of the siege of La
Rochelle, of constant intriguing between Roman Catholic
Spain and Roman Catholic Frenchmen. As tlie religious
motive, acting in a sphere to which it did not naturally
belong, and in which it had no rightful place, died away,
the political necessities and interests of States began to
have juster weight; not that they had been wholly lost
sight of in the mean time, but the religious animosities had
either blinded the eyes, or fettered the action, of statesmen.
It was natural that in France, one of the greatest sufferers
from religious passions, owing to the number and character
of the Protestant minority, this reaction should first and
most markedly be seen. Placed between Spain and the
German States, among which Austria stood foremost with-
out a rival, internal union and checks upon the power of
the House of Austria were necessities of political existence.
Happily, Providence raised up to her in close succession two
great rulers, Henry lY. and Richelieu, — men in whom religion
fell short of bigotry, and who, when forced to recognize it
in the sphere of politics, did so as masters and not as slaves.
Under them French statesmanship received a guidance, which
Richelieu formulated as a tradition, and which moved on the
following general'lines, — (1) Internal union of the kingdom,
appeasing or putting down religious strife and centralizing
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STATE OF EUROPE IN leSO.
authority in the king; (2) Besistance to the power of the
House of Austria, which actually and necessarily carried with
it alliance with Protestant German States and with Holland ;
(8) Extension of the botmdaries of France to the eastward, at
the expense mainly of Spain, which then possessed not only the
present Belgium, but other provinces long since incorporated
with France ; and (4) The creation and development of a great
sea power, adding to the wealth of the kingdom, and intended
specially to make head against France's hereditary enemy, Eng*
land; for which end again the alliance with Holland was to
be kept in view. Such were the broad outlines of policy laid .
down by statesmen in the front rank of genius for the guid-
ance of that country whose people have, not without cause^
claimed to be the most complete exponent of European
civilization, foremost in the march of progress, combining
political advance with individual development. This tradi** '
tion, carried on by Mazarin, was received from him by
Louis XIV. ; it will be seen how far he was faithful to it,
and what were the results to France of his action. Mean-
while it may be noted that of these four elements necessary
to the greatness of France, sea power was one ; and as the
second and third were practically one in the means employed^
it may bo said that sea power was one of the two great means
by which France's external greatness was to be maintained.
England on the sea, Austria on the land, indicated th#
direction that French effort was to take.
As regards the condition of France in 1660, and her readi*
ness to move onward in the road marked by Richelieu, it may
be said that internal peace was secured, the power of the
nobles wholly broken, religious discords at rest ; the tolerant
edict of Nantes was still in force, while the remaining Prot-
estant discontent had been put down by the armed hand.
All power was absolutely centred in the throne. In other
respects, though the kingdom was at peace, the condition was
less satisfactory. There was practically no navy ; commerce,
internal and external, was not prosperous ; the finances were
in disorder ; the army small
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STATE OF EUROPE IN im.
Spain, the nation before which all others had trembled less
than a century before, was now long in decay and scarcely
formidable; the central weakness had spread to all parts
of the administration. In extent of territory, however, she
was still great. The Spanish Netherlands still belonged to
her ; she held Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia ; Gibraltar had not
yet fallen into English hands ; her vast possessions in Amer-
ica— with the exception of Jamaica, conquered by England
a few years before — were still untouched. The condition
of her sea power, both for peace and war, has been already
alluded to. Many years before, Richelieu had contracted a
temporary alliance with Spain, by virtue of which she placed
forty ships at his disposal ; but the bad condition of the ves-
sels, for the most part ill armed and ill commanded, com-
pelled their withdrawal. The navy of Spain was then in full
decay, and its weakness did not escape the piercing eye of the
cardinal. An encounter which took place between tiie Span-
ish and Dutch fleets in 1689 shows most plainly the state of
degradation into which this once proud navy had fallen.
^ Her navy at this time," says the narrative quoted, met one of
those shocks, a succession of which during this war degraded her
from her high station of mistress of the seas in both hemispheres,
to a contemptible rank among maritime powers. The king was
fitting oat a powerful fleet to carry the war to the coasts of Sweden,
and for its equipment had commanded a reinforcement of men and
provisions to be sent from Dunkirk. A fleet accordingly set sail,
but were attacked by Yon Tromp, some captured, the remainder
forced to retire within the harbor again. Soon after, Tromp seized
three English [neutral] ships carrying 1070 Spanish soldiers from
Cadiz to Dunkirk ; he took the troops out, but let the ships go free.
Leaving seventeen vessels to blockade Dunkirk, Tromp with the re-
maining twelve advanced to meet the enemy's fleet on its arrival. It
was soon seen entering the Straits of Dover to the number of sixty-
seven sail, and having two thousand troops. Being joined by De
Witt with four more ships, Tromp with his small force made a reso-
lute attack upon the enemy. The fight lasted till four p.m., when the
Spanish admiral took refuge in the Downs. Tromp determined to
engage if they should come out; but Oquendo with his powerful
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1960.
96
fleety nuuiy of which carried from sixty to a handred guns, saffered
himself to be blockaded ; and the English admiral told Tromp he was
ordered to join the Spaniards if hostilities began. Tromp sent home
for instructions, and the action of England only served to call out
the vast maritime powers of the Dutch. Tromp was rapidly rein-
forced to ninety-six saU and twelve fire-ships, and ordered to attack.
Leaving a detached squadron to observe the English, and to attack
them if they helped the Spaniards, he began the fight embarrassed by
a thick fog, under cover of which the Spaniards cut their cables to
escape. Many running too dose to shore went aground, and most
of the remainder attempting to retreat were sunk, captured, or driven
on the French coast Never was victory more complete." ^
When a navy submits to such a line of action, all tone and
pride must have departed ; but the navy only shared in the
general decline which made Spain henceforward have an
ever lessening weight in the policy of Europe.
In the midst of the splendors of her court and language,** says
Guizot, the Spanish government felt itself weak, and sought to hide
its weakness under its immobility. Philip IV. and his minister,
weary of striving only to be conquered, looked but for the security
of peace, and only sought to put aside all questions which would call
for efforts of which they felt themselves incapable. Divided and
enervated, the house of Austria had even less ambition than power,
and except when absolutely forced, a pompous inertia became the
policy of the successors of Charles Y.'^'
Such was the Spain of that day. That part of the Spanish
dominions which was then known as the Low Countries, or
the Roman Catholic Netherlands (our modem Belgium), was
about to be a fruitful source of variance between France and
her natural ally, the Dutch Republic. This State, whose
political name was the United Provinces, had now reached
the summit of its influence and power, — a power based, as
has already been explained, wholly upon the sea, and upon
the use of that element made by the great maritime and com-
mercial genius of the Dutch people. A recent French author
1 Paries: History of Holland.
* B^pnbliqiw d'Angletem.
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.
thus describes the commercial and colonial conditions, at the
accession of Louis XIY., of this people, which beyond any
other in modem times, save only England, has shown how
the harvest of the sea can lift up to wealth and power a
country intrinsically weak and without resources : —
Holland had become the Phoenicia of modem times. Mistresses
of the Scheldt, the United Provinces closed the outlets of Antwerp
to the sea, and inherited the commercial power of that rich city,
which an ambassador of Venice in the fifteenth century had compared
to Venice herself. They received besides in their principal cities the
workingmen of the Low Countries who fled from Spanish tyranny
of conscience. The manufactures of clothes, linen stuffs, etc., which
employed six hundred thousand souls, opened new sources of gain to
a people previously content with the trade in cheese and fish. Fish-
eries alone had already enriched them. The herring fishery supported
nearly one fifth of the population of Holland, producing three hun-
dred thousand tons of salt-fish, and bringing in more than eight
million francs annually.
''The naval and commercial power of the republic developed
rapidly. The merchant fieet of Holland alone numbered 10,000
sail, 168,000 seamen, and supported 260,000 inhabitanto. She had
taken possession of the greater part of the European carrying-trade,
and had added thereto, since the peace, all the carriage of mer
chandise between America and Spain, did the same service for the
French ports, and maintained an importation traffic of thirty-six
million francs. The north countries, Brandenburg, Denmark, Swe^
den, Muscovy, Poland, access to which was opened by the Baltic to
the Provinces, were for them an inexhaustible market of exchange.
They fed it by the produce they sold there, and by purchase of the
products of the North, — wheat, timber, copper, hemp, and furs.
The total value of merchandise yearly shipped in Dutch bottoms, in
all seas, exceeded a thousand million francs. The Dutch had made
themselves, to use a contemporary phrase, the wagoners of all seas." ^
It was through its colonies that the republic had been able
thus to develop its sea trade. It had the monopoly of all the
products of the East. Produce and spices from Asia were
by her brought to Europe of a yearly value of sixteen million
> Leftm-Pontalifl : Jmd de Witt.
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.
97
francs. The powerful East India Gompanj, founded in 1602,
had built up in Asia an empire, with possessions taken from
the Portuguese. Mistress in 1660 of tiie Cape of Good Hope,
which guaranteed it a stopping-place for its ships, it reigned
as a sovereign in Ceylon, and upon the coasts of Malabar and
Goromandel. It had made Batavia its seat of government,
and extended its traffic to China and Japan. Meanwhile the
West India Company, of more rapid rise, but less durable,
had manned eight hundred ships of war and trade. It had
used them to seize the remnants of Portuguese power upon
the shores of Guinea, as well as in Brazil.
Tlie United Provinces had thus become the warehouse
wherein were collected the products of all nations.
The colonies of the Dutch at this time were scattered
througliout the eastern seas, in India, in Malacca, in Java, the
Moluccas, and various parts of the vast archipelago lying to
the nortliward of Australia. They had possessions oft the
west coast of Africa, and as yet the colony of New Amster-
dam remained in tlieir liands. In South America the Dutch
West India Company had owned nearly three hundred leagues
of coast from Bahia in Brazil northward; but much had
recently escaped from their hands.
The United Provinces owed their consideration and power
to their wealth and their fleets. The sea, which beats lilce
an inveterate enemy against their shores, had been subdued
and made a useful servant; the land was to prove their
destruction. A loug and fierce strife had been maintained
with an enemy more cruel than the sea, — the Spanish king-
dom ; the successful ending, with its delusive promise of rest
and peace, but sounded the knell of the Dutch Republic. So
long as the power of Spain remained unimpaired, or at least
great enough to keep up the terror that she had long inspired,
it was to the interest of England and of France, both sufferers
from Spanish menace and intrigue, that the United Prov-
inces should be strong and independent. When Spain fell, —
and repeated humiliations showed that tier weakness was
real and not seeming, — other motives took the place of fear.
7
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.
England coveted Holland's trade and sea dominion ; France
desired the Spanish Netherlands. The United Provinces had
reason to oppose the latter as well as the former.
Under the combined assaults of the two rival nations, the
intrinsic weakness of the United Provinces was soon to be
felt and seen. Open to attack hj the land, few in numbers,
and with a government ill adapted to put forth the united
strength of a people, above all unfitted to keep up adequate
preparation for war, the decline of the republic and the nation
was to be more striking and rapid than the rise. As yet,
however, in 1660, no indications of the coming fall were
remarked. The republic was still in the front rank of the
great powers of Europe. If, in 1654, the war with England
bad shown a state of unreadiness wonderful in a navy that
had so long humbled the pride of Spain on the seas, on the
other hand the Provinces, in 1657, had effectually put a stop
to the insults of France directed against her commerce ; and
a year later, by their interference in the Baltic between
Denmark and Sweden, they had hindered Sweden from es*
tablishing in the North a preponderance disastrous to them.
They forced her to leave open tlie entrance to the Baltic, of
which they remained masters, no other navy being able to
dispute its control with them. The superiority of their fleet,
the valor of their troops, the skill and firmness of their
diplomacy, had caused the prestige of their government to bo
recognized. Weakened and humiliated by the last English
war, they bad replaced themselves in the rank of great
powers. At this moment Charles II. was restored."
The general character of the government has been before
mentioned, and need here only be recalled. It was a loosely
knit confederacy, administered by what may not inaccurately
be called a commercial aristocracy, with all the political
timidity of that class, which has so much to risk in war. The
effect of these two factors, sectional jealousy and commercial
spirit, upon the military navy was disastrous. It was not
kept up properly in peace, there were necessarily rivalries in
a fleet which was rather a maritime coalition than a united
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99
navy, and ihere was too little of a true military Bpirit among
the officers. A more heroic people than the Datch never
existed; the annals of Dutch sesrfights give instances of
desperate enterprise and endurance certainly not excelled,
perhaps never equalled, elsewhere; but they also exhibit
instances of defection and misconduct which show a lack
of military spirit, due evidently to lack of professional pride
and training. This professional training scarcely existed in
any navy of that day, but its place was largely supplied in
monarchical countries by the feeling of a military caste. It
remains to be noted that the government, weak enough
from the causes named, was yet weaker from the division
of the i)eople into two great factions bitterly hating each
otlier. The one, which was the party of the merchants
(burgomasters), and now in power, favored the confederate
republic as described ; the other desired a monarchical gov-
ernment under the House of Orange. The Republican party
wished for a French alliance, if possible, and a strong navy ;
the Orange party favored England, to whose royal house the
Prince of Orange was closely related, and a powerful army.
Under these conditions of government, and weak in numbers,
the United Provinces in 1660, with their vast wealth and ex-
ternal activities, resembled a man kept up by stimulants.
Factitious strength cannot endure indefinitely; but it is
wonderful to see this small State, weaker by far in numbers
than either England or France, endure the onslaught of either
singly, and for two years of both in alliance, not only without
being destroyed, but without losing her place in Europe. She
owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two
meu, but mainly to her sea power.
The conditions of England, with reference to her fitness to
enter upon the impending strife, differed from those of both
Holland and France. Although monarchical in government,
and with much real power in the king's hands, the latter was
not able to direct the policy of the kingdom wholly at his
will. He had to reckon, as Louis had not, with the temper
and wishes of his people. What Louis gained for France,
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.
he gained for himself; the glory of France was hie glory.
Charles aimed first at his own advantage, then at that of
England ; but, with the memory of the past ever before him,
he was determined above all not to incur his father's fate
nor a repetition of his own exile. Therefore, when danger
became imminent, he gave way before the feeling of the
English nation. Oharles himself hated Holland ; he hated
it as a republic ; he hated the existing government because
opposed in internal affairs to his connections, the House of
Orange ; and he hated it yet more because in the days of his
exUe, the republic, as one of the conditions of peace with
Cromwell, had driven him from her borders. He was drawn
to France by the political sympathy of a would-be absolute
ruler, possibly by his Roman Catholic bias, and very largely
by the money paid him by Louis, which partially freed him
from the control of Parliament In following these tenden-
cies of his own, Charles had to take account of certain de-
cided wishes of his people. The English, of the same race as
the Dutch, and with similar conditions of situation, were
declai*ed rivals for the control of the sea and of commerce ;
and as the Dutch were now leading in the race, the. English
were the more eager and bitter. A special cause of grievance
was found in the action of the Dutch East India Company,
which claimed the monopoly of trade in the East, and had
obliged distant princes with whom it treated to close their
States to foreign nations, who were thus excluded, not only
from the Dutch colonies, but from all the territory of the
Indies.'' Conscious of greater strength, the English also
wished to control the action of Dutch politics, and in the
days of the English Republic had even sought to impose
a union of the two goveiiiments. At the first, therefore,
popular rivalry and enmity seconded the king's wishes ; the
more so as France had not for some years been formidable
on the continent. As soon, however, as the aggressive policy
of Louis XIY. was generally recognized, the English people,
both nobles and commons, felt the great danger to be there,
as a century before it had been in Spain. The transfer of the
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STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660. 101
Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) to France would tend toward
the subjection of Europe, and especially would be a blow to
the sea power both of tiie Dutch and English ; for it was not
to be supposed that Louis would allow the Scheldt and port of
Antwerp to remain closed, as they then were, under a treaty
wrung by the Dutch from the weakness of Spain. The re-
opening to commerce of that great city would be a blow alike
to Amsterdam and to London. With the revival of inherited
opposition to France the ties of kindred began to tell ; the
memory of past alliance against the tyranny of Spain was
recalled; and similarity of religious faith, still a powerful
motive, drew the two together. At the same time the great
and systematic efforts of Colbert to build up the commerce
and the navy of France excited the jealousy of both the sea
powers ; rivals themselves, they instinctively turned against
a third party intruding upon their domain. Charles was
unable to resist the pressure of his people under all tliese
motives; wars between England and Holland ceased, and
were followed, after Charleses death, by close alliance.
Although her commerce was loss extensive, the navy of
England in 1660 was superior to that of Holland, particu-
larly in organization and efficiency. The stern, enthusiastic
religious government of Cromwell, grounded on military
strength, had made its mark both on the fleet and army.
The names of several of the superior officers under the Pro-
tector, among which that of Honk stands foremost, appear
in the narrative of the first of the Dutch wars under Charles.
This superiority in tone and discipline gradually disappeared
under the corrupting influence of court favor in a licentious
government; and Holland, which upon the whole was
worsted by England alone upon the sea in 1665, successfully
resisted the combined navies of England and France in 1672.
As regards the material of the three fleets, we are told that
the French ships had greater displacement than the English
relatively to the weight of artillery and stores ; hence they
could keep, when fully loaded, a greater height of battery.
Their hulls also had better lines. Tliese advantages would
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102
STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.
natarally follow from the thoughtful and systematic way in
which the French navy at that time was restored from a
state of decay, and has a lesson of hope for us in the present
analogous condition of our own nayy. The Dutch ships, from
the character of their coast, were flatter-bottomed and of less
draught, and thus were able, when pressed, to find a refuge
among the shoals; but they were in consequence less
weatherly and generally of lighter scantling than those of
cither of the other nations.
Thus as briefly as possible have been sketched the condi-
tions, degree of power, and aims which shaped and controlled
the policy of the four principal seaboard States of the day, —
Spain, France, England, and Holland. From the point of
yiew of this history, these will come most prominently and
most often into notice ; but as other States exercised a power-
ful influence upon the course of eyents, and our aim is not
merely nayal history but an appreciation of the effect of
nayal and commercial power upon the course of general
history, it is necessary to state shortly the condition of the
rest of Europe. America had not yet begun to play a promi-
nent part in the pages of history or in the policies of
cabinets.
Germany was then diyided into many small goyernments,
with the one great empire of Austria. The policy of the
smaller States shifted, and it was the aim of France to com-
bine as many of them as possible under her influence^ in
pursuance of her traditional opposition to Austria. With
France thus working against her on the one side, Austria
was in imminent peril on the other from the constant assaults
of the Turkish Empire, still yigorous though decaying. The
policy of France had long inclined to friendly relations with
Turkey, not only as a check upon Austria, but also from her
wish to engross the trade with the Leyant. Colbert, in his
extreme eagerness for the sea power of France, fayored this
alliance. It will be remembered that Oreece and Egypt were
then parts of the Turkish Empire.
Prussia as now known did not exist. The foundations of
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103
the future kingdom were then being prepared bj the Elector
of Brandenburg, a powerful minor State, which was not yet
able to stand quite alone, but carefully avoided a formally
dependent position. The kingdom of Poland still existed, a
most disturbing and important factor in European politics,
because of its weak and unsettled government, which kept
every other State anxious lest some unforeseen turn of events
there should tend to the advantage of a rival. It was the
traditional policy of France to keep Poland upright and
strong. Russia was still below the horizon ; coming, but not
yet come, within the circle of European States and their living
interests. She and the other powers bordering upon the
Baltic were naturally rivals for preponderance in that sea,
in which the other States, and above all the maritime States,
had a particular interest as the source from which naval
stores of every kind were chiefly drawn. Sweden and Den-
mark were at this time in a state of constant enmity, and
were to be found on opposite sides in the quarrels that pre-
vailed. For many years past, and during the early wars of
Louis XIY., Sweden was for the most part in alliance with
France; her bias was that way.
The general state of Europe being as described, the spring
that was to set the various wheels in motion was in the hands
of Louis XIY. The weakness of his immediate neighbors, the
great resources of his kingdom, only waiting for development,
the unity of direction resulting from his absolute power, his
own practical talent and untiring industry, aided during the
first half of his reign by a combination of ministers of singular
ability, all united to make every government in Europe hang
more or less upon his action, and be determined by, if not
follow, his lead. The greatness of France was his object, and
he had the choice of advancing it by either of two roads, — by
the land or by the sea ; not that the one wholly forbade the
other, but that France, overwhelmingly strong as she then
was, had not power to move with equal steps on both paths.
Louis chose extension by land. He had married the eldest
daughter of Philip IV., the then reigning king of Spain ; and
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POLICY OF LOUIS XIV.
though by the treaty of marriage she had renounced all claim
to her father's inheritance, it was not difficult to find reasons
for disregarding this stipulation. Technical grounds were
found for setting it aside as regarded certain portions of the
Netherlands and Franche Comt^, and negotiations were
entered into with the court of Spain to annul it altogether.
The matter was the more important because the male heir to
the throne was so feeble that it was evident that the Austrian
line of Spanish kings would end in him. The desire to put a
French prince on the Spanish throne — either himself , thus
uniting the two crowns, or else one of his family, thus putting
the House of Bourbon in authority on both sides of the Pyre-
nees was the false light which led Louis astray during the
rest of his reign, to the final destruction of the sea power of
France and the impoyerishment and misery of his people.
Louis failed to understand that he had to reckon with all
Europe. The direct project on the Spanish throne had to
wait for a vacancy ; but he got ready at once to move upon the
Spanish possessions to the east of France.
Li order to do this more effectually, he cut off from Spain
every possible ally by skilful diplomatic intrigues, the study
of which would give a useful illustration of strategy in the
realm of politics, but he made two serious mistakes to the
injuiy of the sea power of France. Portugal had until twenty
years before been united to the crown of Spain, and the
claim to it had not been surrendered. Louis considered that
were Spain to regain that kingdom she would be too strong
for him easily to carry out his aims. Among other means
of prevention he promoted a marriage between Charles II.
and the Infanta of Poii;ugal, in consequence of which Portu-
gal ceded to England, Bombay in India, and Tangiers in the
Straits of Oibraltar, which was reputed an excellent port.
We see here a French king, in his eagerness for extension by
land, inviting England to the Mediterranean, and forwarding
her alliance with Poii;ugal. The latter was the more curious,
as Louis already foresaw the failure of the Spanish royal
house, and should rather have wished the union of the penin*
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ADMINISTRATION OF COLBERT. 106
Bular kingdoms. As a matter of fact, Porttigai became a de-
pendent and outpost of England, by which she reatiily landed
in the Peninsula down to the days of Napoleon. Indeed, if
independent of Spain, she is too weak not to be under the
control of the power that rules the sea and so has readiest
access to her. Louis continued to support her against Spain,
and secured her independence. He also interfered with the
Dutch) and compelled them to restore Brazili which they had
taken from the Portuguese*
On the other hand, Louis obtained from Oharles II. the
cession of Dunkirk on the Channel, which had been seized
and used by Oromwell. This surrender was made for money,
and was inexcusable from the maritime point of view. Dun*
kirk was for the English a bridge-head into France. To
France it became a haven for privateers, the bane of Eng
land's commerce in the Channel and the North Sea. As
the French sea power waned, England in treaty after treaty
exacted the dismantling of the works of Dunkirk, which it
may be said in passing was the home port of the celebrated
Jean Bart and other great French privateersmen.
Meanwhile the greatest and wisest of Louis* ministerSi
Colbert, was diligently building up that system of administra*
tion, which, by increasing and solidly basing the wealth of the
State, should bring a surer greatness and prosperity than the
king's more showy enterprises. With those details that con*^
cem the internal development of the kingdom this history has
no concern, beyond the incidental mention that production,
both agricultural and manufacturing, received his careful
attention; but upon the sea a policy of skilful aggression
upon the shipping and commerce of the Dutch and English
quickly began, and was instantly resented. Great trading
companies were formed, directing French enterprise to the
Baltic, to the Levant, to the East and West Indies \ customs
regulations were amended to encourage French manufactures,
and to allow goods to be stored in bond in the great ports, by
which means it was hoped to make France take Holland's
place as the great warehouse for Europe, a function for
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106 PROPOSITION OF LEIBNITZ.
which her geographical position eminently fitted her ; while
tonnage duties on foreign shipping, direct premiums on home-
built ships, and careful, rigorous colonial decrees giving
French vessels the monopoly of trade to and from the colo*
nies, combined to encourage the growth of her mercantile
marine. England retaliated at once ; the Dutch, more seri-
ously threatened because their carrying-trade was greater and
their home resources smaller, only remonstrated for a time ;
but after three years tliey also made reprisals. Colbert, rely-
ing on the great superiority of France as an actual, and still
more as a possible producer, feared not to move steadily on
the grasping path marked out ; which, in building up a great
merchant shipping, would lay the broad base for the military
shipping, which was being yet more rapidly forced on by the
measures of the State. Prosperity grew apace. At the end
of twelve years everything was flourishing, everything rich in
the State, which was in utter confusion when he took charge
of the finances and marine.
^ Under him/' Bays a French historian, " France grew by peace as
Bhe had grown by war. . . . The warfare of tariffs and premiums
Wilfully conducted by him tended to reduce within just limits the
exorbitant growth of commercial and maritime power which Holland
had arrogated at the expense of other nations ; and to restrain Eng-
land, which was burning to wrest this supremacy from Holland in
order to use it in a manner much more dangerous to Europe. The
interest of France seemed to be peace in Europe and America ; a
mysterious voice, at once the voice of the past and of the future,
called for her warlike activity on other shores." ^
This voice found expression through the mouth of Leibnitz,
one of the world's great men, who pointed out to Louis that
to turn the arms of France against Egypt would give her, in
the dominion of the Mediterranean and the control of Eastern
trade, a victory over Holland greater than the most success-
ful campaign on land; and while insuring a much needed
peace within his kingdom, would build up a power on the sea
that would insure preponderance in Europe. This memorial
1 Martin : History of France.
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SECOND ANOLO-DUTCH WAR.
107
called Loais from the pursuit of glory on the land to seek the
durable grandeur of France in the possession of a great sea
power, the elements of which, thanks to the genius of Colbert,
he had in his hands. A century later a greater man than
Louis sought to exalt himself and France by the path pointed
out by Leibnitz ; but Napoleon did not have, as Louis had, a
navy equal to the task proposed. This project of Leibnitz
will be more fully referred to when the narrative reaches
the momentous date at which it was broached ; when Louis,
with his kingdom and navy in the highest pitch of efficiency,
stood at the point where the roads parted, and then took the
one which settled that France should not be the power of the
sea. This decision, which killed Colbert and ruined the pros-
perity of France, was felt in its consequences from generation
to generation afterward, as the great navy of England, in
war after war, swept the seas, insured the growing wealth of
the island kingdom through exhausting strifes, while drying
up the external resources of French trade and inflicting
consequent misery. The false line of policy that began with
Louis XIY. also turned France away from a promising career
in India, in the days of his successor.
Meanwhile the two maritime States, England and Holland,
though eying France distrustfully, had greater and growing
grudges against each other, which under the fostering care of
Charles IL led to war. The true cause was doubtless commer-
cial jealousy, and the conflict sprang immediately from colli-
sions between the trading companies. Hostilities began on
the west coast of Africa ; and an English squadron, in 1664,
after subduing. several- Dutdbi-stationftdtibeee, sailed to New-
Amsterdam (now New York), and seized it. All these affairs
took place before the formal declaration of war in February,
1666. This war was undoubtedly popular in England ; the in-
stinct of the people found an expression by the lips of Honk,
who is reported to have said, ^*What matters this or that
reason ? What we want is more of the trade which the Dutch
now have.'' There is also little room to doubt that, despite
the pretensions of the trading companies, the government of
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X08 SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR.
the United Provinces would gladlj have avoided the war ; the
able man who was at their head saw too clearly the delicate
position in which they stood between England and France.
They claimed, however, the support of the latter in virtue of
li defensive treaty made in 1662. Louis allowed the claim,
but unwillingly ; and the still young navy of France gave
practically no help.
The war between the two sea States was wholly maritime,
and bad the general characteristics of all such wars. Three
great battles were fought, — the first off Lowestoft, on the
Norfolk coast, June 18, 1665; the second, known as the
Four Days' Battle in the Straits of Dover, often spoken of
by French writers as that of the Pas de Calais, lasting from
the 11th to the 14th of June, 1666; and the third, off the
North Foreland, August 4 of the same year. Li the first and
last of these the English had a decided success ; in the sec-
ond tlie advantage remained with the Dutch. This one only
will be described at length, because of it alone has been found
such a full, coherent account as will allow a clear and accurate
tactical narrative to be given. There are in these fights points
of interest more generally applicable to the present day than
are the details of somewhat obsolete tactical movements.
In the first battle off Lowestoft, it appears that the Dutch
commander, Opdam, who was not a seaman but a cavalry
officer, had very positive orders to fight; the discretion
proper to a commander-in-chief on the spot was not intrusted
to him. To interfere thus with the commander in the field
or afloat is one of the most common temptations to the
government in the cabinet, and is generally disastrous.
Tourville, the greatest of Louis XIV.'s admirals, was forced
thus to risk the whole French navy against his own judg-
ment ; and a century later a great French fleet escaped from
the English admiral Keith, througli his obedience to impera-
tive orders from bis immediate superior, who was sick in port.
In the Lowestoft fight the Dutch van gave way; and a
little later one of the junior admirals of tlie centre, Opdam's
own squadron, being killed, the crew was seized with a panic.
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BATTLE OF LOWESTOFT.
took the command of tho ship from her officers^ and carried
her out of action. This movement was followed by twelve or
thirteen other ships, leaving a great gap in the Dutch line.
The occurrence shows, what has before been pointed out, that
the discipline of the Dutch fleet and tho tone of the officers
were not high, despite the fine fighting qualities of the nation,
and although it is probably true that there were more good
seamen among the Dutch than among the English captains*
The natural steadfastness and heroism of the Hollandei*s
could not wholly supply that professional pride and sense
of military honor which it is the object of sound military
institutions to encourage. Popular feeling iii the United
States is pretty much at sea in this matter ; there is with it
no intermediate step between personal courage with a gun in
its hand and entire military efficiency.
Opdam, seeing the battle going against him, seems to have
yielded to a feeling approaching despair. He sought to grap-
ple the English commander-in-chief, who on this day was the
Duke of York, the king's brother. He failed in this, and
in the desperate struggle which followed, his ship blew up.
Sliortly after, throe, or as one account says four, Dutch ships
ran foul of one another, and this group was burned by one
fire-ship ; three or four others singly met the same fate a little
later. The Dutch fleet was now in disorder, and retreated
under cover of the squadron of Van Tromp, son of the famous
old admiral who in the days of the Commonwealth sailed
through the Channel with a broom at his masthead.
Fire-ships are seen here to have played a very conspicuous
part, more so certainly than in the war of 1668, though at
both periods they formed an appendage to the fleet. There is
on the surface an evident resemblance between the rOle of
the fire-ship and the part assigned in modern warfare to the
torpedo-cruiser. The terrible character of the attack, the
comparative smallness of the vessel making it, and the large
demands upon the nerve of the assailant, are the chief points
of resemblance ; the great points of difference kve the com-
parative certainty with wh\6h the modern vessel can be
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110
FIRE-SHIPS.
handled, which is partly met hj the same advantage in the
iron-clad over the old Bhip-of-the-line, and the instantaneous-
neas of the injury by torpedo, whose attack fails or succeeds
at once, whereas that of the fire-ship required time for effect-
ing the object, which in both cases is total destruction of the
hostile ship, instead of crippling or otherwise reducing it. An
appreciation of the character of fir^hips, of the circumstances
under which they attained their greatest usefulness, and of
the causes which led to their disappearance, may perhaps help
in the decision to which nations must come as to whether the
torpedo-cruiser, pure and simple, is a type of weapon destined
to survive in fleets.
A French officer, who has been examining the records of
the French navy, states that the fire-ship first appears, incor-
porated as an arm of the fleet, in 1686.
« Whether specially built for the purpose, or whether altered from
other purposes to be fitted for their particular eud, they received a
special equipment The command was given to officers not noble,
with the grade of captain of fire-ship. Five subordinate officers and
twenty-fiye seamen made up the crew. Easily known by grappling-
irons which were always fitted to their yards, the fire-ship saw its rdle
growing less in the early years of the eighteenth century. It was
finally to disappear from the fieets whote speed it delayed and whose
evolutions were hy it complicated. As the ships-of-war grew larger,
their action in concert with fire-ships became daily more difficult. On
the other hand, there had already been abandoned the idea of com-
bining them with the fighting-ships to form a few groups^ each pro-
vided with all the means of attack and defence. The fonnation of
the close-hauled line-of-battle, by assigning the fire-ships a place in a
second line placed half a league on the side farthest from the enemy,
made them more and more unfitted to fulfil their office. The official
plan of the battle of Malaga (1704), drawn up immediately after the
battle, shows the fire-slup in this position as laid down by Paul Hoste.
Finally the use of shells, enabling ships to be set on fire more surely
and quickly, and introduced on board at the period of which we are
now treating, though the general use did not obtain until much later,
was the Ust blow to the firoHBhip." ^
^ GoQgeard : liarine de Qaem.
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FIRE-^SHIPS AND TORPEDO-CRUISERS. HI
Those who are familiar with the theories and discnssiona
of our own day on tlie subject of fleet tactics and weapons^
will recognize in this short notice of a long obsolete type cer-
tain ideas which are not obsolete. The fire-ship disappeared
from fleets whose speed it delayed." In heavy weather
small bulk must always mean comparatively small speed. In a
moderate sea, we are now told, the speed of the torpedo-boat
falls from twenty knots to fifteen or less, and the seventeen to
nineteen knot cruiser can either run away from the pursuing
boats, or else hold them at a distance under fire of machine
and heavy guns. These boats are sea-going, '^and it is
thought can keep the sea in all weathers ; but to be on board
a 110-foot torpedo-boat, when the sea is lively, is said to be far
from agreeable. The heat, noise, and rapid vibrations of the
engines are intense. Cooking seems to be out of the question,
and it is said that if food were well cooked few would be able
to appreciate it. To obtain necessary rest under these con-
ditions, added to the rapid motions of the boat, is most diffi-
cult Larger boats are to be built; but the factor of loss
of speed in rough weather will remain, unless the size of the
torpedo-cruiser is increased to a point that will certainly lead
to fitting them with something more than torpedoes. Like
fire-ships, mall torpedo-cruisers will delay the speed and com-
plicate the evolutions of the fleet with which they are asso-
ciated.^ The disappearance of the fire-ship was also hastened,
we are told, by the introduction of shell firing, or incendiary
projectiles ; and it is not improbable that for deep-sea fight*
ing the transfer of the torpedo to a class of larger ships will
put an end to the mere torpedo-cruiser. The fire-ship con-
tinued to be used against fleets at anchor down to the days
of the American Civil War ; and the torpedo-boat will always
be useful within an easy distance of its port
A third phase of naval practice two hundred years ago, men-
tioned in the extract quoted, involves an idea very familiar
> Since the abore was written, the experience of the English antnmn manoen-
vret of 1888 has Terifled this statement ; not indeed that anj snch experiment was
needed to establish a self-erident fact.
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GROUP FORMATIONS,
to modem discussions ; immely, the group formation. The
idea of combining fire-ships with the fighting-ships to form a
few groups^ each provided with all the means of attack and
defence/' was for a time embraced ; for we aro told that it
was later on abandoned. The combining of the sliips of a
fleet into groups of two, three, or four meant to act specially
together is now largely favored in England ; less so in France,
where it meets strong opposition. No question of this sort,
ably advocated on either side, is to be settled by one man's
judgment, nor until time and experience have applied their
infallible tests. It may be remarked, however, that in a well-
organized fleet there are two degrees of command which are
in themselves both natural and necessary, that can be neither
done away nor ignored ; these aro tiio command of the wholo
fleet as one unit, and the command of each ship as a unit in
itself. When a fleet becomes too large to be handled by one
man, it must be subdivided, and in the heat of action become
practically two fleets acting to one common end ; as Nelson,
in his noble order at Trafalgar, said, The second in com-
mand will, (rfter my intentions are made known to him"
(mark the force of the after," which so well protects the
functions both of the commander-in-chief and the second),
^< have the entire direction of his line, to make the attack
upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are
captured or destroyed."
The size and cost of the individual iron-clad of the present
day makes it unlikely that fleets will be so numerous as to
require subdivision ; but whether they aro or not does not
affect the decision of the group question. Looking simply
to the principle underlying the theory, and disregarding the
seeming tactical clumsiness of the special groups proposed,
the question is : Shall there bo introduced between the natu-
ral commands of tlie admiral and of the captains of indi-
vidual ships a third artificial contrivance, which on the one
hand will in effect partly supersede the supreme authority,
and on the other will partly fetter the discretion of com-
manders of ships? A further difliculty springing from the
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FIRE-SHIPS.
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narrow principle of support specially due to particular ships,
on which the group system rests, is this : that when signals
can no longer be seen, the duty of the captain to his own ship
and to the fleet at large will be complicated by his duty to ob-
serve certain relations to particular ships; which particular
ships must in time come to have undue prominence in his
views. The group formation had its day of trial in old times,
and disappeared before the test of experience ; whether in its
restored form it will survive, time will show. It may be said,
before quitting the subject, that as an order of sailing, corre-
sponding to the route-step of an army in march, a loose group
formation has some advantages ; maintaining some order with-
out requiring that rigid exactness of position, to observe which
by day and night must be a severe strain on captain and deck-
officers. Such a route-order should not, however, be permitted
until a fleet has reached high tactical precision.
To return to the question of fire-ships and torpedo-boats,
the r61e of the latter, it is often said, is to be found in that
mSlSe which is always to succeed a couple of headlong passes
between the opposing fleets. In the smoke and confusion of
that liour is the opportunity of the torpedo-boat. Tliis cer-
tainly sounds plausible, and the torpedo vessel certainly has
a power of movement not possessed by the fire-ship. A mSlie
of the two fleets, however, was not the condition most favor-
able for the fire-ship. I shall quote here from another French
officer, whose discussion of these Anglo-Dutch sea-fights, in a
late periodical, is singularly clear and suggestive. He says:
Far from impeding the direct acUon of the fire-ship, which was
naught or nearly so during the confused battles of the war of 1652,
the regularity and ensemble newly attained in the movements of
squadrons seem rather to favor it. The fire-shipe played a very
important part at the battles of Lowestoft, Pas de Calais, and the
North Foreland. Thanks to the good order preserved by the ships-
of -the line, these incendiary ships can indeed be better protected by
the artillery; much more efficiently directed than before toward a
distinct and determined end.**^
1 Chabaod-Amaolt : Bevne Mar. et CoL 1885.
S
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FIBE^SHIPS.
In the midst of the confused milSes of 1652 the fire-ship
acted, so to speak, alone, seeking by chance an enemy to
grapple, running the risk of a mistake, without protection
against the guns of the enemy, nearly sure to be sunk by
him or else burned uselessly. All now, in 1665, has become
different. Its prey is clearly pointed out ; it knows it, fol-
lows it easily into the relatiyely fixed position had by it in
the enemy's line. On the other hand, the ships of his own
division do not lose sight of the fire-ship. They accompany
it as far as possible, cover it with their artillery to the end
of its course, and disengage it before burning, if the fruitless*
ness of the attempt is seen soon enough. Evidently under
such conditions its action, always uncertain (it cannot be
otherwise), nevertheless acquires greater chances of success."
These instructive comments need perhaps the qualifying, or
additional, remark that confusion in the enemy's order at
the time that your own remains good gives the best open-
ing for a desperate attack. The writer goes on to trace the
disappearance of the fire-ship : —
Here then we Bee the fire-Bhip at the* point of its highest impor*
tance. That importance will decrease, the fire-ship itself will end by
disappearing from engagements in the open iea^ when naval artillery
becoming more perfect shall have greater range, be more accurate
and more rapid ; ^ when ships receiving better forms, greater steering
power, more extensive and better balanced sail power, shall be able,
thanks to quicker speed and handling, to avoid almost certainly the
fire-ships sent against them ; when, finaUy, fleets led on principles of
tactics as skilful as they were timid, a tactics which will predominate
a century later during the whole war of American Independence,
when these fleets, in order not to jeopardize the perfect regularity of
their order of battle, will avoid coming to close quarters, and will
leave to the cannon alone to decide the fate of an action."
In this discussion the writer has in view the leading feature
which, while aiding the action of the fire-ship, also gives this
1 The recent development of rapid-firing and nuushine gnnsi with the great
increaee of their calibre and oonaeqnent range and penetration, reprodoces this
same step in the cjde of progress.
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ORDERS OF BATTLE.
war of 1666 its peculiar interest in the history of naval tacr
tics. In it is found for the first time the close-hauled Iine-of«
battle undeniably adopted as the fighting order of the fleets.
It is plain enough that when those fleets numbered, as they
often did, from eighty to a hundred ships, such lines would be
very imperfectly formed in every essential, both of line and
interval ; but the general aim is evident, amid whatever imper-
fections of execution. The credit for this development is
generally given to the Duke of York, afterward James II. ;
but the question to whom the improvement is due is of little
importance to sea-officers of the present day when compared
with the instructive fact that so long a time elapsed between
the appearance of the large sailingHSihip, with its broadside
battery, and the systematic adoption of the order which was
best adapted to develop the full power of the fleet for mutual
support. To us, having the elements of the problem in our
hands, together with tihe result finally reached, that result
seems simple enough, almost self-evident Why did it take
so long for the capable men of that day to reach it 7 The rea-
son— and herein lies the lesson for the officer of to-day —
was doubtless the same that leaves the order of battle so
uncertain now ; namely, that the necessity of war did not force
men to make up their minds, until the Dutch at last met
in the English their equals on the sea. The sequence of
ideas which resulted in the line-of-battle is clear and logical.
Though familiar enough to seamen, it will be here stated in
the words of the writer last quoted, because they have a neatr
ness and precision entirely French : —
" With, the increase of power of the ship-of-war, and with the per-
fecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an equal
progress in the art of utilizing them. ... As naval evolutions
become more skilfal, their importance grows from day to day. To
these evolutions there is needed a base, a point from which they de-
part and to which they retam. A fleet of war-ships must be always
ready to meet an enemy ; logically, therefore, this point of departure
for naval evolutions must be the order of battle. Now, since the
disappearance of galleys, almost all the artillery is found upon the
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ORDERS OF BATTLE.
sides of a ship of war. Hence it is the beam that must necessarilj
and always be turned toward the enemy. On the other hand, it Is
necessary that the sight of the latter must nerer be interrupted by a
friendly ship. Only one formation allows the ships of the same fleet
to satisfy fully these conditions. That formation is the line ahead
[column]. This line, therefore, is imposed as the only order of
battle, and consequently as the basis of all fleet tactics. In order
tliat this order of battle, this long thin line of guns, may not be in«
jured or broken at some point weaker than the rest, there la at the
same time felt the necessity of putting in it only ships which, if not of
equal force, hare at least equally strong sides. Logically it follows,
at the same moment in which the line ahead became definitively the
order for battle, there was established the distinction between the ships
' of the line,' alone destined for a place therein, and the lighter ships
meant for other uses."
If to these we add the considerations which led to making
the line-of-battle a close-hauled line, we have the problem fully
worked out. But the chain of reasoning was as clear two hun*
dred and fifty years ago as it is now ; why then was it so long
in being worked out ? Partly, no doubt, because old traditions —
in those days traditions of galley-fighting — had hold of and
confused men's minds ; chiefly because men are too indolent
to seek out the foundation truths of the situation in their day,
and develop the trno theory of action from its base up. As
a rare instance of clear-sightedness, recognizing such a funda-
mental change in conditions and predicting results, words of
Admiral Labrousse of the French navy, written in 1840, are
most instructive. Thanks to steam," ho wrote, ships will
be able to move in any direction with such speed that the effects
of collision may, and indeed must, as they formerly did, take
the place of projectile weapons and annul the calculations of
the skilful manoeuvrcr. The ram will be favorable to speed,
without destroying the nautical qualities of a ship. As soon
as one power shall have adopted this terrible weapon, all
others must accept it, under pain of evident inferiority, and
thus combats will become combats of ram against ram.''
While forbearing the unconditional adhesion to the ram as
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BATTLE OF THE FOUR DATS.
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the controlling weapon of the day, which the French navy has
yielded, the above brief argument may well be taken as an in-
stance of the way in which researches into the order of battle
of the future should be worked out. A French writer, com-
menting on Labrousse's paper, says : —
^'Twenty-eeven years were scarce enough for our fathers, oonnting
from 1638, the date of building the ^Couronne,' to 1665, to pass from
the tactical order of the line abreast, the order for galleys, to that
of the line ahead. We ourselves needed twenty-nine years from
1830, when the first steamship was brought into our fleet, to 1859,
when the application of the principle of ram-fighting was affirmed by
laying down the * Solferino ' and the < Magenta' to work a revolation in
the contrary direction ; so true it is that truth is always slow in get-
ting to the light. . . . This transformation was not sudden, not only
because the new material required time to be built and armed, but
above all, it is sad to say, because the necessary consequences of the
new motive power escaped most minds." ^
We come now to the justly celebrated Four Days' Battle of
June, 1666, which claims special notice, not only on account
of the great number of ships engaged on either side, nor yet
only for the extraordinary physical endurance of the men who
kept up a hot naval action for so many successive days, but
also because the commanders-in-chief on either side, Monk
and De Buyter, were the most distinguished seamen, or rather
sea-commanders, brought forth by their respective countries
in the seventeenth century. Monk was possibly inferior to
Blake in the annals of the English navy ; but there is a gen-
eral agreement that De Buyter is the foremost figure, not only
in the Dutch service, but among all tho naval officers of that
age. The account about to be given is mainly taken from a
recent number of the Be^ne Maritime et Goloniale," ' and is
there published as a letter, recently discovered, from a Dutch
gentleman serving as volunteer on board De Buyter's ship, to
a friend in France. The narrative is delightfully clear and
probable, — qualities not generally found in the description of
1 Qoageard : Marine de Gnerre.
< Vol. Izzxii. p. 137.
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SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR.
those long-ago fights; and the satisfaction it gave was in<
creased by finding in the Memoirs of the Count de Gniche,
who also served as volunteer in the fleet, and was taken to De
Ruyter after his own vessel had been destroyed by a fire-ship,
an account confirming the former in its principal details.^
This additional pleasure was unhappily marred by recognizing
certain phrases as common to both stories ; and a comparison
showed that the two could not be accepted as independent
narratives. There are, however, points of internal diiference
which make it possible that the two accounts are by different
eye-witnesses, who compared and corrected their versions be-
fore sending them out to their friends or writing them in their
journals.
The numbers of the two fleets were : English about eighty
ships, the Dutch about one hundred ; but the inequality in
numbers was largely compensated by the greater size of many
of the English. A great strategic blunder by the government
in London immediately preceded the fight. The king was
informed that a French squadron was on its way from the
Atlantic to join the Dutch. He at once divided his fleet,
sending twenty ships under Prince Rupert to the westward
to meet the French, while the remainder under Monk were to
go east and oppose the Dutch.
A position like that of the English fleet, threatened witli an
attack from two quarters, presents one of the subtlest tempta-
tions to a commander. The impulse is very strong to meet
both by dividing his own numbers as Charles did ; but unless
in possession of overwhelming force it is an error, exposing
both divisions to be beaten separately, which, as we are about
to see, actually happened in this case. The result of the first
two days was disastrous to the larger English division under
Monk, which was then obliged to retreat toward Rupert ; and
probably the opportune return of the latter alone saved the
English fleet from a very serious loss, or at the least from
being shut up in their own ports. A hundred and forty years
^ Mtfmoires da Cte. de Oniche. A Londresi chei P. ChaDgnion. 174a
pp. S34-264.
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BATTLE OF THE FOUR DAYS.
119
later, in tho exciting game of strategy that was played in the
Bay of Biscay before Trafalgar, the English admiral Corn-
wallis made precisely the same blander, dividing his fleet into
two equal parts out of supporting distance, which Napoleon at
the time characterized as a glaring piece of stupidity. The
lesson is the same in all ages.
The Dutch had sailed for the English coast with a fair
easterly wind, but it changed later to southwest with thick
weather, and freshened, so that De Buyter, to avoid being
driven too far, came to anchor between Dunkirk and the
Downs.^ The fleet then rode with its head to the southnsiouth-
west and the van on the right ; while Tromp, who commanded
the rear division in the natural order, was on the left. For
some cause this left was most to windward, the centre squad-
ron under Buyter being to leeward, and the right, or van, to
leeward again of the centre.^ This was the position of the
Dutch fleet at daylight of June 11, 1666; and although not
expressly so stated, it is likely, from the whole tenor of the
narratives, that it was not in good order.
The same morning Monk, who was also at anchor, made
out the Dutch fleet to leeward, and although so inferior in
numbers determined to attack at once, hoping that by keeping
the advantage of tho wind ho would be able to commit himself
only so far as might seem best He therefore stood along the
Dutch line on the starboard tack, leaving the right and centre
out of cannon-shot) until he came abreast of the left, Tromp's
squadron. Monk then had thirty-five ships well in hand ; but
the rear had opened and was straggling, as is apt to be the
case with long columns. Witli the thirty-five he then put his
helm up and ran down for Tromp, whose squadron cut tlieir
cables and made sail on the same tack (V) ; the two engaged
1 See Map of English Channel and North Sea, page 107.
« Plate I, June 11, 1666, Fig. 1. V,Tan; C, centre; R, rear: in this part
of the action the Dutch order was Inrerted, so that the actual ran was the proper
rear. The great nnmher of ships engaged in the fleet actions of these Anglo-
Dutch wars make it impossible to represent each ship and at the same time pre-
serve clearness in the plans. Each figure of a ship therefore represents a gronp,
more or less numerous.
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SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR.
lilies thus standing over toward the French coast, and the
breeze heeling the ships so that the English could not use
their lower-deck guns (Fig. 2, V). The Dutch centre and
rear also cut (Fig. CK), and followed the movement, but
being so far to leeward, could not for some time come into
action. It was during this time that a large Dutch ship,
becoming separated from her own fleet, was set on fire and
burned, doubtless the ship in which was Count de Quiche.
As tiiey drew near Dunkirk the English went about, prob-
ably all together; for in the return to the northward and
westward the proper English van fell in with and was roughly
handled by the Dutch centre under Buyter himself (Fig. 2,
0^0* ^^^^^ ^^^^ would be more likely to befall the rear, and
indicates that a simultaneous movement had reversed the
oi*der. The engaged ships had naturally lost to leeward, thus
enabling Buyter to fetch up with them. Two English flag-
ships were here disabled and cut oif ; one, the Swiftsure,"
hauled down her colors after the admiral, a young man of
only twenty-seven, was killed. "Highly to be admired,"
says a contemporary writer, "was the resolution of Vice-
Admiral Berkeley, who, though cut off from the line, sur-
rounded by enemies, great numbers of his men killed, his
ship disabled and boarded on all sides, yet continued fighting
almost alone, killed several with his own hand, and would
accept no quarter ; till at length, being shot in tlie throat
with a musket-ball, he retired into the captain's cabin, where
he was found dead, extended at his full length upon a table,
and almost covered with his own blood." Quite as heroic,
but more fortunate in its issue, was the conduct of the other
English admiral thus cut off ; and the incidents of his strug-
gle, though not specially instructive otherwise, are worth
quoting, as giving a lively picture of the scenes which passed
in the heat of the contests of those days, and afford coloring
to otherwise dry details.
Being in a short time completely disabled, one of the enemy's
fire-sbips grappled him on the starboard quarter ; he was, however,
freed by the almost incredible exertions of his lieutenant, who, hav
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BATTLE OF THE FOUR DAYS.
Ing in the midst of the flames loosed the grappling-irons, swung back
on board his own ship nnhnrt The Dutch, bent on the destmction
of this unfortunate ship, sent a second which grappled her on tlie
larboard side, and with greater success than the former ; for the sails
instantly taking fire, the crew were so terrified that nearly fifty of
them jumped overboard. The admiral, Sir John Harman, seeing
tills confusion, ran with his sword drawn among those who remained,
and threatonc<1 with instant death the first man who should attempt
to quit the ship, or should not exert himself to quench the flames.
The crew then returned to their duty and got the fire under ; but
the rigging being a good deal burned, one of the topsail yards fell
and broke Sir John's leg. In the midst of this accumulated distress,
a third fire-ship prepared to grapple him, but was sunk by the guns
before she could effect her purpose. The Dutch vice-admiral,
Evertzen, now bore down to him and offered quarter ; but Sir John
replied, ' No, no, it is not come to that yet,' and giving him a broad-
side, killed the Dutch oommander; after which the other enemies
sheered off."*
It is therefore not snrpriaing that the account we hare been
following reported two English flag-ships lost, one by a fire-
ship. '^The English chief still continued on the port tack,
and," says the writer, as night fell we could see him proudly
leading liis line past the squadron of North Holland and Zea-
land [the actual rear, but proper van] , which from noon up to
that time had not been able to reach the enemy [Fig. 2, R^']
from their Iccwardly position." The merit of Monk's attack
as a piece of grand tactics is evident, and bears a strong re-
semblance to that of Nelson at the Nile. Discerning quickly
the weakness of the Dutch order, he had attacked a vastly
superior force in such a way that only part of it could come
into action; and though the English actually lost more
heavily, they carried off a brilliant prestige and must have
left considerable depression and heart-burning among the
Dutch. The eye-witness goes on : The affair continued
until ten P. M., friends and foes mixed tc^ether and as likely
to receive injury from one as from the other. It will be re-
marked that the success of the day and the misfortunes of
1 CampbeU : Lires of the AdinimlB.
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122 SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR.
the English came from theii* being too much scattered, too
extended in their line ; but for which we could never have
cut off a comer of them, as we did. The mistake of Monk
was in not keeping his ships better together ; " that is, closed
up. Tlie remark is just, the criticism scarcely so ; the open-
ing out of the line was almost unavoidable in so long a column
of sailing-ships, and was one of the chances taken by Monk
when he offered battle.
The English stood off on the port tack to the west or west-
northwest, and next day returned to the fight. The Dutch
were now on the port tack in natural order, tlie right leading,
and were to windward ; but the enemy, being more weatherly
and better disciplined, soon gained the advantage of the wind.
The English this day had forty-four ships in action, the Dutch
about eighty ; many of tlie English, as before said, larger. The
two fleets passed on opposite tacks, the English to windward ; ^
but Tromp, in the rear, seeing that the Dutch order of battle
was badly formed, the ships in two or three lines, overlapping
and so masking each other's fire, went about and gained to
windward of the enemy's van (RO » ^hich he was able to do
from the length of the line, and because the English, running
parallel to the Dutch order, were off the wind. ^^At this
moment two flag-officers of the Dutch van kept broad off,
presenting their sterns to the English (V)* Ruyter, greatly
astonished, tried to stop them, but in vain, and therefore felt
obliged to imitate the manoeuvre in order to keep his squad-
ron together ; but he did so with some order, keeping some
ships around him, and was joined by one of the van ships, dis*
gusted with the conduct of his immediate superior. Tromp
was now in great danger, separated [by his own act first
and then by the conduct of the van] from his own fleet by
the English, and would have been destroyed but for Ruyter,
who, seeing tlie urgency of the case, hauled up for him," the
van and centre thus standing back for the rear on the oppo-
site tack to that on which they entered action. This pre-
vented the English from keeping up the attack on Tromp, lest
1 PUte I., Jane 12, Fig. 1, V, C. R.
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BATTLE OF THE FOUR DAYS.
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Rnjter should gain (lie wind of them, which they coold not
afford to yield becanse of their very inferior numbers. Both
the action of Tromp and that of the junior flag-officers in the
van, though showing very different degrees of warlike ardor,
bring out strongly the lack of subordination and of military
feeling which has been charged against the Dutch officers as
a body ; no signs of which appear among the English at this
time.
How keenly Ruyter felt the conduct of his lieutenants was
manifested when *^ Tromp, immediately after this partial ac-
tion, went on board his flagship. The seamen cheered him ;
but Ruyter said, ^ This is no time for rejoicing, but rather for
tears.* Indeed, our position was bad, each squadron acting
differently, in no line, and all the ships huddled together like
a flock of sheep, so packed that the English might have sur-
rounded all of them with their forty ships [June 12, Fig. 2].
The English were in admirable order, but did not push their
advantage as they should, whatever the reason." The reason
no doubt was the same that often prevented sailing-ships
from pressing an advantage, — disability from crippled spars
and rigging, added to the inexpediency of such inferior num-
bers risking a decisive action.
Ruyter was thus able to draw his fleet out into line again,
although much maltreated by the English, and the two fleets
passed again on opposite tacks, the Dutch to leeward, and
Ruyter's ship the last in his column. As he passed the
English rear, he lost his maintopmast and mainyard. After
another partial rencounter the English drew away to the
northwest toward their own shores, the Dutch following
them ; the wind being still from southwest, but light. The
English were now fairly in retreat, and the pursuit continued
all night, Ruyter's own ship dropping out of sight in the rear
from her crippled state.
The third day Monk continued retreating to the westward.
He burned, by the English accounts, three disabled ships, sent
ahead those that were most crippled, and himself brought up
the rear with those that were in fighting condition, which are
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SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR.
yariouBly stated, again by the English, at twenty-eight and
sixteen in number (Plate 11., June 18). One of the largest
and finest of the English fleet, the Royal Prince," of ninety
guns, ran aground on the Galloper Shoal and was taken by
Tromp (Plate II. a) ; but Monk's retreat was so steady and
orderly that he was otherwise unmolested. This shows that
the Dutch had suffered very severely. Toward evening Ru-
pert's squadron was seen ; and all the ships of the English
fleet, except those crippled in action, were at last united.
The next day the wind came out again very fresh from the
southwest, giving the Dutch the weather-gage. Tiie English,
instead of attempting to pass upon opposite tacks, came up
from astern relying upon the speed and handiness of their
ships. So doing, the battle engaged all along the line on the
port tack, the English to leeward.^ The Dutch fire-ships were
badly handled and did no harm, whereas the English burned
two of their enemies. The two fleets ran on thus, exchang-
ing broadsides for two hours, at the end of which time the
bulk of the English fleet had passed through the Dutch line.^
All regularity of order was henceforward lost. At this mo-
ment," says the eye-witness, the lookout was extraordinary,
for all were separated, the English as well as we. But luck
would have it that the largest of our fractions surrounding
the admiral remained to windward, and the largest fraction
of the English, also with their admiral, remained to leeward
[Figs. 1 and 2, 0 and G This was the cause of our victory
and their ruin. Our admiral had with him thirty-five or forty
ships of his own and of other squadrons, for the squadrons
wore scattered and order much lost. The rest of the Dutch
ships had left him. The leader of the van, Van Ness, had
gone off with fourteen ships in chase of three or four English
ships, which under a press of sail had gained to windward of
the Dutch van [Pig. 1, V]. Van Tromp with the rear squad-
> Plate II., Jnne 14, Fig. I, E, D.
* Fig. 1, y, C, R. ThiB result was probably dae simpl/ to the greater weather-
llnesB of the English ships. It would perhaps be more accurate to say tliat the
Dutch had sagged to leeward so that the/ drifted through the English line.
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BATTLE OF THE FOUR DAYS.
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ron had fallen to leeward, and so had to keep on [to leeward
of Ruyter and the English main body, Fig. 1, R] after Van
Ness, in order to rejoin the admiral by passing round the
English centre/' De Ruyter and the English main body kept
up a sharp action, beating to windward all the time. Tromp,
having carried sail, overtook Yan Ness, and returned bringing
the van back with him (Y^ ; but owing to the constant
plying to windward of the English main body he came up to
leeward of it and could not rejoin Ruyter, who was to wind-
ward (Fig. 8, Y", R Ruyter, seeing this, made signal to
the ships around him, and the main body of the Dutch kept
away before the wind (Fig 8, C), which was then very
strong. ^ Thus in less than no time we found ourselves in
the midst of the English ; who, being attacked on both sides,
were thrown into confusion and saw their whole order de-
stroyed, as well by dint of the action, as by the strong wind
that was then blowing. This was the hottest of the fight
[Fig. 8]. We saw the high admiral of England separated
from his fleet, followed only by one fire-ship. With that he
gained to windward, and passing through th0 North Holland
squadron, placed himself again at the head of fifteen or twenty
ships that rallied to him."
Thus ended this great searfight, the most remarkable, in
some of its aspects, that has ever been fought upon the ocean.
Amid conflicting reports it is not possible to do more than
estimate the results. A fairly impartial account says : The
States lost in these actions three vice-admirals, two thousand
men, and four ships. The loss of the English was five thou-
sand killed and three thousand prisoners ; and they lost besides
seventeen ships, of which nine remained in the hands of the
victors.'' ^ There is no doubt that the English had much the
worst of it, and that this was owing wholly to the original
blunder of weakening the fleet by a great detachment sent in
another direction. Qreat detachments are sometimes neces«
sary evils, but in this case no necessity existed. Granting
the approach of the French, the proper course for the English
1 Leftvre-Pontalis. Jean de Witt
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SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR.
was to fall with their whole fleet upon the Dutch before their
allies could come up. This lesson is as applicable to-day as
it ever was, A second lesson, likewise of present application,
is the necessity of sound military institutions for implanting
correct military feeling, pride, and discipline. Great as was
the first blunder of the English, and serious as was the disas-
ter, there can be no doubt that the consequences would have
been much worse but for the high spirit and skill with which
the plans of Monk were carried out by his subordinates, and
the lack of similar suppoi*t to Ruyter on the part of the Dutch
subalterns. In the movements of the English, we hear noth-
ing of two juniors turning tail at a critical moment, nor of a
third, with misdirected ardor, getting on the wrong side of
the enemy's fleet Their drill also, their tactical precision,
was remarked even then. The Frenchman De Quiche, after
witnessing this Four Days' Fight, wrote : —
NothiDg equals the beautiful order of the Euglish at sea. Never
was a line drawn straighter than that formed by their ships ; thus
they bring all their fire to bear upon those who draw near them. • . •
They fight like a liue of cavalry which is handled according to rule,
and applies itself solely to force back those who oppose ; whereas
the Dutch advance like cavalry whose squadrons leave their ranks
and come separately to the charge." ^
The Dutch government, averse to expense, unmilitary in its
tone, and incautious from long and easy victory over tho
degenerate navy of Spain, had allowed its fleet to sink into
a mere assembly of armed merchantmen. Things were at
their worst in the days of Cromwell. Taught by tho severe
lessons of that war, the United Provinces, under an able
ruler, had done much to mend matters, but full efficiency
had not yet been gained.
«In 1666 as in 1653," says a French naval writer, the fortune
of war seemed to lean to the side of the English. Of the three great
battles fought two were dedded victories; and the third, though
adverse, had but increased the glory of her seamen. This was due
to the intelligent boldness of Monk and Rupert, the talents of part
1 M6noix«s, pp. 249, 251, 266, 267.
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SOLDIERS COMMANDING SHIPS. 127
of the admirals and captains, and the skill of the seamen and soldiers
under them. The wise and yigoroos efforts made by the government
of the United Provinces, and the undeniable superiority of Ruyter in
experience and genius over any one of his opponents, could not com-
pensate for the weakness or incapacity of part of the Dutch officers,
and the manifest inferiority of the men under their orders." ^
England, as has been said before, still felt the impress of
Cromweirs iron hand upon her military institutions ; but that
impress was growing weaker. Before the next Dutch war
Monk was dead, and was poorly replaced by the cavalier
Rupert. Court extravagance cut down the equipment of the
navy as did the burgomaster's parsimony, and court corrup-
tion undermined discipline as surely as commercial indiffer-
ence. The effect was evident when the fleets of the two
countries met again, six years later.
There was one well-known feature of all the military navies
of that day which calls for a passing comment ; for its correct
bearing and value is not always, perhaps not generally, seen.
The command of fleets and of single vessels was often given
to soldiers, to military men unaccustomed to the sea, and
ignorant how to handle the ship, that duty being intrusted to
another class of officer. Looking closely into the facts, it is
seen that this made a clean division between the direction of
the fighting and of the motive power of the ship. This is the
essence of the matter ; and the principle is the same whatever
the motive power may be. The inconvenience and inefficiency
of such a system was obvious then as it is now, and the logic
of facts gradually threw the two functions into the hands of
one corps of officers, the result being the modem naval officer,
as that term is generally understood.' Unfortunately, in this
process of blending, the less important function was allowed
to get the upper hand ; the naval officer came to feel more
1 Chaband-Amaiilc : Reyne Msr. et Col. 1886.
* The tnie sigDiflcanoe of this change has often been misanderstood, and hence
erroneoos inferences as to the future haye been drawn. It was not a case of the
new displacing the old, but of the military element in a military organisation
asserting its necessary and ineritable control orer all otlier fonctions.
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MILITARY QUALITIES OF
proud of his dexterity in managing the motive power of his
ship than of his skill in developing her military efficiency.
The bad effects of this lack of interest in military science
became most evident when the point of handling fleets was
reached, because for that military skill told most, and previous
study was most necessary ; but it was felt in the single ship as
well. Hence it came to pass, and especially in the English
navy, that the pride of the seaman took the place of the pride
of the military man. The English naval officer thought more
of that which likeued him to the merchant captain than of that
which made him akin to the soldier. In the French navy
this result was less general, owing probably to the more mili-
tary spirit of the government, and especidly of the nobility,
to whom the rank of officer was reserved. It was not possible
that men whose whole association was military, all of whose
friends looked upon arms as the one career for a gentleman,
could think more of the sails and rigging than of the guns
or the fleet. The English corps of officers was of different
origin. There was more than the writer thought in Ma-
caulay's well-known saying : ^< There were seamen and there
were gentlemen in tlie navy of Gharles II.; but the seamen
were not gentlemen, and the gentlemen were not seamen."
The trouble was not in the absence or presence of gentlemen
as such, but in the fact that under the conditions of that day
the gentleman was pre-eminently Uio military element of
society ; and that the seaman, after the Dutch wars, gradually
edged the gentleman, and with him the military tone and
spirit as distinguished from simple courage, out of the service.
Even such men of family as Herbert and Russell, William
in.'s admirals," says the biographer of Lord Hawke, were
sailors indeed, but only able to hold their own by adopting
the boisterous manners of the hardy tarpaulin." The same
national traits which made the French inferior as seamen
made them superior as military men ; not in courage, but in
skill. To this day the same tendency obtains ; the direction
of the motive power has no such consideration as the military
functions in the navies of the Latin nations. The studious
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FRENCH AND ENGLISH OFFICERS.
and systematio side of the French character also inclined the
French officer, when not a trifler, to consider and develop
tactical questions in a logical manner ; to prepare himself to
handle fleets, not merely as a seaman but as a military man.
The result showed, in the American Revolutionary War, that
despite a mournful history of governmental neglect, men who
were first of all military men, inferior though they were in
opportunities as seamen to their enemies, could meet them on
more than equal terms as to tactical skill, and were practically
their superiors in handling fleets. The false theory has
already been pointed out, which directed the action of the
French fleet not to crushing its enemy, but to some ulterior
aim ; but this does not affect the fact that in tactical skill the
military men were superior to the mere seamen, though their
tactical skill was applied to mistaken strategic ends. The
source whence the Dutch mainly drew their officers does not
certainly appear ; for while the English naval historian in 1666
says that most of the captains of their fleet were sons of rich
burgomasters, placed there for political reasons by the Grand
Pensionary, and without experience, Duquesne, the ablest
French admiral of the day, comments in 1676 on the precision
and skill of the Dutch captains in terms very disparaging to
his own. It is likely, from many indications, that they were
generally merchant seamen, with little original military feel-
ing ; but the severity with which the delinquents were pun<
ished both by the State and by popular frenzy, seems to have
driven these officers, who were far from lacking the highest
personal courage, into a sense of what military loyalty and
subordination required. They made a very different record
in 1672 from that of 1666.
Before finally leaving the Four Days* Fight, the conclu-
sions of another writer may well be quoted : —
^*Sach was that bloody Battle of the Four Days, or Straits of
Calais, the most memorable sea-fight of modem days ; not, indeed, by
its results, but by the aspect of its different phases ; by the fury of
the combatants ; by the boldness and skill of the leaders ; and by the
new character which it gave to sea warfare. More than any other
9
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CHANGES IN TACTICS.
this fight marks clearly the passage from former methods to the tactics
of the end of the seventeenth oentary. For the first time we can fol-
low, as though traced upon a plan, the principal movements of the
contending fleets. It seems quite dear that to the Dutch as well
as to the British have been given a tactical book and a code of sig-
nals ; or, at the least, written instructions, extensive and precise, to
serve instead of such a code. We feel that each admiral now has
his squadron in hand, and that even the commander-in-chief disposes
at his will, during the fight, of the various subdivisions of his fieet.
Compare this action with those of 1652, and one plain &ct stares you
in the face, — that between the two dates naval tactics have under-
gone a revolution.
^'Such were the changes that distinguish the war of 1665 from that
of 1652. As in the latter epoch, the admiral still thinks the weather-
gage an advantage for his fieet ; but it is no longer, from the tactical
point of view, the principal, we might almost say the sole, preoccu-
pation. Now he wbhes above all to keep his fleet in good order and
compact as long as possible, so as to keep the power of combining^
during the action, the movements of the different squadrons. Look
at Ruyter, at tlie end of the Four Days' Fight ; with great difficulty
he has kept to windward of the English fleet, yet he does not hesitate
to sacrifice this advantage in order to unite the two parts of his fleet,
which are separated by the enemy. If at the later fight off the
North Foreland great intervals exist between the Dutch squadrons,
if the rear afterward continues to withdraw from the centre, Ruyter
deplores such a fault as the chief cause of his defeat He so deplores
it in his official report ; he even accuses Tromp [who was his personal
enemy] of treason or cowardice, — an unjust accusation, but which
none Uie less shows the enormous importance thenceforth attached,
during action, to the reunion of the fleet into a whole strictly and
regularly maintained."^
This commentary is justified in bo far as it points out gen-
eral aims and tendencies ; but the results were not as com-
plete as might be inferred from it.
The English, notwithstanding their heavy loss in the Four
Days' Battle, were at sea again within two months, much
to the surprise of the Dutch; and on the 4th of August
1 Chabaud-Aniaalt : Revue Har. et Col. 1S85.
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another sevoro fight was fonght off the North Foreland, end-
ing in the complete defeat of the latter, who retired to their
own coasts. The English followed, and effected an entrance
into one of the Dutch harbors, where thej destroyed a large
fleet of merchantmen as well as a town of some importance.
Toward the end of 1666 both sides were tired of the war,
which was doing great harm to trade, and weakening both
navies to the advantage of the growing sea power of France.
Negotiations looking toward peace were opened ; but Charles
II., ill disposed to the United Provinces, confident that the
growing pretensions of liouis XIY. to the Spanish Nether-
lands, would break up the existing alliance between Holland
and France, and relying also upon the severe reverses suf-
fered at sea by the Dutch, was exacting and haughty in his
demands. To justify and maintain this line of conduct he
should have kept up his fleet, the prestige of which had been
so advanced by its victories. Instead of that, poverty, the
result of extravagance and of his home policy, led him to per-
mit it to decline ; ships in large numbers were laid up ; and
he readily adopted an opinion which chimed in with his
penury, and which, as it has had advocates at all periods
of sea history, should be noted and condemned here. This
opinion, warmly opposed by Monk, was : —
That aa the Dutch were chiefly supported by trade, as the supply
of their navy depended upon trade, and, aa experience showed, nothing
provoked the people so much as injuring their trade, his Majesty
should therefore apply himself to this, which would effectually hum-
ble them, at the same time that it would less exhaust the English than
fitting out such mighty fleets as had hitherto kept the sea every sum-
mer. • . • Upon these motives the king took a fatal resolution of
laying up his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the
cruise." ^
In consequence of this economical theory of carrying on a
war, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, De Witt, who had
the year before caused soundings of the Thames to be made,
1 Campbell : Lires of the Admirals.
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PEACE OF BREDA.
sent into the river^ under De Ruyter^ a force of sixty or
seventy ships-of-the-linOi which on the 14th of June, 1667,
went up as high as Gravesend, destroying ships at Chatham
and in the Medway, and taking possession of Sheerness. The
light of the fires could be seen from London, and the Dutch
fleet remained in possession of the mouth of the river until
the end of the month. Under this blow, following as it did
upon the great plague and the great fire of London, Charles
consented to peace, which was signed July 81, 1667, and is
known as the Peace of Breda. The most lasting result of the
war was the transfer of New York and Now Jersey to Eng-
land, thus joining her northern and southern colonies in
North America.
Before going on again with the general course of the history
of the times, it will be well to consider for a moment the
theory which worked so disastrously for England in 1667 ;
that, namely, of maintaining a sea-war mainly by preying
upon the enemy's commerce. This plan, which involves only
the maintenance of a few swift cruisers and can be backed by
the spirit of greed in a nation, fitting out privateers without
direct expense to the State, possesses the specious attractions
which economy always presents. The great injury done to the
wealth and prosperity of the enemy is also undeniable ; and
although to some extent his merchant-ships can shelter them-
selves ignobly under a foreign flag while the war lasts, this
ffuerre de eoune^ as the French call it, this commerce-destroy-
ing, to use our own phrase, must, if in itself successful, greatly
embarrass the foreign government and distress its people.
Such a war, however, cannot stand alone ; it must be aup-
portedy to use the military phrase ; unsubstantial and evanes-
cent in itself, it cannot reach far from its base. That base
must be either home ports, or else some solid outpost of the
national power, on the shore or the sea ; a distant dependency
or a powerful fleet. Failing such support, the cruiser can
only dash out hurriedly a short distance from home, and its
blows, though painful, cannot be fatal. It was not the policy
of 1667, but Oromweirs powerful fleets of ships-of-the-line in
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COMMERCE^DESTROYING WAR. 133
1662, that shut the Dutch merchantmen in their ports and
caused the grass to grow in the streets of Amsterdam. When,
instructed by the suffering of that time, the Dutch kept large
fleets afloat through two exhausting wars, though their com-
merce suffered greatly, thej bore up the burden of the strife
against England and France united. Forty years later, Louis
XIY. was driven, by exhaustion, to the policy adopted by
Charles II. through parsimony. Then were the days of the
great French privateers, Jean Bart, Forbin, Duguay-Trouin,
Du Casse, and others. Tlie regular fleets of the French navy
were practically withdrawn from the ocean during the great
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1712). The French
naval historian says: —
Unable to renew the naval armaments, Louis XIY. increased the
number of craisers upon the more frequented seas, especially the Chan-
nel and the Grerman Ocean [not far from home, it will be noticed].
In these different spots the craisers were always in a position to in-
tercept or hinder the movements of transports laden with troops, and
of the numerous convoys carrying supplies of all kinds. In these
seaSy in the centre of the commercial and political world, there is
always work for cruisers. Notwithstanding the difficulties they met,
owing to the absence of large friendly fleets, tbey served advanta-
geously the cause of the two peoples [French and Spanish]. Tliese
cruisers, in the face of the Anglo-Dutch power, needed good lock,
boldness, and skill. These three conditions were not lacking to our
seamen ; but then, what chiefs and what captains they had I " ^
The English historian, on the other hand, while admitting
how severely the people and commerce of England suffered
from the cruisers, bitterly reflecting at times upon the admin*
istration, yet refers over and over again to the increasing
prosperity of the whole country, and especially of its commer-
cial part. In the preceding war, on the contrary, from 1689
to 1697, when France sent great fleets to sea and disputed the
supremacy of the ocean, how different the result ! The same
English writer says of that time : —
^ Lapojroase-Bonfilfl : Hist de la Marino Fran^aise.
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MILITARY VALUE OF
With respect to our trade it is certain that we suffered infinitely
more, not merely than the French, for that was to be expected from
the greater number of our merchant-ships, but than we ever did in
any former war. • • • This proceeded in great measure from the vigi-
lance of the French, who carried on the war iu a piratical way. It
is out of all doubt that, taking all together, our traffic suffered exces-
sively ; our merchants were many of them ruined." ^
Macaulay says of this period: '^During many months of
1698 the English trade with the Mediterranean had been in-
terrupted almost entirely. There was uo chance that a mer-
chantman from London or Amsterdam would, if unprotected,
reach the Pillars of Hercules without being boarded by a
French privateer; and the protection of armed vessels was
not easily obtained." Why ? Because the vessels of Eng-
land's navy were occupied watching the French navy, and
this diversion of them from the cruisers and privateers con-
stituted the support which a commerce-destroying war must
have. A French historian', speaking of the same period in
England (1696), says : The state of the finances was deplora-
ble ; money was scarce, maritime insurance thirty per cent,
the Navigation Act was virtually suspended, and the English
shipping reduced to the necessity of sailing under the Swedish
and Danish flags." * Half a century later the French govern-
ment was again reduced, by long neglect of the navy, to a
cruising warfare. With what results ? First, the French
historian says : From June, 1756, to June, 1760, French pri-
vateers captured from the English more than twenty-five hun-
dred merchantmen. In 1761, though Franco had not, so to
speak, a single 8hip-6f-the-line at sea, and though the English
had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their
comrades still took eight hundred and twelve vessels. But,"
he goes on to say, ^'the prodigious growth of the English
shipping explains the number of these prizes."^ In other
words, the suffering involved to England iu such numerous
1 Campbell : Liyes of the Admirals. * Mjurtin : History of France.
' Martin : History of France.
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captures, which muet have caueed great individual injury and
discontent, did not really prevent the growing prosperity of
the State and of the community at large. The English naval
historian, speaking of the same period, says: While the
commerce of France was nearly destroyed, tlie trading-fleet of
England covered the seas. Every year her commerce was
increasing ; tlie money which the war carried out was returned
by the produce of her industry. Eight thousand merchant
vessels were employed by the English merchants." And
again, summing up the results of the war, after stating the
immense amount of specie brought into the kingdom by for-
eign conquests, he says: *^Tlie trade of England increased
gradually every year, and such a scene of national prosperity,
while waging a long, bloody, and costly war, was never before
shown by any people in the world." On the other hand, the
historian of the French navy, speaking of an earlier phase of
the same wars, says : The English fleets, having nothing to
resist them, swept the seas. Our ,'privateers and single cruis-
ers, having no fleet to keep down the abundance of their ene-
mies, ran short careers. Twenty thousand French seamen
lay in English prisons." ^ When, on the other hand, in the
War of the American Revolution France resumed the policy of
Colbert and of the early reign of Louis XIV., and kept large
battle-fleets afloat, the same result again followed as in the
days of Tourville. "For the first time," says the Annual
Register, forgetting or ignorant of the experience of 1698, and
remembering only the glories of the later wars, " English
merchantships were driven to take refuge under foreign
flags." ^ Finally, in quitting this part of the subject, it may be
remarked that in the island of Martinique the French had a
powerful distant dependency upon which to base a cruising
warfare; and during the Seven Years' War, as afterward
during the First Empire, it, with Guadeloupe, was the refuge
of numerous privateers. " The records of the English admi-
ralty raise the losses of the English in the West Indies during
the first years of the Seven Years' War to fourteen hundred
1 Lapejronse-BoDfilB. ' Annaal Beg., toL xxtU. p. 10.
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MILITARY VALUE OF
merchantmen taken or destroyed." Tlie English fleet was
therefore directed against the islands, both of which felU in-
volving a loss to the trade of France greater than all the dep-
redations of her cruisers on the English commerce, besides
breaking up the system; but in the war of 1778 the great
fleets protected the islands, which were not even threatened
at any time.
So far we have been viewing the effect of a purely cruising
warfare, not based upon powerful squadrons, only upon that
particular part of the enemy's strotigth against which it is theo-
retically directed, — upon his commerce and general wealth ;
upon the sinews of war. The evidence seems to show that
even for its own special ends such a mode of war is inconclu-
sive, worrying but not deadly ; it might almost be said that
it causes needless suffering. What, however, is the effect of
this policy upon the general ends of the war, to which it is
one of the means, and to which it is subsidiary ? How, again,
does it react upon the people that practise it ? As the his-
torical evidences will come up in detail from time to time, it
need here only be summarized. The result to England in the
days of Charles II. has been seen, — her coast insulted, her
shipping burned almost witliin sight of her capital. In the
War of the Spanish Succession, when the control of Spain was
the military object, while the French depended upon a cruis-
ing war agamst commerce, the navies of England and Hol-
land, unopposed, guarded the coasts of the peninsula, blocked
the port of Toulon, forced the French succors to cross the
Pyrenees, and by keeping open the sea highway, neutralized
the geographical nearness of France to the seat of war.
Their fleets seized Gibraltar, Barcelona, and Minorca, and co-
operating with the Austrian army failed by little of reducing
Toulon. In the Seven Years' War the English fleets seized,
or aided in seizing, all the most valuable colonies of France
and Spain, and made frequent descents on the French coast.
The War of the American Revolution affords no lesson, the
fleets being nearly equal. The next most striking instance to
Americans is the War of 1812. Everybody know^ how our
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COMMERCE-DESTROYING. 137
privateers swarmed over the seas^ and that from the small-
ness of our navy the war was essentially, indeed solely, a
cruising war. Except upon the lakes, it is doubtful if more
than two of our ships at any time acted together. The injury
done to English commerce, thus unexpectedly attacked by a
distant foe which had been undervalued, may be fully con-
coded ; but on the one hand, the American cruisers were
powerfully supported by the French fleet, which being assem*
bled in larger or smaller bodies in the many ports under the
emperor's control from Antwerp to Venice, tied the fleets of
England to blockade duty ; and on the other hand, when the
fall of the emperor released them, our coasts were insulted in
every direction, the Chesapeake entered and controlled, its
shores wasted, the Potomac ascended, and Washington burned.
Tlie Northern frontier was kept in a state of alarm, though
there squadrons, absolutely weak but relatively strong, sus-
tained the general defence ; while in the South the Mississippi
was entered unopposed, and New Orleans barely saved. When
negotiations for peace were opened, the bearing of the English
toward the American envoys was not that of men who felt
their country to be threatened with an unbearable evil. The
late Civil War, with the cruises of the Alabama" and
Sumter" and their consorts, revived the tradition of com*
merce-destroying. In so far as this is one means to a gen-
eral end, and is based upon a navy otherwise powerful, it is
well ; but we need not expect to see the feats of those ships
repeated in the face of a great sea power. In the first place,
those cruises were powerfully supported by the determination
of the United States to blockade, not only tlie chief centres
of Southern trade, but every inlet of the coast, thus leaving
few ships available for pursuit; in the second place, had
there been ten of those cruisers where there was one, they
would not have stopped the incursion in Southern waters of
the Union fleet, which penetrated to every point accessible
from the sea ; and in the third place, the undeniable injury,
direct and indirect, inflicted upon individuals and upon one
branch of the nation's industry (and how high that shipping
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POWER OF GREAT NAVIES^.
industry stands in the writer's estimation need not be re*
peated)^ did not in the least influence or retard the event ot
the war. Such injuries, unaccompanied hj others, are more
irritating than weakening. On the other hand, will any refuse
to admit that the work of the great Union fleets powerfully
modified and hastened an end which was probably inevita-
ble in any case ? As a sea power the South then occupied
the place of France in the wars we have been considering,
while the situation of the North resembled that of England ;
and, as in France, the sufferers in the Confederacy were not a
class, but the government and the nation at large. It is not
the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or
many, that strikes down the money power of a nation ; it is
the possessign of that overbearing power on the sea which
drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as
a fugitive ; and which, by controlling the great common, closes
tlie highways by which commerce moves to and from the
enemy's shores. This overbearing power can only bo exer-
cised by great navies, and by them (on the broad sea) less
efliciently now than in the days when the neutral flag had not
its present immunity. It is not unlikely that, in the event of
a war between maritime nations, on attempt may be made by
the one having a great sea power and wishing to break down
its enemy's commerce, to interpret the phrase effective
blockade " in the manner that best suits its interests at the
time ; to assert that the speed and disposal of its ships make
the blockade effective at much greater distances and with
fewer ships than formerly. The determination of such a ques-
tion will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon
neutral powers ; it will raise the issue between belligerent and
neutral rights; and if the belligerent have a vastly overpower-
ing navy he may carry his point, just as England, when pos-
sessing the mastery of the seas, long refused to admit the
doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods.
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CHAPTER m.
War or £nolani> and Francs in Alliance against the United
Provinces, 1672-1674. — Finally, of France against Combined
Europe, 1674-1678. — Sea Battles of Solbbat, the Texbl, and
Strombou.
O Louis XIV. made his first step toward seizing parts of the
Spanish Netherlands and Franche Oomt^. At the same time
that his armies moved forward, he sent out a State paper setting
forth his claims upon the territories in question. This paper
showed unmistakably the ambitious character of the young
king, roused the anxiety of Europe, and doubtless increased the
strength of the peace party in England^ Under the leader-
ship of Holland, but with the hearty co-operation of the Eng^
lish minister, an alliance was formed between the two countries
and Sweden, hitherto the friend of France, to check Louis'
advance before his power became too great. The attack first
on the Netherlands in 1667, and then on Franche Gomt^ in
1668, showed the hopeless weakness of Spain to defend her
possessions ; they fell almost without a blow.
The policy of the United Provinces, relative to the claims
of Louis at this time, was summed up in the phrase that
France was good as a friend, but not as a neighbor.'' They
were unwilling to break their traditional alliance, but still more
unwilling to have her on their border. The policy of the Eng-
lish people, though not of their king, turned toward the Dutch*
In the increased greatness of Louis they saw danger to all
Europe ; to themselves more especially if, by a settled prepon*
derance on the continent, his hands were free to develop his sea
power. Flanders once in the power of Louis XIY.," wrote the
conclusion of the Peace of Breda,
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140 TRIPLE ALLIANCE BETWEEN
English ambassador Temple, the Dutch feel that their coun«
try will be only a maritime province of France ; " and sliar-
ing that opinion, he advocated the policy of resistance to the
latter country, whose domination in the Low Countries ho con-
sidered as a threatened subjection of all Europe. Ho nover
ceased to represent to his government how dangerous to Eng-
land would be the conquest of the sea provinces by France,
and he urgently pointed out the need of a prompt understand-
ing with the Dutch. ^ This would be the best revenge/ said
he, ^ for the trick France has played us in involving us in the
last war with the United Provinces.' " These considerations
brought the two countries together in that Triple Alliance
with Sweden which has been mentioned, and which for a time
checked the onward movement of Louis. But the wars be-
tween the two sea nations were too recent, the humiliation of
England in the Thames too bitter, and the rivalries that still
existed too real, too deeply seated in the nature of things, to
make that alliance durable. It needed the dangerous power
of Louis, and his persistence in a course threatening to both,
to weld the union of these natural antagonists. This was not
to be done without another bloody encounter.
Louis was deeply angered at the Triple Alliance, and his
wrath was turned mainly upon Holland, in which from the
necessities of her position he recognized his most steadfast
opponent. For the time, however, he seemed to yield ; the
more readily because of the probable approaching failure of
the Spanish royal line, and the ambition he had of getting
more than merely the territory lying to the east of France,
when the throne became vacant. But, though he dissembled
and yielded, from that time he set his mind upon the destruc-
tion of the republic. This policy was directly contrary to
that laid down by Richelieu, and to the true welfare of
France. It was to England*s interest, at least just then, that
the United Provinces should not be trodden down by France ;
but it was much more to the interest of France that they
should not be subjected to England. England, free from the
continent, might stand alone upon the seas contending with
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ENGLAND, HOLLAND, AND SWEDEN. 141
France ; but France, hampered by her continental politics,
could not hope to vrest the control of the eeaa from Eng-
land without an ally. This ally Louis proposed to destroy,
and he asked England to help him. The final result is
already known, but the outlines of the contest must now
be followed.
Before the royal purpose had passed into action, and while
there was still time to turn the energies of France into an-
other channel, a different course was proposed to the king.
This was the project of Leibnitz, before spoken of, which has
special interest for our subject because, in proposing to re-
verse the lines which Louis then laid down, to make conti-
nental expansion secondary and growth beyond the sea the
primary object of France, the tendency avowedly and necessa-
rily was to base tlie greatness of the country upon the control
of the sea and of commerce. The immediate object offered to
the France of that day, with the attainment of which, how-
ever, she could not have stopped short, was the conquest of
Egypt; that country which, facing both the Mediterranean
and Eastern seas, gave control of the great commercial route
which in our own day has been completed by the Suez Canal.
That route had lost much of its value by the discovery of the
way round the Cape of Qood Hope, and yet more by the un-
settled and piratical conditions of the seas through which it
lay ; but with a really strong naval power occupying the key
of the position it might have been largely restored. Such a
power posted in Egypt would, in the already decaying condi-
tion of the Ottoman Empire, have controlled the trade not
only of India and the far East, but also of the Levant ; but the
enterprise could not have stopped there. The necessity of
mastering the Mediterranean and opening the Bed Sea, closed
to Christian vessels by Mohammedan bigotry, would have
compelled the occupation of stations on either side of Egypt ;
and France would have been led step by step, as England has
been led by the possession of India, to the seizure of points
like Malta, Cyprus, Aden, in short, to a great sea power. That
is clear now ; but it will be interesting to hear the arguments
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142
PROPOSITION OF LEIBNITZ.
\)j which Leibnitz sought to convince the French king two
hundred years ago.
After pointing out the weakness of the Turkish Empire,
and the readiness with which it might be further embarrassed
by stirring up Austria and Poland, the latter the traditiopal
ally of France ; after showing that France had no armed enemy
in the Mediterranean, and that on the other side of Egypt she
would meet the Portuguese colonies, longing to obtain protec-
tion against the Dutch in India, the memorial proceeds : —
^ The conquest of Egypt, that Holland of the East, is infinitely
easier than that of the United Provinces. France needs peace in the
west, war at a distance. War with Holland will probably ruin the
new Indian companies as well as the colonies and commerce lately
revived by France, and will increase the burdens of the people while
diminishing their resources. The Dutch will retire into then* man-
tune towns, stand there on the defensive in perfect safety, and assume
the offensive on the sea with great chance of success. If France
does not obtain a complete victory over them, she loses all her influ-
ence in Europe, and by victory she endangers that influence. In
Egypt, on the contrary, a repulse, almost impossible, will be of no great
consequence, and victory will give the dominion of the seas, the
commerce of the East and of India, the preponderance in Christendom,
and even the empire of the East on the ruins of the Ottoman power.
The possession of Egypt opens the way to conquests worthy of
Alexander ; the extreme weakness of the Orientals is no longer a
secret. Whoever has Egypt will have all the coasts and islands of
the Indian Ocean. It is in Egypt that Holland will be conquered ;
it is there she will be despoiled of what alone renders her prosperous,
the treasures of the East. She will be struck without being able to
ward off the blow. Should she wish to oppose the designs of France
upon Egypt, she would be overwhelmed with the universal hatred of
Christians ; attacked at home, on the contrary, not only could she ward
off the aggression, but she could avenge herself sustained by universal
public opinion, which suspects the views of France of ambition." ^
The memorial had no effect. All that the efforts of am-
bition and human prudence could do to lay the foundations
for the destruction of a nation, Louis XIY. now did. Diplo-
1 Martin: Histoiy of France.
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BARGAINS BETWEEN LOUIS AND CHARLES. 143
matic strategy on a vast scale was displayed in order to isolate
and hem in Holland. Loais, who had been nnable to make
Europe accept the conquest of Belgium by France, now hoped
to induce it to see without trembling the fall of Holland."
His efforts were in the main successful. The Triple Alliance
was broken ; the King of England, though contrary to the
wishes of liis people, made an offensive alliance with Louis ;
and Holland, when the war began, found herself without an
ally in Europe, except the worn-out kingdom of Spain and the
Elector of Brandenburg, then by no means a first-class State.
But in order to obtain the help of Charles II., Louis not only
engaged to pay him large sums of money, but also to give to
England, from the spoils of Holland and Belgium, Walcheren,
Sluys, and Cadsand, and even the islands of Goree and Voorn ;
the control, that is, of the mouths of the great commercial
rivera the Scheldt and the Meuse. With regard to the united
fleets of the two nations, it was agreed that the officer bear*
ing the admiral's flag of England should command in chief.
The question of naval precedence was reserved, by not
sending the admiral of France afloat ; but it was practically
yielded. It is evident that in his eagerness for the ruin of
Holland and his own continental aggrandizement Louis was
playing directly into England's hand, as to power on the sea.
A French historian is justified in saying: These negotia-
tions have been wrongly judged. It has been often repeated
that Charles sold England to Louis XIY. This is true only
of internal policy. Charles indeed plotted the political and re-
ligious subjugation of England with the help of a foreign
power ; but as to external interests, he did not sell them, for
the greater share in the profit from the ruin of the Dutch was
to go to England." ^
During the years preceding the war the Dutch made every
diplomatic effort to avert it, but the hatred of Charles and
Louis prevented any concession being accepted as final. An
English royal yacht was ordered to pass Uirough the Dutch
ships-of-war in the Channel, and to fire on them if they did
^ HartiB ; Hiitoiy of France.
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144 WAR OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN
not strike their flags. Iii January^ 1672, England sent an
ultimatum, summoning Ilolland to acknowledge the right of
the English crown to tlie sovereignty of the British seas, and
to order its fleets to lower their flags to the smallest English
man-of-war ; and demands such as these received the support
of a French king. The Dutch continued to yield, but seeing at
length that all concessions were useless, they in February
ordered into commission seventy-five ships-of-the-line, besides
smaller vessels. On the 28d of March Uie English, without
declaration of war, attacked a fleet of Dutch merchantmen ;
and on the 29th the king declared war. Tliis was followed,
April 6th, by the declaration of Louis XIV. ; and on the 28th
of the same month he set out to take command in person of
his army.
The war which now began, including the third and last of
the great contests between the English and Dutch upon the
ocean, was not, like those before it, purely a sea war ; and it
will be necessary to mention its leading outlines on the land
also, not only in order to clearness of impression, but also
to bring out the desperate straits to which the republic was
reduced, and the final deliverance through its sea power in
the hands of the great seaman De Ruyter.
The naval war differs from those that preceded it in more
than one respect ; but its most distinctive feature is that the
Dutch, except on one occasion at the very beginning, did not
send out their fleet to meet the enemy, but made what may
properly be called ajtrategic use of their dangerous coast and
shoals, upon which were based their sea operations. To this
course they were forced by the desperate odds under which
they were fighting ; but they did not use their shoals as a
mere shelter, — the warfare they waged was the defensive-
offensive. When the wind was fair for the allies to attack,
Ruyter kept under cover of his islands, or at least on ground
where the enemy dared not follow ; but when the wind served
so that he might attack in his own way, he turned and fell
upon them. There are also apparent indications of tactical
combinations, on his part, of a higher order than have yet
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ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED PROVINCES. 146
been mot ; though it is possible that the particular aots re-
ferred to, consisting in partial attacks amounting to little
more than demonstrations against the French contingent, may
have sprung from political motives. This solution for the
undoubted fact that the Dutch attacked the French lightly
has not been met with elsewhere by the writer ; but it seems
possible that the rulers of the United Provinces may have
wished not to increase the exasperation of their most dan^-
gerous enemy by humiliating his fleet, and so making it less
easy to his pride to accept their offers. Thera is, however,
an equally satisfactory military explanation in the supposition
that, the French being yet inexperienced, Ruyter thought
it only necessary to contain them while falling in force upon
the English. The latter fought throughout with their old
gallantry, but less than their old discipline ; whereas the
attacks of the Dutch were made with a sustained and unani-
mous vigor that showed a great military advance. The action
of the French was at times suspicious ; it has been alleged
that Louis ordered his admiral to economize his fleet, and
there is good reason to believe that toward the end of the
two years that England remained in his alliance he did
do so.
The authorities of the United Provinces, knowing that the
French fleet at Brest was to join the English in the Thames,
made great exertions to fit out their squadron so as to attack
the latter before the junction was made; but the wretched
lack of centralization in their naval administration caused
this project to fail. The province of Zealand was so back-
ward that its contingent, a large fraction of the whole, was
not ready in time ; and it has been charged that the delay
was due, not merely to mismanagement, but to disaffection
to the party in control of the government. A blow at the
English fleet in its own waters, by a superior force, before its
ally arrived, was a correct military conception ; judging from
the after-history of this war, it might well have produced a
profound effect upon the whole course of the struggle. Ruyter
finally got to sea and fell in with the allied fleets, but though
10
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THE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY.
fully intending to fightyfell back before them to his own coast
The allies did not follow liim there, bnt retired, apparently in
full security, to Southwold Bay, on' the east coast of England,
some ninety miles north of the mouth of the Thames. There
they anchored in three divisions, — two English, the rear and
centre of the allied line, to the northward, and the van, com-
posed of French ships, to the southward. Ruyter followed
them, and on the early morning of June 7, 1672, the Dutch
fleet was signalled by a French lookout frigate in the north-
ward and eastward ; standing down before a northeast wind
for the allied fleet, from which a large number of boats and
men were ashore in watering parties. The Dutch order of
battle was in two lines, the advanced one containing eighteen
ships with fire-ships (Plate III., A). Their total force was
ninety-one ships-of-the-line ; that of the allies one hundred
and one.
The wind was blowing toward the coast, which here trends
nearly north and south, and the allies were in an awkward posi-
tion. They had first to get under way, and they could not
fall back to gain time or room to establish their order. Most
of the ships cut their cables, and the English made sail on
the starboard tack, heading about north-northwest, a course
which forced them soon to go about ; whereas the French
took the other tack (Plate III., B). The battle began therefore
by the separation of the allied fleet. Ruyter sent one division
to attack the French, or rather to contain them; for these
opponents exchanged only a distant cannonade, although the
Dutch, being to windward, had the choice of closer action if
they wished it. As their commander, Bankert, was not cen-
sured, it may be supposed he acted under orders ; and he was
certainly in command a year later, and acting with great judg-
ment and gallantry at the battle of the Texel. Meanwhile
Ruyter fell furiously upon the two English divisions, and ap-
parently with superior forces ; for the English naval historians
claim that the Dutch were in the proportion of three to two.^
^ Ledyard, rol. ii. p. 599 ; Campbell : Lires of the Admirals. See also letter
of Sir Richard Haddock, Naral Chronicle, roL XTii. p. 121.
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THE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY.
147
If this can be aocepted, it gives a marked evideuce of Bny-
ter^s high qualities as a general officer, in advance of any
other who appears in this century.
The results of the battle, considered simply as an engage-
ment, were indecisive ; both sides lost heavily, but the honors
and the substantial advantages all belonged to the Dutch,
or rather to De Ruyter. fie had outgeneralled the allies by
his apparent retreat, and then returning had surprised them
wholly udprepared. The false move by which tilie English,
two thirds of the whole, stood to the northward and westward,
while the other third, the French, went off to the east and
south, separated the allied fleet; Ruyter threw his whole
force into the gap, showing front to the French with a divi-
sion probably smaller in numbers, but which, from its position
to windward, had the choice of coming to close action or not,
while with the remainder he fell in much superior strength
upon the English (Plate III., B). Paul Hoste says ^ that Vice-
Admiral d'Estr^es, commanding the French, had taken meas-
ures for tacking and breaking through the Dutch division
opposed to him so as to rejoin the Duke of York, the allied
commander-in-chief. It may be so, for D'Estr^es was a very
brave man, and not enough of a seaman to appreciate the
dangers of the attempt ; but no such move was begun, and
both the English and Ruyter thought that the French rather
avoided than sought close action. Had D'Estr^es, however,
gone about, and attempted to break through the line of expe-
rienced Dutchmen to windward of him with the still raw sea-
men of France, the result would have been as disastrous as
that which overtook the Spanish admiral at the battle of St.
Vincent a hundred and twenty-five years later, when he tried
to reunite his broken fleet by breaking through the close order
of Jervis and Nelson. (See Plate III., a.) The truth, which
gradually dawns through a mass of conflicting statements, is,
that the Duke of York, though a fair seaman and a brave
man, was not an able one ; that his fleet was not in good
order and was thus surprised; that his orders beforehand
^ Horte: NaTtl Tictics.
THE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY.
were not so precise as to make the French admiral techni-
cally disobedient in taking the opposite tack from the com-
mander-in-chief, and so separating the squadrons; and that
Buyter profited most ably by the surprise which he had him-
self prepared, and by the furtlier opportunity given him by
the ineptness of his enemies. Unless for circumstances that
are not stated, the French admiral took the right tack, with
a northeast wind, for it led out to sea and would give room
for manoeuvring; had the Duke of York chosen the same, the
allied fleet would have gone out together, with only the dis-
advantage of the wind and bad order. In that case, however,
Buyter could, and probably would, have done just what he did
at the Tezel a year later, — check the van, the French, with
a small containing force, and fall with the mass of his fleet
upon the centre and rear. It is the similarity of his action in
both cases, under very different conditions, that proves ho
intended at Southwold Bay merely to keep the French in
check while he destroyed the English.
In this battle, called indifferently Southwold Bay and Sole-
bay, Buyter showed a degree of skill combined with vigor
which did not appear upon the sea, after his death, until the
days of Suffren and Nelsod. His battles of the war of 1672
were no affairs of circumspection," though they were fought
circumspectly ; his aim was no less than the enemy's total
overthrow, by joining good combinations to fury of attack.
At Solebay he was somewhat, though not greatly, inferior to
his enemies ; afterward much more so.
The substantial results of Solebay fight were wholly favora-
ble to the Dutch. The allied fleets were to have assisted the
operations of the French army by making a descent upon the
coast of Zealand. Buy tor's attack had inflicted an amount of
damage, and caused an expenditure of ammunition, which
postponed the sailing of the fleet for a month ; it was a diver-
sion, not only important, but vital in the nearly desperate
condition to which the United Provinces were reduced ashore.
It may be added, as an instructive comment on the theory of
commerce-destroying, that after this staggering check to the
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THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND. I49
enemy's superior forces, Rnyter met and convoyed safely to
port a fleet of Dutch merchantmen*
The progress of the land campaign must now be briefly
described.^ Early in May the French army in several corps
moved forward, passing through the outskirts of the Spanish
Netherlands, and directing their attack upon Holland from
the south and east The republican party which was in
power in Holland had neglected the army, and now made
the mistake of scattering the force they had among many for-
tified towns, trusting that each would do something toward
delaying the French. Louis, however, under the advice of
Turenne, simply observed the more important places, while
the second-rate towns surrendered nearly as fast as they
were summoned ; the army of the Provinces, as well as their
territory, thus passing rapidly, by fractions, into the power of
the enemy. Within a mouth the French were in the heart
of the country, having carried all before them, and with no
organized force remaining in their front sufficient of itself
to stop them. In the fortnight following the battle of
Solebay, terror and disorganization spread throughout the
republic. On the 16th of Juno the Grand Pensionary ob-
tained permission of the States-General to send a deputation
to Louis XIY., begging him to name the terms on which he
would grant them peace; any humiliation to the foreigner
was better in the eyes of the politician than to see the oppo-
site party, the House of Orange, come into power on his
downfall. While negotiations were pending, the Dutch towns
continued to surrender ; and on the 20th of June a few French
soldiers entered Muyden, the key to Amsterdam. They were
only stragglers, though the large body to which they belonged
was near at hand ; and the burghers, who had admitted them
under the influence of the panic prevailing throughout the
land, seeing that they were alone, soon made them drunk and
put them out The nobler feeling that animated Amsterdam
now made itself felt in Muyden ; a body of troops hurried up
from the capital, and the smaller city was saved* Situated
1 8ee Map, p. 107.
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150 THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND.
on the Zujder Zee, two hours distant from Amsterdam, at tlie
junction of a number of rivers and canals, Muyden not only
held the key of the principal dykes by which Amsterdam
could surround herself with a protecting inundation, it also
held the key of the harbor of this great city, all the ships
whidi went from the North Sea to Amsterdam by the Zuyder
Zee being obliged to pass under its guns. Muyden saved and
its dykes open, Amsterdam had time to breathe, and remained
free to break off her communications by land and to maintain
them by sea." ^ It was the turning-point of the invasion ; but
what would have been the effect upon the spirit of the Dutch,
oppressed by defeat and distracted in council, if in that fateful
fortnight which went before, the allied fleet had attacked their
coasts 7 From this they were saved by the battle of Solebay.
Negotiations continued. The burgomasters — the party rep-
resenting wealth and commerce — favored submission; they
shrank from the destruction of their property and trade.
New advances were made ; but while the envoys were still in
the camp of Louis, the populace and the Orange party rose,
and with them the spirit of resistance. On the 25th of June
Amsterdam opened the dykes, and her example was followed
by the other cities of Holland ; immense loss was entailed,
but the flooded country and the cities contained therein,
standing like islands amid the waters, were safe from attack
by land forces until freezing weather. The revolution con-
tinued. William of Orange, afterward William III. of Eng-
land, was on the 8th of July made stadtholder, and head of
the army and navy ; and the two De Witts, the heads of the
republican party, were murdered by a mob a few weeks later.
The resistance born of popular enthusiasm and pride of
country was strengthened by the excessive demands of Louis
XIV. It was plain that the Provinces must conquer or be
destroyed. Meanwhile the other States of Europe were wak-
ing up to the danger, and the Emperor of Germany, the
Elector of Brandenburg, and the King of Spain declared for
Holland ; while Sweden, though nominally in alliance with
^ Martin : Histozj of France.
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NAVAL BATTLES OFF SCHONEVSLDT. 161
France, was unwilling to Hee ihe deatrnction of Uie Provinoea,
becauae that would be to the advantage of England's sea
power. Nevertheless the next year, 1678, opened with prom-
ise for France, and the English king was prepared to fulfil
his port of the compact on the seas ; but the Dutch, under
the firm leadership of William of Orange, and with their
hold on the sea unshaken, now refused to accept conditions of
peace which had been offered by themselves the year before.
Three naval battles were fought in 1678, all near the coast
of the United Provinces ; the first two, June 7 and June 14,
off Schoneveldt, from which place they have taken their name ;
the third, known as the battle of the Tezel, August 21. In
all three Buyter attacked, choosing his own time, and retir-
ing when it suited him to the protection of his own shores.
For the allies to carry out their objects and make any diver*
sion upon the seaboard, or on the other hand to cripple the
sea resources of the hard-pressed Provinces, it was necessary
first to deal successfully with Buyter's fleet The great ad-
miral and his government both felt this, and took the reso-
lution that ^ the . fleet should be posted in the passage of
Schoneveldt, or a little farther south toward Ostend, to ob-
serve the enemy, and if attacked, or seeing the enemy's fleet
disposed to make a descent upon the shores of the United
Provinces, should resist vigorously, by opposing his designs
and destroying his ships.*' ^ From this position, with good
lookouts, any movement of the allies would be known.
The English and French put to sea about the 1st of June,
under the command of Prince Bupert, first cousin to the
king, the Duke of York having been obliged to resign his
oflice on account of the passage of the Test Act, directed
against persons of the Boman Catholic faith holding any
public employment The French were under Vice-Admiral
d'Estr^es, the same who had commanded them at Solebay. A
force of six thousand English troops at Yarmouth was ready
to embark if De Buyter was worsted. On the 7th of June the
Dutch were made out, riding within the sands at Schoneveldt
1 Bnndi : Life of De Rvjtor.
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THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL.
A detached squadron was sent to draw them out, but Ruytei
needed no invitation ; the wind served, and he followed the
detached squadron with such impetuosity as to attack before
the allied line was fairly formed. On this occasion the French
occupied the centre. The affair was indecisive, if a battle can
be called so in which an inferior force attacks a superior, in-
flicts an equal loss, and frustrates the main object of the
enemy. A week later Buyter again attacked, with results
which, though indecisive as before as to the particular action,
forced the allied fleet to return to the English coast to refit,
and for supplies. The Dutch in these encounters had fifty-
five ships-of-the-line ; their enemies eighty-one, fifty-four of
which were English.
The allied fleets did not go to sea again until the latter part
of July, and this time they carried with them a body of troops
meant for a landing. On the 20th of August the Dutch fleet
was seen under way between the Texel and the Mcuse. Ru-
pert at once got ready to fight; but as the wind was from the
northward and westward, giving the allies the weather-gage,
and with it the choice of the method of attack, Buyter
availed himself of his local knowledge, keeping so close to
the beach that the enemy dared not approach, — the more
so as it was late in the day.- During the night the wind
shifted to oast-southeast off the land, and at daybreak, to use
the words of a French ofScial narrative, the Dutch made
all sail and stood down boldly into action."
The allied fleet was to leeward on the port tack, heading
about south, — the French in the van, Bupert in the centre,
and Sir Edward Spragge commanding the rear. De Buyter
divided his fleet into three squadrons, the leading one of
which, of ten or twelve ships only, he sent against the
French; while with the rest of his force he attacked the
English in the centre and rear (Plate IV., A, A', A")- If we
accept the English estimate of the forces, which gives the Eng-
lish sixty ships, the French thirty, and the Dutch seventy,
Buyter^s plan of attack, by simply holding the French in
check as at Solebay, allowed him to engage the English on
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THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL.
153
equal terms. The battle took on several distinct phases,
which it is instructive to follow. M. de Martel, commanding
the van of the French, and consequently the leading sub-
division of the allied fleet, was ordered to stretch ahead, go
about and gain to windward of the Dutch van, so as to place
it between two fires. This he did (B) ; but as soon as
Bankert — the same who had manoeuvred so judiciously at
Solebay the year before — saw the danger, he put his helm up
and ran through the remaining twenty ships of D'Estr^'
squadron with his own twelve (C), — a feat as creditable to
him as it was discreditable to the French ; and then wearing
round stood down to De Ruyter, who was hotly engaged with
Rupert (C). He was not followed by D'Estr^es, who suf-
fered him to carry this important reinforcement to the Dutcn
main attack undisturbed. This practically ended the French
share in the fight.
Rupert, during his action with De Ruyter, kept off con-
tinually, with the object of drawing the Dutch farther away
from their coast, so that if the wind shifted they might not
be able to regain its shelter. De Ruyter followed him, and
the consequent separation of the centre from the van (B, B')
was one of the reasons alleged by D'Estr^ for his delay*
It does not, however, seem to have prevented Bankert from
joining his chief.
In the rear an extraordinary action on the part of Sir
Edward Spragge increased the confusion in the allied fleet.
For some reason this officer considered Tromp, who com-
manded the Dutch rear, as his personal antagonist, and in
order to facilitate the latter's getting into action, he hove-
to (stopped) the whole English rear to wait for him. This
ill-timed point of honor on Spragge's part seems to have
sprung from a promise he had made to the king that he
would bring back Tromp alive or dead, or else lose his own
life. The stoppage, which recalls the irresponsible and insub-
ordinate action of the junior Dutch flag-officers in the former
war, of course separated the rear (A", B", C"), which also
drifted rapidly to leeward, Spragge and Tromp carrying on a
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154
THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL.
hot private action on their own account These two junior
admirals sought each other personally, and the battle be-
tween their flags was so severe that Spragge twice had to
shift his own to another ship; on the second occasion the
boat in which he was embarked was sunk by a shot, and he
himself drowned.
Rupert, thus forsaken by his van and rear, found himself
alone with Buyter (B') ; who, reinforced by his van, had the
address further to cut off the rear subdivision of the allied
centre, and to surround the remaining twenty ships with
probably thirty or forty of his own (C). It is not creditable
to the gunnery of the day that more substantial results did
not follow; but it is to be remembei'ed that all Ruyter's
skill could secure, except for probably a very short time, was
an action on equal terms with the English ; his total inferi-
ority in numbers could not be quite overcome. The damage
to the English and Dutch may therefore have been great, and
was probably nearly equal.
Rupert finally disengaged himself, and seeing that the
English rear (C^^) was not replying well to its immediate
opponents, ran down toward it, Buyter following him ; the
two Opposing centres steering paittllel courses, and within
cannon-shot, but by mutual consent, induced perhaps by
ammunition running short, refraining from firing. At four
p. M. the centres and rears united, and towaixl five a fresh
engagement began, which continued till seven, when Ruyter
withdrew, probably because of the approach of the French,
who, by tiieir own accounts, rejoined Rupert about that
time. This ended the battle, which, like all that preceded
it in this war, may be called a drawn fight, but as to which
the verdict of the English naval historian is doubtless cor-
rect : The consequences which the Dutch, through the
prudence of their admiral, drew from this battle were ex-
ceedingly great; for they opened their ports, which were
entirely blocked up, and put an end to all thoughts, by re-
moving the possibility, of an invasion.**^
1 CampbeU : Lives of the Admixali.
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THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL.
The military features of the action have sufficiently ap-
peared in the account that has been given, — the skill of De
Ruyter; the firmness and promptness of Bankert, first in
checking and then in passing through the French division ;
the apparent disloyalty or, at the best, inefficiency of the lat-
ter ; the insubordination and military blundering of Spragge ;
the seeming lack of everything but hard fighting on Rupert's
part. Tlie allies indulged in bitter mutual recriminations.
Rupert blamed both D'Estr^es and Spragge ; D'Estr^es found
fault with Rupert for running to leeward ; and D'Estr^es' own
second, Martel, roundly called his chief a coward, in a letter
which earned him an imprisonment in the Bastille. The
French king ordered an inquiry by the intendant of the navy
at Brest, who made a report^ upon which the account here
given has mainly rested, and which leaves little doubt of the
dishonor of the French arms in this battle. M. d'Estr^es
gave it to be understood," says the French naval historian,
that the king wished his fleet spared, and that the English
should not be trusted. Was he wrong in not relying upon
the sincerity of the English alliance, when he was receiving
from all quarters warnings that the people and the nobles
were murmuring against it, and Charles II. was perhaps
alone in his kingdom in wishing it ? " ' Possibly not ; but he
was surely wrong if he wished any military man, or body of
men, to play the equivocal part assigned to the French admiral
on this day ; the loss of the fleet would have been a lighter
disaster. So evident to eye-witnesses was the bad faith or
cowardice (and the latter supposition is not admissible), that
one of the Dutch seamen, as they discussed among themselves
why the French did not come down, said : You fools ! they
have hired the English to fight for them, and all their business
here is to see that they earn their wages." A more sober-
minded and significant utterance is that with which the in-
tendant at Brest ends the official report before mentioned:
'^It would appear in all these sea-fights Ruyter has never
cared to attack the French squadron, and that in this last
> Tionde : BataillM NftTales de la France, year 1673. * Ibid.
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166
THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL.
action he had detached ten ships of the Zealand squadron to
keep it in play.*' ^ No stronger testimony is needed to Euy ter's
opinion of the inefficiency or faithlessness of that contingent
to the allied forces.
Another chapter in the history of maritime coalitions was
closed, on the 21st of August, 1678, by the battle of the
TezeL In it, as in others, were amply justified the words
with which a modern French naval officer has stamped
them : United by momentary political interests, but at hot-
tom divided to the verge of hatred, never following the same
path in counsel or in action, they have never produced good
results, or at least results proportioned to the efforts of the
powers allied against a common enemy. The navies of
France, Spain, and Holland seem, at several distinct times,
to have joined only to make more complete the triumph of
the British arms." ' When to this well-ascertained tendency
of coalitions is added the equally well known jealousy of
every country over the increasing power of a neighbor, and
the consequent unwillingness to see such increase obtained
by crushing another member of the family of nations, an
approach is made to the measure of naval strength required
by a State. It is not necessary to be able to meet all others
combined, as some Englishmen have seemed to think; it
is necessary only to be able to meet the strongest on favor^
able terms, sure that the others will not join in destroying a
factor in the political equilibrium, even if they hold aloof.
England and Spain were allies in Toulon in 1798, when
the excesses of Revolutionary France seemed to threaten the
social order of Europe; but the Spanish admiral told the
English flatly that the ruin of the French navy, a large part of
which was there in their hands, could not fail to be injurious
to the interests of Spain, and a part of the French ships
was saved by his conduct, which has been justly character-
ized as not only full of firmness, but also as dictated by the
highest political reason.*
1 Tronde : Batailles NavalM de la France, year 1678.
* Chaband-ArnaiiU : Revue Mar. et Col. Jvly, 1886.
■ JurieD de la Gravi^re : Goerres Maritimea.
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DE RUYTER'S MILITARY CHARACTER. 167
The battle of the Texel, closing tlie loiig serieB of wars in
which the Dutch and English contended on equal terms for
the mastery of the seas, saw the Dutch nayj in its highest eflS-
ciencj, and its greatest ornament, De llujter, at the summit
of his glory. Long since old in years, for he was now sixty-
six, he had lost none of his martial vigor ; his attack was as
furious as eight years before, and his judgment apparently
had ripened rapidly through the experience of the last war,
for there is far more evidence of plan and military insight
tiian before. To him, under the government of the great
Pensionary De Witt, with whom he was in close sympathy,
the increase of discipline and sound military tone now ap-
parent in the Dutch navy must have been largely due. He
went to this final strife of the two great sea-peoples in the
fulness of his own genius, with an admirably tempered instru-
ment in his hands, and with the glorious disadvantage of
numbers, to save his country. The mission was fulfilled not
by courage alone, but by courage, forethought, and skill.
The attack at the Texel was, in its general lines, the same
as that at Trafalgar, the enemy's van being neglected to fall
on the centre and rear, and as at Trafalgar the van, by fail-
ing to do its duty, more than justified the conception ; but as
the odds against De Buyter were greater than those against
Nelson, so was his success less. The part played by Bankert
at Solebay was essentially the same as that of Nelson at St.
Vincent, when he threw himself across the path of the Span-
ish division with his single ship (see Plato III., c, c') ; but
Nelson took bis course without orders from Jervis, while
Bankert was carrying out Buyter's plan. Once more, still
himself in his bearing, but under sadly altered surroundings,
will this simple and heroic man come before us ; and here,
in contrast with his glory, seems a proper place to insert a
little description by the Oomte de Ouiche^ of his bearing in
the Four Days' Fight, which brings out at once the homely
and the heroic sides of his character.
I never saw him [during those last three days] other than even*
tempered ; and when victory was assured, saying always it was the
1 M^moiies.
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158 COALITION AGAINST FRANCE.
good God that gives it to ns. Amid tlie disorders of the fleet and'
the appearance of loss, he seemed to be moved only bj the misfor-
tune to hb country, but always submissive to the will of God.
Finally, it may be said that he has something of the frankness and
lack of polish of our patriarchs ; and, to conclude what I have to
say of him, I will relate that the day after the victory I found him
sweeping his own room and feeding his chickens."
Nine days after the battle of the Tezel, on the 80th of
Augusty 1678, a formal alliance was made between Holland
on the one hand, and Spain, Lorraine, and the emperor of
Germany on the other, and the French ambassador was
dismissed from Yieuna. Louis almost immediately offered
Holland comparatively moderate terms; but the United
Provinces, witli their new allies by their sides and with their
backs borne firmly upon the sea which had favored and sup-
ported them, set their face steadily against him. In England
the clamor of the people and Parliament became louder;
the Protestant feeling and the old enmity to France were
daily growing, as was the national distrust of the king.
Charles, though he had himself lost none of his hatred of the
republic, had to give way. Louis, seeing the gathering storm,
made up his mind, by the counsel of Turenne, to withdraw
from his dangerously advanced position by evacuating Hol-
land, and to try to make peace with the Provinces 'separately
T^hile continuing the war with the House of Austria in Spain
and Germany. Thus he^etumed to Richelieu'sjjoli^
Holland^was saved. February lff,~1674, peac^ was signed
between England and the Provinces. The latter recognized
the absolute supremacy of the English flag from Gape Finis-
terre in Spain to Norway, and paid a war indemnity.
The withdrawal of England, which remained neutral during
the remaining four years of the war, necessarily made it less
maritime. The King of France did not think his navy, either
in numbers or efiiciency, able to contend alone with that of
Holland; he therefore withdrew it from the ocean and con-
fined his sea enterprises to the Mediterranean, with one or two
half-privateering expeditions to the West Indies. The United
Provinces for their part, being freed from danger on the side
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REVOLT OF SICILY AGAINST SPAIN. 169
of the sea, and not having, except for a short time, any
serious idea of operating against the French coast, diminished
their own fleets. The war became more and more conti-
nental, and drew in more and more the other powers of
Europe. Oradually the German States cast their lot with
Austria, and on May 28, 1674, the Diet proclaimed war
against France. The great work of French policy in the last
generations was undone, Austria had resumed her supremacy
in Germany, and Holland had not been destroyed. On the
Baltic, Dekimark, seeing Sweden inclining toward France^
hastened to make common cause with the German Empire,
sending fifteen thousand troops. There remained in Germany
only Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg faithful still to their
French alliance. The land war had tlius drawn in nearly
all the powers of Europe, and, from the nature of the case,
the principal theatre of the conflict was beyond the eastern
boundary of France, toward the Rhine, and in the Spanish
Netherlands ; but while this was raging, a maritime episode
was introduced by the fact of Denmark and Sweden being
engaged on opposite sides. Of this it will not be neces-
sary to speak, beyond mentioning that the Dutch sent a
squadron under Tromp to join the Danes, and that the united
fleets won a great victory over the Swedes in 1676, taking
from them ten ships. It is therefore evident that the sea
superiority of Holland detracted greatly from Sweden's value
as an ally to Louis XIY.
Another maritime strife arose in the Mediterranean by the
revolt of the Sicilians against the Spanish rule.^ The help
they asked from France was granted as a diversion against
Spain, but the Sicilian enterprise never became more than a
side issue. Its naval interest springs from bringing Ruyter
once more on the scene, and that as the antagonist of
Duquesne, the equal, and by some thought even the superior,
of Tourville, whose name has always stood far above all
others in the French navy of that day.
Mesfiina revolted in July, 1674, and the French kmg at
^ See M^> of Mediterranean, p. 15.
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160
THE BATTLE OF STROMBOLL
once took it under his proteotion. The Spanieh navy through*
out Beems to have behaved badly, certainly inefficiently ; and
early in 1675 the French were safely established in the city.
During the year their naval power in the Mediterranean was
much increased, and Spain, unable to defend the island herself,
applied to the United Provinces for a fleet, the expenses of
which she would bear. The Provinces, fatigued by the
war, involved in debt, suffering cruelly in .their commerce,
exhausted by the necessity of paying the emperor and all the
German princes, could no longer fit out the enormous fleets
which they had once opposed to France and England.'* They
however hearkened to Spain and sent De Buyter, with a
squadron of only eighteen ships and four fire-ships. The
admiral, who had noted the growth of the French navy, said
the force was too small, and departed oppressed in spirit, but
with the calm resignation which was habitual to him. He
reached Cadiz in September, and in the mean time the French
had further strengthened themselves by the capture of
Agosta, a port commanding the southeast of Sicily. * De
Buyter was again delayed by the Spanish government, and
did not reach the north coast of the island until the end of
i)ecember, when head winds kept him from entering the
Straits of Messina. He cruised between Messina and the
Lipari Islands in a position to intercept the French fleet
convoying troops and supplies, which was expected under
Duquesne.
On the 7th of January, 1676, the French came in sight,
twenty ships-of-the-line and six ^re-ships ; the Dutch had but
nineteen ships, one of which was a Spaniard, and four fire-
ships ; and it must be remembered that, although there is no
detailed account of the Dutch ships in this action, they were
as a rule inferior to those of England, and yet more to those of
France. The first day was spent in manoeuvring, the Dutch
having the weather-gage ; but during that night, which was
squally and drove the Spanish galleys accompanying the
Dutch to take refuge under Lipari, the wind shifted, and com-
ing out at west-southwest, gave the French the weather-gage
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III
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THE BATTLE OF STROMBOLI.
161
and the power to attack. Diiquesne iresoWed to nse it, and
sending Uie convoy ahead, formed his line on the starboard
tack standing soath ; the Dutch did the same, and waited for
him (Plate V., A, A, A).
An emotion of surprise must be felt at seeing the great
Dutch admiral surrender the choice of attack on the 7th. At
daybreak of that day he saw the enemy and steered for him ;
at three P. M., a French account says, he hauled his wind on the
same tack as themselves, but out of cannon-shot to windward.
How account for the seeming reluctance of the man who
three years before had made the desperate attacks of Solebay
and the Tezel 7 His reasons have not been handed down ; it
may be that the defensive advantages of the lee-gage had been
recognized by this thoughtful seaman, especially when pre-^
paring to meet, with inferior forces, an enemy of impetuous
gallantry and imperfect seamanship. If any such ideas did
influence him they were justified by the result. The battle of
Stromboli presents a partial anticipation of the tactic^ of the
French and English a hundred years later; but in this case
it is the French who seek the weather-gage and attack with
fury, while the Dutch take the defensive. The results were
very much such as Olerk pointed out to the English in his
celebrated work on naval tactics, the accounts here followed
being entirely French.*
The two fleets being drawn up in line-of-battle on the star-
board tack, heading south, as has been said, 'De Buyter
awaited the attack which he had refused to make. Being be-
tween the French and their port, he felt they must fight At
nine a. m. the French line kept away all together and ran down
obliquely upon the Dutch, a manoeuvre difiicult to be per-
formed with accuracy, and during which the assailant re-
ceives his enemy's fire at disadvantage (A^ A'^, A!"^. In
doing this, two ships in the French van were seriously dis-
abled. M. de la Fayette, in the ^ Frudente,' began the action ;
but having rashly thrown himself into the midst of the
enemy's van, he was dismantled and forced jto haul off " (a).
1 Lapejnouie, Bonfila : Hist de la Marine Fran9aiB9.
11
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162
THE TACTICS AT STROMBOLL
Oonfusion ensued in the French line, from the difficult char-
acter of the manoeuyre. Yice-Admiral do Preuilli, com-
manding the van, in keeping away took too little room, so
that in coming to the wind again, the ships, in too close order,
lapped and interfered with one another's fire [A']. The
absence of M. de la Fayette from the line tlirew the ^ Parfait '
into peril. Attacked by two ships, she lost her maintopmast
and had also to haul off for repairs/' Again, the French
came into action in succession instead of all together, a usual
and almost inevitable result of the manoeuvre in question.
^ In the mid%t of a terrible cannonade," that is, after part of
his ships were engaged, Duquesne, commanding the centre,
took post on the beam of Buyter's division.'' The French rear
came into action still later, after the centre (A'', A!"). Lan-
geron and Bethune, commanding leading ships of the French
centre, are crushed by superior forces." How can this be,
seeing the French had the more ships? It was because, as
the narrative tells us, the French had not yet repaired the
disorder of the first movement" However, all at last got
into action (B, B, B), and Duquesne gradually restored order.
Tlie Dutch, engaged all along the line, resisted everywhere,
and there was not one of their ships which was not closely
engaged ; more cannot be said for the admiral and captains
of the inferior fleet. The remaining part of the fight is not
very clearly related. Ruyter is said to have given way con-
tinually with his two leading divisions ; but whether this was
a confession of weakness or a tactical move does not appear.
The rear was separated ((X), in permitting which either
Ruyter or the immediate commander was at fault; but the-
attempts made by the French to surround and isolate it
failed, probably because of damaged spars, for one French
ship did pass entirely around the separated division. The
action ended at 4.80 P. M., except in the rear, and the Span-
ish galleys shortly after came up and towed the disabled
Dutch ships away. Their escape shows how injured the
French must have been. The positions, C, CK, are intended
to show the Dutch rear far separated, and the disorder in
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CLERK'S NAVAL TACTICS.
which a fleet action under sail necesBarily ended from loss
of spars.
Tliose who are familiar with Clerk's work on naval tac-
tics, pablished about 1780, will recognize in this account of
the battle of Stromboli all the features to which he called the
attention of English seamen in his thesis on the methods
of action employed hj them and their adversaries in and be-
fore his time. Clerk's thesis started from the postulate that
English seamen and officers were superior in skill or spirit,
or both, to Uie French, and their ships on the whole as fast ;
that tliey were conscious of this superiority and therefore
eager to attack, while the French, equally conscious of in-
feriority, or for other reasons, were averse to decisive engage-
ments. With these dispositions the latter, feeling they could
rely on a blindly furious attack by the English, had evolved
a crafty plan by which, while seeming to fight, they really
avoided doing so, and at the same time did the enemy much
harm. This plan was to take the lee-gage, the characteristic
of which, as has before been pointed out, is that it is a defen-
sive position, and to await attack. The English error, accord-
ing to Clerk, upon which the French had learned by experience
that they could always count, was in drawing up their line
parallel to the enemy, or nearly so, and then keeping away
all together to attack, ship for ship, each its opposite in the
hostile line. By standing down in this manner the assailant
lost the use of most of his artillery, while exposed to the full
fire of his opponent, and invariably came up in confusion, be-
cause the order of attack was one difficult to maintain at any
time, and much more so in the smoke under fire, with torn
sails and falling masts. This was precisely the attack made
by Duquesne at Stromboli, and it there had precisely the
consequences Clerk points out, — confusion in the line, the van
arriving first and getting the brunt of the fire of the defence,
disabled ships in the van causing confusion in the rear, etc.
Clerk further asserts, and he seems to be right, that as the
action grew warm, the French, by running off to leeward, in
their turn, led the English to repeat the same mode of at-
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164 TACTICS OF DUQUESNE AND RUYTER.
tack ; 1 and bo we find, at Stromboli, Ruyter giving ground in
the same waj, though his motive does not appear. Clerk
also points out that a necessary corollary of the lee-gage,
assumed for tactical reasons, is to aim at the assailant's spars,
his motive power, so that his attack cannot be pushed far-
ther than the defendant chooses, and at Stromboli the crip*
pled condition of the French is evident ; for after Ruyter had
fallen to leeward, and could no longer help his separated rear,
it was practically unmolested by the French, although none
of these had been sunk. While therefore there cannot with
certainty be attributed to Ruyter the deliberate choice of
the lee-gage, for which there was as yet no precedent, it is
evident that he reaped all its benefits, and that the character
of the French officers of his day, inexperienced as seamen and
of impetuous valor, offered just the conditions that gave most
advantage to an inferior force standing on the defensive.
The qualities and characteristics of the enemy are among the
1 Thb morement, according to Clerk, waa not made by the whole of a French
line together, bnt in a way much more icientific and military. A group of two
or three ihips withdrew at a time, being coTered by the imoke and the con-
tinned fire of the rett of their line. In time a second line was partly formed,
which in its torn protected the ships which had remained on the first, as they
executed the somewhat exposed movement of falling back. In Plan V., Dutch
ships at b, b, b, are represented as thus withdrawing. English official reports of
the eighteenth century often speak of French ships acting thus; the English
oflicers attributing to their superior ralor a movement which Clerk more plau-
sibly considers a skilfnl military mancDuvre, well calculated to give the defence
several opportunities of disabling the assailants as they bore down on a course
which impeded the use of their artillery. In 181S the frigate " United States,"
commanded by Decatur, employed the same tactics in her fight with the Mace-
donian ; " and the Confederate gunboats at Mobile by the same means inflicted
on Farragttt's flag-ship the greater part of the heavy loss which she sustained.
In its essential features the same line of action can now be followed by a
defendant, having greater speed, when the ardor of the attack, or tlio necessities
of the case, force the assailant to a direct approach. An indirect cause of a
lee line falling farther to leeward has never been noticed. When a ship
in that line (as at c) found itself without an opponent abeam, and its next
ahead perhaps heavUy engaged, the natural impuhM would be to put up the
helm so as to bring the broadside to bear. This advantage would be gained by
a loss of ground to leeward and consequent disorder in the line ; which, if the
act were repeated by several ships, could only be restored by the whole line
keeping away
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DE RUYTER KILLED OFF AGOSTA.
principal factors which a man of genius considers, and it was
to this as much as to any other one trait that Nelson owed
his dazzling successes. On the other hand, the French ad-
miral attacked in a wlioUy unscientific manner, ship against
ship, without an attempt to concentrate on a part of the
enemy, or even trying to keep him in play until the French
squadron of eight ships-of-the-line in Messina, near by, could
join. Such tactics cannot be named beside that of Sole-
bay or the Texel; but as Duquesue was the best French
officer of the century, with the possible exception of Tour-
Tille, this battle has a value of its own in the history of tao*
tics, and may by no means be omitted. The standing of the
commander-in-chief is the warrant thai it marks the highest
point to which French naval tactics has as yet attained.
Before quitting this discussion, it may be noted that the
remedy Clerk proposed was to attack the rear ships of the
enemy's line, and preferably to leeward ; the remainder of
the fleet must then either abandon them or stand down for
a general action, which according to his postulate was all
that the English seamen desired.
After the fight De Ruyter sailed to Palermo, one of his
ships sinking on the way. Duquesne was joined outside
Messina by the French division that had been lying there.
The remaining incidents of the Sicilian war are unimportant
to the general subject. On the 22d of April, De Ruyter and
Duquesne met again off Agosta. Duquesne had twenty-nine
ships, the allied Spaniards and Dutch twenty-seven, of which
ten were Spanish. Unfortunately the Spaniard commanded
in chief, and took the centre of the line with the ships of
his country, contrary to the advice of Ruyter, who, know-
ing how inefficient his allies were, wished to scatter them
through the line and so support them better. Ruyter himself
took the van, and the allies, having the wind, attacked ; but
the Spanish centre kept at long cannon range, leaving the
brunt of the battle to fall on the Dutch van. The rear,
following the commander-in-chiefs motions, was also but
slightly engaged. In this sorrowful yet still glorious fulfil-
ment of hopeless duty, De Ruyter, who never before in his
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166 ENGLAND BECOMES HOSTILE TO FRANCE.
long career had been struck by an enemy's shoti received a
mortal wound. He died a week later at Syracuse^ and with
him passed away the last hope of resistance on the sea. A
month later the Spanish and Dutch fleets were attacked at
anchor at Palermoi and many of them destroyed; while a
division sent from Holland to reinforce the Mediterranean
fleet was met by a French squadron in the Straits of Gib-
raltar and forced to take refuge in Cadiz.
The Sicilian enterprise continued to be only a diyersiouy
and the slight importance attached to it shows clearly how
entirely Louis XIV, was bent on the continental war. How
differently would the value of Sicily have impressed him, had
his eyes been fixed on Egypt and extension by sea. As the
years passed, the temper of the English people became more
and more excited against France; the trade rivalries with
Holland seemed to fall into the shade, and it became likely
that England, which had entered the war as the ally of Louis,
would, before it closed, take up arms against him. In addi-
tion to other causes of jealousy she saw the French navy
increased to a number superior to her own. Charles for a
while resisted the pressure of Parliament, but in January,
1678, a ti-eaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was made
between tlie two sea countries ; the king recalled the English
troops which until now had been serving as part of the
French army, and when Parliament opened again in Feb-
ruary, asked for money to equip ninety ships and thirty
thousand soldiers. Louis, who was expecting this result, at
once ordered the evacuation of Sicily. He did not fear Eng-
land by land, but on the sea he could not yet hold his own
against the union of the two sea powers. At the same time
he redoubled his attacks on the Spanish Netherlands. As
long as there was a hope of keeping the ships of England out
of the fight, he had avoided touching the susceptibilities of
the English people on the subject of the Belgian sea-coast ;
but now that they could no longer be conciliated, he thought
best to terrify Holland by tlie sharpness of his attack in the
quarter where she dreaded him most.
The United Provinces were in truth the mainspring of the
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SUFFERINGS OF THE UNITED PROVINCES. 167
coalition. Though among the smallest in extent of the coun-
tries arrayed against Louis, they were strongest in the char-
acter and purpose of their ruler, the Prince of Orange, and
in the wealth which, while supporting the armies of the con-
federates, also kept the poor and greedy Oerman princes
faithful to their aJliance. Almost alone, by dint of mighty
sea power, by commercial and maritime ability, they bore the
burden of the war; and though they staggered and com-
plained, they still bore it. As in later centuries England, so
at the time we are now speaking of Holland, the great sea
power, supported the war against the ambition of France ;
but her sufferings were great Her commerce, preyed upon
by French privateers, lost heavily; and there was added an
immense indirect loss in the transfer of the carrying-trade
t)etween foreign countries, which had contributed so much to
the prosperity of the Dutch. When the flag of England be-
came neutral, this rich business went to her ships, which
crossed the seas the more securely because of the eager desire
of Louis to conciliate the English nation. This desire led
him also to make very large concessions to English exigencies
in the matter of commercial treaties, undoing much of the
work of protection upon which Colbert sought to nourish the
yet feeble growth of French sea power. These sops, however,
only stayed for a moment the passions which were driving
England ; it was not self-interest, but stronger motives, which
impelled her to a break with France.
Still less was it to the interest of Holland to prolong the
war, after Louis showed a wish for peace. A continental
war could at best be but a necessary evil, and source of weak-
ness to her. The money she spent on her own and the
allied armies was lost to her navy, and the sources of her
prosperity on the sea were being exhausted. How far the
Prince of Orange was justified, by the aims of Louis XIY., in
that unyielding attitude of opposition toward him which he
always maintained, may be uncertain, and there is here no
need to decide the question ; but there can be no doubt that
the strife sacrificed the sea power of Holland through sheer
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168
PEACE OF NIMEGUEN.
exhaustion, and with it destroyed her position among the
nations of the world. Situated between France and Eng-
land," says a historian of Holland, by one or other of them
were the United Provinces, after they had achieved their
independence of Spain, constantly engaged in wars, which
exhausted their finances, annihilated their navy, and caused
the rapid decline of their trade, manufactures, and commerce;
and thus a peace-loving nation found herself crushed by the
weight of unprovoked and long-continued hostilities* Often,
too, the friendship of England was scarcely less harmful to
Holland than her enmity. As one increased and the other
lessened, it became the alliance of the giant and the dwarf.'' ^
Hitherto we have seen Holland the open enemy or hearty
rival of England; henceforward she appears as an ally, — in
both cases a sufferer from her smaller size, weaker numbers,
and less favored situation.
The exhaustion of the United Provinces and the clamor of
their merchants and peace party on the one hand, aided on
the other by the sufferings of France, the embarrassment of
her finances, and the threatened addition of England's navy
to her already numerous enemies, inclined to peace the two
principal parties to this long war. Louis had long been will-
ing to make peace with Holland alone ; but the States had
been withheld, at first by fidelity to those who had joined
them in their hour of trouble, and latterly by the firm pur-
pose of William of Orange. Difficulties were gradually
smoothed away, and the Peace of Nimeguen between the
United Provinces and France was signed August 11, 1678.
The other powers shortly afterward acceded to it. The
principal sufferer, as was natural, was the overgrown but
feeble monarchy whose centre was Spain, which gave up to
France Franche Oomttf and a number of fortified towns in
the Spanish Netherlands, thus extending the boundaries of
France to the east and northeast Holland, for whose de-
struction Louis began the war, lost not a foot of ground in
Europe ; and beyond the seas only her colonies on the west
> Davietf: Uistoijrof HoUand.
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EFFECTS UPok FRANCE OF THE WAR. 169
coast of Africa and in Guiana. She owed her safety at first,
and the final successful issue, to her sea power. That de-
livered her in the hour of extreme danger, and enabled her
afterward to keep alive the general war. It maj be said to
have been one of the chief factors, and inferior to no other
one singly, in determining the event of the great war which
was formally closed at Nimeguen.
The effort none the less sapped her strength, and being
followed by many years of similar strain broke her down.
But what was the effect upon the vastly greater state, the
extreme ambition of whose king was the principal cause of
the exhausting wars of this time ? Among the many activi-
ties which illustrated the brilliant opening of the reign of the
then youthful king of France, none was so important, hone so
intelligently directed, as those of Colbert, who aimed first at
restoring the finances from the confusion into which they had
fallen, and then at establishing them upon a firm foundation
of national wealth. This wealth, at that time utterly beneath
the possibilities of France, was to be developed on the lines
of production encouraged, trade stimulated to healthful ac-
tivity, a large merchant shipping, a great navy, and colonial
extension. Some of these are sources, others the actual con
stitnents, of sea power ; which indeed may be said in a sea-
board nation to be the invariable accompaniment, if it be not
the chief source, of its strength. For nearly twelve years all
went well ; the development of the greatness of France in
all these directions went forward rapidly, if not in all with
equal strides, and the king's revenues increased by bounds.
Then came the hour in which he had to decide whether the
exertions which his ambition naturally, perhaps properly,
prompted should take the direction which, while imposing
great efforts, did nothing to sustain but rather hindered the
natural activities of his people, and broke down commerce by
making control of the sea uncertain ; or whether he should
launch out in pursuits which, while involving expense, would
keep peace on his borders, lead to the control of the sea, and
by the impulse given to trade, and all upon which trade de-
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170 EFFECTS UPON FRANCE OF THE WAB.
pendsi would bring in money nearly if not quite equal to that
wliich the State spent. This is not a fanciful picture ; by
his attitude toward Holland, and its consequences, Louis gave
the first impulse to England upon the path which realized
to her, within his own day, the results which Colbert and
Leibnitz had hoped for France. He drove the Dutch carry*
ing-trade into the ships of England ; allowed her to settle
peacefully Pennsylvania and Carolina, and to seize New York
and New Jersey; and he sacrificed, to gain her neutrality,
the growing commerce of Franco. Not all at once, but
very rapidly, England pressed into the front place as a sea
power ; and however great her sufferings and the sufferings
of individual Englishmen, it remained true of her that even
in war her prosperity was great Doubtless France could
not forget her continental position, nor wholly keep free
from continental wars ; but it may be believed that if she
had chosen the path of sea power, she might both have
escaped many conflicts and borne tliose that were unavoid-
able with greater ease. At the Peace of Nimegucn the
injuries were not irreparable, but *^the agricultural classes,
commerce, manufactures, and the colonies had alike been
smitten by the war ; and the conditions of peace, so advan-
tageous to the territorial and military power of France, were
much less so to manufactures, the protective tariffs having
been lowered in favor of England and Holland," ^ the two
sea powers. Tlie merchant shipping was stricken, and the
splendid growth of the royal navy, that excited the jealousy
of England, was like a tree without roots ; it soon withered
away under the blast of war.
Before finally quitting this war with Holland, a short notice
of the Comte d'Estr^es, to whom Louis committed the charge
of the French contingent of the allied fleet, and who com-
manded it at Solebay and the Texel, will throw some light
upon the qualifications of the French naval officers of the day
before experience had made seamen of many of them. D'Es-
tr^es went to sea for the first time in 1667, being then a man
1 Haitin : Histoiy of France.
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NOTICE OF THE COMTE lyESTRllBS. 171
of mature years ; but in 1672 we find him in the chief com-
mand of an important squadron, having under him DuquesnCi
who was a seaman, and had been so for nearly forty years.
In 1677, D'Estr^es obtained from the king a body of eight
ships which he undertook to maintain at his own expense,
upon the condition of receiving half the prizes made. With
tliis squadron he made an attack upon the then Dutch island
of Tobago, with a recklessness which showed that no lack of
courage prompted his equivocal conduct at the TexeL The
next year he went out again and contrived to run the whole
squadron ashore on the Aves Islands. The account given by
the flag-captiun of this transaction is amusing as well as
instructive. In his report he says : —
''The day that the sqaadron was lost, the sun having been taken
by the pilots, the vioe^dmiral as usual had them put down the posi*
tion in his cabin. As I was entering to learn what was going on, I
met the third pilot, Bourdaloue, who was going oat crying. I asked
him what the matter was, and he answered : * Because I find more
drift than the other pilots, the admiral is threatening me and abusing
me, as usual ; yet I am only a poor lad who does the best he can.'
When I had entered the cabin, the admiral, who was very angry, said
to me, 'That scoundrel of a Bourdaloue is always coming to me
with some nonsense or other ; I will drive him out of the ship. He
makes us to be running a course, the devil knows where, I don't.*
As I did not know which was right," says the captain of the ship,
rather naively, " I did not dare to say anything for fear of bringing
down a like storm on my own head." ^
Some hours after this scene, which, as the French oflScer
from whom the extract is taken says, appears now almost
grotesque, but which is only an exact portrayal of the sea
manners of the day, the whole squadron was lost on a group
of rocks known as the Aves Islands. Such were the oflScers.'*
The flag-captain, in another part of his report, says : ^' The
shipwreck resulted from the general line of conduct held by
Yice-Admiral d'Estr^es. It was always the opinion of his
servants, or others than the proper oflScers of the ship, which
1 Gonf^eazd : Marine de Qaerre.
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172 NOTICE OP THE COMTE ITESTRMBS.
prevailed. This manner of acting maj be understood in fhe
Cotute d'EstrteSi who, withoat the neceasaiy knowledge of
a profeaaion he had embraced ao late, alwaya had with him
ofascore coonaelloray in order to appropriate the opinions
they gave him so aa to blind the ship's company as to his
capacity/' ^ D'Estr^ had been made yice^tdmiral two yeara
after he first went aboard ship.
1 Tteude: Batafllet Haralet.
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CHAPTER IV.
English Revolution. ^ War of trb Lbaoub or Augsburg, 1688*
1697. —Sea Battles of Bbacht Head and La Hougue.
»
T^HE Peace of Nimeguen was followed by a period of ten
years in which no extensive war broke out. They
were, however, far from being years of political quiet. Louis
XIY. was as intent upon pushing on his frontiers to the east-
ward in peace as in war, and grasped in quick succession
fragments of territory which had not been given him by the
peace. Claiming this and that in virtue of ancient feudal
ties; this and that other as implicitly surrendered by the
treaty, because dependent upon something else that had been
explicitly surrendered ; purchasing at one time, using bare
force in other cases, and backing up all the so-called peaceful
methods of obtaining his asserted rights by the presence of
armed power, he carried on this process of extension between
1679 and 1682. The aggression most startling to Europe,
and above all to the German Empire, was the seizure of the
then imperial city of Strasburg on the 80th of September,
1681 ; and on the same day Oasale, in Italy, was sold to him
by the Duke of Mantua, showing that his ambitions were
directed that way as well as to the north and east Both of
these were positions of great strategic importance, threaten-
ing, the one Germany, the other Italy, in case of war.
The excitement throughout Europe was very great; in
every direction Louis, serenely trusting to his power, was
making new enemies and alienating former friends. The
king of Sweden, directly insulte^l, and injured in his duchy
of Deux-Ponts, turned against him, as did the Italian States ;
and *the Pope himself sided with the enemies of a king
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174
AGGRESSIONS OF LOUIS XIV.
who was already showing his zeal for the conversion of the
Protestants^ and was preparing for the reyocation of the Edict
of Nantes. Bat the discontent, though deep and general,
had to be organized and directed ; the spirit necessary to
give it form and final effective expression was foond again
in Holland, in William of Orange. Time, however, was
needed to mature the work. *^No one yet armed himself;
but every one talked, wrote, agitated, from Stockholm to
Madrid. . • • The war of the pen preceded by many years
the war of the sword ; incessant appeals were made to Euro-
pean opinion by indefatigable publicists; under all forms
was diffused the terror of the New Universal Monarchy,"
which was seeking to take the place once filled by the House
of Austria. It was known that Louis sought to make himself
or his son emperor of Germany. But complications of differ-
ent kinds, private interests, lack of money, all combined to
delay action. The United Provinces, despite William's wishes,
were yet unwilling to act again as banker for a coalition,
and the emperor was so threatened on his eastern frontier
by the rebel Hungarians and the Turks that he dared not
risk a western war.
Meanwhile the armed navy of France was daily growing
in strength and efiiciency under Colbert's care, and acquiring
tiie habit of war by attacks upon the Barbary pirates and
their ports. During the same years the navies both of Eng-
land and of Holland were declining in numbers and efficiency.
It has already been said that in 1688, when William needed
Dutch ships for his exp^ition to England, it was objected that
the navy was in a far different condition from 1672, being
incalculably decreased in strength and deprived of its most
able commanders." In England, the decline of discipline had
been followed by an economical policy as to material, grad-
ually lessening the numbers and injuring the condition of
the fleet ; and after the littie flare-up and expected war with
France in 1678, the king gave the care of the navy to a new
body of men, concerning whom an English naval historian
says : <<This new administration lasted five years, and if
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ACCESSION OF JAMES II.
175
it had continued five years longer would in all probability
have remedied even the numerous and mighty evils it had ^
introduced, by wearing out the whole royal navy, and so
leaving no room for future mistakes. However, a just senso
of this induced the king, in 1684, to resume the management
of the fleet into his own hands, restoring most of the old
officers ; but before any great progress in the work of res-
toration could be made, his Majesty died," ^ — in 1686. The
change of sovereigns was of vast importance, not merely to /
.the English navy, but from the ultimate effect it was to have
upon the designs of Louis XIY. and the fortune of the gen-
eral war which his aggressions were preparing. James IL
was peculiarly interested in the navy, being himself a sea-
man, and having commanded in chief at Lowestoft and South-
wold Bay. He knew its actual depressed condition ; and the
measures he at once took to restore it, both in numbers
and efficiency, were thoughtful and thorough. In the three
years of his reign very much indeed was done to prepare
a weapon which was first proved against himself and his
best friend.
The accession of James IL, which promised fairly for
Louis, precipitated the action of Europe against him. The
House of Stuart, closely allied to the King of France, and
sympathizing with his absolutist rule, had used the still
great power of the sovereign to check the political and re-
ligious enmity of the English nation to France. James IL
added to the same political sympathies a strength of Roman
Catholic fervor which led him into acts peculiarly fitted to
revolt the feeling of the English people, with the final
result of driving him from the throne, and calling to it, by
the voice of Parliament, his daughter Mary, whose husband
was William of Orange.
In the same year that James became king, a vast diplo-
matic combination against France began. This movement
had two sides, religious and political. The Protestant States
were enraged at the increasing persecutions of the French
1 GampbeU: LiTti of the Admlnli.
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176
LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG.
Protestants, and their feelings became stronger as tlie policy
of James of England showed itself more and more bent
toward Rome. The Protestant northern States, Holland,
Sweden, and Brandenburg, drew together in alliances ; and
they counted for support upon the Emperor of Austria and
(Germany, upon Spain and other Roman Catholic States whose
motives were political apprehension and anger. The emperor
had latterly been successful against the Turks, thus freeing
his hands for a move against France. July 9, 1686, there
was signed at Augsburg a secret agreement between the
emperor, the kings of Spain and Sweden, and a number of
Oerman princes. Its object was at first defensiye only
against France, but it could readily be turned into an of«
fensive alliance. This compact took the name of the League
of Augsburg, and from it the general war which followed two
years later was called the War of the League of Augsburg.
The next year, 1687, saw yet greater successes of the
Empire over the Turks and Hungarians. It was evident
that France could expect no more from diversions in that
quarter. At the same time the discontent of the English and
the ambitions of the Prince of Orange, who hoped from his
accession to the throne of England no ordinary personal
aggrandizement, but the fulfilment of his strongest politi-
cal wish and conviction, in curbing forever the power of
Louis XIY., became more and more plain. But for his
expedition into England, William needed ships, money, and
men from the United Provinces ; and they hung back, know-
ing that the result would be war with the French king, who
proclaimed James his ally. Their action was at last decided
by the course of Louis, who chose this moment to revoke
concessions made at Nimeguen to Dutch trade. The serious
injury thus done to Holland's material interests turned the
wavering scale. This violation of the conventions of Nime-
guen,'' says a French historian,^ by giving a severe blow to
Dutch commerce, reducing her European trade more than
one fourth, removed the obstacle that religious passions still
1 Aiartla : Hktoiy of FnxkOb.
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ENGLISH REVOLUTION.
177
enconntered in material intereets, and pnt all Holland at tho
disposition of William, none having reitson longer to concili-
ate France.*' This was in November, 1687. In the summer
of the following year the birth of an heir to the English
throne brought things to an issue. English loyaltjr might
have put up with the reign of the father, now advanced in
years, but could not endure the prospect of a continued
Roman Catholic royalty.
Matters had at last reached the crisis to which they had
been tending for years. Louis and William of Orange, long^
standing enemies, and at the moment the two chief figures
in European politics, alike from their own strong personalia-
ties and the cause which either represented, stood on the
brink of great actions, whose effects were to be felt through
many generations. William, despotic in temper himself,
stood on the shores of Holland looking hopefully toward free
England, from which he was separated by the narrow belt
of water that was the defence of the island kingdom, and
might yot be an impassable barrier to his own high aims ; for
the French king at that moment could control the sea if he
wouldi Louis, holding all the power of France in his sihgle
grasp, facing eastward as before, saw the continent gathering
against him ; while on his flank was England heartily hostile,
longing to enter on the strife against him, but as yet without
a leader. It still remained with him to decide whether he
would leave the road open for the head to join the waiting
body, and to bring Holland and England, the two sea powers,
under one rule. If he attacked Holland by land, and sent
his superior navy into the Channel, he might well keep
William in his own country; the more so as the English
navy, beloved and petted by the king, was likely to have more
than the usual loyalty of seamen to their chief. Faithful
to the bias of his life, perhaps unable to free himself from
it, he turned toward the continent, and September 24, 1688,
declared waJr against Germany and moved his armies toward
the Rhine. William, overjoyed, saw removed the last ob-
stacle to his ambition. Delayed for some weeks by contrary
12
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178
WILLIAM LANDS IN ENGLAND.
windSy he finally set sail from Holland on the 80th of October.
More than five hundred transports^ with fifteen thousand
troops, escorted by fifty men-of-war, formed the expedition ;
and it is typical of its mingled political and religious char-
acter, that the larger part of the army officers were French
Protestants who had been driven from France since the last
war, the commander-in-chief under William being the Hu-
guenot Schomberg, late a marshal of France. The first start
was foiled by a violent storm ; but sailing again on the 10th
of November, a fresh, fair breeze carried the ships through
the Straits and the Channel, and William landed on the 15th
at Torbay. Before the end of the year, James had fled from
his kingdom. On ihe 21st of the following April, William and
Mary were proclaimed sovereigns of Great Britain, and Eng-
land and Holland were united for the war, which Louis had
declared against the United Provinces as soon as he heard of
William's invasion. During all the weeks that the expedi-r
tion was preparing and delayed, the French ambassador at
the Hague and the minister of the navy were praying the
king to stop it with his great sea power, — a power so great
that the French fleet in the first years of the war outnum-
bered those of England and Holland combined; but Louis
would not Blindness seems to have struck the kings of
England and France alike ; for James, amid all his apprehen-
sions, steadily refused any assistance from the French fleet,
trusting to the fidelity of the English seamen to his person,
although his attempts to have Mass celebrated on board the
ships had occasioned an uproar and mutiny which nearly
ended in the crews throwing the priests overboard.
France thus entered the War of the League of Augsburg
without a single ally. *^ What her policy had most feared,
what she had long averted, was come to pass. England and
Holland were not only allied, but united under the same
chief ; and England entered the coalition with all the eager-
aess of passions long restrained by the Stuart policy.'' As
regards the sea war, the different battles have much less
tactical value than those of De Buyter. The chief points
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WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG. 179
of strategic interest are the failure of Louis^ having a de-
cided superiority at sea, properly to support James II* in
Ireland, which remained faitiiful to him, and the gradual
disappearance from the ocean of the great French fleets,
which Louis XIY. could no longer maintain, owing to the
expense of that continental policy which he had chosen for
himself. A third point of rather minor interest is the pe-
culiar character and large proportions taken on by the
commerce-destroying and privateering warfare of the French,
as their large fleets were disappearing. This, and the great
effect produced by it, will appear at first to contradict what
has been said as to the general inadequacy of such a warfare
when not supported by fleets; but an examination of the
conditions, which will be made later on, will show that the
contradiction is rather apparent than real.
Taught by the experience of the last conflict, the chief
effort of the French king, in the general war he had brought
upon himself, should have been directed against the sea pow-
ers, — against William of Orange and the Anglo-Dutch alli-
ance. The weakest point in William's position was Ireland ;
though in England itself not only were there many parti-
sans of the exiled king, but even those who had called in
William fenced his kingship about with jealous restrictions.
His power was not Secure so long as Ireland was not sub-
dued. James, having fled from England in January, 1689,
landed in Ireland in the following March, accompanied by
French troops and a French squadron, and was enthusias-
tically welcomed everywhere but. in the Protestant North*
He made Dublin his capital, and remained in the country
until July of the next year. During these fifteen months
the French were much superior at sea; they landed troops
in Ireland on more than one occasion ; and the English, at-
tempting to prevent this, were defeated in the naval battle
of Bantry Bay.^ But although James was so well estab-
lished, and it was of the utmost importance to sustain him ;
although it was equally important to keep William from get*
> See Map of English Chaimel, etc., p. 107.
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180 OPERATIONS IN IRELAND.
tl/c'v1^ ting a foothold till James was further strengthened and Lon-
p donderrjy then passing through its famous siege, reduced;
r and although the French were superior to the united Eng-
" '* lish and Dutch on the seas in 1689 and 1690; nevertheless,
the English admiral Booke was able, unmolested, to throw
succors and troops into Londonderry, and afterward landed
Marshal Schomberg, with a small army, near Oarrickfergus.
Booke stopped intercourse between Ireland and Scotland,
where were many Stuart partisans, and then with his small
squadron passed along the east coast of Ireland, attempted
to burn the shipping in Dublin harbor, failing only through
lack of wind, and finally came off Cork, then occupied by
James, took possession of an island in the harbor, and re-
turned in safety to the Downs in October. These services,
which raised the siege of Londonderry and kept open the com-
munications between England and Ireland, extended through-
out the summer months ; nor was any attempt made by the
French to stop them. There can be little doubt than an
effective co-operatiou of the French fleet in the summer of
1689 would have broken down all opposition to James in
Ireland, by isolating that country from England, with cor-
responding injury to William's power.
The following year the same strategic and political mis-
take was made. It is the nature of an enterprise such as
James's, dependent upon a weaker people and foreign help,
to lose strength if it does not progress; but the chances were
still in his favor, provided France co-operated heartily, and
above all, with her fleet. It is equally the nature of a merely
y military navy like that of France to be strongest at the begin-
ning of hostilities ; whereas that of the allied sea powers grew
daily stronger, drawing upon the vast resources of their mer-
chant shipping and their wealth. The disparity of force was
still in favor of France in 1690, but it was not as great as the
year before. The all-important question was where to direct
it. There were two principal courses, involving two views of
naval strategy. The one was to act against the allied fleet,
whose defeat, if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of
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WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG. 181
William's throne in England ; the other was to make the fleet
subsidiary to the Irish campaign. The French king decided
upon the former, which was undoubtedly the proper course ;
but there was no reason for neglecting, as he did, the impor-
tant duty of cutting off the communications between the two
islands. As early as March he had sent a large fleet with six*
thousand troops and supplies of war, which were landed with-
out any trouble in the southern ports of Ireland ; but after
performing tliat senrice, the ships employed returned to Brest,
and there remained inactive during May and June while the
grand fleet under the Oomte de Tounrille was assembling.
During those two months the English were gathering an army
on their west coast, and on the 21st of June, William em-
barked his forces at Chester on board two hundred and eighty-
eight transports, escorted by only six men-of-war. On the
24th he landed in Carrickfergas, and the ships-of-war were
dismissed to join the English grand fleet, which, however,
they were not able to do; Tourville's ships having in the
mean time got to sea and occupied the channel to the east-
ward. There is nothing more striking than the carelessness
shown by both the contending parties, during the time that
Ireland was in dispute, as to the communications of their
opponents with the island ; but this was especially strange in
the French, as they had the larger forces, and must have re-
ceived pretty accurate information of what was going on from
disaffected persons in England. It appears that a squadron
of twenty-five frigates, to be supported by ships-of-the-line,
were told off for duty in St George's Channel; but they
never reached their station, and only ten of the frigates had
got as far as Einsale by the time James had lost all at the
battle of the Boyne. The English communications were not
even threatened for an hour.
Tourville's fleet, complete in numbers, having seventy-eight
ships, of which seventy were in the line-of-battle, with twenty-
two fire-ships, got to sea June 22, the day after William em«
barked. On the 80th the French were off the Lizard, to the
dismay of the English admiral, who was lying off the Isle
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182 * BATTLE OF BE ACHY HEAD.
of Wight in such an unprepared attitude that he had not even
lookout ships to the westward. He got under way, standing
off-shore to the southeast, and was joined from time to time,
during the next ten days, by other English and Dutch ships.
The two fleets continued moving to the eastward, sighting
each other from time to time.
The political situation in England was critical. The Jaco-
bites were growing more and more open in their demonstra-
tions, Ireland had been in successful revolt for over a year,
and William was now there, leaving only the queen in Lon-
don. The urgency of the case was such that the council
decided the French fleet must be fought, and orders to that
effect were sent to the English admiral, Herbert. In obedi-
ence to his instructions he went out, and on the 10th of July,
being to windward, with the wind at northeast, formed his line-
of-battle, and then stood down to attack the French, who
waited for him, with their foretopsails aback ^ on the star-
board tack, heading to the northward and westward.
The fight that followed is known as the battle of Beachy
Head. The ships engaged were, French seventy, English and
Dutch according to their own account fifty-six, according to
the French sixty. In the allied line of battle the Dutch were
in the van ; the English, commanded in person by Herbert,
in the centre ; and the rear was made up partly of English
and partly of Dutch ships. The stages of the battle were as
follows : —
1. The allies, being to windward, bore down together in
line abreast. As usual, this manoeuvre was ill performed,
and as also generally happens, the van came under fire be*
fore the centre and rear, and bore the brunt of the injury.
2. Admiral Herbert, though commander-in-chief, failed to
attack vigorously with the centre, keeping it at long range.
The allied van and rear came to close action (Plate YI., A).
Paul Hoste's ' account of this manceuvre of the allies is that
the admiral intended to fall mainly on the French rear. To
that end he closed the centre to the rear and kept it to wind-
I That if, nearly motionlen. * Hoite : Nayal Tactics.
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BATTLE OF BEACH Y HEAD.
183
ward at long caonon-Bhot (refused it), bo as to prevent the
French from tacking and doubling on the rear* If that were
his purpose, his plan, though tolerably conceived in the main,
was faulty in detail, for this manoeuvre of the centre left a
great gap between it and the van. He should rather have
attacked, as Buyter did at the Texel, as many of the rear
ships as he thought he could deal with, and refused his van,
assigning to it the part of checking the French van. It may
be conceded that an admiral who, from inferior numbers, can« v/
not spread as long and close a line as his enemy, should not
let the latter overlap the extremities of his fleet ; but he
should attain his end not, as Herbert did, by leaving a great
opening in the centre, but by increasing each interval between
the sliips refused. The allied fleet was thus exposed to be
doubled on at two points, both van and centre ; and both
points were attacked.
8. The commander of the French van, seeing the Dutch
close to his line and more disabled than himself, pressed six
of his leading ships ahead, where they went about, and so put
the Dutch between two fires (Plate YI. B).
At the same time Tourville, finding himself without adver-
saries in the centre, having beaten off the leading division
of the enemy's centre, pushed forward his own leading ships,
which Herbert's dispositions had left without opponents; and
these fresh ships strengthened the attack upon the Dutch in
the van (B).
This brought about a mSKe at the head of the lines, in
which the Dutch, being inferior, suffered heavily. Luckily
for the allies the wind fell calm ; and while Tourville him*
self and other French ships got out their boats to tow
into action again, the allies were shrewd enough to drop
anchor with all sail set, and before Tourville took in the
situation the ebb-tide, setting southwest, had carried his
fleet out of action. He finally anchored a league from his
enemy.
At nine P. H., when the tide changed, the allies weighed and
stood to the eastward. So badly had many of them been
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SLUGGISH PURSUIT BY THE FRENCH.
mauled, that, by English accounts, it was decided rather to
destroy the disabled ships than to risk a general engagement
to preserye them.
Touryille pursued ; but instead of ordering a general chase,
be kept the Une-of^battle, reducing the speed of the fleet to
that of the slower ships. The occasion was precisely one of
those in which a mSlie is permissible, indeed, obligatory. An
/ enemy beaten and in flight should be pursued with ardor, and
with only so much regard to order as will prevent the chas-
ing vessels from losing mutual support, — a condition which by
no means implies such relative bearings and distances as are
required in the beginning or middle of a well-contested action.
The failure to order such general pursuit indicates the side
on which Tourville's military character lacked completeness;
and the failure showed itself, as is apt to be tlie case, at the
supreme moment of his career. He never had such another
opportunity as in this, the first great general action in which
he commanded in chief, and which Hoste, who was on board
the flag-ship, calls the most complete naval victory ever gained.
It was so indeed at that time, the most complete, but not the
most decisive, as it perhaps might have been. The French,
according to Hoste, lost not even a boat, much less a ship,
which, if true, makes yet more culpable the sluggishness of
the pursuit; while the allies fled, casting sixteen of their ships
ashore and burning them in sight of the enemy, who pursued
as far as the Downs. The English indeed give the allied loss
as only eight ships, — an estimate probably full as much out
one way as the French the other. Herbert took his fleet to
the Thames, and baffled the enemy's further pursuit by remov-
ing the buoys.^
Tourville's is the only great historical name among the
seamen of this war, if we except the renowned privatecrsmen
at whose head was Jean Bart. Among the English, extraor-
dinary merit cannot be claimed for any one of the gallant
and enterprising men who commanded squadrons. Tourville,
1 Ledyaid nys tho order to remove the baoyi was not carried out (Naval
Hiatory, vol. U. p. 636).
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TOURVILLE*S MILITARY CHARACTER. 186
who bj ibis time had served afloat for nearly thirty years,
was at once a seaman and a military man. With superb
courage, of which he had given dazzling examples in his
youth, he had seen service wherever the French fleets had
fought, — in the Anglo-Dutch war, in the Mediterranean, and
against the Barbary pirates. Reaching the rank of admiral,
he commanded in person all the largest fleets sent out during
the earlier years of this war, and he brought to the command
a scientific knowledge of tactics, based upon both tlieory and
experience, joined to that practical acquaintance with the
seaman's business which is necessary in order to apply tac-
tical principles upon the ocean to the best advantage. But
with all these high qualities he seems to have failed, where
so many warriors fail, in the ability to assume a great re-
sponsibility.^ The caution in his pursuit of the allies after
Beachy Head, though so different in appearance, came from
the same trait which impelled him two years later to lead
his fleet into almost certain destruction at La Hougue, be-
cause he had the king's order in his pocket. He was brave
enough to do anything, but not strong enough to bear the
heaviest burdens. Tonrville was in fact the forerunner of
the careful and skilful tacticians of the coming era, but
with the savor still of the impetuous hard-fighting which
characterized the sea commanders of the seventeenth cen-
tury. He doubtless felt, after Beachy Head, that he had done
very well and could be satisfied ; but he could not have acted
as he did had he felt, to use Nelson' s words, that ^< if we
had taken ten ships out of the enemy's eleven, and let the
eleventh escape, being able to take her, I could never call
such a good day."
Th»^y aftcp the sea fight off Beachy Head, with its great
irV" but still partial results, the cause of James H. was lost ashore
in Ireland. The army which William had been allowed to
transport there unmolested was superior in number and quality
^ to that of James, as William himself was superior as a leader
^ Seignelaj, the French miDiiter of marine of the day, called him " poltron
de t^, maif pae de cobot."
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CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND.
to the ex-king. The counsel of Louia XIY. was that James
should avoid decisive action^ retiring if necessary to the Shan-
non, in the midst of a country wholly devoted to him. It
was, however, a good deal to ask, this abandonment of the
capital after more than a year's occupancy, with all the
consequent moral effect; it would have been much more to
the purpose to stop William's landing. James undertook to
4 cover Dublin, taking up the line of the river Boyne, and ^
there on the tlth of July the two armies met, with the
result that James was wholly defeated. The king himself
fled to Kinsale, where he found ten of those frigates that had
been meant to control St. George's Channel. He embarked,
and again took refuge in France, begging Louis to improve
the victory at Beachy Head by landing him with another
French army in England itself. Louis angrily refused, and
directed that the troops still remaining in Ireland should be
at once withdrawn.
The chances of a rising in favor of James, at least upon
the shores of the Channel, if they existed at all, were greatly
exaggerated by his own imagination. After the safe retreat
of the allied fleet to the Thames, Tourville, in accordance
. with his instructions, made several demonstrations in the
south of England ; but they were wholly fruitless in drawing
out any show of attachment to the Stuart cause.
In Ireland it was different. The Irish army with its
French contingent fell back, after the battle of the Boyne, to
the Shannon, and there again made a stand; while Louis,
receding from his first angry impulse, continued to send
reinforcements and supplies. But the increasing urgency of
the continental war kept him from affording enough support,
and the war in Ireland came to a close a little over a year
later, by the defeat at Aghrim and capitulation of Limerick.
The battle of the Boyne, which from its peculiar religious
coloring has obtained a somewhat factitious celebrity, may
be taken as the date at which the English crown was firmly
fixed on William's head. Yet it would be more accurate to *
say that the success of William, and with it the success of
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WAR OF THE LEAGUE OP AUGSBURG. 187
Europe against Louis XIY. in the War of the League of Augs-
burg, was due to the mistakes and failure of the French
naval campaign in 1690 ; though in that campaign was won
the most conspicuous single success the French have ever
gained at sea over the English. As regards the more strik-
ing militarj operations, it is curious to remark that Tourville
sailed the day after William left Ohester, and won Beachv
Head the day before the battle of the Boyne ; but the real
failure lay in permitting William to transport that solid body
of men without hindrance. It might have been favorable
to French policy to let him get into Ireland, but not with
such a force at his back. The result of the Irish campaign
was to settle William safely on the English throne and estab-
lish the Anglo-Dutch alliance; and the union of the two
sea peoples under one crown was the pledge, through their
commercial and maritime ability, and the wealth they drew
from the sea, of the successful prosecution of the war by their
allies on the continent.
The year 1691 was distinguished by only one great mari-
time event. This was ever afterward known in France as
Tourville's deep-sea*' or *^ off-shore " cruise ; and the mem-
ory of it as a brilliant strategic and tactical display remains
to this day in the French navy. That staying power, which
has already been spoken of as distinctive of nations whose
sea power is not a mere military institution, but based upon
the character and pursuits of the people, had now come
into play with the allies. Notwithstanding the defeat and
loss of Beachy Head^ the united fleets took the sea in 1691
with one hundred ships-of-the-line under the command of
Admiral Russell. Tourville could only gather seventy-two,
the same number as the year before. ''With these he left
Brest June 26. As the enemy had not yet appeared upon
the coasts of the Channel, he took up his cruising ground
at the entrance, sending lookout ships in all directions. In-
formed that the allies had stationed tibemselves near the Scilly
Islands to cover the passage of a convoy expected from the
Levant, Tourville did not hesitate to steer for the English
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188
BATTLE OF LA HOUQUE.
ooastfl, where the approaching arrival of another merchant
fleet from Jamaica was equally expected. DeceiTing the Eng-
lish cruisers by false courses, he reached the latter fleet, took
from it several ships, and dispersed it before Russell could
come up to fight him. When at last Tourville was in pres-
ence of the allied fleet, he manoeuvred so skilfully, always
keeping the weather-gage, that the enemy, drawn far out
into the ocean, lost fifty days without finding an opportunity
to engage. During this time French privateers, scattered
throughout the Channel, harassed the enemy's commerce
and protected convoys sent into Ireland. Worn out by fruit-
less efforts, Russell steered for the Irish coast. Tourville,
after having protected the return of the French convoys,
anchored again in Brest Roads.*'
The actual captures made by Tourville's own fleet were
insignificant, but its service to the commerce-destroying war-
fare of the French, by occupying the allies, is obvious ; never-
theless, the loss of English commerce was not as great this
year as the next. The chief losses of the allies seem to have
been in the Dutch North Sea trade.
The two wars, continental and maritime, that were being
waged, though simultaneous, were as yet independent of each
other. It is unnecessary in connection with our subject to
mention the operations of the former. In 1692 there oc-
curred the great disaster to the French fleet which is known
as the battle of La Hougue. In itself, considered tactically,
it possesses little importance, and the actual results have
been much exaggerated ; but popular report has made it one
of the famous sea battles of the world, and therefore it can-
not be wholly passed by.
Misled by reports from England, and still more by the rep*
resentations of James, who fondly nursed his belief that the
attachment of many English naval ofiicers to his person was
greater than their love of country or faithfulness to their
trust, Louis XIY. determined to attempt an invasion of the
south coast of England, led by James in person. As a first
step thereto, Tourville, at the head of between fifty and sixty
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BATTLE OP LA HOUQUE.
ships-of-the-line, thirteen of which were to come from Toulon,
was to engage the English fleet ; from which so many deser-
tions were expected as would, with the consequent demorali-
zation, yield the French an easy and total yictory. The first
hitch was in the failure of the Toulon fleet, delayed by con-
trary winds, to join ; and Tourville went to sea with only
forty-four ships, but with a peremptory ordelr from the king
to fight when he fell in with the enemy, were they few or
many, and come what might
On the 29th of May, Tourville saw the allies to the north-
ward and eastward; they numbered ninety-nine sail-of-the-
line. The wind being southwest, he had the choice of en^
gaging, but first summoned all the flag-officers on board hih
own ship, and put the question to them whether he ought
to fight They all said not, and he then handed them the
order of the king.^ No one dared dispute that ; though, had
they known it, light ressels with contrary orders were even
then searching for the fleet The other officers then returned
to their ships, and the whole fleet kept away together for the
allies, who waited for them, on the starboard tack, heading
south-southeast, the Dutch occupying the van, the English
the centre and rear. When they were within easy range,
the French hauled their wind on the same tack, keeping tiie
weather-gage. Tourville, being so inferior in numbers, could
not wholly avoid the enemy's line extending to the rear of
^ The author has followed in the text the traditional and generaUy accepted
•oeouDt of Toorrille'i orden and the motives of his action. A French writer,
M. de Crisenojr, in a Teiy interesting paper npon the secret history preceding
and accompanjing the erent, traTerses manj of these traditional statements.
According to him, Lonis XIV. was not under anj illosion as to the lojalfcj of
the English officers to their flag ; and the instructions giren to Tonrrille, while
peremptory under certain conditions, did not compel him to fight in the situa-
tion of the French fleet on the day of the haitle. The tone of the instructions,
however, implied dissatisfaction with the admiral's action In previous cruises,
probably in the pursuit after Beadiy Head, and a consequent doubt of his vigor
In the campaign then beginning. Mortiflcation therefore impelled him to the
desperate attack on the allied fleet ; and, according to M. de Crisenoy, the coun*
dl of war in the admiral's cabin, and the dramatic production of the king's
orders, had no existence In fact
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190 DESTRUCTION OF FRENCH SHIPS.
his own, which was also necessarily weak from its extreme
length; but he avoided Herbert's error at Beachy Head,
keeping his van refused with long intervals between the
ships, to check the enemy's van, and engaging closely with
his centre and rear (Plate Yl\ A, A, A). It is not neces-
sary to follow the phases of this unequal fight ; the extraor-
dinary result was that when the firing ceased at night, in
consequence of a thick fog and calm, not a single French
ship had struck her colors nor been sunk. No higher proof
of military spirit and efficiency could be given by any navy,
and Tourville's seamanship and tactical ability contributed
largely to the result, which it must also be confessed was not
creditable to the allies. The two fleets anchored at night-
fall (B, B, B), a body of English ships (B') remaining to
the southward and westward of the French. Later on, these
cut their cables and allowed themselves to drift through the
French line in order to rejoin their main body ; in doing which
they were roughly handled.
Having amply vindicated the honor of his fleet, and shown
the uselessness of further fighting, Tourville now thought of
retreat, which was begun at midnight with a light northeast
wind and continued all the next day. The allies pursued,
the movements of the French being much embarrassed by the
crippled condition of the flag-ship Royal Sun," the finest
ship in the French navy, which the admiral could not make
up his mind to destroy. The direction of the main retreat
was toward the Ohannel Islands, thirty-five ships being with
the admiral; of them twenty passed with the tidal current
through the dangerous passage known as the Race of Alder-
ney, between the island of that name and the mainland, and
got safe to St. Malo. Before the remaining fifteen could
follow, the tide changed; and the anchors which had been
dropped dragging, these ships were carried to the eastward
and to leeward of the enemy. Three sought refuge in Cher-
bourg, which had then neither breakwater nor port, the re-
maining twelve at Cape La Hougue; and they were all
burned either by their own crews or by the allies. The
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WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG. 191
French tims lost fifteen of the finest ships in their navy, the
least of which carried sixty guns; but this was little more
than the loss of the allies at Beachy Head. The impression
made upon the public mind, accustomed to the glories and
successes of Louis XIV., was out of all proportion to the
results, and blotted out the memory of the splendid self-
devotion of Tourville and his followers. La Hougue was
also the last general action fought by the French fleet, which
did rapidly dwindle away in the following years, so that this
disaster seemed to be its death-blow. As a matter of fact,
however, Tourville went to sea the next year with seventy
ships, and the losses were at the time repaired. The decay
of the French navy was not due to any one defeat, but to
the exhaustion of France and the great cost of the continental
war; and this war was mainly sustained by the two sea
peoples whose union was secured by the success of William
in the Irish campaign. Without asserting that the result
would have been different had the naval operations of France
been otherwise directed in 1690, it may safely be said that
their misdirection was the immediate cause of things turning
out as they did, and the first cause of the decay of the French
navy.
The five remaining years of the War of the League of
Augsburg, in which all Europe was in arms against France,
are marked by no great sea battles, nor any single maritime
event of the first importance. To appreciate the effect of the
sea power of the allies, it is necessary to sum up and condense
an account of the quiet, steady pressure which it brought to
bear and maintained in all quarters against France. It is
thus indeed that sea power usually acts, and just because
so quiet in its working, it is the more likely to be unnoticed
and must be somewhat carefully pointed out.
The head of the opposition to Louis XIV. was William IIL,
and his tastes being military rather than n^val combined
with the direction of Louis' policy to make the active war
continental rather than maritime ; while the gradual with- '
drawal of the great French fleets, by leaving the allied
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ACTION OF THE ALLIED NAVIES.
navies without enemies on the sea, worked in the same
way. Furthermore, the efficiency of the English navy, which
was double in numbers that of the Dutch, was at this time
at a low pitch; the demoralizing effects of the reign of
Charles II. could not be wholly overcome during the three
years of his brother's rule, and there was a yet more serious
cause of trouble growing out of the political state of Englaud.
It has been said that James believed the naval officers and
seamen to be attached to his person ; and, whether justly
or unjustly, this thought was also in the minds of the present
rulers, causing doubts of the loyalty and trustworthiness of
many officers, and tending to bring confusion into the naval
administration. We are told that " the complaints made by
the merchants were extremely well supported, and showed the
folly of preferring unqualified men to that board which
directed the naval power of England; and yet the mischief
could not be amended, because the more experienced people
who had been long in the service were thought disaffected,
and it appeared the remedy might have proved worse than
the disease." ^ Suspicion reigned in the cabinet and the city,
factions and irresolution among the officers; and a roan
who was unfortunate or incapable in action knew that the
yet more serious charge of treason might follow liis mis-
adventure.
After La Hougue, the direct military action of the allied
/ navies was exerted in three principal ways, the first being in
attacks upon the French ports, especially those in the Channel
and near Brest. These had rarely in view more than local
injury and the destruction of shipping, particularly in the
ports whence the French privateers issued; and although
on some occasions the number of troops embarked was large,
William proposed to himself little more than the diversion
which such threats caused, by forcing Louis to take troops
from the field, for coast defence. It may be said generally
of all these enterprises against the French coast, in this and
later wars, that they effected little, and even as a diversion
1 CampbeU : Lives of the AdminUi.
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WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG.
did not weaken the French armies to any great extent. If
the French ports had been less well defended, or Fre^nch
water-ways open into the heart of the country, like our own
Chesapeake and Delaware bays and the Southern sounds,
the result might have been different.
In the second place, the allied navies were of great direct .
military value, though they fought no battles, when Louis XIY .
decided in 1694 to make his war against Spain offensive.
Spain, though so weak in herself, was yet troublesome from
her position in the rear of France; and Louis finally con-
cluded to force her to peace by carrying the war into Cata«
Ionia, on the northeast coast. The movement of his armies
was seconded by his fleet under Tourville ; and the reduction
of that difficult province went on rapidly until the approach
of the allied navies in largely superior force caused Tourville
to retire to Toulon. This saved Barcelona; and from that
time until the two sea nations had determined to make peace,
they kept their fleets on the Spanish coast and arrested the
French advance. When, in 1697, William had become dis-
posed to peace and Spain refused it, Louis again invaded,
the allied fleet did not appear, and Barcelona fell. At the
same time a French naval expedition was successfully di-
rected against Cartagena in South America, and under the
two blows, both of which depended upon the control of the
sea, Spain yielded.
Tlie third military function of the allied navies was the y<
protection of their sea commerce ; and herein, if history may
be trusted, they greatly failed. At no time has war against
commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater
results than during this period ; and its operations were
widest and most devastating at the very time that the great
French fleets were disappearing, in the years immediately
after La Hougue, apparently contradicting the assertion
that such a warfare must be based on powerful fleets or
neighboring seaports. A somewhat full discussion is due,
inasmuch as the distress to commerce wrought by the pri-
vateers was a large factor in bringing the sea nations to wish
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COMMERCE-DESTROYINQ.
for peace; just aa the subsidies, which flieir commerce en-
abled them to paj the continental armies, besides keeping up
their own, were the chief means by which the war was pro-
longed and France brought to terms. The attack and defence
of commerce is still a living question.
In the first place it is to be observed that the decay of the
French fleet was gradual, and that the moral effect of its ap-
pearance in the Channel, its victory at Beachy Head, and gal«
lant conduct at La Hougue remained for some time impressed
on the minds of the allies. This impression caused their
ships to be kept together in fleets, instead of scattering in pur-
suit of the enemy's cruisers, and so brought to the latter a
support almost equal to an active warfare on the seas. Again,
the efiiciency of the English navy, as has been said, was
low, and its administration perhaps worse ; while treason in
England gave the French the advantage of better information.
Thus in the year following La Hougue, the French, having
received accurate information of a great convoy sailing for
Smyrna, sent out Tourville in May, getting him to sea before
the allies were ready to blockade him in Brest, as they had
intended. . Tliis delay was due to bad administration, as was
also the further misfortune that the English government did
not learn of Tourville's departure until after its own fleet had
sailed with the trade. Tourville surprised the convoy near the
Straits, destroyed or captured one hundred out of four hundred
ships, and scattered the rest. This is not a case of simple
cruising warfare, for Tourville's fleet was of seventy-one ships ;
but it shows the incompetency of the English administration.
In truth, it was immediately after La Hougue that the depre-
dations of cruisers became most ruinous ; and the reason was
twofold : first, the allied fleet was kept together at Spithead
for two months and more, gathering troops for a landing
on the continent, thus leaving the cruisers unmolested ; and
in the second place, the French, not being able to send their
fleet out again that summer, permitted the seamen to take
service in private ships, thus largely increasing the num-
bers of the latter. The two causes working together gave
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WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG. 195
an impunity and extension to commerce-destroying which
caused a tremendous outcry in England. It must be con-
fessed/' says the English naval chronicler, "that our commerce
sufiFered far less the year before, when the French were
masters at sea, than in this, when their grand fleet was
blocked up in port." But the reason was that the French
having little commerce and a comparatively large number
of seamen, mainly employed in the fleet, were able, when
this lay by, to release them to cruisers. As the pressure of
the war became greater, and Louis continued to reduce the
number of his ships in commission, another increase was
given to the commerce-destroyers. "The ships and officers
of the royal navy were loaned, under certain conditions, to
private firms, or to companies who wished to undertake
privateering enterprises, in which even the cabinet ministers '
did not disdain to take shares ; " indeed, they were urged
to do so to please the king. The conditions generally pro-
vided that a certain proportion of the profits should go to
the king, in return for the use of the ships. Such employ-
ment would be demoralizing to any military service, but not
necessarily all at once ; and the conditions imparted for the
time a tone and energy to privateering that it cannot always
have. In truth, the public treasury, not being able to main-
tain the navy, associated with itself private capital, risking
only material otherwise useless, and looking for returns to rob-
bing the enemy. The commerce-destroying of this war, also,
was no mere business of single cruisers ; squadrons of three
or four up to half a dozen ships acted together under one man,
and it is only just to say that under seamen like Jean Bart,
Forbin, and Duguay-Trouin, they were even more ready to
fight than to pillage. The largest of these private expeditions,
and the only one that went far from the French shores, was
directed in 1697 against Oartagena, on the Spanish Main.
It numbered seven ships-of-the-line and six frigates, besides
smaller vessels, and carried twenty-eight hundred troops.
The chief object was to lay a contribution on the city of
Oartagena ; but its effect on the policy of Spain was marked.
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EFFECTS OF SEA POWER.
and led to peace. Such a temper and concert of action went
far to supply the place of supporting fleets, but could not
wholly do so ; and although the allies continued to keep their
large fleets together, still, as the war went on and efiiciency
of administration improved, commerce-destroying was brought
within bounds. At the same time, as an evidence of how
much the unsupported cruisers suffered, even under these
favorable conditions, it may be mentioned that the English
report fifty-nine ships-of-war captured against eighteen ad-
mitted by the French during the war, — a difference which
a French naval historian attributes, with much probability,
to the English failing to distinguish between ships-of-war
properly so called, and those loaned to private firms. Cap-
tures of actual privateers do not appear in the list quoted
from. The commerce-destroying of this war, therefore, was
marked by the particular characteristics of cruisers acting
together in squadron, not far from their base, while the enemy
thought best to keep his fleet concentrated elsewhere; not-
withstanding which, and the bad administration of the Eng-
lish navy, the cruisers were more and more controlled as the
great French fleets disappeared.'' The results of the war of
1689-1697 do not therefore vitiate the general conclusion that
^< a cruising, commerce-destroying warfare, to be destructive,
must be seconded by a squadron warfare, and by divisions of
ships-of-the-line; which, forcing the enemy to unite his forces,
permit the cruisers to make fortunate attempts upon his trade.
Without such backing the result will be simply the capture
of the cruisers." Toward the end of this wai* the real ten-
dency was becoming manifest, and was still more plainly seen
in the next, when the French navy had sunk to a yet lower
state of weakness.
Notwithstanding their losses, the sea nations made good
their cause. Tlie war, which began with the French taking
the offensive, ended by reducing them everywhere to the
defensive, and forced Louis to do violence at once to his
strongest prejudices and his most reasonable political wishes,
by recognizing as king of England him whom he looked upon
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PEACE OF RYSWICK.
as a usurper as well as his own inveterate enemy. On its
surface, and taken as a whole, this war will appear almost
wholly a land struggle, extending from tlie Spanish Nether-
lands down the line of the Rhine, to Savoy in Italy and
Catalonia in Spain. The sea fights in tiie Channel, the Irish
struggle receding in the distance, look like mere episodes;
while the underlying action of trade and commerce is wholly
disregarded, or noticed only as tlieir outcries tell of their
sufferings. Yet trade and shipping not only bore the burden
of suffering, but in the main paid the armies that were fight-
ing the French; and this turning of the stream of wealth
from both sea nations into the coffers of their allies was
perhaps determined, certainly hastened, by the misdirection
of that naval supremacy with which France began the war.
' It was then possible, as it will usually be possible, for a really
fine military navy of superior force to strike an overwhelming
blow at a less ready rival ; but the opportunity was allowed
to slip, and the essentially stronger, better founded sea power
of the allies had time to assert itself.
The peace signed at Ryswick in 1697 was most disadvanta-
geous to France; she lost all that had been gained since
the Peace of Nimeguen, nineteen years before, with the single
important exception of Strasburg. All that Louis XIY. had
gained by trick or force during the years of peace was given
up. Immense restitutions were made to Germany and to
Spain. In so far as the latter were made in the Netherlands,
they were to the immediate advantage of the United Provinces,
and indeed of all Europe as well as of Spain. To the two
sea nations the terms of the treaty gave commercial benefits,
which tended to - the increase of their own sea power and to
the consequent injury of that of France.
France had made a gigantic struggle ; to stand alone as she
did then, and as she has since done more than once, against
all Europe is a great feat. Yet it may be said that as the
United Provinces taught the lesson that a nation, however
active and enterprising, cannot rest upon external resources
alone, if intrinsically weak in numbers and territory, so
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CONDITION OF FRANCE.
France in its measure shows that a nation cannot subsist in-
definitely off itself, however powerful in numbera and strong
in internal resources.
It is said that a friend once found Oolbert looking dreamily
from his windows, and on questioning him as to the subject
of his meditations, received this reply : *^ In contemplating
the fertile fields before my eyes, I recall those which I have
seen elsewhere ; what a rich country is France ! " This con*
viction supported him amid the many discouragements of his
official life, when struggling to meet the financial difficulties
arising from the extravagance and wars of the king ; and it
has been justified by the whole course of the nation's history
since his days. France is rich in natural resources as well
as in the industry and thrift of her people. But neither indi*
vidual nations nor men can thrive when severed from natural
intercourse with their kind ; whatever the native vigor of con*
stitution, it requires healthful surroundings, and freedom to
draw to itself from near and from far all that is conducive to
its growth and strength and general welfare. Not only must
the internal organism work satisfactorily, the processes of
decay and renewal, of movement and circulation, go on easily,
but, from sources external to themselves, both mind and body
must receive healthful and varied nourishment. With all her
natural gifts France wasted away because of the want of that
lively intercourse between the different parts of her own body
and constant exchange with other people, which is known as
commerce, internal or external. To say that war was the
cause of these defects is to state at least a partial truth ; but
it does not exhaust the matter. War, with its many acknowl-
edged sufferings, is above all harmful when it cuts a nation
off from others and throws it back upon itself. There may
indeed be periods when such rude shocks have a bracing effect,
but they are exceptional, and of short duration, and they do
not invalidate the general statement. Such isolation was the
lot of France during the later wars of Louis XIY., and it well-
nigh destroyed her ; whereas to save her from the possibility
of such stagnation was the great aim of Colbert's life.
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CONDITION OF FRANCE.
War alone could not entail it, if only war could be post-
poned until the processes of circulation within and without the
kingdom were established and in vigorous operation. They did
not exist when he took office; they had to be both created and
firmly rooted in order to withstand the blast of war. Time
was not given to accomplish this great work, nor did Louis XIY.
support the schemes of his minister by turning the budding
energies of his docile and devoted subjects into paths favor-
able to it. So when the great strain came upon the powers
of the nation, instead of drawing strength from every quar-^
ter and. through many channels, and laying the whole outside
world under contribution by the energy of its merchants and
seamen, as England has done in like straits, it was thrown
back upon itself, cut off from the world by the navies of Eng-
land and Holland, and the girdle of enemies which surrounded
it upon the continent. The only escape from this process of
gradual starvation was by an effectual control of the sea ; the
creation of a strong sea power which should insure free play
for the wealth of the land and the industry of the people.
For this, too, France had ^reat natural advantages in her tliree
seaboards, on the Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterra-
nean; and politically she had had the fair opportunity of join-
ing to her own maritime power that of the Dutch in friendly
alliance, hostile or at least wary toward England. In the pride
of his strength, conscious of absolute control in his kingdom,
Louis cast away this strong reinforcement to his power, and
proceeded to rouse Europe against him by repeated aggres-
sions. In tho period which we have just considered, France
justified his confidence by a magnificent, and upon the whole
successful, maintenance of his attitude against all Europe ;
she did not advance, but neither did she greatly recede. But
this display of power was exhausting ; it ate away the life of
the nation, because it drew wholly upon itself and not upon
the outside world, with which it could have been kept in con-
tact by the sea. In the war that next followed, the same
energy is seen, but not the same vitality; and France was
everywhere beaten back and brought to the verge of ruin.
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200 CONDITION OF FRANCE.
The lesaon of both is the same ; nations^ like meiii however
strong, decay when cut off from the external activities and
resources which at once draw out and support their internal
powers. A nation, as we have already shown, cannot live
indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way by which it can
communicate with other peoples and renew its own strength
is the sea.
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CHAPTER V.
War of the Spakibh Sucorssion, 1703-1718. — Sba Battlb o9
Malaga.
r^URINQ the last thirty years of the seyenteenth centtuyi
amid all the strifes of arms and diplomacy^ there had
been clearly foreseen the coming of an event which would raise
new and great issues. This was the failure of the direct royal
line in that branch of the House of Austria which was then on
the Spanish throne; and the issues to be determined when the
present king, infirm both in body and mind, should die, were
whether the new monarch was to be taken from the House of
Bourbon or from the Austrian family in Germany ; and whether,
in either event, the sovereign thus raised to the throne should
succeed to the entire inheritance, the Empire of Spain, or some
partition of that vast inheritance be made in the interests of
the balance of European power. But this balance of power
was no longer understood in the narrow sense of continental
possessions ; the effect of the new arrangements upon com-
merce, shipping, and the control both of the ocean and the
Mediterranean, was closely looked to. The influence of the
two sea powora and the nature of their interests were becom-
ing more evident.
It is nqcessary to recall the various countries that were
ruled by Spain at that time in order to understand the strate-
gic questions, as they may fairly be called, now to be settled.
These were, in Europe, the Netherlands (now Belgium) ; Naples
and the south of Italy ; Milan and other provinces in the north ;
and, in the Mediterranean, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearic
Isles. Corsica at that time belonged to Qenoa. In the west-
ern hemisphere, besides Cuba and Forto Rico, Spain then
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202 WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
held all that part of the continent now divided among the
Spanish American States, a region whose vast commercial
possibilities were coming to be understood ; and in the Asian
archipelago there were large possessions that entered less into
the present dispute. The excessive weakness of this empire,
owing to the decay of the central kingdom, had hitherto caused
other nations, occupied as they were with more immediate
interests, to regard with indifiFerence its enormous extent.
This indifference could not last when there was a prospect of
a stronger administration, backed possibly by alliances with
one of the great powers of Europe.
It would be foreign to our subject to enter into the details
of diplomatic arrangement, which, by shifting about peoples
and territories from one ruler to another, sought to reach
1 a political balance peacefully. Tlie cardinal points of each
nation's policy may be shortly stated. The Spanish cabinet
and people objected to any solution which dismembered the
empire. The English and the Dutch objected to any exten-
sion of France in the Spanish Netherlands, and to the mo-
nopoly by the French of the trade with Spanish America,
both wliich they feared as the results of placing a Bourbon
on the Spanish throne. Louis XIY. wanted Naples and Sicily
for one of his sons, in case of any partition ; thus giving
France a strong Mediterranean position, but one which would
be at the mercy of the sea powers, — a fact which induced
William III. to acquiesce in this demand. The Emperor of
Austria particularly objected to these Mediterranean positions
going away from his family, and refused to come into any of
the partition treaties. Before any arrangement was perfected,
the actual king of Spain died/ but before his death was
induced by his ministers to sign a will, bequeathing all his
States to the grandson of Louis XIY., then Duke of Anjou,
. known afterward as Philip Y. of Spain. By this step it was
hoped to preserve the whole, by enlisting in its defence the
nearest and one of the most powerful States in Europe, — near-
est, if are excepted the powers ruling the sea, which are always
near any country whose ports are open to their ships.
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LOUIS XIV. INVADES THE NETHERLANDS. 203
Louis XIV . accepted the bequest, and in so doing felt bound
in honor to resist all attempts at partition. The union of the
two kingdoms under one family promised important advan-
tages to France, henceforth delivered from that old enemj in
the rear, which had balked so many of her efforts to extend
her frontiers eastward. As a matter of fact, from, that time,
with rare breaks, there existed between the two kingdoms an
alliance, the result of family ties, which only the weakness
of Spain kept from being dangerous to the rest of Europe.
The other countries at once realized the situation, and nothing
could have saved war but some backward step on the part of
the French king. The statesmen of England and Holland,
the two powers on whose wealth the threatened war must
depend, proposed that the Italian States should be given to
the son of the Austrian emperor, Belgium bo occupied by
themselves, and that the new king of Spain should grant
no commercial privileges in the Indies to France above other
nations. To the credit of their wisdom it must be said that
this compromise was the one which after ten years of war
was found, on the whole, best ; and in it is seen the growing
sense of the value of extension by sea. Louis, however, would
not yield ; on the contrary, he occupied, by connivance of the
Spanish governors, towns in the Netherlands which had been
held by Dutch troops under treaties with Spain. Soon after,
in February, 1701, tiie English Parliament met, and denounced
any treaty which promised France the dominion of the Medi-
terranean. Holland began to arm, and the Emperor of Austria
pushed his troops into northern Italy, where a campaign fol-
lowed, greatly to the disadvantage of Louis.
In September of the same year, 1701, the two sea powers
and the Emperor of Austria signed a secret treaty, which
laid down the chief lines of the coming war, with the ex-
ception of that waged in the Spanish peninsula itself. By
it the allies undertook to conquer the Spanish Netherlands
in order to place a barrier between France and the United
Provinces ; to conquer Milan as a security for the emperor's
other provinces ; and to conquer Naples and Sicily for the
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204 WAR OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
same security, and also for tlie security of the uavigation and
commerce of the subjects of his Britannic M&jesty and of the
United ProYinces. The sea powers should have the right to
conquer, for the utility of the said navigation and commerce,
the countries and towns of the Spanish Indies ; and all that
tliey should be able to take there should be for them and re-
main theirs. The war begun, none of the allies could treat
without the others, nor without having taken just measures —
first, to prevent the kingdoms of France and Spain from ever
being united under the same king; second, to prevent the
French from ever making themselves masters of the Spanish
Indies, or from sending ships thither to engage, directly or
indirectly, in commerce; third, to secure to the subjects of
his Britannic Majesty and of the United Provinces the com-
mercial privileges which they enjoyed in all the Spanish States
under the late king.
It will be noticed that in these conditions there is no sug-
gestion of any intention to resist the accession of the Bourbon
king, who was called to the throne by the Spanish govern-
ment and at first acknowledged by England and Holland; but,
on the other hand, the Emperor of Austria does not withdraw
the Austrian claim, which centred in his own person. The
voice of the sea powers was paramount in the coalition, as the
terms of the treaty safeguarding their commercial interests
show, though, as they were about to use German armies for
the land war, German claims also had to be considered. As
a French historian points out : —
" This was really a new treaty of partition. • . . William III., who
had conducted all, had taken care not to exhaust England and Holland,
in order to restore the Spanish monarchy, intact, to the emperor ; his
final condition was to reduce the new king, Philip Y., to Spain proper,
and to secure to England and Holland at once the commercial use of
all the regions that had been under the Spanbh monarchy, together
with important military and maritime positions against France." ^
But though war was imminent, the countries about to cn«
gage hesitated. Holland would not move without England,
1 Martin i Historj of France.
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DECLARATIONS OF WAR.
and despite the strong feeling of the latter country against
France, the manufacturers and merchants still remembered
the terrible sufferings of the last war. Just then, as the scales
were wayering, James 11. died. Louis, yielding to a sentiment
of sympathy and urged by his nearest intimates, formally rec-
ognized the son of James as king of England; and the English
people, enraged at what they looked on as a threat and an in-
sult, threw aside all merely prudential considerations. The
House of Lords declared that there could be no security till
the usurper of the Spanish monarchy was brought to reason;''
and the House of Commons voted fifty thousand soldiers and
thirty-five thousand seamen, besides subsidies for German and
Danish auxiliaries. William HI. died soon after, in March,
1702; but Queen Anne took up his policy, which had become
that of the English and Dutch peoples.
Louis XIY. tried to break part of the on-coming storm by
forming a league of neutrals among the other Oerman States ;
but the emperor adroitly made use of the Oerman feeling, and
won to his side the Elector of Brandenburg by acknowledging
him as king of Prussia, thus creating a North-Oerman Protes-
tant royal house, around which the other Protestant States
naturally gathered, and which was in the future to prove a
formidable rival to Austria. The immediate result was that
France and Spain, whose cause was thenceforth known as
that of the two crowns, went into the war without any ally
save Bavaria. War was declared in May by Holland against
the kings of France and Spain ; by England against France
and Spain, Anne refusing to recognize Philip Y. even in de-
claring war, because he had recognized James IH. as king of
England; while the emperor was still more outspoken, declar-
ing against the King of France and the Duke of Anjou. Thus
began the great War of the Spanish Succession.
It is far from easy, in dealing with a war of such propor-
tions, lasting for more than ten years, to disentangle from
the general narrative that part which particularly touches
our subject, without at the same time losing sight of the
relation of the one part to the whole. Such a loss, however,
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206 WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
18 fatal to the end in view, which is not a mere chronicle
of naval events, nor even a tactical or strategic discussion
of certain naval problems divorced from their surroundings of
cause and effect in general history, but an appreciation of
the effect of sea power upon the general result of the war and
upon the prosperity of nations. It will conduce to clearness,
however, to point out again that the aim of William III. was
not to dispute the claim of Philip Y. to the throne, — a matter
of comparative indifference to tlie sea powers, — but to seize,
to the benefit of their commerce and colonial empire, such
portions of the Spanish American possessions as he could,
and at the same time to impose such conditions upon the new
monarchy as would at least prevent any loss, to English and
Dutch commerce, of the privileges they bad had under the
Austrian line. Such a policy would not direct the main
effort of the sea nations upon the Spanish peninsula, but
upon America; and the allied fleets might not have entered
the Straits. Sicily and Naples were to go, not to England,
but to Austria. Subsequent causes led to an entire change
in this general plan. A new candidate, a son of the Emperor
of Germanyi was set up in 1708 by the coalition under the
name of Oarlos III., and the peninsula became the scone of
a doubtful and bloody war, keeping the Anglo-Dutch fleets
hovering round the coasts ; with the i*esult, as regards the sea
powers, that nothing of decisive importance was done in
Spanish America, but that England issued from the strife
witli Gibraltar and Port Mahon in her hands, to be thence-
forth a Mediterranean power. At the same time that Carlos
III. was proclaimed, a treaty was negotiated with Portu-
gal, known as the Methuen Treaty, which gave England the
practical monopoly of Poi*tuguese trade, and sent the gold of
Brazil by way of Lisbon to London, — an advantage so great
that it aided materially in keeping up the war on the continent
as well as in maintaining the navy. At the same time the
efficiency of the latter so increased that the losses by French
cruisers, though still heavy, were at no time unendurable.
•When the war broke out, in pursuance of the original
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CAPTURE OF GALLEONS AT VIGO.
207
policy, Sir Qeorge Booke, with a fleet of fifty shipfl-of-the-
line and transports carrying fourteen thonsand troops, was sent
against Oadiz, which was the great European centre of the
Spanish-American trade ; there came the specie and products
of the West, and thence they were dispersed through Europe.
It had been the purpose of William III. also to seize Carta-
gena, one of the principal centres of the same trade in the
other hemisphere ; and to that end, six months before his
death, in September, 1701, he had despatched there a squadron
under that traditional seaman of the olden time, Benbow.
Benbow fell in with a French squadron sent to supply and
strengthen the place, and brought it to action north of Carta-
gena; but though superior in force, the treason of several
of his captains, who kept out of action, defeated his purpose,
and after fighting till his ship was helpless and he himself
had received a mortal wound, the French escaped and Carta-
gena was saved. Before his death Benbow received a let-
ter from the French commodore to this effect: Yesterday
morning I had no hope but I should have supped in your
cabin. As for those cowardly captains of yours, hang them
up, for, by Qod ! they deserve it." And hanged two of them
were. Booke's expedition against Cadiz also failed, as it was
nearly certain to do ; for his instructions were so to act as
to conciliate the Spanish people and disincline them to the
Bourbon king. Such doubtful orders tied his hands; but
after failing there, he learned that the galleons from the
West Indies, loaded with silver and merchandise, had put
into Vigo Bay under escort of French ships-of-war. He
went there at once, and found the enemy in a harbor whose
entrance was but three quarters of a mile wide, defended by
fortifications and a heavy boom; but a passage was forced
through the boom under a hot fire, the place seized, and all
the shipping, with much of the specie, either taken or sunk.
This affair, which is known in history as that of the Vigo
galleons, was a brilliant and interesting feat of arms, but
has no military features calling for mention, except the blow
It gave to the finances and prestige of the two crowns.
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208 WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
The affair at Yigo had, howeyer, important political re-
sults, and helped to that change in the general plan of the
sea powers wliich has been mentioned. The King of Por-
tugal, moved by fear of the French, had acknowledged
Philip y. ; but his heart was against him, for he dreaded
French influence and power brought so near his little and
isolated kingdom. It had been a part of Booke's mission
to detach him from the alliance of the two crowns ; and the
affair of Yigo, happening so near his own frontiers, impressed
him with a sense of the power of the allied navies. In truth,
Portugal is nearer to the sea than to Spain, and must fall
naturally under the influence of the power controlling the
sea. Inducements were offered, — by the Emperor of Austria
a cession of Spanish territory, by the sea powers a subsidy ;
but the king was not willing to declare himself until the
Austrian claimant should have landed at Lisbon, fairly com-
mitting the coalition to a peninsular as well as a continental
war. The emperor transferred his claims to his second son,
Charles ; and the latter, after being proclaimed in Vienna
and acknowledged by England and Holland, was taken by
the allied fleets to Lisbon, where he landed in March, 1704.
This necessitated the important change in the plans of the
sea powers. Pledged to the support of Oarlos, their fleets
were thenceforth tied to the shores of the peninsula and the
protection of commerce ; while the war in the West Indies,
becoming a side issue on a small scale, led to no results.
From this time on, Portugal was the faithful ally of England,
whose sea power during this war gained its vast preponder-
ance over all rivals. Her ports were the refuge and support
of English fleets, and on Portugal was based in later days
the Peninsular war with Napoleon. In and through all,
Portugal, for a hundred years, had more to gain and more
to fear from England than from any other power.
Great as were the effects of the maritime supremacy of the
two sea powers upon the general result of the war, and espe-
cially upon that undisputed empire of the seas which Eng-
land held for a century after, the contest is marked by no
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CHARACTER OF THE NAVAL STRUGGLE. 209
one naval action of military interest Once only did great
fleets meet, and then with results that were indecisive ; after
which the French gave np the struggle at sea, oon&ning them-
selves wholly to a commerce-destroying warfare. This fea- ^
tore of the War of the Spanish Succession characterizes
nearly the whole of the eighteenth century, with the excep-
tion of the American Revolutionary struggle. The noiseless,
steady, exhausting pressure with which sea power acts, cut-
ting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its
own, supporting war in scenes where it does not appear itself,
or appears only in the background, and striking open blows
at rare intervals, though lost to most, is emphasized to the
careful reader by the events of this war and of the half-
century that followed. The overwhelming sea power of
England was the determining factor in European history
during the period mentioned, muntaining war abroad while
keeping its own people in prosperity at home, and building
up the great empire which is now seen; but from its very
greatness its action, by escaping opposition, escapes attention.
On the few occasions in which it is called to fight, its supe-
riority is so marked that the affairs can scarcely be called
battles; with the possible exceptions of Byng's action at
Minorca and Hawke's at Quiberon, the latter one of the
most brilliant pages in naval history, no decisive encounter
between equal forces, possessing military interest, occum^^
between 1700 and 1778.
Owing to this characteristic, the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession, from the point of view of our subject, has to be
blocked out in general outline, avoiding narrative and in-
dicating general bearings, especially of the actions of the
fleets. With the war in Flanders, in Germany, and in Italy
the navies had natorally no concern ; when they had so pro-
tected the commerce of the allies that there was no serious
check to that flow of subsidies upon which the land war
depended, their part toward it was done. In the Spanish pen^
insula it was different Immediately after landing Carlos III.
at Lisbon, Sir George Booke sailed for Barcelona, which it
14
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CAPTURE OF GIBRALTAR.
was understood would be handed over when the fleets ap-
peared ; but the governor was faithful to his king and kept
down the Austrian party, Rooke then sailed for Toulon,
where a French fleet was at anchor. On his way he sighted
anotlier French fleet coming from Brest, which he chased but
was unable to overtake ; so that both the enemy's squadrons
were united in the port. It is worth while to note here that
the English navy did not as yet attempt to blockade the French
ports in winter, as they did at a later date. At this period
fleets, like armies, went into winter quarters. Another Eng-
lish admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, had been sent in the
spring to blockade Brest ; but arriving too late, ho found his
bird flown, and at once kept on to the Mediterranean. Rooke,
not thinking himself strong enough to resist the combined
French squadrons, fell back toward the Straits ; for at this
time England had no ports, no base, in the Mediterranean, no
useful ally ; Lisbon was the nearest refuge. Rooke and Shovel
met off Lagos, and there held a council of war, in which the
former, who was senior, declared that his instructions forbade
his undertaking anything without the consent of the kings of
Spain and Portugal. This was indeed tying the hands of the
sea powers ; but Rooke at last, chafing at the humiliating inac-
tion, and ashamed to go home without doing something, de-
cided to attack Gibraltar for three reasons : because he heard
it was insufficiently garrisoned, because it was of infinite
importance as a port for tlie present war, and because its
capture would reflect credit on the queen's arms. The place
was attacked, bombarded, and then carried by an assault
in boats. The English possession of Gibraltar dates from
August 4, 1704, and the deed rightly keeps alive the name
of Rooke, to whose judgment and fearlessness of responsi^
bility England owes the key of the Mediterranean.
The Bourbon king of Spain at once undertook to retake
the place, and called upon ilie French fleet in Toulon to sup-
port his attack. Tourville had died in 1701, and the fleet
was commanded by the Oount of Toulouse, — a natural son
of Louis XIY., only twenty-six years old. Rooke also sailed
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NAVAL BATTLE OF MALAGA.
eastward, and the two fleets met on the 24th of August off
Velez Malaga. The allies were to windward with a northeast
wind, both fleets on the port tack heading to the southward and
eastward. There is some uncertainty as to the numbers ; the
French had fifty-two ships-of-the-linoi their enemy probably
halt a dozen more. The allies kept away together, each ship
for its opposite \ there was apparently no attempt on Booke's
part at any tactical combination. The battle of Malaga pos-
sesses indeed no military interest, except that it is the first
in which we find fully developed that wholly unscientific
method of attack by the English which Glerk criticised, and
which prevailed throughout the century. It is instructive
to notice that the result in it was the same as in all others
fought on the same principle. The van opened out from the
centre, leaving quite an interval; and the attempt made to
penetrate this gap and isolate the van was the only tactical
move of the French. We find in them at Malaga no trace
of the cautious, skilful tactics which Clerk rightly thought
to recognize at a later day. The degeneracy from the able
combinations of Monk, Buyter, and Tourville to the epoch of
mere seamanship is clearly marked by the battle of Malaga,
and gives it its only historical importance. In it was real-
ized that primitive mode of fighting which Macaulay has
sung, and which remained for many years the ideal of the
English navy: —
" Then on both sides the leaden
GaTe signal for the charge ;
And on both sides the footmen
Strode forth with lance and targe ;
And on both sides the horsemen
Strack their spnis deep in gore,
And fnmt to front the armies
Met with a mightj rtnr."
Human movement is not always advance; and there are
traces of a somewhat similar ideal in the naval periodical
literature of our own day. The fight was severe, lasting from
ten in the morning till five in the afternoon, but was en-
tirely indecisive. The next day the wind shifted, giving the
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WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
weather-gage to the Fi*ench, but they did not use the oppor-
tunity to attack; for wliich they wore much to blame, if
their claim of the advantage the day before is well founded.
Booke could not have fought ; nearly half his fleet, twenty-
five ships, it is said, had used up all their ammunition. Even
during the battle itself several of the allied ships were towed
out of line, because they had not powder and ball for a single
broadside. This was doubtless due to the attack upon Gibral-
tar, in which fifteen thousand shot were expended, and to the
lack of any port serving as a base of supplies, — a deficiency
which the new possession would hereafter remove. Booke, in
seizing Gibraltar, had the same object in view that prompted
the United States to seize Port Royal at the beginning of
the Civil War, and which made the Duke of Parma urge
upon his king, before sending the Spanish Great Armada, to
seize Flushing on the coast of Holland, — advice which, had
it been followed, would have made unnecessary that dreary
and disastrous voyage to the north of England. The same
reasons would doubtless lead any nation intending serious
operations against our seaboard, to seize points remote from
the great centres and susceptible of defence, like Gardiner's
Bay or Port Royal, which in an inefficient condition of our
navy they might hold with and for their fleets.
Booke retired in peace to Lisbon, bestowing by the way on
Gibraltar all the victuals and ammunition that could be spared
from the fleet. Toulouse, instead of following up his victory,
if it was one, went back to Toulon, sending only ten ships-
of-the-line to support the attack on Gibraltar. All the at^
tempts of the French against the place were carried on in a
futile manner ; the investing squadron was finally destroyed
and the land attack converted into a blockade. With this
reverse," says a French naval officer, " began in the French
people a regrettable reaction against the navy. The wonders
to which it had given birth, its immense services, were for-
gotten. Its value was no longer believed. The army, more
directly in contact with the nation, had all its favor, all its
sympathy. The prevailing error, that the greatness or decay
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FALL OF BARCELONA.
213
of franco depended upon some Rhenish positions, conid not
but favor these ideas adverse to the sea service, which have
made England's strength and our weakness." ^
During this year, 1704, the battle of Blenheim was fought,
in which the French and Bavarian troops were wholly over-
thrown by the English and Oerman under Marlborough and
Prince Eugene. The result of this battle was that Bavaria
forsook the French alliance, and Germany became a second-
ary theatre of the general war, which was waged thereafter
mainly in the Netherlands, Italy, and tlie Peninsula*
The following year, 1706, the allies moved against Philip Y •
by two roads, — from Lisbon upon Madrid, and by way of Bar-
celona. The former attack, though based upon the sea, was
mainly by land, and resultless ; the Spanish people in that
quarter showed unmistakably that they would not welcome
the king set up by foreign powers. It was different in Cata-
lonia. Carlos III. went there in person with the allied fleet.
The French navy, inferior in numbers, kept in port. The
French army also did not appear. The allied troops invested
the town, aided by three thousand seamen and supported by
supplies landed from the fleet, which was to them both base
of supplies and line of communications. Barcelona surren-
dered on the 9th of October ; all Catalonia welcomed Carlos,
and the movement spread to Aragon and Valencia, the capital
of the latter province declaring for Carlos.
The following year, 1706, the French took the offensive in
Spain on the borders of Catalonia, while defending the passes
of the mountains toward Portugal. In the absence of the
allied fleet, and of the succors which it brought and main-
tained, the resistance was weak, and Barcelona was again
besieged, this time by the French party supported by a French
fleet of thirty sail-of-the-line and numerous transports with
supplies from the neighboring port of Toulon. The siege,
begun April 6, was going on hopefully ; the Austrian claim-
ant himself was within the walls, the prize of success ; but
on the 10th of May the allied fleet appeared, the French ships
1 Lapeyroofle-Bonfils : Hist, de la Marine Fran^aise.
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214
WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
retired, and the siege was raised in disorder. The Bourbon
claimant dared not retreat into Aragon, and so passed by
Roussillon into France, leaving his rival in possession. At
the same time there moved forward from Portugal — that
other base which the sea power of the English and Dutch at
once controlled and utilized — another army maintained by
the subsidies earned from the ocean. This time the western
attack was more successful ; many cities in Estremadura and
Leon fell, and as soon as the allied generals learned the rais-
ing of the siege of Barcelona, they pressed on by way of
Salamanca to Madrid. Philip Y., after escaping into France,
had returned to Spain by the western Pyrenees ; but on the
approach of the allies he had again to fly, leaving to them
his capital. The Portuguese and allied troops entered Ma-
drid, June 26, 1706. The allied fleet, after the fall of Bar-
celona, seized Alicante and Cartagena.
So far success had gone ; but the inclinations of the Spanisli
people had been mistaken, and the strength of their purpose
and pride, supported by the natural features of their country,
was not yet understood. The national hatred to the Portu-
guese was aroused, as well as the religious dislike to here-
tics, the English general himself being a Huguenot refugee.
Madrid and the surrounding country were disaffected, and
the south sent the Bourbon king assurance of its fidelity.
The allies were not able to remain in the hostile capital, par-
ticularly as the region around was empty of supplies and full
of guerillas. They retired to the eastward, drawing toward the
Austrian claimant in Aragoii. Reverse followed reverse, and
on the 25th of April, 1707, the allied army was disastrously over-
thrown at Almansa, losing fifteen thousand men. All Spain
fell back again into the power of Philip V., except the prov-
ince of Oatalonia, part of which also was subdued. The next
year, 1708, the French made some progress in the same quar-
ter, but were not able to attack Barcelona; Valencia and
Alicante, however, were reduced.
The year 1707 was not marked by any naval event of
importance. During the summer the allied fleets in the
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SARDINIA AND PORT MAHON TAKEN.
215
Mediterranean were diverted from the coast of Spain to
support an attack upon Toulon made hj the Austrians and
Piedmontese. The latter moved from Italy along the coast
of the Mediterranean, the fleet supporting the flank on the
sea, and contributing supplies. The siege, however, failed,
and the campaign was inconclusive. Returning .home, the
admiral, Sir Cloudeslej Shovel, with several ships-of-the-line,
was lost on the Scillj Islands, in one of those shipwrecks
which have become historical.
In 1708 the allied fleets seized Sardinia, which from its
fruitfulness and nearness to Barcelona became a rich store-
house to the Austrian claimant, so long as bj the allied help
he controlled the sea. The same jear Minorca, with its valu-
able harbor, Port Mahon, was also taken, and from that time
for fifty years remained in English hands. Blocking Oadiz
and Cartagena by the possession of Gibraltar, and facing ^
Toulon with Port Mahon, Great Britain was now as strongly
based in the Mediterranean as either France or Spain ; while,
with Portugal as an ally, she controlled the two stations of
Lisbon and Gibraltar, watching the trade routes both of the
ocean and of the inland sea. By the end of 1708 the dis-
asters of France by land and sea, the frightful sufferings of
the kingdom, and the almost hopelessness of carrying on a
strife which was destroying France, and easily borne by Eng-
land, led Louis XIY. to offer most humiliating concessions
to obtain peace. He undertook to surrender the whole Span-
ish monarchy, reserving only Naples for the Bourbon king.
The allies refused ; they demanded the abandonment of the
whole Spanish Empire without exception by the Duke of
Anjou, refusing to call him king, and added thereto rainous
conditions for France herself. Louis would not yield these,
and the war went on.
During the remaining years the strenuous action of the sea
power of the allies, which had by this time come to be that
of Great Britain alone, with littU help from Holland, was less
than ever obtrusive, but the reality of its effect remained.
The Austrian claimant, confined to Catalonia for the most
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216
WAR OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
part, was kept in communication with Sardinia and the Ital-
ian provinces of Germany by the English fleet ; but the entire
disappearance of the French navy and the evident intention
on the part of Louis to keep no squadrons at sea, allowed
some diminution of the Mediterranean fleet, with the result
of greater protection to trade. In the years 1710 and 1711
expeditions were also made against the French colonies in
North America. Nova Scotia was taken, but an attempt on
Quebec failed.
During the winter of 1709 and 1710 Louis withdrew all the
French troops from Spain, thus abandoning the cause of his
grandson. But when the cause of France was at the veiy
lowest, and it seemed as though she might be driven to con-
cessions which would reduce her to a second-class power, the
existence of the coalition was threatened by the disgrace of
Marlborough, who represented England in it. His loss of
favor with the queen was followed by the accession to power
of the party opposed to the war, or rather to its further con-
tinuance. This change took place in the summer of 1710,
and the inclination toward peace was strengthened both by
the favorable position in which England then stood for treat-
ing, and by the heavy burden she was bearing; which it
became evident could bring in no further advantages com-
mensurate to its weight. The weaker ally, Holland, had
gradually ceased to contribute her stipulated share to the sea
forces ; and although far-sighted Englishmen might see with
complacency the disappearance of a rival sea power, the imme-
diate increase of expense was more looked to and felt by the
men of the day. The cost both of the continental and Span-
ish wars was also largely defrayed by England's subsidies ;
and while that on the continent could bring her no further
gain, it was seen that the sympathies of the Spanish people
could not be overborne in favor of Carlos III. without paying
more than the game was worth. Secret negotiations between
England and France soon began, and received an additional
impulse by the unexpected death of the Emperor of Germany,
the brother of the Austrian claimant of the Spanish throne.
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BRITISH CONDITIONS OF PEACE. 217
There being no other male heir, Carlos became at once
emperor of Austria, and was soon after elected emperor of
Germany. England had no more wish to see two crowns
on an Austrian head than on that of a Bourbon.
The demands made by England, as conditions of peace in
1711, showed her to have become a sea power in the purest
sense of the word, not only in fact, but also in her own con-
sciousness. She required that the pame person should never
be king both of France and Spain ; that a barrier of fortified
towns should be granted her allies, Holland and Germany,
as a defensive line against France; that French conquests
from her allies should be restored ; and for herself she de-
manded the formal cession of Gibraltar and Port Mahon,
whose strategic and maritime value has been pointed out, the
destruction of the port of Dunkirk, the home nest of tlie pri*
vateers that preyed on English commerce, the cession of the
French colonies of Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay, and Nova
Scotia, the last of which she held at that time, and finally,
treaties of .commerce with France and Spain, and the conces-
sion of the monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish Amer-
ica, known as the Asiento, which Spain had given to France
m 1701.
Negotiations continued, though hostilities did not cease ;
and in June, 1712, a four months' truce between Great Britain
and France removed the English troops from the allied armies
on the continent, their great leader Marlborough having been
taken from their head the year before. The campaign of 1712
was favorable to France ; but in almost any event the with-
drawal of Great Britain made the end of the war a question of
but a short time. The remonstrances of Holland were met
by the reply that since 1707 the Dutch had not furnished
more than one third their quota of ships, and taking the war
through, not over one half. The House of Commons in an
address to the throne in 1712 complained that —
The service at sea haUi been carried on through the whole course
of the war in a manner highly disadvantageous to your Majesty's
kingdom, for the necessity requiring that great fleets should be fitted
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218
PEACE OP UTRECHT.
out every year for maintainiug a superiority in the Mediterranean
and for opposing any force which the enemy might prepare either at
Dunkirk or in the ports of west France ; your Majesty's readiness,
in fitting out your proportion of ships for all parts of that service,
hath not prevailed with Holland, which has been greatly deficient
every year in proportion to what your Majesty hath furnished. • • .
Hence your Majesty hath been obliged to supply those deficiencies
with additional reinforcements of your own ships, and your Majesty's
ships have been forced in greater numbers to continue in remote seas,
and at unseasonable times of the year, to the great damage of the
navy. This also hath straitened the convoys for trade ; the coasts
have been exposed for want of cruisers ; and you have been disabled
from annoying the enemy in their most beneficial commerce with the
West Indies, whence they received those vast sAipplies of treasure,
without which they could not have supported the expenses of the
war."
In fact, between 1701 and 1716 the commerce of Spanish
America had brought into France forty million dollars in
specie. To these complaints the Dutch envoy to England
could only reply that Holland was not in a condition to fulfil
her compacts. "The reverses of 1712, added to Great Brit-
ain's fixed purpose to have peace, decided the Dutch to the
same ; and the English still kept, amid their dissatisfaction
with their allies, so much of their old feeling against France
as to support all the reasonable claims of Holland. April
11, 1718, an almost general peace, known as the Peace of
Utrecht, one of the landmarks of history, was signed be-
tween France on the one hand, and England, Holland, Prus-
sia, Portugal, and Savoy on the other. The emperor still
held out, but the loss of British subsidies fettered the move-
ments of his armies, and with the withdrawal of the sea
powers the continental war might have fallen of itself ; but
France with her hands freed carried on during 1718 a bril-
liant and successful campaign in Germany. On the 7th of
March, 1714, peace was signed between France and Austria.
Some embers of the war continued to burn in Catalonia and
the Balearic Islands, which persisted in their rebellion against
Philip Y. ; but the revolt was stifled as soon as the arms of
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RESULTS OF THE WAR TO FRANCE AND SPAIN. 219
France were tamed against them. Barcelona was taken hj
storm in September, 1714; the islands submitted in the follow-
ing summer.
The changes effected by this long war and sanctioned bj
the peace, neglecting details of lesser or passing importance,
may be stated as follows: 1. The House of Bourbon was
settled on the Spanish throne, and the Spanish empire
retained its West Indian and American possessions; the
purpose of William HI. against her dominion there was frus-
trated when England undertook to support the Austrian
prince, and so fastened the greater part of her naval force
to the Mediterranean. 2. The Spanish empire lost its pos-
sessions in the Netherlands, Oelderland going to the new
kingdom of Prussia and Belgium to the emperor; the
Spanish Netherlands thus became the Austrian Netherlands.
8. Spain lost also the principal islands of the Mediterranean ;
Sardinia being given to Austria, Minorca with its fine harbor
to Oreat Britain, and Sicily to the Duke of Savoy. 4. Spain
lost also her Italian possessions, Milan and Naples going to
the emperor. Such, in the main, were the results to Spain of
the fight over the succession to her throne.
France, the backer of the successful claimant, came out
of the strife worn out, and with considerable loss of terri-
tory. Slie had succeeded in placing a king of her own royal
house on a neighboring throne, but her sea strength was ex-
hausted, her population diminished, her financial condition
ruined. The European territory surrendered was on her
northern and eastern boundaries ; and she abandoned the use
of the port of Dunkirk, the centre of that privateering warfare
BO dreaded by English merchants. In America, the cession
of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland was the first step toward
that entire loss of Canada which befell half a century later ;
but for the present she retained Cape Breton Island, with its
port Louisburg, the key to the Oulf and Biver St. Lawrence.
The gains of England, by the treaty and the war, corre-
sponded very nearly to the losses of France and Spain, and were
all in the direction of extending and strengthening her sea
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220
RESULTS OF THE WAR TO
power. Oibraltar and Port Mahon in the Mediterranean, and
the colonies already mentioned in North America, afforded
new bases to that power, extending and protecting her trade.
Second only to the expansion of her own was the injury to
the sea power of France and Holland, by the decay of their
navies in consequence of the immense drain of the land war-
fare; further indications of that decay will be given Uter.
The very neglect of Holland to fill up her quota of ships, and
the bad condition of those sent, while imposing extra bur-
dens upon England, may be considered a benefit, forcing the
British navy to greater development and effort. The dispro-
portion in military power on the sea was further increased
by the destruction of the works at Dunkirk ; for though not
in itself a first-class port, nor of much depth of water, it had
great artificial military strength, and its position was pecu-
liarly adapted to annoy English trade. It was but forty
miles from the South Foreland and the Downs, and the
Channel abreast it is but twenty miles wide. Dunkirk
was one of Louis' earliest acquisitions, and in its develop-
ment was as his own child ; the dismantling of the works
and fiUing-in of the port show the depth of his humiliation
at this time. But it was the wisdom of England not to base
her sea power solely on military positions nor even on fighting-
ships, and the commercial advantages slie had now gained
by the war and the peace were very great. Tlie grant of the
slave trade with Spanish America, in itself lucrative, became
yet more so as the basis for an immense smuggling inter-
course with those countries, which gave the English a par-
tial recompense for their failure to obtain actual possession ;
while the cessions made to Portugal by Franco in South
America were mainly to the advantage of England, which
had obtained the control of Portuguese trade by the treaty
of 1708. The North American colonies ceded were valuable,
not merely nor chiefly as military stations, but commercially ;
and treaties of commerce on favorable terms were made both
with France and Spain. A minister of the day, defending the
treaty in Parliament, said : <^ The advantages from this peace
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ENGLAND AND HOLLAND.
221
appear in the addition made to our wealth ; in the great
quantities of bullion lately coined in our mint ; hj the vast
increase in our shipping employed since the peace, in the fish-
eries, and in merchandise; and bj the remarkable growth of
the customs upon imports, and of our manufactures, and
the growth of our country upon export;" in a word, by the
impetus to trade in all its branches.
While England thus came out from the war in good run-
ning condition, and fairly placed in that position of mari-
time supremacy which she has so long maintained, her old
rival in trade and fighting was left hopelessly behind. As
the result of the war Holland obtained nothing at sea, —
no colony, no station. The commercial treaty with France
placed her on the same terms as England, but she received
no concessions giving her a footing in Spanish America like
that obtained by her ally. Indeed, some years before the
peace, while the coalition was still maintaining Carlos, a
treaty was made with the latter by the British minister,
unknown to the Dutch, practically giving the British mo-
nopoly of Spanish trade in America ; sharing it only with y
Spaniards, which was pretty much the same as not sharing
it at all. This treaty accidentally became known, and made
a great impression on the Dutch ; but England was then so
necessary to the coalition that she ran no risk of being left
out by its other members. The gain which Holland made
by land was that of military occupation only, of certain for-
tified places in the Austrian Netherlands, known to his-
tory as the barrier towns;" nothing was added by them
to her revenue, population, or resources; nothing to that
national strength which must underlie military institutions.
Holland had forsaken, perhaps unavoidably, the path by
which she had advanced to wealth and to leadership among
nations. The exigencies of her continental position had led
to the neglect of her navy, which in those days of war and
privateering involved a loss of carrying-trade and commerce ;
and although she held her head high through the war, the
symptoms of weakness were apparent in her failing arma
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GAINS OF AUSTRIA.
ments. Therefore, though the United Provinces attained
the great object for which tliey began the war, and Bayed
the Spanish Netherlands from the hands of France, the
success was not worth the cost. Thenceforth they witlidrew
for a long period from the wars and diplomacy of Europe ;
partly, perhaps, because they saw how little they had gained,
but yet more from actual weakness and inability. After the
strenuous exertions of the war came a reaction, which showed
painfully the inherent weakness of a State narrow in ter-
ritory and small in the number of its people. The visible
decline of the Provinces dates from the Peace of Utrecht ; the
real decline began earlier. Holland ceased to be numbered
among the great powers of Europe, her navy was no longer
V a military factor in diplomacy, and her commerce also shared
in the general decline of the State.
It remains only to notice briefly the results to Austria,
and to Germany generally. France yielded the barrier of
the Rhine, with fortified places on the east bank of the river.
Austria received, as has been mentioned, Belgium, Sardinia,
Naples, and the Spanish possessions in northern Italy ; dis-
satisfied in other respects, Austria was especially discontented
at her failure to obtain Sicily, and did not cease negotiating
afterward, until she had secured that island. A circumstance
more important to Oermany and to all Europe than this transi-
tory acquisition of distant and alien countries by Austria was
the rise of Prussia, which dates from this war as a Protestant
and military kingdom destined to weigh in the balance against
Austria.
Such were the leading results of the War of the Spanish
Succession, the vastest yet witnessed by Europe since the
Orusades." It was a war whose chief military interest was
on the land, — a war in which fought two of the greatest
generals of all times, Marlborough and Prince Eugene, the
names of whose battles, Blenheim, Ramillies, Malplaquet,
Turin, are familiar to the most casual reader of history ;
while a multitude of able men distinguished themselves on
the other theatres of the strife, in Flanders, in Oermany, in
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RESULTS OF THE WAR.
Italj, in Spain. On the sea only one great battle, and that
scarcely worthy of the name, took place. Tet looking only,
for the moment, to immediate and evident results, who reaped
the benefit 7 Was it France, whose only gain was to seat a
Bourbon on the Spanish throne ? Was it Spain, whose only
gain was to have a Bourbon king instead of an Austrian,
and thus a closer alliance with France ? Was it Holland,
with its barrier of fortified towns, its ruined navy, and its ex-*
hausted people 7 Was it, lastly, Austria, even though she had
fought with the money of the sea powers, and gained such
maritime States as the Netherlands and Naples 7 Was it with
these, who had waged war more and more exclusively by land,
and set their eyes more and more on gains on the land, or was
it not rather with England, who had indeed paid for that con-
tinental war and even backed it with her troops, but who mean-
while was building up her navy, strengthening, extending,
and protecting her commerce, seizing maritime positions, — in
a word, founding and rearing her sea power upon the ruins
of that of her rivals, friend and foe alike 7 It is not to de*
preciate the gains of others that the eye fixes on England's
naval gi*owth; their gains but bring out more clearly the
immenseness of hers. It was a gain to France to have a
friend rather than an enemy in her rear, though her navy
and shipping were ruined. It was a gain to Spain to be
brought in close intercourse with a living country like
France after a century of political death, and she had saved
the greater part of her threatened possessions. It was a
gain to Holland to be definitively freed from French aggres-
sion, with Belgium in the hands of a strong instead of a
weak State. And it doubtless was a gain to Austria not
only to have checked, chiefly at the expense of others, the
progress of her hereditary enemy, but also to have received
provinces like Sicily and Naples, which, under wise gov-
ernment, might become the foundation of a respectable sea
power. But not one of these gains, nor all together, com-
pared in greatness, and much less in solidity, with the gain
to England of that unequalled sea power which started ahead
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224 COMMANDINO POSITION OF ENGLAND.
dnriiig the War of the League of Aagsbiirg, and reodved ita
completeneaa and seal during that of the Spanish Soccession.
Bj it she controlled the great commerce of the open sea with
a militarj shipping that had no rival, and in the exhausted
condition of the other nations could haye none; and that
shipping was now securelj based on strong positions in all
the disputed quarters of the world. Although her Indian
empire was not yet beg^, the vast superiority of her navy
would enable her to control the conmranicationa of other
nations with those rich and distant r^ons, and to assert
her will in any disputes arising among the trading-stations
of the different nationalities. The commerce which had sua-
tained her in prosperity, and her allies in military efficiency,
during the war, though checked and harassed by the enemy's
cruisers (to which she could pay only partial attention amid
the many claims upon her), started with a bound into new
life when the war was o?er. All over the world, exhausted
by their share of the common suffering, people were long-
^ ing for the return of prosperity and peaceful commerce ; and
there was no country ready as England was in wealth, capital,
and shipping to forward and reap the advantages of every
enterprise by which the interchange of commodities was pro-
moted, either by lawful or unlawful means. In the War of
the Spanish Succession, by her own wise management and
through the exhaustion of other nations, not only her navy
but her trade was steadily built up ; and indeed, in that
dangerous condition of the seas, traversed by some of the
most reckless and restless cruisers France ever sent out, the
efficiency of the navy meant safer voyages, and so more em-
ployment for the merchant-ships. The Britiali merchant-
ships, being better protected than tliose of the Dutch, gained
the reputation of being far safer carriers, and the carrying-
trade naturally passed more and more into their hands ; while
the habit of employing them in preference, once established,
was likely to continue.
Taking all thbgs together/' says an historian of the British
navy, <<I donbt whether the credit of the English nation ever
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COMMANDING POSITION OF ENGLAND. 226
stood higher than at this period, or the spirit of the people higher.
The success of oar arms at sea, the necessity of protecting onr
trade, and the popularity of every step taken to increase our mari-
time power, occasioned such measures to be pursued as annually
added to our force. Hence arose that mighty difference which at
the close of the year 1706 appeared in the Boyal Navy ; this, not
only in the number but in the quality of the ships, was much supe-
rior to what it had been at the time of the Revolution or even before.
Hence it was that our trade rather increased than diminished during
the last war, and that we gained so signally by our strict intercourse
with Portugal." *
The sea power of England therefore was not merely in the
great nary, with which we too commonly and exclusively
associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688^ and it
shrivelled away like a leaf in the fire. Neither was it in a
prosperous commerce alone ; a few years after the date at
which we have arrived^ the commerce of France took on fair
proportions, but the first blast of war swept it off the seas
as the navy of Cromwell had once swept that of Holland.
It was in the union of the two, carefully fostered, that Eng- y
land made the gain of sea power over and beyond all other
States ; and this gain is distinctly associated with and dates
from the War of the Spanish Snccession. Before that war
England was one of the sea powers ; after it she was the sea
power, without any second. This power also she held alone,
unshared by friend and unchecked by foe. She alone was
rich, and in her control of the sea and her extensive ship*
ping had the sources of wealth so much in her hands that
there was no present danger of a rival on the ocean. Thus
her gain of sea power and wealth was not only great but
solid, being wholly in her own hands ; while the gains of the
other States were not merely inferior in degree, but weaker
in kind, in that they depended more or less upon the good
will of other peoples.
Is it meant, it maybe asked, to attribute to sea power alone
the greatness or wealth of any State ? Certainly not The
> CampbeU \ Ltree of the Admirals.
16
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226 DEPRESSED CONDITION OF FRANCE.
due use and control of the sea is but one link in the chain of
exchange by which wealth accumulates ; but it is the central
link, which lays under contribution other nations for the bene-
fit of the one holding it, and which, history seems to assert,
most surely of all gathers to itself riches. In England, this
control and use of the sea seems to arise naturally, from the
concurrence of many circumstances; the years immediately
preceding the War of the Spanish Succession had, moreover,
farthered the advance of her prosperity by a series of fiscal
measures, which Macaulay speaks of as the deep and solid
foundation on which was to rise tlie most gigantic fabric of
commercial prosperity which the world had ever seen.'' It
may be questioned, however, whether the genius of the people,
inclined to and developed by trade, did not make easier the
taking of such measures ; whether their adoption did not at
least partially spring from, as well as add to, the sea power
of the nation* However that may be, there is seen, on the
opposite side of the Channel, a nation which started ahead of
England in the race, — a nation peculiarly well fitted, by situa-
tion and resources, for the control of the sea both by war and
commerce. The position of France is in this peculiar, that
of all the great powers she alone had a free choice ; the others
were more or less constrained to the land chiefly, or to the
sea chiefly, for any movement outside their own borders ; but
she to her long continental frontier added a seaboard on
three seas. In 1672 she definitely chose expansion by land.
At that time Colbert had administered her finances for twelve
years, and from a state of terrible confusion had so restored
them that the revenue of the King of France was more than
double that of the King of England. In those days France
paid the subsidies of Europe ; but Golberf s plans and hopes
for France rested upon making her powerful on the sea. The
war with Holland arrested these plans, the onward movement
of prosperity ceased, the nation was thrown back upon itself,
shut off from the outside world. Many causes doubtless
worked together to the disastrous result which marked the
end of the reign of Louis XIY • : constant wars, bad adminis-
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DEPRESSED CONDITION OF FRANCE. 227
tratioQ in tho latter half of the period, extravagance through-
out ; but France was practically never invaded, the war was
kept at or beyond her own frontiers with slight exceptions,
her home industries could suffer little from direct hostili-
ties. In these respects she was nearly equal to England, and
under better conditions than her other enemies. What made
the difference in the results 7 Why was France miserable and
exhausted, while England was smiling and prosperous 7 Why
did England dictate, and France accept, terms of peace 7 The
reason apparently was the difference in wealth and credit.
France stood alone against many enemies; but those ene-
mies were raised and kept moving by English subsidies.
The Lord Treasurer of England, writing in 1706 to Marl-
borough, says : —
Though the land and trade of both England and Holland have
excessive burthens upon them, yet the credit continues good both of
them and us ; whereas the finances of France are so much more ex-
hausted that they are forced to give twenty and twenty-five per cent
for every penny they send oat of the kingdom, unless they send it in
specie."
In 1712 the expenditure of France was 240,000,000 francs^
while the taxes brought in only 118,000,000 gross, of which,
after deducting losses and necessary expenses, only 87,000,000
remained in the treasury ; the deficit was sought to be met
by anticipating parts of the revenue for years ahead, and by
a series of extraordinary transactions tedious to name or to
understand.
''In the summer of 1715 [two years after the peace] it seemed
as if the situation could not grow worse, — no more public nor private
credit; no more clear revenue for the State; the portions of the
revenue not pledged, anticipated on the following years. Neither
labor nor consumption could be resumed for want of circulation ;
usury reigned on the ruins of society. The alternations of high
prices and the depreciation of commodities finally crushed the people*
Provision riots broke out among them, and even in the army* Manu-
factures were languishing or suspended ; forced mendicity was prey-
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228 COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY OF ENGLAND.
ing upon the cities. The fields were deserted, the knds ^ow foi
lack of instruments, for lack of manure, for lack of cattle ; the houses
were falling to ruin. Monarchical France seemed ready to expire
with its aged king."^
Thus it WEB in France, with a population of nineteen mil-
lions at that time to the eight millions of all the British
Islands ; with a land vastly more fertile and productiye ; be-
fore the great days, too, of coal and iron. In England, on tlie
contrary, the immenae grants of Parliament in 1710 struck
the French prodigiously ; for while their credit was low, or
in a manner quite gone, ours was at its zenith." During that
same war there appeared that mighty spirit among our
merchants which enabled them to carry on idl their schemes
with a vigor that kept a constant circulation of money
throughout the kingdom, and afforded such mighty encour-
agement to all manufactures as has made the remembrance
of those times grateful in worse/*
^By the treaty with Portugal we were prodigious gainers. . . • The
Portuguese began to feel the comfortable effects of their Brazil gold
mines, and the prodigious commerce that followed with us made their
good fortune in great measure ours ; and so it has been ever since ;
otherwise I know not how the expenses of the war had been
borne. . . • The running cash in the kingdom increased very consider-
ably, which must be attributed in great measure to our Portuguese
trade ; and this, as I have made manifest, we owed wholly to our
power at sea [which took Portugal from the alliance of the two
crowns, and threw her upon the protection of the maritime powers].
Our trade with the Spanish West Indies by way of Cadis was cer-
tainly much interrupted at the beginning of this war ; but afterward
it was in great measure restored, as well by direct communication
with several provinces when under the Archduke, as tlirough Portu-
gal, by which a very great though contraband trade was carried on.
We were at the same time very great gainers by our commerce with
the Spaniards in the West Indies [also contraband]. • . . Our colonies,
though complaining of neglect, grew richer, more populous, and
carried their trade farther than in former times. . • . Our national
1 Martin: History of France.
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COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY OF ENGLAND. 229
end with respect to England was in this war particularly in great
measure answered, — I mean the destruction of the French power at
sea, for, after the battle of Malaga, we hear no more of their great
fleets ; and though by this the number of their privateers was very
much increased, yet the losses of our merchants were fiir less in the
latter than in the former reign. • . • It is certainly a matter of great
satisfaction that • . • setting out at first with the sight of so great
a naval power as the French king had assembled in 1688, while we
struggled under such difficulties, and when we got out of that trouble-
some war, in 1697, found ourselves loaded with a debt too heavy
to be shaken off in the short interval of peace, yet by 1706, instead
of seeing the navy of France riding upon our coast, we sent every
year a powerful fleet to insult theirs, superior to them not only in
the ocean, but in the Mediterranean, forcing them entirely out of
that sea by the mere sight of our flag. ... By this we not only
secured our trade with the Levant, and strengthened our interests
with all the Italian princes, but struck the States of Barbary with
terror, and awed the Sultan from listening to any proposals from
France. Such were the fruits of the increase of our naval power,
and of the manner in which it was employed. • . . Such fleets were
necessary; they at once protected our flag and our allies, and at-
tached them to our interest ; and, what is of greater importance than
all the rest, they established our reputation for maritime force so
effectually that we feel even to this day [1740] the happy effects
of the fame thus acquired." '
It is needless to add more. Thus stood the Power of the
Seas during the years in which the French historians tell us
that their cruisers were battening on her commerce. The
English writer admits heavy losses. In 1707, that is, in the
space of five years, the returns, according to the report of a
committee of the House of Lords, ^'sbow that since the
beginning of the war Eiigland had lost 80 ships-of-war and
1146 merchant-ships, of which 800 were retaken ; whereas
we had taken from them, or destroyed, 80 ships-of-war,
and 1846 merchantmen; 175 privateers also were taken."
The greater number of the ships-of-war were probably on
private venture, as has been explained. But, be the relative
1 GsmpbeU: liveB of the AdminJs.
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230
DUQUAY'TROUIN AT RIO JANEIRO.
numbers what they may, no argument is needed beyond the
statements just given, to show the inability of a mere cruising
warfare, not based upon large fleets, to break down a great
sea power. Jean Bart died in 1702 ; but in Forbin, Du Gasse,
and others, and above all in Dugnay-Trouin, ho left worthy
successors, the equals of any commerce-destroyers the world
has ever seen.
The name of Puguay-Trouin suggests the mention, before
finally leaving the War of the Spanish Succession, of his
greatest privateering expedition, carried to a distance from
home rarely reached by the seamen of his occupation, and
which illustrates curiously the spirit of such enterprises in
that day, and the shifts to which the French government was
reduced. A small French squadron had attacked Rio Janeiro
in 1710, but being repulsed, had lost some prisoners, who
were said to have been put to death, Duguay-Trouin sought
permission to avenge the insult to France. The king, con-
senting, advanced the ships and funiishcd the crews; and
a regular contract was drawn up between the king on the
one hand and the company employing Duguay-Trouin on the
other, stipulating the expenses to be borne and supplies fur-
nished on either hand ; among which we find the odd, busi-
ness-like provision that for every one of the troops embarked
who shall die, be killed, or desert during the cruise, the
company should pay a forfeit of thirty francs. The king
was to receive one fifth of the net profits, and was to bear
the loss of any one of the vessels that should be wrecked, or
destroyed in action. Under these provisions, enumerated in
full in a long contract, Duguay-Trouin received a force of
six ship&of-the-line, seven frigates, and over two thousand
troops, with which he sailed to Bio Janeiro in 1711 ; captured
the place after a series of operations, and allowed it to be
ransomed at the price of something under four hundred thou-
sand dollars, probably nearly equal to a million in the present
day, besides five hundred cases of sugar. The privateering
company cleared about ninety-two per cent on their venture.
As two of the ships-of-the-Iine were never heard from after
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WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND SWEDEN. 231
sailing on the return voyage, the king's profits were probably
small.
While the War of the Spanish Saccession was engaging
all western Europe, a strife which might have had a profound
influence upon its issue was going on in the east. Sweden
and Russia were at war, the Hungarians had reyolted against
Austria, and Turkey was finally drawn in, though not till
the end of the year 1710. Had Turkey helped the Hun-
garians, she would have made a powerful diyersion, not for
the first time in history, in favor of France. The English
historian suggests that she was deterred by fear of the
English fleet ; at all events she did not move, and Hungary
was reduced to obedience. The war between Sweden and
Russia was to result in the preponderance of the latter upon
the Baltic, the subsidence of Sweden, the old ally of France,
into a second-rate State, and the entrance of Russia defini-
tively into European politics.
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CHAPTER VI.
Ths Rxosnot hi Fbanob« — Albxroki ik Spain. — Fouoibs or
Walpolb and Flbubi. — Wab of thb Polish Sucoxssion. —
Enoubh Contbaband Tbadb in Spanish Ambbica. — Gbbat
Britain dboulbbs Wab aoainst Spain* — 1715-1789.
nPHE Peace of Utrecht was boou followed by the deatlis
of the rulers of the two countries which had played
the foremost part in the War of the Spanish Succession.
Queen Anne died August 1, 1714 ; Louis XIV. on the 1st
of September, 1715.
The successor to the English thronCi the German George I.,
though undoubtedly the choice of the English people, was
far from being their fayorite, and was rather endured as a
necessary evil, giving them a Protestant instead of a Roman
Catholic king. Along with the coldness and dislike of his
own partisans, he found a yery considerable body of dis-
affected men, who wished to see the son of James II. on the
throne. There was therefore a lack of solidity, more ap-
parent than real, but still real, in his position. In France,
on the contrary, the succession to the throne was undis-
puted; but the heir was a child of fiyo years, and there was
much jealousy as to the possession of the regency, a power
more absolute than that of the King of England. The re-
gency was obtained and exercised by the next in succession
to the throne, Philip, Duke of Orleans ; but he had to appre-
hend, not only attempts on the part of rivals in France to
shake his hold, but also the active enmity of the Bourbon
king of Spain, Philip Y,, — an enmity which seems to have
dated from an intrigue of Orleans, during the late war, to
supplant Philip on the Spanish throne. There was therefore
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POLICY OF THE REGENT.
a feeling of instability, of apprehension^ in the governments
of England and France, which influenced the policy of both.
As regards the relations of France and Spain, the mntual
hatred of the actual rulers stood for a while in the way of
the friendly accord Louis XIY. had hoped from family ties,
and was injurious to the true interests of both nations.
The Begent Orleans, under the advice of the most able
and celebrated French statesman of that day, the Abb^ Dubois,
made overtures of alliance to the King of Oreat Britain. He
began first by commercial concessions of the kind generally
acceptable to the English, forbidding French shipping to trade
to the South Seas under penalty of deaths and lowering the
duties on the importation of English coal. England at first
received these advances warily; but the regent would not
be discouraged, and offered, further, to compel the Pretender,
James IIL, to withdi-aw beyond the Alps. He also undertook
to fill up the port at Mardyck, a new excavation by which the
French government was trying to indemnify itself for the loss
of Dunkirk. These concessions, all of which but one, it will
be noted, were at the expense of the sea power or commercial
interests of France, induced England to sign a treaty by
which the two countries mutually guaranteed the execution
of the treaties of Utrecht as far as their respective interests
were concerned ; especially the clause by which the House of
Orleans was to succeed to the French throne, if Louis XY«
died childless. The Protestant succession in England wad
likewise guaranteed. Holland, exhausted by the war, was
unwilling to enter upon new engagements, but was at last
brought over to this by the remission of certain dues on her
merchandise entering France. The treaty, signed in Janu-
ary, 1717, was known as the Triple Alliance, and bound
France to England for some years to come.
While France was thus making overtures to England,
Spain, under the guidance of another able churchman, was
seeking the same alliance and at the same , time developing
her national strength with the hope of recovering her lost
Italian States. The new minister, Oardinal Alberoni, promised
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234 ALLIANCE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.
Philip y. to put him in a poBition to reconquer Sicily and
Naples, if granted five years of peace. He worked hard
to bring up the revenues, rebuild the navy, and re-establish
the army, while at the same time promoting manufactures,
commerce, and shipping, and the adyance made in all these
was remarkable ; but the more legitimate ambition of Spain
to recover her lost possessions, and with them to establish
her power in the Mediterranean, so grievously wounded by
the loss of Gibraltar, was hampered by the ill-timed purpose
of Philip to overthrow the regency of Orleans in France.
Alberoni was compelled to alienate France, whose sea power,
as well as that of Spain, was concerned in seeing Sicily
in friendly hands, and, instead of that natural ally, had to
conciliate the maritime powers, England and Holland. This
he also sought to do by commercial concessions ; promising
promptly to put the English iu possession of the privileges
granted at Utrecht, concerning which Spain had so far
delayed. In return, he asked favorable action from them
in Italy. George I., who was at heart German, received
coldly advances which were unfriendly to the German em-
peror in his Italian dominions ; and Alberoni, offended, with-
drew them. The Triple Alliance, by guaranteeing the exist-
ing arrangement of succession to the French throne, gave
further offence to Philip Y., who dreamed of asserting his
own claim. The result of all these negotiations was to
bind England and France together against Spain, — a blind
policy for the two Bourbon kingdoms.
The gist of the situation created by these different aims
and feelings, was that the Emperor of Austria and Uie King
of Spain both wanted Sicily, which at Utrecht had been
given to the Duke of Savoy ; and that France and England
both wished for peace in western Europe, because war would
give an opportunity to the malcontents in either kingdom.
The position of George, however, being more secure than
that of Orleans, the policy of the latter tended to yield
to that of the former, and this tendency was increased by the
active ill-will of tlie King of Spain. George, as a German,
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THE SPANIARDS INVADE SARDINIA.
235
wished the emperor's success; and the English statesmen
naturally preferred to see Sicily in the hands of their late
ally and welUassured friend rather than in Spain's. France,
contrary to her true policy^but under the urgency of the
regent's position, entertained the same views, and it was
proposed to modify the Treaty of Utrecht by transferring
Sicily from Savoy to Austria, giving the former Sardinia
instead. It was necessary, however, to consider Spain,
which under Alberoni had already gained a degree of mili-
tary power astounding to those who had known her weakness
during the last war. She was not yet ready to fight, for only
half of the five years asked by the cardinal had passed ; but
still less was she ready to forego her ambitions. A trifling
incident precipitated an outbreak. A high Spanish official,
travelling from Rome to Spain by land, and so passing through
the Italian States of the emperor, was arrested as a rebellious
subject by order of the latter, who still styled himself King
of Spain. At this insult, Alberoni could not hold Philip
back. An expedition of twelve ships of war and eighty-six
hundred soldiers was sent against Sardinia, the transfer to
Savoy not having yet taken effect, and reduced the island in a
few months. This happened in 1717.
Doubtless tlie Spaniards would at once have moved on
against Sicily ; but France and England now intervened more
actively to prevent the general war that seemed threaten-
ing. England sent a fleet to the Mediterranean, and negotia*
tions began at Paris, Vienna, and Madrid. The outcome
of these conferences was an agreement between England and
France to effect the exchange of Sardinia and Sicily just
mentioned, recompensing Spain by giving her Parma and
Tuscany in northern Italy, and stipulating that the emperor
should renounce forever his absurd but irritating claim to the
Spanish crown. This arrangement was to be enforced by
arras, if necessary. The emperor at first refused consent;
but the increasing greatness of Alberoni's preparations at
last decided him to accept so advantageous an offer, and the
accession of Holland to the . compact gave it the historical
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236
SPANISH INVASION OF SICILY.
title of the Quadruple Alliance. Spain was obstinate ; and
it is significant of Alberoni's achievements in developing her
power, and the eagerness, not to say anxiety, of George I., that
the offer was made to purchase her consent by ceding Gib-
raltar. If the Regent Orleans knew this, it would partly
justify his forwarding tlie negotiations.
Alberoni tried to back up his military power by diplomatic
efforts extending all over Europe. Russia and Sweden were
brought together in a project for invading England in the
interest of the Stuarts ; the signing of the Quadruple Alli-
ance in Holland was delayed by his agents ; a conspiracy was
started in France against the regent ; the Turks were stirred
up against the emperor ; discontent was fomented through-
out Great Britain ; and an attempt was made to gain over the
Duke of Savoy, outraged by being deprived of Sicily. On the
Ist of July, 1718, a Spanish army of thirty thousand troops,
escorted by twenty-two shipsof-the-line, appeared at Palermo.
The troops of Savoy evacuated the city and pretty nearly
the whole island, resistance being concentrated in die citadel
of Messina. Anxiety was felt in Naples itself, until the Eng-
lish admiral, Byng,^ anchored there the day after the invest-
ment of Messina. The King of Sicily having now consented
to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, Byng received on
board two thousand Austrian troops to be landed at Messina.
When he appeared before the place, finding it besieged, he
wrote to the Spanish general suggesting a suspension of arms
for two months. This was of course refused ; so the Aus-
trians were landed again at Reggio, in Italy, and Byng passed
through the Straits of Messina to seek the Spanish fleet,
which had gone to the southward.
The engagement which ensued can scarcely be called a
battle, and, as is apt to happen in such affairs, when the par-
ties are on the verge of war but war has not actually been
declared, there is some doubt as to how far the attack was
morally justifiable on the part of the English. It seems
pretty sure that Byng was determined beforehand to seize
i Afterward Lord Torriogton ; father of Admiral John Byng, shot in 1757.
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ACTION OFF CAPE PASSARO.
or destroy the Spanish fleet, and that as a military man he
was justified by his oi'ders. The Spanish naval officers had
not made up their minds to any line of conduct ; they were
much inferior in numbers, and, as must always be the case«
Alberoni's hastily reTived navy had not within the same pe-
riod reached nearly the efficiency of his army. The Bnglish
approached threateningly near, one or more Spanish ships
opened fire, whereupon the English, being to windward, stood
down and made an end of them ; a few only escaped into
Yaletta harbor. The Spanish navy was practically annihi-
lated. It is difficult to understand the importance attached
by some writers to Byng's action at this time in attacking
without regard to the line-of-battle. He had before him a
disorderly force, much inferior both in numbers and dis-
cipline. His merit seems rather to lie in the readiness to
assume a responsibility from which a more scrupulous man
might have shrunk; but in this and throughout the cam-
paign he rendered good service to England, whose sea power
was again strengthened by the destruction not of an actual
but a possible rival, and his services were rewarded by a peer-
age. In connection with this day's work was written a de-
spatch which has great favor with English historians. One
of the senior captains was detached with a division against
some escaping ships of the enemy. His report to the ad-
miral ran thus : Sm, — We have taken or destroyed all the
Spanish ships upon this coast, the number as per margin.
BespectfuUy, etc., O. Walton." One English writer makes,
and another indorses, the uncalled-for but characteristic fling
at the French, that the ships thus thrust into the margin
would have filled some pages of a French narration.^ It may
be granted that the so-called battle ^ of Oape Passaro did not
merit a long description, and Captain Walton possibly felt so ;
but if all reports of naval transactions were modelled upon his,
the writing of naval history would not depend on official papers.
Thus the Spanish navy was struck down on the lltii of
1 Campban : LWee of the Admirtls; qvoted bj Lord Hahon In Ui HiBtofy ol
England.
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238 DESTRUCTION OF SPANISH DOCK^YARDS.
August) 1718» off Gape Passaro. This settled the fate of
Sicily^ if it had been doubtful before. The Eugliah fleet
cruised round the island^ supporting the Austrians and iso-
lating the Spaniards^ none of whom were permitted to witli-
draw before peace was made. Alberoni's diplomatic projects
failed one after the other, with a strange fatality. In the
following year the French, in pursuance of the terms of the
alliance, invaded the north of Spain and destroyed the dock-
yards ; burning nine large ships on the stocks, besides the
materials for seven more, at the instigation of an English
attacks accompanying the French headquarters. Thus was
completed the destruction of the Spanish navy, which, says an
English historian, was ascribed to the maritime jealousy of
England. This was done,'' wrote the French commander,
the Duke of Berwick, a bastard of the house of Stuart, in
order that the English government may be able to show the
next Parliament that nothing has been neglected to diminish
the navy of Spain." The acts of Sir George Byng, as given by
the English naval historian, make yet more manifest the pur-
pose of England at this time. While the city and citadel of
Messina were being besieged by the Austrians, English, and
Sardinians, a dispute arose as to the possession of the Spanish
men-of-war within the mole. Byng, reflecting within him-
self that possibly the garrison might capitulate for the safe
return of those ships into Spain, which he was determined
not to suffer; that on the other hand the right of posses-
sion might breed an inconvenient dispute at a critical junc-
ture among the princes concerned, and if it should at length
be determined that they did not belong to England it were
better they belonged to no one else, proposed to Count de
Merci, the Austrian general, to erect a battery and destroy
them as they lay.'' ^ After some demur on the part of the
other leaders, this was done. If constant care and watch-
fulness deserve success, England certainly deserved her sea
power ; but what shall be said of the folly of France at this
time and in this connection ?
^ LiTMofthe Admlnk.
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ENGLAND IN THE BALTIC.
239
The steady stream of reverses, and the hopelessness of
contending for distant maritime possessions when without a
nayjy broke down the resistance of Spain. England and
France insisted upon the dismissal of Alberoni, and Philip
yielded to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. The Austrian
power, necessarily friendly to England, was thus firmly settled
in the central Mediterranean, in Naples and Sicily, as England
herself was in Gibraltar and Port Mahon. Sir Robert Wal-
pole, the minister now coming into power in England, failed
at a later day to support this favorable conjunction, and so
far betrayed the traditional policy of his country. The do-
minion of the House of Savoy in Sardinia, which then began,
has lasted ; it is only within our own day that the title
King of Sardinia has merged in the broader one of King
of Italy.
Contemporaneously with and for some time after the short
episode of Alberoni's ministry and Spain's ambition, a strug-
gle was going on around the shores of the Baltic which must
be mentioned, because it gave rise to another effectual illus-
tration of the sea power of England, manifested alike in the
north and south yrlth a slightness of exertion which calls
to mind the stories of the tap of a tiger's paw. The long
contest between Sweden and Russia was for a moment in*
terrupted in 1718, by negotiations looking to peace and to an
alliance between the two for the settlement of the succes-
sion in Poland and the restoration of the Stuarts in Eng-
land. This project, on which had rested many of Alberoni's
hopes, was finally stopped by the death in battle of the Swe-
dish king. The war went on ; and the czar^ seeing the ex-
haustion of Sweden, purposed its entire subjugation. This
destruction of the balance of power in the Baltic, making it
a Russian lake, suited neither England nor France ; especially
the former, whose sea power both for peace and war depended
upon the naval stores chiefly drawn from those regions. The
two western kingdoms interfered, both by diplomacy^ while
England besides sent her fleet. Denmark, which was also at
war with her traditional enemy Sweden, readily yielded ; but
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240
TEE REGENCY IN FRANCE.
Peter the Qreat chafed heavily under the implied coercion,
until at last orders were sent to the English admiral to join
his fleet to that of the Swedes and repeat in the Baltic the
history of Cape Passaro. The czar in alarm withdrew his
fleet This happened in 1T19 ; but Peter, though baffledi was
not yet subdued. The following year the interposition of
England was repeated with greater efifect, although not in
time to save the Swedish coasts from serious injury; but
the czar, recognizing the fixed purpose with which he had
to deal, and knowing from personal observation and prac-
tical experience the efficiency of England's sea power, con-
sented finally to peace. The French claim mu(di for their
own diplomacy in this happy result, and say tliat England
supported Sweden feebly ; being willing that she should lose
her provinces on the eastern shore of the Baltic because Rus-
sia, thus brought down to the sea-shore, could more easily
open to English trade the vast resources of her interior.
This may very possibly be true, and certainty can be felt that
British interests, especially as to commerce and sea power,
were looked after ; but the character of Peter the Great is
the guarantee that the argument which weighed most heavily
with him was the military efficiency of the British fleet and
its ability to move up to his very doors. By this Peace of
Nystadt, August 80, 1721, Sweden abandoned Livonia, Estho-
nia, and other provinces on the east side of the Baltic. This
result was inevitable ; it was yearly becoming less possible
for small States to hold their own.
It can readily be understood that Spain was utterly dis-
contented with the terms wrung from her by the Quadruple
Alliance. The twelve years which followed are called years
of peace, but the peace was very uncertain, and fraught with
elements of future wars. The three great grievances rankling
with Spain were — Sicily and Naples in the possession of
Austria, Gibraltar and Mahon in the hands of England, and
lastly, the vast contraband trade carried on by English mer-
chants and ships in Spanish America. It will be seen that
England was the active supporter of all these injuries ; Eng-
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DEATH OF THJS REGENT.,
241
land therefore was the special enemy of 8pa.in^ but Spain was
not the onlj enemy of England.
The quiet, such as it was, that succeeded the fall of Albe-
roni was due mainly to the character and policy of the two
ministers of France and England, who agreed in wishing a
general peace. The policy and reasons of the French regent
are already known. Moved by the same reasons, and to re-
move an accidental offence token by England, Dubois ob«
tained for her the further concession from Spain, additional
to the commercial advantages granted at Utrecht, of send-
ing a ship every year to trade in the West Indies. It is
said that this ship, after being anchored, was kept continu-
ally supplied by others, so that fresh cargo came in over one
side as fast as the old was sent ashore from the other. Dubois
and the regent both died in the latter half of 1728, after
an administration of eight years, in which they had re-
versed the policy of Richelieu by alliance with England and
Austria and sacrificing to them the interests of France.
The regency and the nominal government of France passed
to another member of the royal family ; but the real ruler was
Cardinal Fleuri, the preceptor of the young king, who was
now thirteen years of age. Efforts to displace the preceptor
resulted only in giving him the title, as well as the power, of
minister in 1726. At this time Sir Robert Walpole had become
prime minister of England, with an influence and power which
gave him practically the entire guidance of the policy of the
State. The chief wish of both Walpole and Fleuri was peace,
above all in western Europe. France and England thereforo
continued to act together for that purpose, and though they
could not entirely stifle every murmur, they were for several
years successful in preventing outbreaks. But while the aims
of the two ministers were thus agreed, the motives which in*
spired them were different. Walpole desired peace because
of the still unsettled condition of the English succession ; for
the peaceful growth of English commerce, which he had ever
before his eyes ; and probably also because his spirit, im-
patient of equals in the government, shrank from war which
16
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242 ADMINISTRATION OF FLEURI.
would ralae up stronger men around him. Flcuri, reosonablj
secure as to the throne and his own power, wished like WaL
pole the peaceful development of his country, and shrank
from war with the love of repose natural to old age ; for he
was seventy-three when he took office, and ninety when he
laid it down in death. Under his mild administration the
prosperity of France revived ; the passing traveller could
note the change in the face of the country and of the people ;
yet it may be doubted whether this change was due to the
government of the quiet old man, or merely to the natural
elasticity of the people, no longer drained by war nor isolated
from the rest of the world. French authorities say that agri-
culture did not revive throughout the country. It is certain,
however, that the maritime prosperity of France advanced
wonderfully, owing mainly to the removal of commercial
restrictions in the years immediately following the death of
Louis XIY. . The West India islands in particular throve
greatly, and their welfare was naturally shared by tlio home
ports that traded with them. The tropical climate of Mar-
tinique, Guadeloupe, and Louisiana, and cultivation by slaves,
lent themselves readily to the paternal, semi-military gov-
ernment which marks all French colonies, but which pro-
duced less happy results in the bitter weather of Canada. In
the West Indies, France at this time obtained a decided pre-
ponderance over England ; the value of the French half of
Hayti was alone equal to that of all the English West Indies,
and French cofiFee and sugar were driving those of England
out of European markets. A like advantage over England in
the Mediterranean and Levant trade is asserted by French
historians. At the same time the East India Company was
revived, and its French depot, whose name tells its association
with the East, the Breton town of L'Orient, quickly became
a splendid city. Fondicherry on the Coromandel coast, and
Chandemagore on the Qanges, the chief seats of French
power and commerce in India, grew rapidly ; the Isle of
Bourbon and the Isle of France, now the Mauritius, whose
position is so well suited for the control of the Indian Ocean,
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FRANCE IN INDIA.
248
became, the one a rich agricultural colony, the other a power-
ful naval station. The monopoly of the great company was
confined to the trade between home and the chief Indian
stations ; the traffic throughout the Indian seas was open to
private enterprise and grew more rapidly. This great move-
ment, wholly spontaneous, and even looked on with distrust
by the government, was personified in two men, Dupleix and
La Bourdonuais ; who, the former at Ghandemagore and the
latter at the Isle of France, pointed out and led the way in all
these undertakings, which were building up the power and
renown of the French in the Eastern seas. The movement
was begun which, after making France the rival of England
in the Hindustan peninsula, and giving her for a moment the
promise of that great empire which has bestowed a new title
on the Queen of Qreat Britain, was destined finally to falter
and perish before the sea power of England. The extent
of this expansion of French trade, consequent upon peace
and the removal of restrictions, and not due in any sense
to government protection, is evidenced by the growth of
French merchant shipping from only three hundred vessels
at the death of Louis XIY., to eighteen hundred, twenty years
later. This, a French historian claims, refutes ^ the deplor-
able prejudices, bom of our misfortunes, that France is not
fitted for sea commerce, the only commerce that indefinitely
extends the power of a nation with its sphere of activity." ^
This free and happy movement of the people was far from
acceptable to Fleuri, who seems to have seen it witli the
distrust of a hen that has hatched ducklings. Walpole and
himself were agreed to love peace ; but Walpole was obliged
to reckon with the English people, and these were prompt to
resent rivalry upon the sea and in trade, however obtained.
Moreover, Fleuri had inherited the unfortunate policy of Louis
XIY. ; his eyes were fixed on the continent. He did not in-
deed wish to follow the course of the regency in quarrelling
with Spain, but rather to draw near to her ; and although he
was not able for a time to do so without sacrificing his peace
1 Maitiii : Hiatoiy of France.
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244 WALPOLETS NAVAL DEMONSTRATIONS.
policy, because of Spain's restless enmity to England, yet his
mind was chiefly bent upon strengthening the position of
France on the land, by establishing Bourbon princes where
he could, and drawing them together by family alliances.
The navy was allowed to decay more and more. ^^The
French government abandoned the sea at the very moment
that the nation, through the activity of private individuals,
was making an effort to regain it." The material force fell
to fifty-four ships-of-the-line and frigates, mostly in bad con-
dition ; and even when war with England had been imminent
for five years, France had but forty-five ships-of-the-line to
England's ninety. This difference foreshadowed the results
which followed a quarter of a century of war.
During the same period Walpole, relying upon Fleuri's
co-operation, resolutely set his face against open war between
England and Spain. The difficulties caused by the threaten-
ing and exasperating action of the latter country, and of
such allies as she from time to time could raise, were met,
and for a while successfully met, by naval demonstrations, —
reminders of that sea power which one nation after another
had felt and yielded to. In 1726, the Spanish king and the
emperor agreed to sink their long-standing feud, and signed a
treaty at Vienna, in which there was a secret clause providing
that the emperor would support the claim of Spain to Gibraltar
and Port Mahon, by arms if necessary. Russia also showed
a disposition to join this confederacy. A counter-alliance
was formed between England, France, and Prussia; and
English fleets were sent, one to the Baltic to awe the czarina,
another to the coast of Spain to check that government and
protect Gibraltar, and a third to Porto Bello, on the Spanish
Main, to blockade the fleet of galleons there assembled, and
by cutting off the supplies remind the Spanish king at once of
his dependence upon the specie of America, and of England's
control of the highway by which it reached him. Walpole's
aversion to war was marked by giving the admiral at Porto
Bello the strictest orders not to fight, only to blockade ; the
consequence of which, through the long delay of the squadron
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TRADE IN SPANISH AMERICA,
246
upon the sickly coast, was a mortality among the crews that
shocked the nation, and led, among other causes, to the minis-
ter's overthrow many years later. Between three and four
tliousand officers and men, including Admiral Hosier himself,
died there. Walpole's aim, however, was reached; though
Spain made a foolish attack by land upon Gibraltar, the
presence of the English fleet assured its supplies and provi-
sions and averted the formal outbreak of war. The emperor
withdrew from the alliance, and under English pressure also
revoked the charter of an East India company which he had
authorized in the Austrian Netherlands, and which took its
name from the port of Ostend. English merchants demanded
the removal of tliis competitor, and also of a similar rival es-
tablished in Denmark ; \>oth which concessions the English
ministry, backed by Holland, obtained. So long as com-
merce was not seriously disturbed, Walpole's peace policy,
accompanied as it naturally was by years of plenty and
general content, was easily maintained, even though Spain
continued threatening and arrogant in her demands for Gib-
raltar ; but unfortunately she now entered more deeply upon
a course of annoyance to English trade. The concessions of
the Asiento, or slave-trade, and of the annual ship to South
America have been mentioned ; but these privileges were but
a part of the English commerce in those regions. The sys-
tem of Spain with regard to the trade of her colonies was of
the narrowest and most exclusive character; but, while at-
tempting to shut them out from foreign traffic, she neglected
to provide for their wants herself. The consequence was that
a great smuggling or contraband trade arose throughout her
American possessions, carried on mainly by the English, who
made their lawful traffic by the Asiento and the yearly ship
subserve also the imlawful, or at least unauthorized, trade.
This system was doubtless advantageous to the great body
of the Spanish colonists, and was encouraged by them, while
colonial governors connived at it, sometimes for money, some-
times swayed by local public opinion and their own knowledge
of the hardships of the case ; but there were Spanish subjects
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246
VIOLENT ACTION OF SPAIN.
who saw their own buBiness injured by the use and abuse of
English priyilegeSy and the national government suffered both
in pocket and in pride by these evasions of the revenue. It
now began to pull the strings tighter. Obsolete regulations
were revived and enforced. Words in which the action of
Spain in this old controversy have been described are curi-
ously applicable to certain recent disputes to which the
United States has been a party. ^^The letter of the treaty
was now followed^ though the spirit which dictated it was
abandoned. Although English ships still enjoyed the liberty
of putting into Spanish harbors for the purpose of refitting
and provisioning, yet they were far from enjoying the same
advantages of carrying on a friendly and commercial inter-
course. They were now watched with a scrupulous jealousy,
strictly visited by guarda-costas, and every efficient means
adopted to prevent any commerce with the colonies, except
what was allowed by the annual ship." If Spain could have
confined herself to closer watchfulness and to enforcing in
her own waters vexatious customs regulations, not essentially
different from those sanctioned by the. general commercial
ideas of that day, perhaps no furUier harm would have re-
sulted; but the condition of things and the temper of her
government would not let her stop there. It was not possi-
ble to guard and effectually seal a sesrcoast extending over
hundreds of miles, with innumerable inlets; nor would
traders and seamen, in pursuit of gain which they had
come to consider their right, be deterred by fears of penalties
nor consideration for Spanish susceptibilities. The power of
Spain was not great enough to enforce on the English minis-
try any regulation of their shipping, or stoppage of the abuse
of the treaty privileges, in face of the feelings of the mer-
chants ; and so the weaker State, wronged and harassed, was
goaded into the use of wholly unlawful means. Ships-of-war
and guarda-costas were instructed, or at least permitted, to
stop and search English ships on the high seas, outside of
Spanish jurisdiction; and the arrogant Spanish temper, un-
restrained by the weak central government, made many of
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WALPOLE'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE. 247
these Tisits, both the lawful and the unlawful, scenes of insult
and even yiolence. Somewhat similar results, springing from
causes not entirely different, have occurred in the relations of
Spanish officials to the United States and American merchant-
ships in our own day. The stories of these acts of violence
coming back to England, coupled with cases of loss by confis-
cation and by the embarrassment of trade, of course stirred
up the people. In 1787 the West India merchants petitioned
the House of Commons, saying, —
For many years past their ships have not only frequently been
stopped and searched, but also forcibly and arbitrarily seiced upon
the high seas, by Spanish ships fitted out to cruise, under the plau-
sible pretext of guarding their own coasts; that the commanders
thereof, with their crews, have been inhumanly treated, and their
ships carried into some of the Spanish ports and there condemned with
their cargoes, in manifest violation of the treaties subsisting between
the two crowns ; that the remonstrances of his Majesty's ministers
at Madrid receive no attention, and that insults and plunder must
soon destroy their trade.''
Walpole struggled hard, during the ten years following
1729, to keep off war. In that year a treaty signed at Seville
professed to regulate matters, restoring the conditions of
trade to what they had been four years before, and providing
that six thousand Spanish troops should at once occupy the
territory of Tuscany and Parma. Walpole argued with his
own people that war would lose them the commercial privi-
leges they already enjoyed in Spanish dominions ; while with
Spain he carried on constant negotiations, seeking concessions
•and indemnities that might silence the home clamor. In the
midst of this period a war broke out concerning the succes-
sion to the Polish throne. The father-in-law of the French
king was one claimant ; Austria supported his opponent. A
common hostility to Austria once more drew France and
Spain together, and they were joined by the King of Sardinia,
who hoped through this alliance to wrest Milan from Austria
and add it to his own territory of Piedmont. The neutrality
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248 BOURBON FAMILY COMPACT.
of England and Holland was secured by a promise not to
attack the Austrian Netherlands, the possession of any part
of which by France was considered to be dangerous to Eng-
land's sea power. The allied States declared war against
Austria in October, 1788, and their armies entered Italy
together; but the Spaniards, intent on their long-cherished
projects against Naples and Sicily, left the others and turned
southward. The two kingdoms were easily and quickly con-
quered, the invaders having command of the sea and the
favor of the population. The second sou of the King of Spain
was proclaimed king under the title of Carlos III., and the
Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies thus came into exist-
ence. Walpole's aversion to war, leading him to abandon
a long-standing ally, thus resulted in the transfer of the
central Mediterranean to a control necessarily unfriendly to
Great Britain.
But while Walpole thus forsook the emperor, he was him.
self betrayed by his friend Fleuri. While making the open
alliance with Spain against Austria, the French government
agreed to a secret clause directed against England. This
engagement ran as follows: Whenever it seems good to
both nations alike, the abuses which have crept into com-
merce, especially through the English, shall be abolished ;
and if the English make objection, France will ward off their
hostility with all its strength by land and sea.'* ^ And this
compact was made,*' as the biographer of Lord Hawke points
out, during a period of intimate and ostentatious alliance
with England itself." ^ " Thus the policy against which
William III. had called on England and Europe to arm, at
last came into existence." Had Walpole known of this
secret agreement, it might have seemed to him an additional
argument in favor of peace ; for, his keen political sagacity
warning him of the existence of a danger which he yet could
not see, he told the House of Commons that if the Span-
iards had not private encouragement from powers more con-
siderable than themselves, they would never have ventured
. 1 BuRowi : Life of Lord Hawko.
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INCREASED POWER OF HOUSE OF BOURBON. 249
on the insults and injuries which have been proved at your
bar ; and he expressed the opinion that England was not
a match for the French and Spaniards too."
Fleuri had indeed given his old friend and fellow-statesman
an ugly fall. The particular question which excited the two
years' War of the Polish Succession, the choice of a ruler for
a distracted kingdom fated soon to disappear from the list
of European States, seems a small matter; but the turn
imparted to European politics by the action of the powers
engaged gives it a very different importance. Franco and
Austria came to an arrangement in October, 1786, upon terms
to which Sardinia and Spain afterward acceded, the principal
points of which were as follows : The French claimant to the
Polish throne gave up his claim to it, and received instead
the duchies of Bar and Lorraine on the east of France, with
the provision that upon his death they were to go to his
son-in-law, the King of France, in full sovereignty ; the two
kingdoms of Sicily and Naples were confirmed to ilie Spanish
Bourbon prince, Don Carlos; and Austria received back
Parma. The Sardinian monarchy also got an increase to its
Italian territory. France thus, under the peace-loving Fleurij
obtained in Bar and Lorraine an accession of strength which
more warlike rulers had coveted in vain; and at the same
time her external position was fortified at the expense of
England, by the transfer of controlling positions in the cen-
tral Mediterranean to an ally. Yet the heart of Fleuri might
well have failed him as he remembered the secret agreement
to check the commerce of England, and thought of her mighty
sea power alongside of the decayed navy of France. That
compact between France and Spain, to which the Two Sicilies
acceded later, bore within it, in the then strained relations
between England and Spain, the germ of the great wars be-
tween England and the House of Bourbon which issued in the
creation of the British Empire and the independence of the
United States.
The clamor in England over Spanish outrages continued,
and was carefully nursed by the opposition to Walpole. The
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260
WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SPAIN.
minister was now over sixty years of age, and scarcely able
to change the settled convictions and policy of his prime.
He was face to face with one of those irrepressible conflicts
between nations and races toward which a policy of repres-
sion and compromise can .be employed but for a short time.
The English were bent upon opening the West Indies and
Spanish America, the Spanish government equally bent upon
obstructing them. Unfortunately for their policy of obstruc-
tion, they strengthened Walpole's enemies by unlawful search
of English ships on tlie open sea, and possibly also by out-
rages to English seamen. Some of the latter were brought
before the bar of the House of Commons, and testified that
they had been not merely plundered, but tortured, shut up
in prison, and compelled to live and work under loathsome
conditions. The most celebrated case was that of a certain
Jenkins, the master of a merchant-brig, who told that a Span-
ish officer had torn off one of his ears, bidding him carry it
to die king his master, and say tliat if he had been there
he would have been served likewise. Being asked what were
his feelings at such a moment of danger and suffering, he
was said to have replied, I commended my soul to God
and my cause to my country.'' This well-turned dramatic
utterance from the mouth of a man of his class throws a
suspicion of high coloring over the whole story ; but it can
be readily imagined what a capital campaign-cry it would be
in the heat of a popular movement. The tide of feeling swept
away Walpole's patchwork of compromise, and war was de-
clared against Spain by Qreat Britain on the 19th of October,
1789. The English ultimatum insisted upon a formal renun-
ciation of the right of search as claimed and exercised by the
Spaniards, and upon an express acknowledgment of the Brit-
ish claims in North America. Among these claims was one
relating to the limits of Georgia, then a recently established
colony, touching the Spanish territory of Florida.
How far the war thus urged on and begun by England,
against the judgment of her able minister, was morally justi-
fiable has been warmly argued on either side by English
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ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
261
writers. The laws of Spain with regard to the trade of her
colonies did not differ in spirit from those of England herself
as sliown by her Navigation Act, and Spanish naval officers
found themselves in a position nearly identical with tliat of
Nelson when captain of a frigate in the West Indies half a
century later. American ships and merchants then, after
the separation from the mother-country, continued tha trada
which they had enjoyed as colonists ; Nelson, zealous for the
commercial advantage of England as then understood, under-
took to enforce the act, and in so doing found against him
the feeling of the West Indians and of the colonial authori-
ties. It does not seem that he or those supporting him
searched unlawfully, for the power of England was great
enough to protect her shipping interests without using irregu-
lar means; whereas Spain between 1780 and 1740, being
weak, was tempted, as she has since been, to seize those
whom she knew to have injured her wherever she could find
them, even outside her lawful jurisdiction.
After reading the entirely sympathetic presentation of the
case of Walpole's opponents, urging war, which is given by
Professor Burrows in his Life of Lord Hawke, a foreigner
can scarcely fail to conclude that the Spaniards were griev-
ously wronged, according to the rights of the mother-country
over colonies as commonly admitted in that day ; though no
nation could tolerate the right of search as claimed by them.
It chiefly concerns our subject to notice that the dispute was
radically a maritime question, that it grew out of the uncon-
trollable impulse of the English people to extend their trade
and colonial interests. It is possible that France was acting
under a similar impulse, as English writers have asserted;
but the character and general policy of Pleuri, as well as the
genius of the French people, make this unlikely. There was
no Parliament and no opposition to make known popular
opinion in the France of that day, and very different esti-
mates of Fleuri's character and administration have found
voice since then. The English look rather at the ability which
obtained Lorraine for France and the Sicilies for the House
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2B2 DECAY OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
of Bourbon, and blame Walpole for being overreached. The
French say of Fleuri that he lived from day to day seeking
only to have quiet in his old age. He had stupefied France
wiUi opiates, instead of laboring to cure her. He could not
even prolong this silent sleep until his own death.'' ^ When
the war broke out between England and Spain, ^Hhe latter
claimed the advantage of her defensive alliance with France.
Fleuri, grievously against his will, was forced to fit out a
squadron ; he did so in niggardly fashion." This squadron,
of twenty-two ships, convoyed to America the Spanish fleet
assembled at Ferrol, and the reinforcement prevented the
English from attacking.* ^ Still, Fleuri made explanations
to Walpole and hoped for compromise, — an ill-founded
hope, which had disastrous results for our sea interests, and
prevented measures which would have given France, from
the beginning of the war, the superiority in eastern seas."
But ^< upon Walpole's overthrow," says another Frenchman,
Fleuri perceived his mistake in letting the navy decay. Its
importance had lately struck him. He knew that the kings
of Naples and Sardinia forsook the French alliance merely
because an English squadron threatened to bombard Naples
and Oenoa and to bring an army into Italy. For lack of
1 Martin : Hlttorj of France.
s The peculiar political relation which France bore toward England between
1789 and 1744, while the latter ooontry waa at war with Spain, needa to be
explained, aa it depended npon viewa of international dntiea which are practi-
cally obaolete. Bj her defenaire alliance with Spain, France had bound heraelf
to fnmiah a contingent of apedfled force to the Spaniah fleet when that country
waa inToWed in war of a certain kind. She claimed, however, that her aending
theae auocora waa not auch an act of hoatUity to England aa invoWed a breach
of the peace exiating between the two nationa. The French ahipaof-war, whUe
thua aerWng with the Spaniah fleet under the terma of the treaty, were enemiea ;
but the French nation and aU other Armed forcea of France, on aea and land,
were neutrala, with all the privflegea of neutrality. Of courae England waa not
bound to accept thia view of the matter, and could make the action of France
a ca$ui hdli; but France claimed it waa not Juiitly ao, and England practicaUy
conceded the daim, though the relation waa likely to lead to formal war, aa it
didinl744. A few yeara later the Dutch wiU be found claiming the aame privi-
lege of neutrality toward France while fnmiahing a large contingent to the
Anatrian army acting againat her.
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DEATH OF WALPOLB AND OP FLEURI.
263
this eloment of greatnesB, France Bilentljr swallowed the
greatest humiliationSy and could only complain of the violence
of English cruisers, which pillaged our commerce, in violation
of the law of nations/' ^ during the years of nominal peace
that elapsed between the time when the French fleet was con-
fined to protecting the Spanish against the English and the
outbreak of formal war. The explanation of these differing
views seems not very hard. The two ministers had tacitly
agreed to follow lines which apparently could not cross.
France was left free to expand by land, provided she did
not excite the jealousy of the English people, and Walpole's
own sense of l^glish interests, by rivalry at sea* This course
suited Fleuri's views and wishes. The one sought power by
sea, the other by land. Which had been wiser, war was to
show; for, with Spain as an ally to one party, war had to
come, and that on the sea. Neither minister lived to see the
result of his policy. Walpole was driven from power in
1742, and died in March, 1746. Fleuri died in office, Janu-
ary 29, 1748.
1 LapejrxooM-Boiifils : Hbt de la Marine Fian^aiae.
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CHAPTER Vn.
Wab bbtwxsn Gbbat Bbitaim and Spain, 1789. — Wab of thb
AUSTBIAN SUCCBBSXON, 1740. — FbAKOB JOINS SpAIN AGAINBT
Qbbat Bbitain, 1744. — Sea Battlbs of Matthews, Anson,
AND Hawks. — Pbaob of Aix-la-Cbapellb, 1748.
T T 7E have now reached the opening of a Beries of great
VV warsy destined to last with short intervals of peace
for nearly half a century, and having, amid many misleading
details, one broad characteristic distinguishing them from
previous, and from many subsequent, wars. This strife em-
braced the four quarters of the world, and that not only as
side issues here and thei*e, the main struggle being in Europe ;
for the great questions to be determined by it, concerning
the world's history, were the dominion of the sea and the con-
trol of distant countries, the possession of colonies, and,
dependent upon these, the increase of wealth. Singularly
enough it is not till nearly the end of the long contest that
great fleets are found engaging, and the struggle transferred
to its proper field, the sea. The action of sea power is evi-
dent enough, the issue plainly indicated from the beginning ;
but for a long time there is no naval warfare of any conse-
quence, because the truth is not recognized by the French
government. The movement toward colonial extension by
Prance is wholly popular, though illustrated by a few great
names ; the attitude of the rulers is cold and mistrustful :
hence came neglect of the navy, a foregone conclusion of
defeat on the main question, and destruction for the time
of her sea power.
Such being the character of the coming wars, it is impor-
tant to realize the relative positions of the three great powers
in those quarters of the world, outside of Europe, where the
strife was to engage.
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ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN NORTH AMERICA. 255
In North America, England now held the thirteen colonies,
the original United States, from Maine to Georgia. In these
colonies was to be found the highest deyelopment of that
form of colonization peculiar to England, bodies of free men
essentially self-governing and self-dependent, still enthusias-
ticallj loyal, and by occupation at once agricultural, commer-
cial, and sea-faring. In the character of their country and
its productions, in its long sea-coast and sheltered harbors,
and in their own selves, Uiey had all the elements of sea
power, which had already received large development. On
such a country and such a people the royal navy and army
were securely based in the western hemisphere. The English
colonists were intensely jealous of the French and Canadians.
France held Canada and Louisiana, a name much more
extensive in its application then than now, and claimed the
entire valley of the Ohio and Mississippi, by right of prior
discovery, and as a necessary link between the St. Lawrenco
and the Oulf of Mexico. There was as yet no adequate occu-
pation of this intermediate country, nor was the claim ad-
mitted by England, whose colonists asserted the right to
extend indefinitely westward. The strength of the French
position was in Canada ; the St Lawrence gave them access
to the heart of the country, and though Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia had been lost, in Cape Breton Island they still
held the key of the gulf and river. Canada had the char-
acteristics of the French colonial system planted in a climate
least suited to it. A government paternal, military, and
monkish discouraged the development of individual enter-
prise and of free association for common ends. The colo-
nists abandoned commerce and agriculture, raising only food
enough for immediate consumption, and were given to arms
and hunting. Their chief traffic was in furs. There was so
little mechanical art among them that they bought of the
English colonies part of the vessels for their interior navi-
gation. The chief element of strength was the military,
arms-bearing character of the population ; each man was a
soldier.
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256 SPANISH, ENGLISH. AND FRENCH
Besides the hostility inherited from the mother-countries^
there was a necessary antagonism between two social and
political systems, so directly opposed, and lying one along-
side the other. The remoteness of Canada from the West
Indies, and the inhospitable winter climate, made it, from the
naval point of view, of much less value to France than the
English colonies to England; besides which the resources
and population were greatly inferior. In 1760 the population
of Canada was eighty thousand, that of the English colonies
twelve hundred thousand. With such disparity of strength
and resources, the only chance for Canada lay in the support
of the sea power of France, either by direct control of the
neighboring seas, or by such powerful diversion elsewhere
as would relieve the pressure upon her.
On the continent of North America, in addition to Mexico
and the countries south of it, Spain held Florida; under
which name were embraced extensive regions beyond the
peninsula, not accurately defined, and having little impor-
tance at any period of these long wars.
In the West Indies and South America, Spain held mainly
what are still known as Spanish American countries, besides
Cuba, Porto Rico, and part of Hayti ; France had Guadeloupe,
Martinique, and tlie western half of Hayti ; England, Jamaica,
Barbadoes, and some of the smaller islands. The fertile char-
acter of the soil, the commercial productions, and the less
rigorous climate would seem to make these islands objects of
particular ambition in a colonial war ; but as a matter of fact
no attempt was made, nor, except as to Jamaica, which Spain
wished to recover, was any intention entertained of conquering
any of the larger islands. The reason probably was that Eng-
land, whose sea power made her the principal aggressor, was
influenced in the direction of her efforts by the wishes of the
great body of Englishmen on the North American continent
The smaller West India islands are singly too small to be
strongly held except by a power controlling the sea. They had
a twofold value in war ; one as offering military positions for
such a power ; the other a commercial value, either as adding to
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IN WEST AND EAST INDIES.
257
one's own resources or diminishing those of the enemy. War
directed against them may be considered as a war upon com^
merce, and the islands themselves as ships or convoys loaded
with enemy's wealth. They will be found therefore changing
hands like counters, and usually restored when peace comes ;
though the final result was to leave most of them in the hands
of England. Nevertheless, the fact of each of the great powers
having a share in this focus of commerce drew thither both
large fleets and small squadrons, a tendency aided by the un«
favorable seasons for military operations on the continent;
and in the West Indies took place the greatej^ number of the
fleetractions that illustrated this long series of wars.
In yet another remote region was the strife between Eng-
land and France to be waged, and there, as ui North America,
finally decided by these wars. In India, the rival nations
were represented by their East India companies, who di-
rectly administered both government and commerce. Back
of them, of course, were the mother-countries; but in imme-
diate contact with the native rulers were the presidents and
ofiicers appointed by the companies. At this time the prin-
cipal settlements of the English were, — on the west coast,
Bombay ; on the east, Calcutta upon the Ganges, at some dis-
tance from the sea, and Madras; while a little south of
Madras another town and station, known generally to the
English as Fort St. David, though sometimes called Cuddalore,
had been established later. The three presidencies of Bombay,
Calcutta, and Madras were at this time mutually independenf,
and responsible only to the Court of Directors in England.
France was established at Chandemagore, on the Ganges,
above Calcutta ; at Pondicherry, on the east coast, eighty miles
south of Madras ; and on the west coast, far to the south of
Bombay, she had a third station of inferior importance, called
Mah^. The French, however, had a great advantage in the
possession of the intermediate station already pointed out in
the Indian Ocean, the neighboring islands of France and
Bourbon. They were yet more fortunate in the personal
character of the two men who were at this time at the head
17
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258 DUPLEIX AND LA BOURDONNAIS.
of their affairs in the Indian peninsula and the islands, Du-
pleix and La Bourdonnais, — men to whom no rivals in ability
or force of character had as yet appeared among the English
Indian officials. ' Yet in these two men, whose cordial fellow-
working might have ruined the English settlement in India,
there appeared again that singular conflict of ideas, that hesi-
tation between the land and the sea as the stay of power, a
prophecy of which seems to be contained in the geographical
position of France itself. The mind of Dupleix, though not
inattentive to commercial interests, was fixed on building up
a great empire in which France should rule over a multitude
of vassal native princes. In the pursuit of this end he dis-
played great tact and untiring activity, perhaps also a some-
what soaring and fantastic imagination ; but when he met
La Bourdonnais, whose simpler and sounder views aimed at
sea supremacy, at a dominion based upon free and certain
communication with the home country instead of the shifting
sands of Eastern intrigues and alliances, discqrd at once arose.
Naval inferiority,'' says a French historian who considers
Dupleix to have had the higher aims, was the principal cause
that arrested his progress ; ^ but naval superiority was pre-
cisely the point at which La Bourdonnais, himself a seaman
and the governor of an island, aimed. It may be that with
the weakness of Canada, compared to the English colonies,
sea power could not there have changed the actual issue ; but
in the condition of the rival nations in India everything
depended upon controlling the sea.
Such were the relative situations of the three countries in
the principal foreign theatres of war. No mention has been
made of the colonies on the west coast of Africa, because they
were mere trading stations having no military importance.
The Gape of Good Hope was in possession of the Dutch, who
took no active part in the earlier wars, but long maintained
toward England a benevolent neutrality, surviving from the
alliance in the former wars of the century. It is necessary
to mention briefly the condition of the military navies, which
1 Martin : History of France.
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ENGLISH AND FRENCH NAVIES IN lllfi. 259
were to hare an importance as yet unrealized* Neither pre-
cise numbers nor an exact account of condition of tiie ships,
can be given ; but the relative efficiency can be fairly esti-
mated. Campbell, the English contemporary naval historian,
says that in 1727 the English navy had eighty four ships-of*
the-line, from sixty guns up ; forty 60-gun ships, and fifty-four
frigates and smaller vessels. In 1784 this number had fallen
to seventy ships-of-the-line and nineteen 60^gun ships. In
1744, after four years of war with Spain alone, the number
was ninety ships-of-the-line and eighty-four frigates. The
French navy at the same time he estimates at forty-five ships-
of-the-line and sixty-seven frigates. In 1747, near the end
of the first war, he says that the royal navy of Spain was
reduced to twenty-two ships-of-the-line, that of France to
thirty-one, while the English had risen to one hundred and
twenty-six. The French writers consulted are less precise
in their figures, but agree in representing not only that the
navy was reduced to a pitiful number of ships, but that these
were in bad condition and the dock-yards destitute of mate-
rials. This neglect of the navy lasted more or less through-
out these wars, until 1760, when the sense of the nation was
aroused to the importence of restoring it ; too late, however,
to prevent the most serious of the French losses. In England
as well as in France discipline and administration had been
sapped by the long peace; the inefiiciency of the armamento
sent out was notorious, and recalls the scandals that marked
the outbreak of the Crimean War; while the very disappear*
ance of the French ships led, by the necessity of replacing
them, to putting afloat vessels superior singly, because more
modern and scientific, to the older ships of the same class in
England. Care must be had, however, in accepting too easily
the complaints of individual writers ; French authors will
be found asserting that English ships are faster, while at
the same period Englishmen complain that they are slower.
It may be accepted as generally true that the French ships
built between 1740 and 1800 were better designed and larger,
class for class, Uian the English. The latter had the un-
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ENGLISH AND FRENCH NAVIES IN YTJfi.
doubted superiority both in the number and quality of the
3eamen and officers. Keeping some fleets always afloat,
whether better or worse, the officers could not quite lose
touch of their profession ; whereas in France it is said that
not one fifth of the officers were, in 1744, employed. This
superiority was kept and increased by the practice, which
henceforth obtained, of blockading the French military ports
with superior force; the enemy's squadrons when they put
to sea found themselyes at once at a disadvantage in point of
practical skill. On the other hand, large as was the number
of English seamen, the demands of commerce were so great
that war found them scattered all over the world, and part of
the fleet was always paralyzed for lack of crews. This con-
stant employment assured good seamanship, but the absence
of so many men had to be supplied by an indiscriminate
press, which dragged in a class of miserable and sickly men,
sadly diluting the quality of the whole. To realize the con-
dition of ships* companies of that day, it will be necessary
only to read the accounts of those sent to Anson starting
for a cruise round the world, or to Hawke when fitting out
for war service; the statements are now almost incredible,
and the results most deplorable. It was not a question of
sanitation only ; the material sent was entirely unfit to meet
the conditions of sea life under the most favorable circum-
stances. In both the French and English service a great
deal of weeding among the officers was necessary. Those
were the palmy days of court and political influence; and,
moreover, it is not possible, after a long peace, at once to pick
out from among tlie fairest-seeming the men who will best
stand the tests of time and exposure to the responsibilities
of war. There was in both nations a tendency to depend
upon officers who had been in their prime a generation before,
and the results were not fortunate.
War having been declared against Spain by England in
October, 1789, the first attempts of the latter power were
naturally directed against the Spanish-American colonies,
the cause of the dispute, in which it was expected to find an
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EXPEDITIONS OF VERNON AND ANSON. 261
«
easy and rich prey. The first expedition sailed under Ad-
miral Vernon in NoYcmber of the same year, and took Porto
Bello by a sudden and audacious stroke, but found only the
insignificant sum of ten thousand dollars in the port whence
the galleons sailed. Returning to Jamaica, Yernon received
large reinforcements of ships, and was joined by a land force
of twelve thousand troops. With this increased force, at-
tempts were made upon lioth Cartagena and Santiago de
Cuba, in the years 1741 and 1742, but in both wretched fail-
ures resulted; the admiral and the general quarrelled, as
was not uncommon in days when neither had an intelligent
comprehension of the other's business. Marryatt, when char-
acterizing such misunderstandings by a humorous exaggera*
tion, seems to have had in view this attempt on Cartagena :
The army thought that the navy might have beaten down
stone ramparts ten feet thick ; and the navy wondered why
the army had not walked up the same ramparts, which were
thirty feet perpendicular.*'
Another expedition, justly celebrated for the endurance and
perseverence shown by its leader, and famous both for the
hardships borne and singular final success, was sent out in
1740 under Anson. Its mission was to pass round Cape Horn
and attack the Spanish colonies on the west coast of South
America. After many delays, due apparently to bad admin-
istration, the squadron finally got away toward the end of
1740. Passing the Cape at the worst season of the year, the
ships met a series of tempests of the most violent kind ; the
squadron was scattered, never all to meet again, and Anson,
after infinite peril, succeeded in rallying a part of it at Juan
Fernandez. Two ships had put back to England, a third
was lost to the southward of Chiloe. With the three left
to him he cruised along the South American coast, taking
some prizes and pillaging the town of Payta, intending to
touch near Panama and join hands with Vernon for the
capture of that place and the possession of the isthmus, if
possible. Learning of the disaster at Cartagena, he then
determined to cross the Pacific and waylay the two galleons
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262 WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.
that Bailed yearly from Acapulco to Manila. In the passage
across, one of the two ships now left to him was found in
such bad condition that she had to be destroyed. With the
other he succeeded in his last undertaking, capturing the
great galleon with a million and a half dollars in specie.
The expedition, from its many misfortunes, had no mili-
tary result beyond the terror and consequent embarrassment
caused to the Spanish settlements ; but its very misfortunes,
and the calm persistency which worked out a great success
from them all, have given it a well-deserved renown.
During the year 1740 happened two events which led to a
^ general European war breaking in upon that in which Spain
and England were already engaged. In May of that year
Frederick the Great became king of Prussia, and in October
the emperor Charles YI., formerly the Austrian claimant of
the Spanish throne, died. He had no son, and left by will the
sovereignty of his estates to his eldest daughter, the cele-
brated Maria Theresa, to secure whose succession the efforts
of his diplomacy had been directed for many years. This suc-
cession had been guaranteed by the European powers ; but
the apparent weakness of her position excited the ambitions
of other sovereigns. The Elector of Bavaria laid claim to
the whole inheritance, in which he was supported by Prance ;
while the Prussian king claimed and seized the province of
Silesia. Other powers, large and small, threw in their lot
with one or the other; while the position of England was
complicated by her king being also elector of Hanover,
and in that capacity hurriedly contracting an obligation of
neutrality for the electorate, although English feeling was
strongly in favor of Austria. Meanwhile the failure of the
Spanish-American expeditions and the seveie losses of Eng-
lish commerce increased the general outcry against Walpole,
who resigned early in 1742. England under the now minis-
try became the open ally of Austria ; and Parliament voted
not only a subsidy to the empress-queen, but also a body of
troops to be sent as auxiliaries to the Austrian Netherlands.
At the same time Holland, under English influence, and bound
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THE NAVIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 263
liko England by previous treaties to support the succession
of Maria Theresa, also voted a subsidy. Here occurs again
that curious view of international relations before mentioned. ,
Both of these powers thus entered the war against France,
but only as auxiliaries to the empress, not as principals ; as
nations, except the troops actually in the field, they were
considered to be still at peace. Such an equivocal situation
could in the end have only one result. On the sea France
had already assumed the same position of auxiliary to Spain,
in virtue of the defensive alliance between the two kingdoms,
while affecting still to be at peace with England ; and it is
curious to see the gravity with which French writers com-
plain of assaults upon French by English ships, upon the
plea that there was no open war between the two States. It
has already been mentioned that in 1740 a French squadron
supported a division of Spanish ships on their way to America.
In 1741, Spain, having now entered the continental war as an
enemy of Austria, sent a body of fifteen thousand troops from
Barcelona to attack the Austrian possessions in Italy. The
English admiral Haddock, in the Mediterranean, sought and
found the Spanish fleet ; but with it was a division of twelve
French sail-of-the-line, whose commander informed Haddock
that he was engaged in the same expedition and had orders
to fight, if the Spaniards, though formally at war with Eng-
land, were attacked. As the allies were nearly double his
force, the English admiral was obliged to go back to Fort
Mahon. He was soon after relieved ; and the new admiral,
Matthews, held at once the two positions of commander-in-
chief in the Mediterranean and English minister at Turin,
the capital of the King of Sardinia. In the course of the year
1742 an English captain in his fleet, chasing some Spanish
galleys, drove them into the French port of St. Tropez, and
following them into the harbor burned them, in spite of the
so-called neutrality of France. In the same year Matthews
sent a division of ships under Commodore Martin to Naples,
to compel the Bourbon king to withdraw his contingent of
twenty thousand troops serving with the Spanish army in
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264 THE NAVIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
northern Italy against the Austrians. To the attempts to
negotiate, Martin replied only by pulling out his watch and
giving the government an hour to come to terms. There
was nothing for it but submission; and the English fleet
left the harbor after a stay of twenty-four hours, having re-
lieved the empress of a dangerous enemy. Henceforward it
was evident that the Spanish war in Italy could only be
maintained by sending troops through France ; England con^
trolled the sea and the action of Naples. These two last
incidents, at St. Tropez and Naples, deeply impressed the
aged Fleuri, who recognized too late the scope and impor-
tance of a well-founded sea power. Causes of complaint wore
multiplying on both sides, and the moment was fast approacV
ing when both France and England must quit the pretence of
being only auxiliaries in the war. Before it came to that,
however, the controlling sea power and wealth of England
again made itself felt by attaching the King of Sardinia to
the Austrian cause. Between the dangers and advantages of
the French or English alliance the king's action was deter-
mined by a subsidy and the promise of a strong English fleet
in the Mediterranean ; in return he engaged to enter the war
with an army of forty-five thousand men. This compact was
signed in September, 1748. In October, Fleuri being now
dead, Louis XY. made with Spain a treaty, by which he en-
gaged to declare war against England and Sardinia, and to
support the Spanish claims in Italy, as also to Gibraltar, Ma-
hon, and Georgia. Open war was thus near at hand, but the
declaration was still deferred. The greatest sea fight that
took place occurred while nominal peace yet existed.
In the latter part of 1748 the Infante Philip of Spain had
sought to land on the coast of the Genoese Republic, which
was unfriendly to the Austrians ; but the attempt had been
frustrated by the English fleet, and the Spanish ships forced to
retreat into Toulon. They lay there for four months, unable
to go out on account of the English superiority. In this di-
lemma the court of Spain applied to Louis XV. and obtained
an order for the French fleet, under the command of Admiral
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BATTLE OFF TOULON.
de Court, — an old man of eighty years, a veteran of tho days
of Louis XI Y., — to escort the Spaniards either to the Gulf of
Genoa or to their own ports, it does not clearly appear which.
The French admiral was ordered not to fire unless he was
attacked. In order to secure tlie best co-operation of the
Spaniards, whose efficiency he probably distrusted, De Court
proposed, as Ruyter had done in days long gone by, to scat-
ter their ships among his own; but as the Spanish admiral,
Navarro, refused, the line-of-battle was formed with nine
French ships in tho van, in the centre six French and three
Spaniards, in the rear nine Spanish ships ; in all, twenty-seven.
In this order the combined fleets sailed from Toulon Febru-
ary 19, 1744. The English fleet, which had been cruising off
Hydres in observation, chased, and on the 22d its van and
centre came up with the allies; but the rear division was
then several miles to windward and astern, quite out of sup-
porting distance (Plate YII., r). The wind was easterly,
both fleets heading to the southward, and the English had
the weather-gage. The numbers were nearly equal, the Eng-
lish having twenty-nine to the allied twenty-«even; but this
advantage was reversed by the failure of tho English rear to
join. The course of the reiir-admiral has been generally at-
tributed to ill-will toward Matthews ; for although he proved
that in his separated position he made all sail to join, he did
not attack later on when he could, on the plea that the sig-
nal for the line-of-battle was flying at tho same time as the
signal to engage; meaning that he could not leave the line
to fight without disobeying the order to form line. This tech-
nical excuse was, however, accepted by the subsequent court-
martial. Under the actual conditions Matthews, mortified and
harassed by the inaction of his lieutenant, and fearing that
the enemy would escape if he delayed longer, made the signal
to engage when his own van was abreast the enemy's cen-
tre, and at once bore down himself out of the line and at-
tacked with his flag-ship of ninety guns the largest ship in
the enemy's line, the Royal Philip," of one hundred and ten
guns, carrying the flag of the Spanish admiral (a). In doing
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266
BATTLE OFF TOULON.
this he was bravely supported hj his next ahead and astern.
The moment of attack seems to have been judiciously chosen;
five Spanish ships had straggled far to the rear, leaving their
admiral with the support only of his next ahead and astern,
while three other Spaniards continued on with the French.
The^ English van stood on, engaging the allied centre, while
the allied van was without antagonists. Being thus disen-
gaged, the latter was desirous of tacking to windward of the
head of the English line, thus putting it between two fires,
but was checked by the intelligent action of the three leading
English captains, who, disregarding the signal to bear down,
kept their commanding position and stopped the enemy's
attempts to double. For this they were cashiered by the
court-martial, but afterward restored. This circumspect
but justifiable disregard of signals was imitated without
any justification by all the English captains of the centre,
save the admiral's seconds already mentioned, as well as by
some of those in the van, who kept up a cannonade at long
range while their commander-in-chief was closely and even
furiously engaged. The one marked exception was Captain
Hawke, afterward the distinguished admiral, who imitated
the example of his chief, and after driving his first antago-
nist out of action, quitted his place in the van (b), brought
to close quarters (b^) a fine Spanish ship that liad kept at
bay five other English ships, and took her, — the only prize
made that day. The commander of the English van, with
his seconds, also behaved with spirit and came to close
action. It is unnecessary to describe the battle further ; as
a military affair it deserves no attention, and its most im-
portant result was to bring out the merit of Ilawke, whom
the king and the govemment always remembered for his
share in it. The general inefficiency and wide-spread mis-
behavior of the English captains, after five years of declared
war, will partly explain the failure of England to obtain
from her undoubted naval superiority the results she might
have expected in this war — the first act in a forty years*
drama — and they give military officers a lesson on the
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CAUSES OF ENGLISH FAILURE.
267
necessity of having their minds prepared and stocked, by
study of the conditions of war in their own day, if they
would not be found unready and perhaps disgraced in the
hour of battle.^ It is not to be supposed that so many Eng-
lish seamen misbehaved through so vulgar and rare a defect
as mere cowardice; it was unpreparedness of mind and lack of
military efficiency in the captains, combined with bad leader-
ship on the part of the admiral, with a possible taint of ill
will toward him as a rude and domineering superior, that
caused this fiasco. Attention may here fitly be drawn to the
effect of a certain cordiality and good-will on the part of su-
periors toward their subordinates. It is not perhaps essential
to military success, but it undoubtedly contributes to the other
elements of that success a spirit, a breath of lif e^ which makes
possible what would otherwise be impossible ; which reaches
heights of devotion and achievement that the strictest dis-
cipline, not so enkindled, cannot attain. Doubtless it is a
natural gift. The highest example of it possil)ly ever known
among seamen was Nelson. When he joined the fleet just
before Trafalgar, the captains who gathered on boaird the
1 There is not in moderD nayal historj a more striking warning to the officers
of eyerj era, than this battle of Tonlon. Coming as it did after a generation of
comparative naval inactivitj, it tried men's reputation as bj fire. The lesson, in
the judgment of the author, is the danger of disgraceful failure to men who
have neglected to keep themselves prepared, not only in knowledge of their pro-
fession, but in the sentiment of what war requires. The average man is not a
coward ; but neither is he endowed bj nature onlj with the rare faculty of seis-
ing intuitively the proper course at a critical moment. . He gains it, some more,
some less, by experience or by reflection. If both have been lacking to him, in-
decision will follow; either from not knowing what to do, or from failure to
realize that utter self-devotion of himself and his command are required. Of
one of the captains cashiered it is said : " No man had ever lived with a fairer
or more honorable character previous to the unfortunate event which did such
irreparable Injury to his reputation. Kany of his contemporaries, men in the
highest popular estimation, who knew him well, could scarcely credit what were
indisputably established as facts, and declared, with the utmost astonishment,
'they believed it next to impossible for Captain Burrlsh to behave otherwise than
as a man of gallantry and intrepidity.' " He had been twenty-flve years in service,
and eleven afloat as a captain (Chamock's Biographia Navalis). Others of the
condemned men bore fair characters ; and even Richard Norris^ who absconded
to avoid trial, had been of respectable repute.
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268
RESULTS OF MATTHEWS'S ACTION.
flag-ship seemed to forget the rank of their admiral in their
desire to testify their joy at meeting him. ^^This Nelson/'
wrote Captain Dufif, who fell iu the battle, is so lovable and
excellent a man, so kindly a leader, that we all wish to ex-
ceed his desires and anticipate his orders." He himself was
conscious of this fascination and its yalue, when writing of
the battle of {he Nile to Lord Howe, he said, ^^I had the
happiness to command a band of brothers."
The celebrity attained by Matthews's action off Toulon, cer-
tainly not due to the skill with which it was managed, nor to
its results, sprang from the clamor at home, and chiefly from
the number and findings of the courts-martial that followed.
Botli the admiral and his second, and also eleven captains out
of the twenty-nine, had charges preferred against them. The
admiral was cashiered because he had broken the line ; that
is, because his captains did not follow him when he left it to
get at the enemy, — a decision ihAi smacks more of the Irish
bull than of the Irish love of fighting. The second was ac-
quitted on the technical grounds already given ; he avoided
the fault of breaking the line by keeping far enough away.
Of the eleven captains one died, one deserted, seven were dis-
missed or suspended, two only were acquitted. Nor were the
French and Spaniards better pleased ; mutual recriminations
passed. Admiral de Court was relieved from his command,
while the Spanish admiral was decorated by his government
with the title of Marquis de la Victoria, a most extraordinary
reward for what was at best a drawn fight. The French, on
the other hand, assert that he left the deck on the plea of a
very slight wound, and that the ship was really fought by a
French captain who happened to be. on board.
To use a common expression, this battle, the first general
action since that off Malaga forty years before, woke up "
the English people and brought about a healthful reaction.
The sifting process begun by the battle itself was continued,
but the result was reached too late to have its proper effect
on the current war. It is rather by its deficient action, than
by such conspicuous successes as were attained in earlier and
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later times, that the general value of England's sea po.wer is
now shown ; like some precious faculty, scarcely valued when
possessed, but keenly missed when withdrawn. Mistress now
of the seas rather by the weakness of her enemies than by her
own disciplined strength, she drew from that mastery no ade-
quate results ; the most solid success, the capture of Gape Bre*
ton Island, in 1746, was achieved by the colonial forces of New
England, to which indeed the royal navy lent valuable aid, for
to troops so situated the fleet is the one line of communication.
The misconduct off Toulon was repeated by oflScers high in
command in the West and East Indies, resulting in the latter
case in the loss of Madras. Other causes concurred with the
effete condition of the naval officers to hamper the action of
that sea power which launches out far from home. The con-
dition of England itself was insecure ; the cause of the Stuarts
was still alive, and though a formidable invasion by fifteen
thousand troops under Marshal Saxe, in 1744, was foiled, partly
by the English Channel fleet, and partly by a storm which
wrecked several of the transports assembled off Dunkirk, with
the loss of many lives, yet the reality of the danger was shown
in the following year, when the Pretender landed in Scotland
with only a few men at his back and the northern kingdom
rose with him. His successful invasion was carried well down
into England itself ; and sober historians have thought that at
one time the chances of ultimate success were rather with than
against him. Another serious fetter upon the full use of Eng-
land's power was the direction given to the French operations
on land and the mistaken means used to oppose them. Neg-
lecting Germany, France turned upon the Austrian Nether*
lands, a country which England, out of regard to her sea
interests, was not willing to see conquered. Her commercial
preponderance would be directly threatened by the passing
of Antwerp, Ostend, and the Scheldt into the hands of her
great rival ; and though her best check against this would
have been to seize valuable French possessions elsewhere and
hold them as a pledge, the weakness of her government and
the present inefficiency of the navy prevented her doing so.
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THB LAND WARFARE, i7if-i7^.
The position of Hanover, again, controlled the action of Eng«
land; for though united only by the tie of a common sov-
ereign, the love of that sovereign for his continental dominion,
his native country, made itself strongly felt in the councils of
a weak and time-serving ministry. It was tlie disregard of
Hanover by the first William Pitt, consequent upon his strong
English feeling, that incensed the king and led him so long
to resist the demands of the nation that he should be put
at the head of affairs. These different causes — dissension
at home, interest in the Netherlands, regard for Hanover
combined to prevent a subservient and second-rate ministry,
divided also among themselves, from giving a proper direc-
tion and infusing a proper spirit into the naval war ; but a
better condition of the navy itself, more satisfactory results
from it, might have modified even their action. As it was,
the outcome of the war was almost nothing as regards the
disputes between England and her special enemies. On the
continent, the questions after 1745 reduced themselves to
two, — what part of the Austrian possessions should be given
to Prussia, Spain, and Sardinia, and how peace was to be
wrenched by France from England and Holland. The sea
countries still, as of old, bore the expenses of the war,
which however now fell chiefly upon England. Marshal
Saxe, who commanded the French in Flanders throughout
this war, summed up the situation in half a dozen words
to his king. Sire," said he, peace is within the walls
of Maestricht." This strong city opened the course of the
Mouse and the way for the French army into the United
Provinces from the rear ; for the English fleet, in conjunc-
tion with that of Holland, prevented an attack from the
sea. By the end of 1746, despite the offoi*ts of the allies,
nearly all Belgium was in the hands of the French ; but up
to this time, although Dutch subsidies were supporting the
Austrian government, and Dutch troops in the Netherlands
were fighting for it, there was nominal peace between the
United Provinces and France. In April, 1747, the King of
France invaded Dutch Flanders, announcing that he was
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WAR IN THE NETHERLANDS.
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obliged to send his armj into the territory of the repablic,
to arrest the protection granted bj the Btates-General' to the
Austrian and English troops; but that he had no intention
of breaking with it, and that the places and provinces occu-
pied would be restored to the United Provinces as soon as
they gave proof that they had ceased to succor the enemies
of France." This was actual, but not formal, war. Numer-
ous places fell during the year, and the successes of the
French inclined both Holland and England to come to terms.
Negotiations went on during the winter ; but in April, 1748,
Saxe invested Haestricht. This forced a peace.
Meanwhile, though languishing, the sea war was not wholly
uneventful. Two encounters between English and French
squadrons happened during the year 1747, completing the
destruction of the French fighting navy. In both cased the
English were decidedly superior; and though there was
given opportunity for some brilliant fighting by particular
captains, and for the display of heroic endurance on the part
of the French, greatly outnumbered but resisting to the last,
only one tactical lesson is afforded. This lesson is, that when
an enemy, either as the result of battle or from original in-
equality, is greatly inferior in force, obliged to fly without
standing on the order of his flying, the regard otherwise due
to order must be in a measure at least dismissed, and a
general chase ordered. The mistake of Tourville in this
respect after Beachy Head has already been noted. In the
first of the cases now under discussion, the English Admiral
Anson had fourteen ships against eight French, weaker
individually as well as in total number; in the second. Sir
Edward Hawke had fourteen against nine, the latter being
somewhat larger, ship for ship, than the English. In both
cases the signal was made for a general chase, and the action /
which resulted was a mSlSe. There was no opportunity for
anything else ; the one thing necessary was to overtake the
running enemy, and that can only certainly be done by
letting the fleetest or best situated ships get ahead, sure
that the speed of the fastest pursuers is better than tiiat of
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HAWKE AND U£TENDUMB.
the Blowest of the pursued, and that therefore either the lat*
ter must be abandoned or the M'bole force brought to bay. In
the second case the French commander, Commodore FJ^ten-
dudre, did not have to be followed far. He had with him a
convoy of two hundred and fifty merchant-ships; detaching
one ship-of-the-line to continue the voyage with the convoy, he
placed himself with the other eight between it and the enemy,
awaiting the attack under his topsails. As the English came
up one after another they divided on either side of the French
column, which was thus engaged on both sides. After an
obstinate resistance, six of the French ships were taken, but
the convoy was saved. The English had been so roughly
handled that the two remaining French men-of-war got back
safely to France. If, therefore. Sir Edward Hawke showed
in his attack the judgment and dash which always distin-
guished that remarkable officer, it may be claimed for Com-
modore rj^tendudre that fortune, in assigning him tlie glorious
disadvantage of numbers, gave him also the leading part in
the drama, and that he filled it nobly. A French officer
justly remarks that he defended his convoy as on shore a
position is defended, when the aim is to save an army corps
or to assure an evolution; he gave himself to be crushed.
After an action that lasted from mid-day till eight P. M. the
convoy was saved, thanks to the obstinacy of the defence ;
two hundred and fifty ships were saved to their owners by
the devotion of L'l^tendudre and of tlie captains under his
orders. This devotion cannot be questioned, for eight ships
had but few chances of surviving an action with fourteen;
and not only did the commander of the eight accept an action
which he might possibly have avoided, but he knew how to
inspire his lieutenants with trust in him; for all supported
the strife with honor, and yielded at last, showing the most
indisputable proofs of their fine and energetic defence. Four
ships were entirely dismasted, two had only the foremast
standing."^ The whole affair, as conducted on both sides,
affords an admirable study of how to follow up an advantage,
1 Troade: Bataflles Navalee de la Fzanoe.
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LA BOURDONNAIS AT THE ISLE OF FRANCE. 273
original or acquired, and of the results that may be obtained
by a gallant, even hopeless defence, for the furtherance of
a particular object. It may be added that Hawke, disabled
from further pursuit himself, sent a sloop of war express to
the West Indies, with information of the approach of the
conroy, — a step which led to the capture of part of it, and
gives a touch of completeness to the entire transaction, which
cannot fail to be gratifying to a military student interested
in seeing the actors in history fully alive to and discharging
to the utmost their important tasks.
Before bringing to a close the story of this war and men-
tioning the peace settlement, an account must be given of
the transactions in India, where France and England were
then on equal terms. It has been said that a£Pairs there
were controlled by the East India companies of either na-
tion ; and that the French were represented in the peninsula
by Dupleix, in the islands by La Bourdonnais. The latter
was appointed to his post in 1786, and his untiring genius
had been felt in all the details of administration, but es-
pecially in converting the Isle of France into a great naval
station, — a work which had to be built up from the foun-
dations. Everything was wanting; everything was by him
in greater or less measure supplied, — storehouses, dock-yards,
foi*tifications, seamen. In 1740, when war between France
and England became probable, he obtained from the East
' India Company a squadron, though smaller than he asked,
with which he proposed to ruin the English commerce and
shipping ; but when war actually began in 1744, he received
orders not to attack the English, the French company hoping
that neutrality might exist between the companies in that
distant region, though the nations were at war. The propo-
sition does not seem absurd in view of the curious relations
of Holland to France, nominally at peace while sending troops
to the Austrian army ; but it was much to the advantage of
the English, who were inferior in the Indian seas. Their
company accepted the proffer, while saying that it of course
could bind neither the home government nor the royal navy.
18
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274
DUPLEIX IN INDIA.
The advantage won by the forethought of La Bourdonnals
was thus lost ; though first, and long alone, on the field, his
hand was stayed. Meanwhile the English admiralty sent out
a squadron and began to seize French ships between India and
China ; not till then did the company awake from its illusion.
Having done this part of its work, the English squadron sailed
to the coast of India, and in July, 1745, appeared off Pondi-
cherry, the political capital of French India, prepared to sus<
tain an attack which the governor of Madras was about to
make by land. La Bourdonnais' time was now come.
Meanwhile, on the mainland of the Indian peninsula, Du-
pleix had been forming wide views and laying broad founda-
tions for the establishment of French preponderance. Having
entered the service of their company at first in a subordinate
clerical position, his ability had raised him by rapid steps to
be head of the commercial establishments at Chandemagore,
to which he gave a very great enlargement, seriously affect-
ing, it is said even destroying, parts of the English trade.
In 1742 he was made governor-general, and as such removed
to Pondicherry. Here he began to develop his policy, which
aimed at bringing India under the power of France. He
saw that through the progress and extension of tlie European
races over the seas of the whole world the time had come
when the Eastern peoples must be brought into ever-increasing
contact with them ; and he judged that India, so often con-
quered before, was now about to bo conquered by Europeans.
He meant that France should win the prize, and saw in Eng-
land the only rival. His plan was to meddle in Indian
politics : first, as head of a foreign and independent colony,
which he already was ; and second, as a vassal of the Great
Mogul, which he intended to become. To divide and con-
quer, to advance the French lines and influence by judicious
alliances, to turn wavering scales by throwing in on one
side or the other the weight of French courage and skill, —
such were his aims. Pondicherry, though a poor harbor, was
well adapted for his political plans ; being far distant from
Delhiy the capital of the Mogul, aggressive extension might
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go on unmarked, until strong enough to bear the light
Dupleix's present aim, therefore, was to build up a great
French principality in southeast India, around Pondicherry,
while maintaining the present positions in Bengal.
Let ifc be noted, however, — and the remark is necessary in
order to justify the narration of these plans in connection with
our subject, a connection perhaps not at first evident, — that
the kernel of the question now before Dupleiz was not how to
build up an empire out of the Indian provinces and races,
but how to get rid of the English, and that finally. The
wildest dreams of sovereignty he may have entertained could
not have surpassed the actual performance of England a few
years later. European qualities were bound to tell, if not
offset by the opposition of other Europeans; and such ^op-
position on the one side or the other depended upon the
control of the sea. In a climate so deadly to the white races
the small numbers whose heroism bore up the war against
fearful odds on many a field must be continually renewed.
As everywhere and always, the action of sea power was here
quiet and unperceived ; but it will not be necessary to belittle
in the least tiie qualities and career of Clive the English hero
of this time and the founder of their empirci in order to
prove the decisive influence which it exerted| despite the
inefficiency of the English naval officers first engaged, and
the lack of conclusive results in such naval battles as were
fought.^ If during the twenty years following 1748, French
1 " NotwithstandiDg the extroordinaij effort made hj the French in tending
out M. LaUj with a coniiderable force last year, I am confident before the end
of thia [1759] thej wiU be near their laat gaap In the Gamade nnlees some very
unforeseen eyent interpose in their faror. The superiority of our squadron and
the plenty of money and supplies of aU kinds which our friends on that coast
wiU be furnished with from this prorince [Bengal], whUe the enemy are in
total want of erery thing, without any Tisihle means of redress, are such adran.
tagee as, if properly attended to, cannot faU of whofly effecting their ruin In
that as well as in every other part of India" (Letter of aire to Pitt, Calcutta,
January 7, 1759; Oleig's Life of Lord aire). It wfll be remembered that the
control and use of Bengal, upon which CUtc here counts, had only lately been
acquired by the English ; in the days of Dupleix they did not possess them« As
win be seen later, Cliye's predictions In this letter were wholly fnlSHed.
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AFFAIRS m INDIA, 1746.
fleets instead of English bad controlled the coasts of the pe«
ninsula and the seas between it and Europe, can it be be-
lieved that the schemes of Dupleix would have utterly failed ?
Naval inferiority/' justly says a French historian, was the
principal cause that arrested the progress of Dupleix. Tlie
French royal navy did not make its appearance in the East
Indies in his day. It remains to tell the story briefly.
The English, in 1745, made preparations to besiege Pondi*
cherry, in which the royal navy was to support the land
forces; but the effects of Dupleix's political schemes were
at once seen. The Nabob of the Garnatio threatened to attack
Madras, and the English desisted. The following year La
Bourdonnais appeared on the scene, and an action took place
between his squadron and that under Commodore Peyton ;
after which, although it had been a drawn fight, the English
ofiicer deserted the coast, taking refuge in Ceylon, and leaving
the control at sea with tlie French. La Bourdonnais anchored
at Pondicherry, where quarrels between him and Dupleix soon
arose, and were aggravated by the conflicting tone of their
instructions from home. In September he went to Madras,
attacked by land and sea, and took the place, but made with
the governor the stipulation that it might be ransomed ; and
a ransom of two million dollars was accordingly paid. When
Dupleix heard of this he was very angry, and claimed to an-
nul the terms of capitulation on the ground that, once taken,
the place was within his jurisdiction. La Bourdonnais re-
sented this attempt as dishonorable to him after the promise
given. While the quarrel was going on, a violent cyclone
wrecked two of his ships and dismasted the rest He soon
after returned to France, where his activity and zeal were
repaid by three years' imprisonment under charges, from the
effects of which treatment he died. After his departure
Dupleix broke the capitulation, seized and kept Madras, drove
out the English settlers, and went on to strengthen the fortifi-
cations. From Madras he turned against Fort St. David, but
the approach of an English squadron compelled him to raise
the siege in March, 1747.
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PEACE OF AIX-LA'CHAPELLE.
During this year the disasters to the French navy in the
Atlantic, already related, left the English undisturbed mas-
ters of the sea. In the following winter they sent to India
the greatest European fleet yet seen in the East, with a large
land force, the whole under the command of Admiral Bos-
cawen, who bore a general's commission in addition to his
naval rank. The fleet appeared off the Goromandel coast in
August, 1748. Pondicherry was attacked by land and sea, but
Dupleix made a successful resistance. The English fleet in
its turn suffered from a hurricane, and the siege was raised in
October. Shortly after came the news of the Peace of Aix-
la-Ghapelle, which ended the European war. Dupleix, with
his home communications restored, could now resume his
subtle and persevering efforts to secure a territorial base
which should, as far as possible, shelter him from the chances
of sea war. Pity that so much genius and patience should
have been spent in an effort wholly vain ; nothing could pro-
tect against that sea attack but a naval aid, which the home
government could not give. One of the conditions of the
peace was that Madras should be restored to the English in
exchange for Louisburg, the prize won by the North Ameri-
can colonists and released by them as reluctantly as Madras
was by Dupleix. This was indeed illustrating Napoleon's
boast that he would reconquer Pondicherry on the bank of
the Vistula ; yet, although the maritime supremacy of Eng-
land made Louisburg in her hands much stronger than Ma-
dras, or any other position in India, when held by the French,
the gain by the exchange was decidedly on the side of Great
Britain. The English colonists were not men to be contented
with this action ; but they knew the naval power of England,
and that they could do again what they had done once, at a
point not far distant from their own shores. They under*
stood the state of the case. Not so with Madras. How pro?
found must have been the surprise of the native princes at
this surrender, how injurious to the personality of Dupleix
and the influence he had gained among them, to see him, in
the very hour of victory, forced, by a power they could not
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INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON
understandy to relinquish his spoil ! They were quite right ;
the mysterious power which they recognized by its working,
though they saw it not, was not in this or that man, king or
statesman, but in that control of the sea which the French
government knew forbade the hope of maintaining that dis-
tant dependency against the fleets of England. Dupleix him-
self saw it not; for some years more ho continued build*
ing, on the sand of Oriental intrigues and lies^ a house which
he vainly hoped would stand against the storms that must
descend upon it.
The Treaty of Aix-larChapelle, ending this general war,
was signed April 80, 1748, by England, France, and Holland,
and finally by all the powers in October of Uie same year.
With the exception of certain portions shorn off the Austrian
Empire, — Silesia for Prussia, Parma for the Infante Philip of
Spain, and some Italian territory to the east of Piedmont for
the King of Sardinia, — the general tenor of the terms was a
return to the status before the war. Never, perhaps, did
any war, after so many great events, and so large a loss of
blood and treasure, end in replacing the nations engaged in
it so nearly in the same situation as they held at first." In
truth, as regarded France, England, and Spain, the affair of
the Austrian succession, supervening so soon upon the out-
break of war between the two latter, had wholly turned hostil-
ities aside from their true direction and postponed for fifteen
years the settlement of disputes which concerned them much
more nearly than the accession of Maria Theresa. In the
distress of her old enemy, the House of Austria, France wsb
easily led to renew her attacks upon it, and England as easily
drawn to oppose the attempts of the French to influence or
dictate in German affairs, — a course the more readily fol-
lowed from the German interests of the king. It may be
questioned whether the true policy for France was to direct
the war upon the heart of the Austrian Empire, by way of the
Rhine and Germany, or, as she finally did, upon the remote
possessions of the Netherlands. In the former case she rested
on friendly territory in Bavaria, and gave a hand to Prussia,
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279
whose military power was now first felt. Such was the first
theatre of the war. On the other hand, in the Netherlands,
whither the chief scene of hostilities shifted later, Fi^ce
strnck not only at Austria, but also at the sea powers, always
jealous of her intrusion there. They were the soul of the war
against her, by their subsidies to her other enemies and by
the losses inflicted on her commerce and that of Spain. The
misery of France was alleged to tlie King of Spain by Louis
XV., as forcing him to conclude peace ; and it is evident that
the suffering must have been great to induce him to yield
such easy terms as he did, when he already held the Nether-
lands and parts of Holland itself by force of arms. But
while so successful on the continent, his navy was annihilated
and communication with the colonies thus cut off ; and though
it may be doubted whether the French government of that
day cherished the colonial ambitions ascribed to it by some,
it is certain French commerce was suffering enormously.
While this was the condition of France, impelling her to
peace, England in 1747 foimd that, from disputes about trade
in Spanish America and through the inefiicient action of her
navy, she had been led away into a continental war, in which
she had met with disaster, incurred nearly £80,000,000 of
debt, and now saw her ally Holland threatened with inva-
sion. The peace itself was signed under a threat by tlie
French envoy that the slightest delay would be tlie signal for
the French to destroy the fortifications of the captured towns
and at once begin the invasion. At the same time her own
resources were drained, and Holland, exhausted, was seeking
to borrow from her. " Money," we are told, " was never so
scarce in the city, and cannot be had at twelve per cent/'
Had France, therefore, at this time had a navy able to make
head against that of England, even though somewhat infe-
rior in strength, she might, with her grip on the Netherlands
and Maestricht, have exacted her own conditions. England,
on the other hand, though driven to the wall on the conti-
nent, was nevertheless able to obtain peace on equal terms,
through the control of the sea by her navy.
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280 INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER.
The commerce of all three nations had suffered enor*
mously, but the balance of prizes in fayor of Groat Britain
was estimated at J& 2,000^000. Stated in another way, it is
said that the combined losses of French and Spanish com-
merce amounted during the war to 8,484 ships, the English
to 8,288 ; but in considering such figures, the relation they
bear to the total merchant shipping of either nation must
not be forgotten. A thousand vessels were a very much
larger fractiooi of French shipping than of English, and
meant more grievous loss.
After the disaster to the squadron of L'l^tendu^re/' says a
French writer, *'the French flog did not appear at sea. Twenty-
two ships-of-the-line composed the navy of France, which sixty
years before had one hundred and twenty. Privateers made few
prizes ; followed everywhere, unprotected, they almost always fell a
prey to the English. The British naval forces, without any rivals,
passed unmolested over the seas. In one year they are said to
have taken from French commerce £7,000,000 sterling. Yet this
sea power, which might have seized French and Spanish colonies,
made few conquests from want of unity and persistence in the direc-
tion given them." ^
To sum up, France was forced to give up her conquests for
want of a navy, and England saved her position by her sea
power, though she had failed to use it to the best advantage.
^ LapeTTOuse-Bouflls : Hist, de la Marine Fran^aiae.
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CHAPTER Vin.
Sevbn Ykars' War, 1756-1768. — England's OvKRWHELMiNa Fowrr
AND CONQUKSTS ON TDB SbAB, IN NORTH AmBRICA, EuROPB, AND
East and Wbst Indibs. — Sba Battles : Btng off Minorca ;
Hawkb and Conflans; Pooock and IVAcBi in East Indies.
THE urgency with which peace was desired hy the prin-
cipal parties to the War of the Austrian Succession
may perhaps be inferred from the neglect to setUe definitely
and conclusively many of the questions outatanding between
them, and notably the very disputes about which the war
between England and Spain began. It seems as though the
powers feared to treat thoroughly matters that contained the
germs of future quarrels, lest the discussion should prolong
the war that then existed. England made peace because the
fall of Holland was otherwise inevitable, not because she had
enforced, or surrendered, her claims of 1789 against Spain.
The right of uninterrupted navigation in West Indian seas,
free from any search, was left undetermined, as were other
kindred matters. Not only so, but the boundaries between
the English and French colonies in the valley of the Ohio,
toward Canada, and on the land side of the Nova Scotian
peninsula, remained as vague as they had before been. It
was plain that peace could not last; and by it, if she had
saved Holland, England surrendered the control of the sea
which she had won. The true character of the strife, shrouded
for a moment by the continental war, was revealed by the so-
called peace; though formally allayed, the contention con-
tinued in every part of the world.
In India, Dupleix, no longer able to attack the English
openly, sought to undermine their power by the line of policy
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RECALL OF DUPLEIX.
already described. Mingling adroitly in the quarrels of sur-
rounding princes, and advancing his own power while so
doing, he attained by rapid steps to the political control, in
1751, of the southern extremity of India, — a country nearly
as large as France. Given tlie title of Nabob, he now had
a place among the princes of the land. A merely commer-
cial policy was in his eyes a delusion; there could be no
middle course between conquest and abandonment." In the
course of the same year further grants extended the Fi*ench
power through extensive regions to the north and east, em-
bracing all the coast of Orissa, and made Dupleix ruler of
a third of India. To celebrate his triumphs, perhaps also in
accordance with his policy of impressing the native mind,
he now founded a town and put up a pillar setting forth his
successes. But his doings caused the directors of the com-
pany only disquietude; instead of the reinforcements he
asked for they sent him exhortations to peace ; and at about
this time Robert Glive, then but twentynsix years old, began
to show his genius. The success of Dupleix and his allies
became checkered with reverses; the English under Glive's
leadership supported the native opponents of the French.
The company at home was but little interested in his political
schemes, and was annoyed at the failure of dividends. Nego-
tiations were opened at London for a settlement of difficulties,
and Dupleix was summoned home ; the English government,
it is said, making his recall an absolute condition of con-
tinued peace. Two days after his departure, in 1754, his
successor signed a treaty with the English governor, wholly
abandoning his policy, stipulating that neither company
should interfere in the internal politics of India, and that all
possessions acquired during the war in the Garnatic should be
given back to the Mogul. What France thus surrendered was
in extent and population an empire, and the mortification of
French historians has branded the concession as ignominious ;
but how could the country have been held, with the English
navy cutting off the eagerly desired reinforcements?
In North America, the declaration of peace was followed by
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AGITATION IN NORTH AMERICA. 283
renewed agitation, which sprang from and betokened the deep
feeling and keen sense of the situation had by the colonists
and local authorities on either side. The Americans held to
their points with the stubbornness of their race. There is
no repose for our thirteen colonies," wrote Franklin, ^ so long
as the French are masters of Canada." The rival claims to
the central unsettled region, which may accurately enough
be called the valley of the Ohio, involved, if the English were
successful, the military separation of Oanada from Louisiana ;
while on the other hand, occupation by- the French, linking
the two extremes of their acknowledged possessions, would
shut up the English colonists between the Alleghany Moun«
tains and the sea. The issues were apparent enough to
leading Americans of that day, though they were more far-
reaching than the wisest of them could have foreseen ; there
is room for curious speculation as to the effect, not only upon
America, but upon the whole world, if the French govern-
ment had had the will, and the French people the genius,
effectively to settle and hold the northern and western
regions which they then claimed. But while Frenchmen
upon the spot saw clearly enough the coming contest and the
terrible disadvantage of unequal numbers and inferior navy
under which Canada must labor, the home government was
blind alike to the value of the colony and to the fact that it
must be fought for ; while the character and habits of the
French settlers, lacking in political activity and unused to
begin and carry through measures for the protection of their
own interests, did not remedy the neglect of the mother-
country. The paternal centralizing system of French rule had
taught the colonists to look to the mother-country, and then
failed to take care of them. The governors of Canada of that
day acted as careful and able military men, doing what they
could to supply defects and weaknesses; it is possible that
their action was more consistent and well-planned than that
of the English governors ; but with the carelessness of both
home governments, nothing in the end could take the place
of the capacity of the English colonists to look out for them-
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284 ARMED COLLISIONS IN AMERICA.
selves. It is odd and amusing to read the conflicting state*
meats of English and French historians as to the purposes
and aims of the opposing statesmen in these years when
the first murmurings of the storm were heard ; the simple
truth seems to be that one of those conflicts familiarly known
to us as irrepressible was at hand, and that both governments
would gladly have avoided it. The boundaries might be un*
determined ; the English colonists were not.
The French governor established posts where they could
on the debatable ground, and it was in the course of a dispute
over one of these^ in 1754, that the name of Washington firat
appears in history. Other troubles occurred in Nova Scotia,
and both home governments then began to awake. In 1765
Braddock's disastrous expedition was directed against Fort
Duqnesne, now Pittsburg, where Washington had surren*
dered the year before. Later in the year another collision
between the English and French colonists happened near
Lake George. Although Braddock*s expedition liad been
first to start, the French government was also moving. In
May of the same year a large squadron of ships-of-war, mostly
armed en flUte^ sailed from Brest with three thousand troops,
and a new governor, De Yaudreuil, for Oanada. Admiral
Boscawen had already preceded this fleet, and lay in wait for
it off the mouth of the St. Lawrence. There was as yet no
open war, and the French were certainly within their rights
in sending a garrison to their own colonies ; but Boscaweu's
orders were to stop them. A fog which scattered the French
squadron also covered its passage ; but two of the ships were
seen by the English fleet and captured, June 8, 1755. As
soon as this news reached Europe, the French ambassador to
London was recalled, but still no declaration of war followed.
In July, Sir Edward Hawke was sent to sea with ordera to
cruise, between Ushant and Cape Finisterre, and to seize any
French ships-of-the-line he might see; to which were added
1 That is, with the gang on board, bat lor the most part not moonted on their
carriages, in order to give increased accommodation for troops. When the troops
were landed, the guns were monnted.
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EXPEDITION AOAINST MmORCA. 286
in August further orders to take all French ships of every
kind, men-of-war, privateers, and merchantmen, and to send
them into English ports. Before the end of the year, three
hundred trading vessels, valued at six million dollars, had
been captured, and six thousand French seamen were impris-
oned in England, — enough to man nearly ten ships-of-the-line.
All this was done while nominal peace still existed. War was
not declared until six months later.
France still seemed to submit, but she was biding her time,
and preparing warily a severe stroke for which she had now
ample provocation. Small squadrons, or detachments of
ships, continued to be sent to the West Indies and to
Canada, while noisy preparations were made in the dock-yard
of Brest, and troops assembled upon the shores of the OhanneL
England saw herself threatened with invasion, — a menace
to which her people have been peculiarly susceptible. The
government of the day, weak at best, was singpilarly unfit for
waging war, and easily misled as to the real danger. Besides,
England was embarrassed, as always at the beginning of a
war, not only by the numerous points she had to protect in
addition to her commerce, but also by the absence of a large
number of her seamen in trading-vessels all over the world.
The Mediterranean was therefore neglected ; and the French,
while making loud demonstrations on the Channel, quietly
equipped at Toulon twelve ships-of-the-line, which sailed on
the 10th of April, 1756, under Admiral la Oalissonidre, con*
voying one hundred and fifty transports with fifteen thou-
sand troops, commanded by the Duke of Richelieu. A week
later the army was safely landed in Minorca, and Port
Mahon invested, while the fleet established itself in blockade
before the harbor.
Practically this was a complete surprise ; for though the
suspicions of the English government had been at last
aroused, its action came too late. The garrison had not been
reinforced, and numbered a scant three thousand men, from
which thirty-five officers were absent on leave, among them
the governor and the colonels of all the regiments. Admiral
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286
BYNCPS ACTION OFF MINORCA.
Byng sailed from Portsmouth with ten shipfrof-the-line only
three days before the French left Toulon. Six weeks later,
when he reached the neighborhood of Port Mahon, his
fleet had been increased to thirteen ships-of-the>line, and
he had with him four thousand troops. It was already
late; a practicable breach had been made in the fortress
a week before. When the English fleet came in sight. La
Galissonidre stood out to meet it and bar the entrance to
the harbor.
The battle that followed owes its historical celebrity wholly
to the singular and tragic event which arose from it. Unlike
Matthews's battle off Toulou, it does afford some tactical in-
struction, though mainly applicable to the obsolete conditions
of warfare under sail ; but it is especially linked to the earlier
action through the effect produced upon the mind of the unfor-
tunate Byng by the sentence of the court-martial upon Mat-
thews. During the course of the engagement he repeatedly
alluded to the censure upon that admiral for leaving the line,
and seems to have accepted the judgment as justifying, if not
determining, his own course. Briefly, it may be said that the
two fleets, having sighted each other on the morning of the
20th of May, were found after a series of manoeuvi*es both on
the port tack, with an easterly wind, heading southerly, the
French to leeward, between the English and the harbor. Byng
ran down in line ahead off the wind, the French remaining by
it, so that when the former made the signal to engage, the fleets
were not parallel, but formed an angle of from thirty to forty
degrees (Plate Vila. A, A). The attack which Byng by his
own account meant to make, each ship against its opposite in
the enemy's line, difiicult to carry out under any circumstances,
was here further impeded by the distance between the two
rears being much greater than that between the vans ; so that
his whole line could not come into action at the same mo-
ment. When the signal was made, the van ships kept away
in obedience to it, and ran down for the French so nearly
head-on (B,B) as to sacrifice their artillery fire in great
measure; they received three raking broadsides, and were
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BYNCrS ACTION OFF MINORCA. 287
seriously dismanUed aloft The sixth English ship, counting
from the Tan, had her foretopmast shot away, flew up into
the windy and came aback, stopping and doubling up the rear
of tlie line. Then undoubtedly was the time for Byng, hav-
ing committed himself to the fight, to have set the example
and borne down, just as Farragut did at Mobile when his line
was confused by the stopping of the next ahead ; but accord*
ing to the testimony of the flag-captain, Matthews's sentence
deterred him. You see, Captain Gardiner, that the signal
for the line is out, and that I am ahead of the ships ' Louisa'
and ^ Trident ' [which in the order should have been aliead of
him]. Yon would not have me, as the admiral of the fleet,
run down as if I were going to engage a single ship. It was
Mr. Matthews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not carrying
down his force together, which I shall endeavor to avoid."
The affair thus became entirely indecisive ; the English van
was separated from the rear and got the brunt of the fight
(G). One French authority blames Oalissonidre for not tack-
ing to windward of the enemy's van and crushing it. Another
says he ordered the movement, but that it could not be made
from the damage to the rigging ; but this seems improbable,
as the only injury the French squadron underwent aloft was
the loss of one topsail yard, whereas the English suffered
very badly. The true reason is probably that given and
approved by one of the French authorities on naval warfare^
Oalissonidre considered the support o^ the land attack on
Mahon paramount to any destruction of the English fleet, if
he thereby exposed his own. The French navy has always
preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to
that more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking
some ships, and therein has approached more nearly the
true end that has been proposed in war." ^ The justice of this
conclusion depends upon the view that is taken of the true end
of naval war. If it is merely to assure one or more posi*
tions ashore, the navy becomes simply a branch of the army
for a particular occasion, and subordinates its action accord-
1 BamataeUe : Tacdque NaT«le.
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288
FRENCH NAVAL POLICY,
ingly; but if the true end is to preponderate over the enemy's
navy and so control the sea, then the enemy's ships and fleets
are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions. A glim-
y mer of this yiew seems to have been present to Morogues
when he wrote that at sea there is no field of battle to be
held, nor places to be won. If nayal warfare is a war of
posts, then the action of the fleets must bo subordinate to
the attack and defence of the posts ; if its object is to break
up the enemy's power on the sea, cutting off his communica*
tions with the rest of his possessions, drying up the sources
of his wealth in his commerce, and making possible a closure
of his ports, then the object of attack must be his organized
military forces afloat ; in short, his nayy. It is to the latter
course, for whateyer reason adopted, that England owed a
control of the sea that forced the restitution of Minorca at
the end of this war. It is to the former that France owed
the lack of prestige in her nayy. Take this yery case of
Minorca; had Galissonidre been beaten, Richelieu and his
fifteen thousand troops must have been lost to France, cooped
up in Minorca, as the Spaniards, in 1718, were confined to
Sicily. The French navy therefore assured the capture of the
island ; but so slight was the impression on the ministry and
the public, that a French nayal officer tells us : Incredible as
it may seem, the minister of marine, after the glorious affair
off Mahon, instead of yielding to the zeal of an enlightened
patriotism and profiting by the impulse which this yictory
gaye to France to build up the nayy, saw fit to sell the ships
and rigging which wo still had in our ports. We shall soon
see the deplorable consequences of this cowardly conduct on
the part of our statesmen." ^ Neither the glory nor the yic-
tory is yery apparent; but it is quite conceiyable that had
the French admiral thought less of Mahon and used the
great adyantage luck had giyen him to take, or sink, four or
fiye of the enemy, the French people would haye anticipated
the outbreak of nayal enthusiasm which appeared too late, in
1760. During the remainder of this war the French fleets,
> LitpeyzoiiM-BoiiiHa: Hiit de la Mttine.
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FRENCH NAVAL POLICY.
•except in the East Indies, appear only as the pnrsned in
a general chase.
The action imposed upon the French fleets was, however,
consistent with the general policy of the French government ;
and John Clerk was probably right in saying that there is
apparent in this action off Minorca a tactics too well defined
to be merely accidental, — a tactics essentially defensive in its
scope and aim.^ In assuming the lee-gage the French ad-
miral not only covered Mahon, but took a good defensive posi-
tion, imposing upon his enemy the necessity of attacking with
all the consequent risks. Clerk seems to bring evidence
enough to prove that the leading French ships did, after
roughly handling their assailants, astutely withdraw (C)
thus forcing the latter to attack again with like results.
The same policy was repeatedly followed during the Ameri-
can war twenty years later, and with pretty uniform success ;
so much so Uiat, although formal avowal of the policy is
wanting, it may be concluded that circumspection, economy,
defensive war, remained the fixed purpose of the French
authorities, based doubtless upon the reasons given by Ad-
miral Grivel, of that navy : —
If two maritiiue powers are at strife, the one that has the fewest
ships must always avoid doubtful engagements ; it must run only
those risks necessary for carrying out its missions, avoid action by
manosnvring, or at worst, if forced to engage, assure itself of favorable
conditions. The attitude to be taken shoold depend radically upon
the power of your opponent Let us not tire of repeating, accord-
ing as she has to do with an inferior or superior power, France has
before her two distinct strategies, radically opposite both In means
and ends, — Grand War and Criiising War."
Such a formal utterance by an officer of rank must be re-
ceived with respect, and the more so when it expresses a
consistent policy followed by a great and warlike nation ; yet
it may be questioned whether a sea power worthy of the name
can thus be secured. Logically, it follows from the position
assumed, that combats between equal forces are to be discour-
^ Qerk: Naval Tactics.
10
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290 EXECUTION OP ADMIRAL BYNQ.
aged} because the loss to you is greater than the loss to your
opponent In fact/' says Ramatuelle^ upholding the French
policy, of what consequence to the English would be the
loss of a few ships ? " But the next ineritable step in the
argument is that it is better not to meet the enemy. As an*
other Frenchman,^ previously quoted, says, it was considered
a mishap to their ships to fall in with a hostile force, and, if
one was met, their duty was to avoid action if possible to do
so honorably. They had ulterior objects of more importance
than fighting the enemy's navy. Such a course cannot be
consistently followed for years without affecting the spirit
and tone of the ofiicers charged with it ; and it led directly
to as brave a man as ever commanded a fleet, the Comte de
Grasse, failing to crush the English under Rodney when he
Had the chance, in 1782. On the 9th of April of that year,
being chased by the English among the Windward Islands, it
happened to him to have sixteen of their fleet under his lee
while the main body was becalmed under Dominica. Though
greatly superior to the separated ships, during the three
hours that this state of things lasted, De Grasse left them
undisturbed, except by a distant cannonade by his own van ;
and his action was justified by the court which tried him,
in which were many ofiicers of high rank and doubtless of
distinction, as being an act of prudence on the part of the
admiral, dictated to him by the ulterior projects of the cruise."
Three days later he was signally beaten by the fleet he had
failed to attack at disadvantage, and all the ulterior projects
of the cruise went down with him.
To return to Minorca; after the action of the 20th, Byng
called a council of war, which decided that nothing more
could be done, and that the English fleet should go to Gib-
raltar and cover that place from an attack. At Gibraltar,
Byng was relieved by Hawke and sent home to be tried. The
court-martial, while expressly clearing him of cowardice or
disaffection, found him guilty of not doing his utmost either
to defeat the French fleet or to relieve the garrison at Mahon ;
1 Jarieii de U Qzayi^ie : Quenet Maritimes.
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ENGLISH MARITIME PROSPERITY.
and, as the article of war prescribed death with no alterna-
tive punishment for this offence, it felt compelled to sentence
him to death. The king refused to pardon, and Byng was
accordingly shot.
The expedition against Minorca was begun while nominal
peace still lasted. On the 17th of May, three days before
Byng's battle, England declared war, and France replied on
the 20th of June. On the 28th, Port Mahon surrendered,
and Minorca passed into the hands of France.
The nature of the troubles between the two nations, and
the scenes where they occurred, pointed out clearly enough the
proper theatre of the strife, and we should by rights now be
at the opening of a sea war, illustrated by great naval actions
and attended with great modifications in the colonial and
foreign possessions of the two powers. Of the two, England y
alone recognized the truth ; France was again turned aside
from the sea by causes which will shortly be given. Her
fleets scarcely appeared ; and losing the control of the sea,
she surrendered one by one her colonies and all her hopes in
Tndia. Later in the struggle she drew in Spain as her ally,
but it was only to involve that country in her own external
ruin. England, on the other hand, defended and nourished
by the sea, rode it everywhere in triumph. Secure and pros-
perous at home, she supported with her money the enemies
of France. At the end of seven years the kingdom of Oreat
Britain had become the British Empire.
It is far from certain that France could have successfully
contended with England on the sea, without an ally. In 1756
the French navy had sixty-three ships-of-the-line, of which
forty-five were in fair condition ; but equipments and artillery
were deficient Spain had forty-six ships-of-the-line ; but
from tlie previous and subsequent performances of the Span-
ish navy, it may well be doubted if its worth were equal to its
numbers. England at this time had one hundred and thirty
ships-of-the-line ; four years later she had one hundred and
twenty actually in commission. Of course when a nation
allows its inferiority, whether on land or sea, to become
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292 SEVEN YEARS' WAR BEGINS.
«
as great aa that of France now was, it cannot hope for
Bucceas.
NeveribeleBSy she obtained advantagea at first The con-
quest of Minorca was followed in November of the same year
by the acquisition of Corsica. The republic of Genoa sur-
rendered to France all tlie fortified harbors of the island.
With Toulon, Oorsica, and Port Mahon, she now had a strong
grip on the Mediterranean. In Canada, the operations of
1756, under Montcalm, were successful despite the inferiority
of numbers. At the same time an attack by a native prince
in India took from the English Calcutta, and gave an oppor-
tunity to the French.
Yet another incident offered a handle for French (states-
manship to strengthen her position on the ocean. The Dutch
had promised France not to renew their alliance with Eng-
land, but to remain neutral. England retaliated by declaring
all tlie ports of France in a state of blockade, and all vessels
bound to those ports liable to seizure as lawful prize." Such
a violation of the rights of neutrals can only be undertaken
by a nation that feels it has nothing to fear from their rising
against it The aggressiveness, bom of the sense of power,
which characterized England might have been used by France
to draw Spain and possibly other States into alliance against
her.
Instead of concentrating against England, France began
y another continental war, this time with a new and extraor-
dinary alliance. The Empress of Austria, working on the
religious superstitions of tiie king and upon the anger of the
king's mistress, who was piqued at sarcasms uttered against
her by Frederick the Great, drew France into an alliance witli
Austria against Prussia. This alliance was further joined
by Russia, Sweden, and Poland. The empress urged that the
two Roman Catholic powers should unite to take Silesia away
from a Protestant king, and expressed her willingness to give
to France a part of her possessions in the Netherlands, which
France had always desired.
Frederick the Great, learning the combination against him,
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CAPTURE OF LOUISBURO, 1768.
293
instead of waiting for it to develop, pnt his armies in motion
and invaded Saxony, wliose ruler was also King of Poland.
This movement, in October, 1756, began the Seven Tears*
War ; which, like the War of the Austrian Succession, but
not to the same extent, drew some of the contestants oif from
the original cause of difference. But while France, having
already on hand one large quarrel with her neighbor across y
the Channel, was thus needlessly entering upon another
struggle, with the avowed end of building up that Austrian
. empire which a wiser policy had long striven to humble, Eng-
land this time saw clearly where her true interests lay.
Making the continental war wholly subsidiary, she turned her
efforts upon the sea and the colonies; at the same time sup-
porting Frederick both with money and cordial sympathy in
the war for the defence of his kingdom, which so seriously
diverted and divided the efforts of France. England thus
had really but one war on hand. In the same year the direc-
tion of the struggle was taken from the hands of a weak
ministry and given into those of the bold and ardent William
Pitt, who retained his office till 1761, by which time the ends
of the war had practically been secured.
In the attack upon Oanada there were two principal lines
to be chosen, — that by the way of Lake Ghamplain, and that
by the way of the St. Lawrence. The former was entirely
inland, and as such does not concern our subject, beyond
noting that not till after the fall of Quebec, in 1769, was it
fairly opened to the English. In 1757 the attempt against
Louisburg failed ; the English admiral being unwilling to
engage sixteen ships-of-the-line he found there, with the fif-
teen under his own command, which were also, he said, of
inferior metal. Whether he was right in his decision or not,
the indignation felt in England clearly shows the difference
of policy underlying the action of the French and English
governments. The following year an admiral of a higher
spirit, Boscawen, was sent out accompanied with twelve thou-
sand troops, and, it must in fairness be said, found only five
ships in the port The troops were landed, while the fleet
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294
FALL OF CANADA, 1760.
covered the siege from the ouljr molestation it could fear, and
ent off from the beai^ied the onlj line by which thej could
look for rapplies. The island fell in 1758, opening Uie waj
hj the St. Lawrence to the heart of Canada, and giring the
English a new base both for the fleet and annj.
The next year the expedition under Wolfe was sent against
Quebec. All his operations were based upon the fleet, which
not only carried his army to the spot, but moved up and down
the river as the various feints required. The landing which
led to Uie decisive action was made directly from the ships.
Montcalm, whose skill and determination bad blocked the
attacks by way of Lake Ghamplain the two previous years,
had written urgently for reinforcements ; but they were re-
fused by the minister of war, who replied that in addition
to other reasons it was too probable that the English would
intercept them on the way, and that the more France scut,
the more England would be moved to send. In a word, the
possession of Canada depended upon sea power.
Montcalm, therefore, in view of the certain attack upon
Quebec by the river, was compelled to weaken his I'esistance
on the Champlain route ; nevertheless, the English did not get
farther than the foot of the lake that year, and their opera-
tions, though creditable, had no effect upon the result at
Quebec.
In 1760, the English, holding the courao of the St. Law-
rence, with Louisburg at one end and Quebec at the oUier,
seemed firmly seated. Nevertheless, the French governor,
De Yaudreuil, still held out at Montreal, and the colonists
still hoped for help from France. The English garrison at
Quebec, though inferior in numbers to the forces of the Cana-
dians, was imprudent enough to leave tlie city and meet them
in the open field. Defeated there, and pursued by the enemy,
the latter nearly entered Quebec pell-mell with the English
troops, and trenches were opened against the city. A few
days later an English squadron came in sight, and the place
was relieved. '^Thus," says the old English chronicler of
the navy, the enemy saw what it was to be inferior at sea ;
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INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER.
for, had a French squadron got the start of the English in
sailing np the river, Quebec must have fallen." Wholly
cut off now, the little body of Frenchmen tliat remained in
Montreal was surrounded by three English armies, which
had come, one by way of Lake Ghamplain, the others from
Oswego and from Quebec. The surrender of the city on the
8th of September, 1760, put an end forever to the French
possession of Canada.
In all other quarters of the world, after the accession of
Pitt to power, the same good fortune followed the English
arms, checkered only at the first by some slight reverses.
It was not so on the continent, where the heroism and skill
of Frederick the Qreat maintained with difficulty his brilliant
struggle against France, Austria, and Russia. The study
of the difficulties of his position, of the military and political
combinations attending it, do not belong to our subjeiit. Sea
power does not appear directly in its effects upon the struggle,
but indirectly it was felt in two ways, — first, by the subsidies
which the abundant wealth and credit of England enabled her
to give Frederick, in whose thrifty and able hands they went
far ; and second, in tiie embarrassment caused to France by
the attacks of England upon her colonies and her own sea-
coast, in the destruction of her commerce, and in the money
— all too little, it is true, and grudgingly given — wliich France
was forced to bestow on her navy. Stung by the constant
lashing of the Power of the sea, France, despite the blindness
and unwillingness of the rulers, was driven to undertake
something against it. With a navy much inferior, unable to
cope in all quarters of the world, it was rightly decided
to concentrate upon one object; and the object chosen was
Oreat Britain itself, whose shores were to be invaded. This
decision, soon apprehended by the fears of the English nation,
caused the great naval operations to centre for some years
around the coast of France and in the Channel. Before de-
scribing them, it will be well to sum up the general plan by
which England was guided in the use of her overwhelming
sea power.
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ENGLISH NAVAL POLICY, 1766-1769.
Besides the operations on the North American continent
already described, this plan was fourfold : —
1. The French Atlantic ports were watched in force, espe-
ciallj Brest, so as to keep the great fleets or small squadrons
from getting out without fighting.
2. Attacks were made upon the Atlantic and Channel
coasts with flying squadrons, followed at times by the descent
of small bodies of troops. These attacks, the direction of
whicli could not be foreseen by the enemy, were chiefly in-
tended to compel him to keep on hand forces at many points,
and so to diminish tlie army acting against the King of Prus-
sia. While the tendency would certainly be that way, it may
be doubted whether the actual dirersion in favor of Frederick
was of much consequence. No particular mention will be
made of these operations, which had but little visible effect
upon the general course of the war.
8. A fleet was kept in the Mediterranean and near Gib-
raltar to prevent the French Toulon fleet from getting round
to the Atlantic. It does not appear that any attempt was
seriously made to stop communications between France and
Minorca. The action of the Mediterranean fleet, though
an independent command, was subsidiary to that in tibe
Atlantic.
4. Distant foreign expeditions were sent against the French
colonies in the West India Islands and on the coast of Africa,
and a squadron was maintained in the East Indies to secui-e
the control of those seas, thereby supporting the English
in the Peninsula, and cutting off the communications of the
French. Tliese operations in distant waters, never inter-
mitted, assumed greater activity and larger proportions after
the destruction of the French navy had relieved England
from the fear of invasion, and when the ill-advised entrance
of Spain into the war, in 1762, offered yet richer prizes to
her enterprise.
The close blockade of the enemy's fleet in Brest, which was
first systematically carried out during this war, may be con.
si4ered rather a defensive than an offensive operation; foe
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PROJECTED INVASION OF ENGLAND. 297
though the intention certainly was to fight if opportunity
offered, the chief object was to neutralize an offensive weapon
in the enemy's hands ; the destmction of the weapon was
secondary. The truth of this remark is shown by the out-
burst of fear and anger which swept over England when an
unavoidable absence of the blockading fleet in 1759 allowed
the French to escape. The effect of the blockade in this and
after wars was to keep the French in a state of constant infe-
riority in the practical handling of their ships, however fair-
showing their outward appearance or equal their numerical
force. The position of the port of Brest was such that a
blockaded fleet could not get out during the heavy westerly
gales that endangered the blockaders ; the latter, therefore,
had the habit of running away from them to Torbay or
Plymouth, sure, with care, of getting back to their station
with an east wind before a large and ill-handled fleet could
get much start of them.
In the latter part of 1758, France, depressed by the sense
of failure upon the continent, mortified and harassed by Eng-
lish descents upon her coasts, which had been particularly an-
noying that year, and seeing that it was not possible to carry
on both the continental and sea wars with her money re-
sources, determined to strike directly at England* Her com-
merce was annihilated while the enemy's throve. It was the
boast of Loudon merchants that under Pitt commerce was
united with and made to flourish by war;^ and this thriving
commerce was the soul also of the land struggle, by the
money it lavished on the enemy of France.
At this time a new and active-minded minister, Ohoiseul,
was called into power by Louis XY. From the beginning
of 1759, preparations were made in the ocean and Channel
ports. Flat-boats to transport troops were built at Havre,
Dunkirk, Brest, and Bochefort It was intended to embark
as many as fifty thousand men for the invasion of England^
while twelve thousand were to be directed upon Scotland.
Two squadrons were fitted out, each of respectable strength,
1 Mahon: Ilistorj of England.
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BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE, 1769.
one at Toulon, the other at Brest The junction of these
two squadrons at Brest was the first step in the great
enterprise.
It was just here that it broke down, through the possession
of Gibraltar by the English, and their naval superiority. It
seems incredible that even the stern and confident William
Pitt should, as late as 1757, have ofiFered to surrender to
Spain the watch-tower from which England overlooks the
road between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, as the
price of her help to recover Minorca. Happily for England,
Spain refused. In 1759, Admiral Boscawen commanded the
English Mediterranean fleet. In making an attack upon
French frigates in Toulon roads, some of his ships were so
damaged that he sailed with his whole squadron to Gibraltar
to refit; taking the precaution, however, to station lookout
frigates at intervals, and to arrange signals by guns to notify
him betimes of the enemy's approach. Taking advantage
of his absence, and in obedience to orders, the French com-
modore. Do la Glue, left Toulon with twelve ships-of-tlie-line
on the 5th of August, and on the 17tli found himself at the
Straits of Gibraltar, with a brisk east wind carrying him out
into the Atlantic. Everything seemed propitious, a thick
haze and falling night concealing the French ships from the
land, while not preventing tlieir sight of each other, when
an English frigate loomed up in the near distance. As soon
as she saw the fleet, knowing they must be enemies, she
hauled in for the land and began firing signal-^ns. Pursuit
was useless; flight alone remained. Hoping to elude the
chase he knew must follow, the French commodore steered
west-northwest for the open sea, putting out all lights ; but
either from carelessness or disaffection, — for the latter is
hinted by one French naval officer, — five out of the twelve
ships headed to the northward and put into Cadiz when on
the following morning they could not see the commodore.
The latter was dismayed when at daylight he saw his forces
thus diminished. At eight o'clock some sails made their
appearance, and for a few minutes he hoped they were the
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BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE, 1769. 299
missing ships. Instead of (hat, they were the lookouts of
fioscawen*s fleet, which, numbering fourteen ships-of-the-
line, was in full pursuit. The French formed their order
on one of the close-hauled lines, and fled ; but of course their
fleet-speed was less than that of the fastest English ships.
The general rule for all chases where the pursuer is decidedly
superior, namely, that order must be obserTed only so far as
to keep the leading ships within reasonable supporting dis-
tance of the slower ones, so that they may not be singly
overpowered before the latter can come up, was by this time
well understood in the English navy, and that is certainly the
fitting time for a mSlie. Boscawen acted accordingly. The
i-ear ship of the French, on the other hand, nobly emulated
the example of L^J^tondudre when he saved his convoy.
Overtaken at two o'clock by the leading English ship, and
soon after surrounded by four others, her captain made for
five hours a desperate resistance, from which he could hope,
not to save himself, but to delay the enemies long enough for
the better sailers to escape. He so far succeeded that — thanks
to the injury done by him and their better speed — they did
that day escape, action at close quarters, which could only
have ended in their capture. When he hauled down his flag,
his three topmasts were gone, the mizzen-mast fell immedi-
ately after, and the hull was so full of water that the ship
was with diSiculty kept afloat. M. de Sabran — his name
is worthy to be remembered — had received eleven wounds in
this gallant resistance, by which he illustrated so signally the
duty and service of a rearguard in retarding pursuit. That
night two of the French ships hauled off to the westward,
and so escaped. The other four continued their flight as
before ; but the next morning the commodore, despairing of
escape, headed for the Portuguese coast, and ran them all
ashore between Lagos and Gape St. Vincent. The English
admiral followed and attacked them, taking two and burning
the others, without regard to the neutrality of Portugal. For
this insult no amend was made beyond a formal apology ;
Portugal was too dependent upon England to be seriously
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HAWKS AND CONFLANS. 1769.
considered. Pitt, writing to the Englisli miniBter to Portugal
about the affair, told him that while soothing the susceptibili-
ties of the Portuguese government he must not allow it to
suppose that either the ships would be given up or the dis-
tinguished admiral censured.^
The destruction or dispersal of the Toulon fleet stopped the
invasion of England, though the five ships that got into Cadiz
remained a matter of anxiety to Sir Edward Hawke, who
cruised before Brest Ghoiseul, balked of his main object,
still clung to the invasion of Scotland. The French fleet
at Brest, under Marshal de Oonflans, a sea ofiicer despite his
title, numbered twenty sail-of-the-line, besides frigates. The
troops to be embarked are variously stated at fifteen to
twenty thousand. The original purpose was to escort the
transports with only five ships-of-ihe-line, besides smaller
vessels. Oonflans insisted that the whole fleet ought to go.
The minister of the navy thought that the admiral was not
a sufiiciently skilful tactician to be able to check the advance
of an enemy, and so insure the safe arrival of the convoy at
its destination near the Clyde without risking a decisive
encounter. Believing therefore that there would be a gen-
eral action, he considered that it would be better to fight it
before tlie troops sailed ; for if disastrous, the convoy would
not be sacrificed, and if decisively victorious, the road would
then be clear. The transports were assembled, not at Brest,
but in the ports to the southward as far as the mouth of the
Loire. The French fleet therefore put to sea with the expec-
tation and purpose of fighting the enemy ; but it is not easy
to reconcile its subsequent course with that purpose, nor with
tlie elaborate fighting instructions' issued by the admiral
before sailing.
About the 5th or 6th of November there came on a tremen-
dous westerly gale. After buffeting it for three days, Hawke
bore up and ran into Torbay, where he waited for the wind
to shift, keeping his fleet in readiness to sail at once. The
^ BCahon : Hiftory of Englaod.
s For theM, aee Tronde : BataiUes Navales.
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EAWKE AND CONFLANS, 1769.
801
same gale, while keeping back the French already in Brest,
gave the chance to a small squadron pnder M. Bompart, which
was expected from the West Indies, to slip in during Hawke's
absence. Conflans made his preparations with activity, dis-
tributed Bomparf s crews among his own ships, which were
not very well manned, and got to sea with an easterly wind
on the 14th. He stood at once to the southward, fiattafing
himself that he had escaped Hawke. The latter, however, had
sailed from Torbay on the 12th; and though again driven
back, sailed a second time on the 14th, the same day that
Conflans left Brest He soon reached his station, learned that
the enemy had been seen to the southward steering east, and
easily concluding that they were bound to Quiberon Bay,
shaped his own course for the same place under a press of
sail. At eleven P. M. of the 19th the French admiral esti-
mated his position to be seventy miles southwest by west from
Belle Isle ; ^ and the wind springing up fresh from the west-
ward, he stood for it under short sail, the wind continuing to
increase and hauling to west-northwest. At daybreak sev-
eral ships were seen ahead, which proved to be the English
squadron of Commodore Duff, blockading Quiberon. The
signal was made to chase; and the English, taking flight, sepa-
rated into two divisions, — one going off before the wind, the
other hauling up to the southward. The greater part of the
French fleet continued its course after the former division, that
is, toward the coast ; but one ship hauled up for the second*
Immediately after, the rear French ships made signal of sails
to windward, which were also visible from aloft on board the
flag-ship. It must have been about the same momotit that
the lookout frigate in advance of the English fleet informed
her admiral of sails to leeward. Hawke's diligence had
brought him up with Conflans, who, in his official reports,
says he had considered it impossible that the enemy could
have in that neighborhood forces superior or even equal to
his own. Conflans now ordered his rear division to haul its
wind in support of the ship chasing to the southward and
1 See Plate Yin.
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HAWKB AND CON FLANS, 1769.
eastward. In a few moments more it was discovered that
the fleet to windward numbered twenty-three ships-of-the-
line to the French twentj-one, and among them some three-
deckers. Oonflans then called in the chasing ships and got
ready for action. It remained to settle his course under
circumstances which he had not foreseen. It was now blow-
ing hard from the west-northwest, with every appearance of
heavy weather, the fleet not far from a lee shore, with an
enemy' considerably superior in numbers ; for besides Hawkers
twenty-three of the line, Duff had four fifty-gun ships. Con-
flans therefore determined to run for it and lead his squadron
into Quiberon Bay, trusting and believing that Hawke would
not dare to follow, under the conditions of the weather, into
a bay which French authorities describe as containing banks
and shoals, and lined with reefs which the navigator rarely
sees without fright and never passes without emotion. It was
in the midst of these ghastly dangers that forty-four large
ships were about to engage pell-mell ; for the space was too
contracted for fleet manoeuvres. Oonflans flattered himself
that he would get in first and be able to haul up close under
the western shore of the bay, forcing the enemy, if he fol-
lowed, to take position between him and the beach, six miles
to leeward. None of his expectations were fulfilled. In the
retreat he took the head of his fleet ; a step not unjustifiable,
since only by leading in person could he have shown just what
he wanted to do, but unfoi*tuuate for his reputation with the
public, as it placed the admiral foremost in the flight. Hawke
was not in the least, nor for one moment, deterred by the
dangers before him, whose full extent he, as a skilful sea^
man, entirely realized ; but his was a calm and steadfast as
well as a gallant tempei*, that weighed risks justly, neither
dissembling nor exaggerating. He has not left us his rea-
soning, but he doubtless felt that the French, leading, would
serve partially as pilots, and must take the ground before
him ; he believed liie temper and experience of his oflScers,
tried by the severe school of the blockade, to be superior to
those of the French ; and he knew that both the government
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THE BREST FLEET DISPERSED. 808
and the couDtry demanded that the enemy's fleet should not
reach another friendly port in safety. On the very day that
he was thus following the French, amid dangers and under
conditions that have made this one of the moi^t dramatic of
sea fights, he was being burnt in effigy in England for allow-
ing them to escape. As Gonflans, leading his fleet, was round*
ing the Cardinals, — as the southernmost rocks at the entrance
of Quiberon Bay are called, — the leading English ships brought
the French rear to action. It was another case of a general
chase ending in a mSlSey but under conditions of exceptional
interest and grandeur from the surrounding circumstances of
the gale of wind, the heavy sea, the lee shoi*e, the headlong
speed, shortened canvas, and the great number of ships en-
gaged. One French seventy-four, closely pressed and out-
numbered, ventured to open her lower-deck ports; the sea
sweeping in carried her down with all on board but twenty
men. Another was sunk by the fire of Hawkc's flag-ship.
Two others, one of which carried a commodore's pennant,
struck their colors. The remainder were dispersed. Seven
fled to the northward and eastward, and anchored off the
mouth of the little river Yilaine, into which they succeeded
in entering at the top of high water in two tides, — a feat
never before performed. Seven others took refuge to the
southward and eastward in Rochefort One, after being very
badly injured, rai^ ashore and was lost near the mouth of
the Loire. The flag-ship bearing the same name as that of
Tourville burned at La Hougue, the Royal Sun,'' anchored
at nightfall off Croisic, a little to the northward of the Loire,
where she rode in safety during the night. The next morn-
ing the admiral found himself alone, and, somewhat precipi-
tately it would seem, ran the ship ashore to. keep her out of
English hands. This step has been blamed by the French,
but needlessly, as Hawke would never have let her get away*
The great French fleet was annihilated ; for the fourteen
ships not taken or destroyed were divided into two parts,
and those in the Yilaine only succeeded in escaping, two
at a time, between fifteen months and two years later. The
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804
ACCESSION OF CHARLES III.
English lost two ships which ran upon a shoal (a), and wero
hopelessly wrecked; their losses in action were slight. At
nightfall Hawke anchored his fleet and prizes in the position
shown in the plate (b).
All possibility of an invasion of England passed away with
the destruction of the Brest fleet. The battle of November
2O9 1759, was the Trafalgar of this war ; and though a block-
ade was maintained over the fractions that were laid up in
the Yilaine and at Bochefort, the English fleets were now
free to act against the colonies of France, and later of Spain,
on a grander scale than ever before. The same year that
saw this great sea fight and the fall of Quebec witnessed also
the capture of Guadeloupe in the West Indies, of Goree on
the west coast of Africa, and the abandonment of the East
Indian seas by the French flag after three indecisive actions
between their commodore, D'Ach^, and Admiral Pocock, —
an abandonment which necessarily led to the fall of the
French power in India, never again to rise. In this year
also the King of Spain died, and his brother succeeded, un-
der the title of Oharles III. This Charles had been King
of Naples at the time when an English commodore had al-
lowed one hour for the court to determine to withdraw the
Neapolitan troops from the Spanish army. He had never for-
gotten this humiliation, and brought to his new throne a
heart unfriendly to England. With such feelings on his part,
France and Spain drew moi*e readily together. Charles's first
step was to propose mediation, but Pitt was averse to it.
Looking upon France as the chief enemy of England, and upon
the sea and the colonies as the chief source of power and
wealth, he wished, now that he had her down, to weaken
her thoroughly for the future as well as the present, and to
establish England's greatness more firmly upon the wreck.
Later on he offered certain conditions; but the influence of
Louis's mistress, attached to the Empress of Austria, prevailed
to except Prussia from the negotiations, and England would
not allow the exception. Pitt, indeed, was not yet ready for
peace. A year later, October 26, 1760, George 11. died, and
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AFFAIRS IN INDIA.
806
Pitt's influence then began to wane^ the new king being less
bent on war. Daring these years, 1759 and 1760, Frederick
the Oreat still continued the deadlj and exhausting strife of
his small kingdom against the great States joined against
him. At one moment his case seemed so hopeless that he
got ready to kill himself ; but the continuance of the war di-
verted the efforts of Prance from England and the sea.
The hour was fast approaching for the great colonial ex-
peditions, which made the last year of the war illustrious by
the triumph of the sea power of England over France and
Spain united. It is first necessary to tell the entirely kin-
dred story of the effect of that sea power in the East Indian
peninsula.
The recall of Dupleix and the entire abandonment of his
policy, which resulted in placing the two East India compa-
nies on equal terms, have already been told. The treaty stipu-
lations of 1754 had not, however, been fully carried out The
Marquis de Bussy, a brave and capable soldier who had been
a second to Dupleix, and was wholly in accord with his policy
and ambitions, remained in the Deccan, — a large region in
the southern central part of the peninsula, over which Dupleix
had once ruled. In 1756, troubles arose between the English
and the native prince in Bengal. The nabob of that province
had died, and his successor, a young man of nineteen, at^
tacked Calcutta. The place fell, after a weak resistance, in
June, and the surrender was followed by the famous tragedy
known as that of the Black Hole of Calcutta. The news
reached Madras in August, and Clive, whose name has already
been mentioned, sailed with the fleet of Admiral Watson, after
a long and vexatious delay. The fleet entered the river in
December and appeared before Calcutta in January, when the
place fell into English hands again as easily as it had been lost.
The nabob was very angry, and marched against the
English; sending meanwhile an invitation to the French
at Chandemagore to join him. Although it was now known
that England and France were at war, the French company,
despite the experience of 1744, weakly hoped that peace
20
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806 BATTLE OF PLASSEY.
might be kept between it and the English. The native
invitation was therefore refused, and offers of neutrality
made to the other company. Clive marched out, met the
Indian forces and defeated them, and the nabob at once
asked for peace, and sought the English alliance, yielding all
the claims on the strength of which he had first attacked
Calcutta. After some demur his ofiFers wore accepted. Clive
and Watson then turned upon Chandernagore and compelled
the surrender of the French settlement.
The nabob, who had not meant to allow this, took umbrage,
and entered into correspondence with Bussy in the Deccan.
Clive had full knowledge of his various intrigues, which were
carried on with the vacillation of a character as weak as it
was treacherous; and seeing no hope of settled peace or
trade under the rule of this man, entered into an extensive
conspiracy for his dethronement, the details of which need
not be given. The result was that war broke out again, and
that Clive with three thousand men, one third of whom were
English, met the nabob at the head of fifteen thousand horse
and thirty-five thousand 'foot. The disproportion in artillery
was nearly as great. Against these odds was fought and
won the battle of Plassey, on the 2Sd of June, 1757, — the
date from which, by common consent^ the British empire in
India is said to begin. The overthrow of the nabob was
followed by placing in power one of the conspirators against
him, a creature of the English, and dependent upon them
for support. Bengal thus passed under their control, the
first-fruits of India. Clive," says a French historian, had
understood and applied the system of Dupleix."
This was true ; yet even so it may be said that the founda-
tion thus laid could never have been kept nor built upon, had
the English nation not controlled the sea. The conditions
of India were such that a few Europeans, headed by men of
nerve and shrewdness, dividing that they might conquer, and
advancing their fortunes by judicious alliances, were able to
hold their own, and more too, amidst overwhelming numerical
odds ; but it was necessary that they should not be opposed by
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NAVAL BATTLES JN BAST INDIES.
807
men of their own kind, a few of whom could turn the waver-
ing balance the other way. At the very time that Clive was
acting in Bengal, Bussy invaded Oriasa, seized the English
factories, and made himself master of much of the coast re-
gions between Madras and Calcutta ; while a French squadron
of nine ships, most of which, however, belonged to the East
India Company and were not first-rate men-of-war, was on its
way to Pondicherry with twelve hundred regular troops, — an
enormous European army for Indian operations of that day.,
The English naval force on the coast, though fewer in num-
bers, may be considered about equal to the approaching French
squadron. It is scarcely too much to say that the future of
India was still uncertain, and the first operations showed it.
The French division appeared off the Coromandel coast to
the southward of Pondicherry on the 26th of April, 1768,
and anchored on the 28th before the English station called
Fort St. David. Two ships kept on to Pondicherry, having
on board the new governor, Comte de Lally, who wished to go
at once to his seat of government. Meanwhile, the English
admiral, Pocock^ having news of the enemy's coming, and
fearing specially for this post, was on his way to it, and
appeared on the 29th of April, before the two ships with the
governor were out of sight The French at once got under
way and stood out to sea on the starboard tack (Plate Va.),
heading to the northward and eastward, the wind being south-
east, and signals were made to recall the ship and frigate (a)
escorting Lally; but they were disregarded by the latter's
order, an act which must have increased, if it did not originate,
the ill-will between him and Commodore d'Ach^, through
which the French campaign in India miscarried. The Eng-
lish, having formed to windward on the same tack as the
French, made their attack in the then usual way, and with
the usual results. The seven English ships were ordered to
keep away together for the French eight, and the four leading
ships, including the admiral's, came into action handsomely ;
the last three, whether by their own fault or not, were late
hi doing so, but it will be remembered that this was almost
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808
NAVAL BATTLES IN EAST INDIES.
alwajs the case in such attacks. The French commodore,
seeing this interval between the van and the rear, formed
the plan of separating them, and made signal to wear to-
gether, but in his impatience did not wait for an answer.
Putting his own helm up, he wore round, and was followed
in succession by the rear ships, while the van stood on. The
English admiral, who had good reason to know, gives D'Ach^
more credit than the French writers, for he describes this
movement thus: —
^'At half-paat four f.m. the rear of the French line had drawn
pretty close up to their flag-fihip. Our three rear ships were signalled
to engage, closer. Soon after, M. d'Ach^ broke the line, and put be-
fore the wind ; his second astern, who had kept on the ' Tarmouth's '
[Enghsh flag-ship] quarter most part of the action, then came up
.alongside, gave his fire, and then bore awaj; and a few minutes
after, tlie enemy's van bore away also."
By this account, which is by no means irrecoQcilablo with the
French, the latter effected upon the principal English ship a
movement of concentration by defiling past her. Tlie French
now stood down to their two separated ships, while the Eng-
lish vessels that had been engaged were too much crippled to
follow. This battle prevented the English fleet from reliev-
ing Fort St. David, whidi surrendered on the 2d of June.
After the fall of this place, the two opposing squadrons
having refitted at their respective ports and resumed their
station, a second action was fought in August, under nearly
the same conditions and in much tlie same fashion. The
French flag-ship met with a series of untoward accidents, which
determined the commodore to withdraw from action ; but the
statement of his further reasons is most suggestive of the
necessary final overthrow of the French cause. Prudence,"
a writer of his own country says, commanded him not to
prolong a contest from which his ships could not but come
out with injuries very difficult to repair in a region where it
was impossible to supply the almost entire lack of spare
stores.'^ This want of so absolute a requisite for naval
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CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ISLANDS. 809
efficiency shows in a strong light the fatal tendency of that
economy which always characterized French operations at
sea, and was at once significant and ominous.
Returning to Pondicherry, D'Ach^ found that, though the
injuries to the masts and rigging could for this time be
repaired, there was lack of provisions, and that the ships
needed calking. Although his orders were to remain on the
coast until October 15, he backed himself with the opinion
of a council of war which decided that the ships could not
remain there longer, because, in case of a third battle, there
was neither rigging nor supplies remaining in Pondicherry ;
and disregarding the protests of the governor, Lally, he
sailed on the 2d of September for the Isle of France. The
underlying motive of D'Ach^, it is known, was hostility to
the governor, with whom he quarrelled continually. Lally,
deprived of the help of the squadron, turned his arms inland
instead of against Madras.
Upon arriving at the islands, D'Ach^ found a state of
things which again singularly illustrates the impotence and
short-sightedness characteristic of the general naval policy
of the French at this time. His arrival there was as un-
welcome as his departure from India had been to Lally.
The islands were then in a state of the most complete desti-
tution. The naval division, increased by the arrival of three
ships-of-the-line from home, so exhausted them that its im-
mediate departure was requested of the commodore. Repairs
were pushed ahead rapidly, and in November several of the
ships sailed to the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch colony,
to seek provisions ; but these were consumed soon after being
received, and the pressure for tlie departure of the squadron
was renewed. The situation of the ships was no less preca-
rious than that of the colony ; and accordingly the commodore
replied by urging his entire lack of food and supplies. The
condition was such that, a little later, it was necessary to
make nmning rigging out of the cables, and to put some of
the ships on the bottom, so as to give their materials to
others. Before returning to India, D'Ach^ wrote to the
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810 ^A^L OF FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.
minister of the navy that be was about to leave, only to
save the crews from dying of bunger, and tbat notbing
need be expected from tbe squadron if supplies were
not sent, for botb men and tbings were in a deplorable
Under tbese circumstances D'Acb^ sailed from tbe islands
in July, 1759, and arrived off tbe Coromandel coast in Sep-
tember. During bis year of absence Lally bad besieged Ma-
dras for two montbs, during tbe northeast monsoon. Botb
squadrons were absent, tbat season being unfit for naval
operations on this coast ; but tbe English returned first, and
are said by tbe French to have caused, by tbe English to
have hastened, tbe raising of tbe siege. D'Ach^, upon bis
return, was much superior in botb number and size of ships ;
but when tbe fleets met, Pocock did not hesitate to attack
with nine against eleven. This action, fought September
10, 1759, was as indecisive os tbe two former ; but D'Achd
retreated, after a very bloody contest. Upon it Oampboll,
in his Lives of tbe Admirals,'' makes a droll, but seemingly
serious, comment: Pocock had reduced the French ships
to a very shattered condition, and killed a great many of
their men ; but what shows the singular talents of both ad-
mirals, they had fought three pitched battles in eighteen
months without the loss of a ship on either side." The
fruits of victory, however, were with the weaker fleet ; for
D'Achd returned to Pondicberry and thence sailed on the Ist
of the next month for tbe islands, leaving India to its fate.
From that time the result was certain. The English con-
tinued to receive reinforcements from home, while the French
did not ; the men opposed to Lally were superior in ability ;
place after place fell, and in January, 1761, Pondicberry itself
surrendered, surrounded by land and cut off from the sea.
This was the end of tbe French power in India ; for though
Pondicberry and other possessions wore restored at tbe peace,
tbe English tenure there was never again shaken, even under
tbe attacks of the skilful and bold Suffren, who twenty
years later met difficulties as great bb D' Ache's with a vigor
state."
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RUIN OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
and conduct which the latter at a more hopeful moment failed
to show.
France having thus lost both Canada and India by the
evident failure of her power to act at a distance bj sea, it ^
would seem scarcely possible that Spain, with her own weak
nary and widely scattered possessions, would choose this mo-
ment for entering the wan Yet so it was. The maritime
exhaustion of France was plain to all, and is abundantly tes-
tified to by her naval historians. The resources of France
were exhausted,'' says one ; the year 1761 saw only a few
single ships leave her ports, and all of them were captured.
The alliance with Spain came too late. The occasional ships
that went to sea in 1762 were taken, and the colonies still
remaining to France could not be saved.'' ^ Even as early as
1768, another Frenchman writes, ^want of money, the de-
pression of commerce given over to English cruisers, the lack
of good ships, the lack of supplies, etc., compelled the French
ministry, unable to raise large forces, to resort to stratagems,
to replace the only rational system of war, Grand War, by
the smallest of petty wars, — by a sort of game in which the
great aim is not to be caught. Even then, the arrival of
four ships-of-the-line at Louisburg, by avoiding the enemy,
was looked on as a very fortunate event. ... In 1769 the
lucky arrival of the West India convoy caused as much sur-
prise as joy to the merchants. We see how rare had be-
come such a chance in seas ploughed by the squadrons of
England."' This was before the disasters of La Glue and
Conflans. The destruction of French commerce, beginning
by the capture of its merchant-ships, was consummated by
the reduction of the colonies. It can hardly, therefore, be
conceded that the Family Compact now made between the
two courts, containing, as it did, not only an agreement to
support each other in any future war, but also a secret clause
binding Spain to declare war against England within a year,
if peace were not made, was honorable to the wisdom of the
two governments." It is hard to pardon, not only the Span*
1 Troader BataUlet NaTalet de la France. " Lapeyxonae-BQiifils.
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THE BOURBON FAMILY COMPACT.
ish government, but even France for alluring a kindred people
into such a bad bargain. It was hoped, however, to revive
the French navy and to promote an alliance of neutral pow-
ers ; many of which, besides Spain, had causes of complaint
against England. During the war with France," confesses
an English historian, the Spanish flag had not always been
respected by British cruisers." ^ During 1758/' says another,
not less than one hundred and seventy-six neutral vessels,
laden with the rich produce of the French colonies or with
military or naval stores, fell into the hands of the English.** '
The causes were already at work which twenty years later
gave rise to the armed neutrality" of the Baltic powers,
directed against the claims of England on the sea. The pos-
session of unlimited power, as the sea power of England then
really was, is seldom accompanied by a profound respect for
the rights of others. Without a rival upon the ocean, it suited
England to maintain that enemy's property was liable to cap-
ture on board neutral ships, thus subjecting these nations
not only to vexatious detentions, but to loss of valuable trade ;
just as it had suited her curlier in the war to establish a paper
blockade of French ports. Neutrals of course chafed under
these exactions ; but the year 1761 was ill-chosen for an armed
protest, and of all powers Spain risked most by a war. Eng-
land had then on^ hundred and twenty ships-of-the-line in
commission, besides those in reserve, manned by seventy thou-
sand seamen trained and hardened by five years of constant
warfare afloat, and flushed with victory. Tlie navy of Franco,
which numbered seventy-seven ships-of-the-line in 1758, lost
as prizes to the English in 1759 twenty-seven, besides eight
destroyed and many frigates lost ; indeed, as has been seen,
their own writers confess that the navy was ruined, root and
branch. The Spanish navy contained about fifty ships ; but
the personnel, unless very different from the days before and
after, must have been very inferior. The weakness of her
empire, in the absence of an efiicient navy, has before been
pointed out. Neutrality, too, though at times outraged, had
1 MahoQ : HJstoi/ of England. * Campbell : Lives of the Admixala.
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ENGLAND DECLARES WAR AGAINST SPAIN. 818
been of great advantage to her, permitting her to reatore her
finances and trade and to re-establish her internal resources ;
but she needed a still longer period of it. Nevertheless, the
Icing, influenced by family feeling and resentment against Eng-
land, allowed himself to be drawn on by the astute Choiseul,
and the Family Compact between the two crowns was signed
on the 15th of August, 1761. . This compact, into which the
King of Naples was also to enter, guaranteed their mutual pos*
sessions by the whole power of both kingdoms. This in itself
was a weighty undertaking ; but the secret clause further
stipulated that Spain should declare war against England on
the 1st of May, 1762, if peace with France had not then been
made. Negotiations of this character could not be kept wholly
secret, and Pitt learned enough to convince him that Spain
was becoming hostile in intention. With his usual haughty
resolve, he determined to forestall her by declaring war ; but
the influence against him in the councils of the new king
was too strong. Failing to carry the ministry with him, he
resigned on the 6th of October, 1761. His prevision was
quickly justified ; Spain had been eager in professing good-
will until the treasure-ships from America should arrive
laden with the specie so needed for carrying on war. On
the 21st of September the Flota of galleons anchored safely
in Cadiz ; and on the 2d of November the British ambassador
announced to his government that two ships had safely ar-
rived with very extraordinary rich cargoes from the West
Indies, so that all the wealth that was expected from Span-
ish America is now safe in old Spain,'' and in the same de-
spatch reports a surprising change in the words of the Spanish
minister, and the haughty language now used.^ The griev-
ances and claims of Spain were urged peremptorily, and the
quarrel grew so fast that even the new English ministry,
though ardently desiring peace, recalled their ambassador be-
fore the end of the year, and declared war on the 4th of
January, 1762 ; thus adopting Pitt's policy, but too late to
reap the advantages at which he had aimed.
> Mahon : History of England.
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814
CAPTURE OF HAVANA.
However, no such delay on the part of England could alter
the essential inequality, in strength and preparation, between
the two nations. The plans formed by Pitt were in the main
adopted by his successor, and carried out with a speed which
the readiness of the English navy permitted. On the 6th
of March, Pocock, who had returned from the East Indies,
sailed from Portsmouth, convoying a fleet of transports to
act against Havana ; in the West Indies he was reinforced
from the forces in that quarter, so that his command con-
tained nineteen ships-of-the-line besides smaller vessels, and
ten thousand soldiers.
In the previous January, the West India fleet, under the
well-known Rodney, had acted with the land forces in the
reduction of Martinique, the gem and tower of the French
islands and the harbor of an extensive privateering system.
It is said that fourteen hundred English merchantmen were
taken during this war in the West Indian seas by ciniisers
whose principal port was Fort Royal in Martinique. With
this necessary base fell also the privateering system resting
upon it. Martinique was surrendered February 12, and the
loss of tliis chief commercial and military centre was im-
mediately followed by that of the smaller islands, Grenada,
Sta. Lucia, St. Vincent. By these acquisitions the English
colonies at Antigua, St. Eitts, and Nevis, as well as the
ships trading to those islands, were secured against the en-
emy, the commerce of England received large additions, and
all the Lesser Antilles, or Windward Islands, became British
possessions.
Admiral Pocock was joined off Cape St. Nicholas by the
West Indian reinforcement on tlie 27th of May, and as the
season was so far advanced, he took his great fleet through
the old Bahama channel instead of the usual route around
the south side of Cuba. This was justly considered a great
feat in those days of poor surveys, and was accomplished
without an accident. Lookout and sounding vessels went
first, frigates followed, and boats or sloops were anchored
on shoals with carefully arranged signals for day or night
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THE ALLIES INVADE PORTUGAL.
Having good weather, the fleet got through in a week and
appeared before Havana. The operations will not be given
in detail. After a forty days' siege the Moro Castle was
taken on the 80th of July, and the city surrendered on the
10th of August The Spaniards lost not only the city and
port, but twelve ships-of-the-line, besides £8,000,000 in money
and merchandise belonging to the Spanish king* The impor-
tance of Havana was not to be measured only by its own size,
or its position as centre of a large and richly cultivated dis-
trict ; it was also the port commanding the only passage by
which the treasure and other ships could sail from the Gulf
of Mexico to Europe in those days. With Havana in an
enemy's hands it would be necessary to assemble them at
Cartagena and from there beat up against the trade-winds,
— an operation always difficult, and which would keep ships
long in waters where they were exposed to capture by Eng-
lish cruisers. Not even an attack upon the isthmus would
have been so serious a blow to Spain. This important result
could only be achieved by a nation confident of controlling
the communications by its sea power, to which the happy
issue must wholly be ascribed, and which had another signal
illustration in the timely conveying of four thousand Amer-
ican troops to reinforce the English ranks, terribly wasted
by battle and fever. It is said that only twenty-five hundred
serviceable fighting men remained on foot when the city felL
While the long reach and vigor of England's sea power was
thus felt in the West Indies, it was receiving further illus-
tration in Portugal and in the far East. The allied crowns
in the beginning had invited Portugal to join their alliance
against those whom they had taken to calling the tyrants
of the seas," reminding her how the English monopoly of. her
trade was draining the country of gold, and recalling the
deliberate violation of her neutrality by the fleet under Bos-
cawen. The Portuguese minister of tlie day well knew all
this, and keenly felt it ; but though the invitation was accom-
panied by the plain statement that Portugal would not be
allowed to continue a neutrality she could not enforce, he
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CAPTURE OF MANILA.
judged rightly that the coantry had more to fear from Eng.
land and her fleet than from the Spanish army. The allies
declared war and invaded Portugal. They were for a time
successful; but the ^tyrants of the seas" answered Por-
tugal's cally sent a fleet and landed at Lisbon eight thousand
soldiers, who drove the Spaniards over the frontiera, and
even carried the war into Spain itself.
Simultaneous with these significant events, Manila was
attacked. With so much already on hand, it was found im-
possible to spare troops or ships from England. The suc-
cesses in India and the absolute security of the establishments
there, with the control of the sea, allowed the Indian officials
themselves to undertake this colonial expedition. It sailed
in August, 1762, and reaching Malacca on the 19th, was sup-
plied at that neutral port with all that was needed for the
siege about to be undertaken ; the Dutch, though jealous of
the English advance, not venturing to refuse their demands.
The expedition, which depended entirely upon the fleet, re-
sulted in the whole group of Philippine Islands surrendering
in October and paying a ransom of four million dollars. At
about the same time the fleet captured the Acapulco galleon
having three million dollars on board, and an English
squadron in the Atlantic took a treasure-ship from Lima with
four million dollars in silver for the Spanish government.
Never had the colonial empire of Spain received such blqws.
Spain, whose opportune intervention might have modified the fate
of the war, entered it too late to help France, but in time to share
her misfortunes. There was reason to fear yet more. Panama and
San Domingo were threatened, and the Anglo-Americans were pre-
paring for the invasion of Florida and Louisiana. • • • The conquest
of Havana had in great measure interrupted the communications be-
tween the wealthy American colonies of Spain and Europe. The
redaction of the Philippine Islands now excladed her from Asia.
The two together severed all the avenues of Spanish trade and cut
off all intercourse between the parts of their vast but disconnected
empire." *
^ Martin : Hiitoiy of Trance.
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SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE.
817
The selection of the points of attack, due to the ministry
of Pitt, was strategically good, cutting effectually the sinews
of the enemy's strength ; and if his plans had been fully car*
ried out and Panama also seized, the success would have been
yet more decisiTC. England had lost also the advantage of
the surprise he would have effected by anticipating Spain's
declaration of war; but her arms were triumphant during
this short contest, through the rapidity with which her pro-
jects were carried into execution, due to the state of efficiency
to which her naval forces and administration had been
brought.
With the conquest of Manila ended the military operations
of the war. Nine months, counting from the formal declara-*
tion by England in January, had been sufficient to shatter the
last hope of France, and to bring Spain to a peace in which
was conceded every point on which she had based her hostile
attitude and demands. It seems scarcely necessary, after
even the brief summary of events that has been given, to
point out that the speed and thoroughness with which Eng-
land's work was done was due wholly to her sea power, which
allowed her forces to act on distant points, widely apart as
Cuba, Portugal, India, and the Philippines, without a fear of
serious break in their communications.
Before giving the terms of peace which ought to summarize
the results of the war, but do so imperfectly, owing to the
weak eagerness of the English ministry to conclude it, it is
necessary to trace in outline the effect of the war upon com-
merce, upon the foundations of sea power and national
prosperity.
One prominent feature of this war may be more strongly
impressed upon the mind by a startling, because paradoxical,
statement that the prosperity of the English is shown by the
magnitude of their losses.
From 1756 to 1760," stateB a French historian, '^French pnvatoen
captured from the English more than twenty^ve hundred merchant-
men. In 1761, though France bad not, so to speak, a single ship-of-
the-line at sea, and thongh the English had taken two hundred and
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818 PROSPERITY OF BRITISH COMMERCE.
forty of our privateers, their comrades stOl took eight hundred and
t?relve English vessels. The explanation of the number of these
prizes lies in the prodigious growtli of the English shipping. In 1760
it u claimed that the English had at sea eight thousand sail ; of these
the French captured nearly one tenth, despite escorts and cruisers.
In the four years from 1756 to 1760 the French lost only nine
hundred and fifty vessels."^
But ibis diBcrepancy is justly attributed by an English
writer ^ to the diminution of the French commerce and the
dread of falling into the hands of the English, which kept
many of their trading-vessels from going to sea;" and he
goes on to point out that the capture of vessels was not the
principal benefit resulting from the efficiency of England's
fleets. Captures like Duquesne, Louisburg, Prince Edward's
Island, the reduction of Senegal, and later on of Guadeloupe
and Martinique, were events no less destructive to French
commerce and colonies than advantageous to those of Eng-
land."' The mnltiplication of French privateers was indeed
a sad token to an instructed eye, showing behind them mer*
chant shipping in enforced idleness, whose crews and whose
owners were driven to speculative pillage in order to live.
Nor was this risk wholly in vain. The same Englishman
confesses that in 1759 the losses of merchantmen showed a
worse balance than the ships-of-war. While the French were
striving in vain to regain equality upon the sea and repair
their losses, but to no purpose, for in building and arming
vessels they labored only for the English fleet," yet, not-
withstanding the courage and vigilance of English cruisers,
French privateers so swarmed that in this year they took two
hundred and forty British vessels, chiefly coasters and small
craft," In 1760 the same authority gives the British loss in
trading-vessels at over three hundred, and in 1761 at over eight
hundred, three times that of the French ; but he adds : It
would not have been wonderful had they taken more and richer
ships. While their commerce was nearly destroyed, and they
1 Martin : Histozy of Fiaaoo.
* Campbell: Lires of the Admirals.
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TRIUMPHANT POSITION OF ENGLAND. 819 *
had few merchant-ships at sea, the trading-fleets of England
covered the seas. Ever^ year her commerce was increasing ;
the money which the war carried out was retnmed by the
produce of her industry. Eight thousand vessels were em-
ployed by the traders of Great Britain." The extent of her
losses is attributed to three causes, of which the first only
was preventable: (1) The inattention of merchant-ships
to the orders of the convoying vessels; (2) The immense
number of English ships in all seas ; (8) The enemy's ven-
turing the whole remains of bis strength in privateering.
During the same year, 1761, the navy lost one ship-of-th^line^
which was retaken, and one cutter. At the same time, not-
withstanding the various exchanges, the English still held
twenty-five thousand French prisoners, while the English
prisoners in France were but twelve hundred. These were
the results of the sea war.
Finally, in summing up the commercial condition of the
kingdom at the end of the war, after mentioning the enormous
sums of specie taken from Spain, the writer says :
These strengthened trade and fostered industry. The remit-
tances for foreign subsidies were in great part paid by bQls on mer-
chants settled abroad, who had the value of the dnifts in British
manufactures. The trade of England increased gradually every year,
and such a scene of national prosperity while waging a long, costly,
and bloody war, was never before shown by any people in the world.**
No wonder, with such results to her commerce and such
unvarying success attending her arms, and seeing the practi-
cal annihilation of the French navy, that the union of France
and Spain, which was then lowering on her future and
had once excited the fears of all Europe, was now beheld by
Great Britain alone without the smallest fear or despondency.
Spain was by her constitution and the distribution of her em-
pire peculiarly open to the attack of a great sea people ; and
whatever the views of the govjernment of the day, Pitt and the
nation saw that the hour had come, which had been hoped
for in vain in 1789, because then years of peace and the obsti*
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820
ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL.
nate bias of a great minister had relaxed the muscles of her
fleet. Now she but reached forth her hand and seized what
she wished ; nor could there have been anj limit to her prey,
had not the ministry again been untrue to the interests of
the country.
The position of Portugal with reference to Great Britain
has been alluded to, but merits some special attention as in-
stancing an element of sea power obtained not by colonies,
but by alliance, whether necessary or prudential. The com-
mercial connection before spoken of ^ was strengthened by
the strongest political ties. The two kingdoms were so situ*
ated as to have little to fear from each other, while they might
impart many mutual advantages. The harbors of Portugal
gave shelter as well as supplies to the English fleet, while
the latter defended the rich trade of Portugal with Brazil.
The antipathy between Portugal and Spain made it neces-
sary for the former to have an ally, strong yet distant.
None is so advantageous in that way as England, which
in her turn might, and always has, derived great advan-
tages from Portugal in a war with any of the southern
powers of Europe.'*
This is an English view of a matter which to others looks
somewhat like an alliance between a lion and a lamb. To
call a country with a fleet like England's ^< distant" from a
small maritime nation like Portugal is an absurdity. Eng-
land is, and yet more in those days was, wherever her fleet
could go. The opposite view of the matter, sliowing equally
the value of the alliance, was well set forth in the memorial
by which, under the civil name of an invitation, the crowns
of France and Spain ordered Portugal to declare against
England.
The grounds of that memorial — namely, the unequal bene-
fit to Portugal from the connection and the disregard of
Portuguese neutrality — have already been given. The King
of Portugal refused to abandon the alliance, for the professed
reason that it was ancient and wholly defensive. To this the
two crowns replied : —
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PEACE OP PARIS, 176S.
821
The defensive alliance i» actnallj an offensive one bj the sitn-
ation of tbo Portagnese dominions and the nature of the English
power. The English squadrons cannot in all seasons keep the sea,
nor cmise on the principal coasts of France and Spain for catting off
the navigation of the two coantries, without the ports and assistance
of Portugal; and these islanders could not insult all maritime
Europe^ if the whole riches of Portugal did not pass through their
hands, which furnishes them with the means to make war and renders
the alliance truly and properly offensive.*'
Between the two arguments the logic of eituation and
power prevailed. Portugal found England nearer and more
dangerous than Spain, and remained for generations of trial
true to the alliance. This relationship was as useful to Eng-
land as any of her colonial possessions, depending of course
upon the scene of the principal operations at any particular
time.
The preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau,
November 8, 1762 ; the definitive treaty on the 10th of the fol-
lowing February, at Paris, whence the peace takes its name.
By its terms France renounced all claims to Canada, Nova
Scotia, and all the islands of the St. Lawrence ; along with
Canada she ceded the valley of the Ohio and all her territory
on the east side of the Mississippi, except the city of New
Orleans. At the same time Spain, as an equivalent for
Havana, which England restored, yielded Florida, under which
name were comprised all her continental possessions east of
the Mississippi. Thus England obtained a colonial empire
embracing Canada, from Hudson's Bay, and all of the present
United States east of tlie Mississippi. The possibilities of this
vast region were then only partially foreseen, and as yet there
was no foreshadowing of the revolt of the thirteen colonies.
In the West Indies, England gave back to France the
important islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The four
so-called neutral islands of the Lesser Antilles were divided
between the two powers ; Sta. Lucia going to France, St. Yin-
cent, Tobago, and Dominica to England, which also retained
Qrenada.
21
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822
OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY.
Minorca was given back to England ; and as the restora-
tion of the island to Spain had been one of the conditions
of the alliance with the latter, France, unable to fulfil her
stipulation, ceded to Spain Louisiana west of the Mississippi.
In India, France recorered the possessions she had held
before Dupleix began his schemes of aggrandizement; but
she gave up the right of erecting fortifications or keeping
troops in Bengal, and so left the station at Cbandemagore
defenceless. In a word, France resumed her facilities for
trading, but practically abandoned her pretensions to polit-
ical influence. It was tacitlj understood that the English
company would keep all its conquests.
The right of fishing upon the coasts of Newfoundland and
in parts of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which France had pre^
Tiously enjoyed, was conceded to her by this treaty; but it
was denied to Spain, who had claimed it for her fishermen.
This concession was among those most attacked by the Eng-
lish opposition.
The nation at large and Pitt, the favorite of the nation,
were bitterly opposed to the terms of the treaty. France,"
said Pitt, is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime and com-
mercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to
us above all through the injury to her which results from it.
You leave to France the possibility of reviving her navy."
In truth, from the point of view of sea power and of the
national jealousies which the spirit of that age sanctioned,
these words, though illiberal, were strictly Justifiable. The
restoration to France of her colonies in the West Indies and
her stations in India, together with the valuable right of
fishery in her former American possessions, put before her
the possibility and the inducement to restore her shipping,
her commerce, and her navy, and thus tended to recall her
from the path of continental ambition which had been so fatal
to her interests, and in the same proportion favorable to the
unprecedented growth of England's power upon the ocean.
The opposition, and indeed some of the ministry, also thought
that so commanding and important a position as Havana
Digitized by
RESULTS OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR. 828
was poorly paid for by the cession of the jet desolate and
unproductive region called Florida. Porto Bico was sug*
gestedy Florida accepted. There were other minor points
of difference, into which it is unnecessary to enter. It could
scarcely be denied that with the commanding military control
of the sea held by England, grasping as she now did so many
important positions, with her navy overwhelmingly supe-
rior in numbers, and her commerce and internal condition
very thriving, more rigorous terms might easily have been
exacted and would have been prudent The ministry de-
fended their eagerness and spirit of concession on the ground
of the enormous growth of the debt, which then amounted
to jS122,000,000, a sum in every point of view much greater
then than now; but while this draft upon the future was
fully justified by the success of the war, it also imperatively
demanded that the utmost advantages which the military
situation made attainable should be exacted. This the min*
istry failed to do. As regards the debt, it is well observed by
a French writer that in this war, and for years afterward,
England had in view nothing less than the conquest of Amer-
ica and the progress of her East India Company. By these
two countiries her manufactures and commerce acquired more
than sufficient outlets, and repaid her for the numerous sacri-
fices she had made. Seeing the maritime decay of Europe,
— its commerce annihilated, its manufactures so little ad-
vanced,— how could the English nation feel afraid of a future
which offered so vast a perspective ? " Unfortunately the na-
tion needed an exponent in the government ; and its chosen
mouthpiece, the only man, perhaps, able to rise to the level
of the great opportunity, was out of favor at court.
Nevertheless, the gains of England were very great, not
only in territorial increase, nor yet in maritime preponder-
ance, but in the prestige and position achieved in the eyes
of the nations, now fully opened to her great resources and
mighty power. To these results, won by the sea, the issue
of the continental war offered a singular and suggestive con-
trast. France had already withdrawn, along with England,
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824
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER IN
from all share in that strife, and peace between the othet
parties to it was signed five days after the Peace of Paris.
The terms of the peace were simply the $tatu9 quo ante bellum.
By the estimate of the King of Prussia, one hundred and eighty
thousand of his soldiers had fallen or died in this war, out
of a kingdom of five million souls ; while the losses of Russia,
Austria, and France aggregated four hundred and sixty thou-
sand men. The result was simply that things remained as
they were.* To attribute this only to a difference between
the possibilities of land and sea war is of course absurd. The
genius of Frederick, backed by the money of England, had
proved an equal match for the mismanaged and not al-
ways hearty efforts of a coalition numerically overwhelming.
What does seem a fair conclusion is, that States having a
good seaboard, or even ready access to the ocean by one or
two outlets, will find it to their advantage to seek prosperity
and extension by the way of the sea and of commerce, rather
than in attempts to unsettle and modify existing political
arrangements in countries where a more or less long posses-
sion of power has conferred acknowledged rights, and created
national allegiance or political ties. Since the Treaty of Paris
in 1768, the waste places of the world have been rapidly
filled ; witness our own continent, Australia, and even South
America. A nominal and more or less clearly defined po-
litical possession now generally exists in the most forsaken
regions, though to this statement there are some marked ex-
ceptions ; but in many places this political possession is little
more than nominal, and in others of a character so feeble
that it cannot rely upon itself alone for support or protection.
The familiar and notorious example of the Turkish Empire,
kept erect only by the forces pressing upon it from opposing
sides, by the mutual jealousies of powers that have no sym-
pathy with it, is an instance of such weak political tenure ;
and though the question is wholly European, all know enough
of it to be aware that the interest and control of the sea powers
is among the chief, if not the first, of the elements that now fix
A See Annual Register, 176S, p. 63.
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REMOTE AND DISORDERED COUNTRIES. 826
the situation ; and that they, if intelligently used, will direct
the future inevitable changes. Upon the western continents the
political condition of the Central American and tropical South
American States is so unstable as to cause constant anxiety
about the maintenance of internal order, and seriously to
interfere with commerce and with the peaceful development
of their resources. So long as — to use a familiar expres-
sion — they hurt no one but themselves, this may go on ; but
for a long time the citizens of more stable governments have
been seeking to exploit their resources, and have borne the
losses arisiug from their distracted condition. North America
and Australia still offer large openings to immigration and
enterprise ; but they are filling up rapidly, and as the oppor-
tunities there diminish, the demand must arise for a more
settled government in those disordered States, for security
to life and for reasonable stability of institutions enabling
merchants and others to count upon the future. There is
certainly no present hope that such a demand can be fulGUed
from the existing native materials ; if the same be true when
the demand arises, no theoretical positions, like the Monroe
doctrine, will prevent interested nations from attempting to
remedy the evil by some measure, which, whatever it may
be called, will be a political interference. Such interferences
must produce collisions, which may be at times settled by
arbitration, but can scarcely fail at other times to cause
war. Even for a peaceful solution, that nation will have the
strongest arguments which has the strongest organized force.
It need scarcely be said that the successful piercing of the
Central American Isthmus at any point may precipitate the
moment that is sure to come sooner or later. The profound
modification of commercial routes expected from this enter-
prise, the political importance to the ITnited States of such a
channel of communication between her Atlantic and Pacific
seaboards, are not, however, the whole nor even the principal
part of the question. As far as can be seen, the time will
come when stable governments for the American tropical
States must be assured by the now existing powerful and
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826 EFFECTS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
Btable States of America or Europe. The geographical position
of those States, the climatic conditions, make it plain at once
that sea power will there, even more than in the case of
Turkey, determine what foreign State shall predominate, —
if not by actual possession, hj its influence over the natiye
governments. The geographical position of the United States
and her intrinsic power give her an undeniable advantage ;
but that advantage will not avail if there is a great infe-
riority of organized brute-force, which still remains the last
argument of republics as of kings. Herein lies to ns the
/ great and still living interest of the Seven Years' War. In
it we have seen and followed England, with an army small
as compared with other States, as is still her case to-day,
first successfully defending her own shores, then carrying
her arms in every direction, spreading her rule and influence
over remote regions, and not only binding them to her obedi*
ence, but making them tributary to her wealth, her strength,
and her reputation. As she loosens the grasp and neutralizes
the influence of France and Spain in regions beyond the sea,
there is perhaps seen tlie prophecy of some other great nation
in days yet to come, that will incline the balance of power in
some future sea war, whose scope will be recognized after-
ward, if not by contemporaries, to have been the political
future and the economical development of regions before lost
to civilization ; but that nation will not be the United States
if the moment find her indifferent, as now, to the empire
of the seas.
The direction then given to England's efforts, by the
instinct of the nation and the fiery genius of Pitt, continued
/ after the war, and has profoundly influenced her subsequent
policy. Mistress now of North America, lording it in India,
through the company whose territorial conquests had been
ratified by native princes, over twenty millions of inhabitants,
— a population larger than that of Great Britian and having
a revenue respectable alongside of that of the home govern-
ment,— England, with yet other rich possessions scattered
far and wide over the globe, had ever before her eyes, as a
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UPON THE AFTER POLICY OF ENGLAND. 827
salutary lesson, the severe chastisement which the weakness
of Spain had allowed her to inflict upon that huge disjointed
empire. Tiie words of the English naval historian of that
war^ speaking about Spain, apply with slight modiflcations
to England in our own day.
Spain is precisely that power against which England can always
contend with the fairest prospect of advantage and honor. That
extensive monarchy is exhausted at heart, her resources lie at a
great distance, and whatever power commands the sea, may tom^
mand the wealtli and commerce of Spain. The dominions froni
which she draws her resources, lying at an immense distance from
the capital and from one another, make it more necessary for her
than for any other State to temporize, until she can inspire with
activity all parts of her enormous but disjointed empire."^
It would be untrue to say that England is exhausted at
heart ; but licr dependence upon the outside world is such as
to give a certain suggestiveness to the phrase.
This analogy of positions was not overlooked by England.
From that time forward np to our own day, the possessions
won for her by her sea power have combined with that sea
power itself to control her policy. The road to India — in
the days of Clive a distant and perilous voyage on which she
had not a stopping-place of her own — was reinforced as op-
portunity offered by the acquisition of St Helena, of the Cape
of Qood Hope, of the Mauritius. When steam made the Bed
Sea and Mediterranean route practicable, she acquired Aden^
and yet later has established herself at Socotra. Malta had
already fallen into her hands during the wars of the French
Revolution ; and her commanding position, as the comer-stone
upon which the coalitions against Napoleon rested, enabled
her to claim it at the Peace of 1816. Being but a short thou-
sand miles from Gibraltar, the circles of military command
exercised by these two places intersect. Tiie present day has
seen the stretch from Malta to the Isthmus of Suez, formerly
without a station, guarded by the cession to her of Gyprua
I CampbeU: LWes of the Admirals.
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I
828 NAVAL POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN.
E^ypt, despite the jealousy of France, has passed under Eng-
lish control. The importance of that position to India, under-
stood by Napoleon and Nelson, led the latter at once to send
an officer overland to Bombay with the news of the battle
of the Nile and the downfall of Bonaparte's hopes. Even
now, the jealousy with wliich England views the advance of
Russia in Central Asia is the result of those days in which
her sea power and resources triumphed over the weakness
of D'Achd and the genius of Suffren, and wrenched the
peninsula of India from the ambition of the French.
^For the first time since the Middle Ages," says M. Martin,
speaking of the Seven Tears' War, Eng^uid had conquered
France single-handed almost without allies, France having powerful
auxiliaries. She had conquered solely by the superiority of her
government*'
Yes ! but by the superiority of her government using the
tremendous weapon of her sea power. This made her rich,
and in turn protected the trade by which she had her
wealth. With her money she upheld her few auxiliaries,
mainly Prussia and Hanover, in their desperate strife. Her
power was everywhere that her ships could reach, and there
was none to dispute the sea to her. Where she would she
went, and with her went her guns and her troops. By this
mobility her forces were multiplied, those of her enemies
distracted. Ruler of the seas, she everywhere obstructed its
highways. The enemies' fleets could not join ; no great fleet
could get out, or if it did, it was only to meet at once, with
uninured officers and crews, those who were veterans in gales
and warfare. Save in the case of Minorca, she carefully held
her own sea-bases and eagerly seized those of the enemy. What
a lion in the path was Gibraltar to the French squadrons of
Toulon and Brest ! What hope for French succor to Canada,
when the English fleet had Louisburg under its lee ?
The one nation that gained in this war was that which
used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war
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NAVAL POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN.
329
by the extent oi its navy, by the number of its subjects who
lived on the sea or by the sea, and by its numerous bases of
operations scattered over the globe. Tet it must be observed
that these bases themselves would have lost tlieir value if
their communications remained obstructed. Therefore the
French lost Louisburg, Martinique, Pondicherry ; so England
herself lost Minorca. The service between the bases and the
mobile force between the ports and the fleets is mutual.^ In
this respect the navy is essentially a light corps ; it keeps
open the communications between its own ports, it obstructs
those of the enemy; but it sweeps the sea for the service
of the land, it controls the desert that man may live and
thrive on the habitable globe.
1 These remarks, alwajrs trae, are doablj to now since the introdnction of
steam. The renewal of coal is a want more frequent, more urgent, more per-
emptorjy than anjr known to the sailing-ship. It is Tain to look for energetic
naTal operations distant from coal stations. It is equally Tain to acquire die-
taut coaling stations without maintaining a powerful naTj ; thej wiU but fall
into the hands of the enemy. But the rainest of all delusions is the expectation
of bringing down an enemy by commerce^estroying alone, with no coaling
stations outside the national boundaries.
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CHAPTER IX.
COURSS or £yKMT8 FXOM THB PbACB 09 Pa&IS TO 1778. — MARI-
TIME War CON8BQUBNT UPON THB Ambrican Ebyolution. — Sba
Battlb orr Ubhant.
TF England had reason to complain that sho had not reaped
from the Treaty of Paris all the advantages that her
military achievements and position entitled her to expect,
France had every cause for discontent at the position in
which the war left her. The gain of England was nearly
measured by her losses; even the cession of Florida, made
to the conqueror by Spain, had been bought by France
at the price of Louisiana. Naturally the thoughts of her
statesmen and of her people, as they bent under the present
necessity to bear the burden of the vanquished, turned to
the future with its possibilities of revenge and compensation.
The Due de Ghoiseul, able though imperious, remained for
many years more at the head of affairs, and worked persist-
ently to restore the power of France from the effects of the
treaty. The Austrian alliance had been none of his seeking ;
it was already made and working when he came to office in
1758 ; but he had even at the first recognized that the chief
enemy was England, and tried as far as could be to direct
the forces of the nation against her. The defeat of Conilans
having thwarted his projects of invasion, he next sought, in
entire consistency with his main purpose, to stir up Spain and
gain her alliance. The united efforts of the two kingdoms
with their fine seaboards could, under good administration and
with time for preparation, put afloat a navy that would be a
fair counterpoise to that of England. It was also doubtless
true that weaker maritime States, if they saw such a combi*
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REVIVAL OF TEE FRENCH NAVY.
nation successfully made and working efficientlj, would pluck
up heart to declare against a government whose greatness
excited envj and fear, and which acted with the disregard to
the rights and welfare of others common to all uncontrolled
power. Unhappily for both France and Spain, the alliance
came too late. The virtual annihilation of the French fleet
in 1769 was indeed followed by an outburst of national en-
thusiasm for the navjy skilfully fostered and guided by
GhoiseuL Popular feeling took up the cry, from one end
of France to the other, * The navy must be restored.' Qif ts
of cities, corporations, and private individuals raised funds.
A prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent ports ;
everywhere ships were building and repairing." The min-
ister also recognized the need of restoring the discipline and
tone, as well as the material of the navy. The hour, how-
ever, was too late ; the middle of a great and unsuccessful
war is no time to begin preparations. Better late than
never " is not so safe a proverb as In time of peace pre-
pare for war." The condition of Spain was better. When
war broke out, the English naval historian estimates that she
had one hundred ships of all sizes ; of these, probably sixty
were of the line. Nevertheless, although the addition of
Spain to her numerous enemies might make the position of
England seem critical, the combination in her favor of num-
bers, skill, experience, and prestige, was irresistible. With
seventy thousand veteran seamen, she had only to maintain
a position already won. The results, we know.
After the peace, Ghoiseul wisely remained faithful to his
own first ideas. The restoration of the navy continued, and
was accompanied and furthered by a spirit of professional
ambition and of desire to excel, among the officers of the
navy, which has been before mentioned, and which, in the
peculiar condition of the United States navy at the present
day, may be commended as a model. The building of ships^
of-war continued with great activity and on a large scale. At
the end of the war, thanks to the movement begun in 1761,
there were forty ships-of-the-line in good condition. In 1770*
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882 TONE OP THE FRENCH OFFICERS.
when Gboiseul was dismissed, tho rojal navy numbered sixty-
four of the line and fifty frigates afloat. The arsenals and
storehouses were filled, and a stock of ship-timber laid up.
At the same time the minister tried to improve the efficiency
of the officers by repressing the arrogant spirit of those of
noble birth, which showed itself both toward superiors and
toward another order of officers, not of the nobility, whose
abilities made them desired on board the fleet. This class-
feeling carried with it a curious sentiment of equality
among officers of very different grades, which injuriously af-
fected the spirit of subordination. Members, all, of a privi-
leged social order, their equality as such was more clearly
recognized than their inequality as junior and senior. The
droll story told by Marryatt of the midshipman, who repre-
sented to his captain that a certain statement had been
made in cbnfidence, seems to have had a realization on tlie
French quarter-deck of that day. Confidence ! " cried the
captain ; who ever heard of confidence between a post-
y captain and a midshipman ! " No sir," replied the young-
ster, not between a captain and a midshipman, but between
two gentlemen." Disputes, arguments, suggestions, between
two gentlemen, forgetful of their relative rank, would break
out at critical moments, and the feeling of equality, which
wild democratic notions spread throughout the fleets of the
republic, was curiously forestalled by that existing among the
members of a most haughty aristocracy. ^^I saw by his
face," says one of Marryatt's heroes, ^Hhat the first lieu-
tenant did not agree with the captain ; but he was too good
an officer to say so at such a moment." The phrase ex-
presses one of the deepest-rooted merits of the English sys-
tem, the want of which is owned by French writers : — .
Under Louis XYI. the intimacy and fellowship existing be-
tween the chief and the subordinate led the latter to discuss the
orders which were given him. . . • The relaxation of discipline and
the spirit of independence were due also to another cause than that
pointed out ; they can be partly attributed to the regulation of the
officers' messes. Admiral, captain, officers, midshipmen, ate together ;
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FOREIGN POLICY OF CHOISEUL. 888
«
eyerything was in common. Thej thee-and-Uion'd each other like
chnms. In handling the ship, the inferior gaye his opinion, argued,
and the chief, irritated, often preferred to yield rather than make
enemies. Facts of this kind are asserted by witnesses whose truth-
fulness is aboye suspicion." ^
Insubordination of this character, to which weaker men
gaye way, dashed in yain against the resolute and fiery tem-
\m of Suffren ; but tlie spirit of discontent rose almost to
tlie height of mutiny, causing him- to say in his despatches
to the minister of the nayy, after his fourth battle: ^^My
heart is pierced by the most general defection. It is frightful
to think that I might four times haye destroyed the English
fleet, and that it still exists." Ghoiseurs reforms broke
against this rock, which only the uprising of the whole na-
tion finally remoyed; but in tlie personnel of the crews a
great improyement was made. In 1767 he reorganized the
artillery of the fleet, forming a body of ten thousand gunners,
who were systematically drilled once a week during the ten
years still to interyene before the next war with England.
Losing sight of no part of his plans, Ghoiseul, while pro-
moting the nayal and military power of France, paid special
attention to the alliance with Spain and judiciously encouraged
and furthered the efforts of that country in the path of pro-
gress under Charles III., the best of her kings of the Bourbon
line. The Austrian alliance still existing was maintained,
but his hopes were chiefly fixed upon Spain. The wisdom
and insight which had at once fastened upon England as the
centre of enmity to France had been justified and further
enlightened by the whole course of the Seyen Years* War.
In Spain was the surest, and, with good administration, the
most powerful ally. The close proximity of the two coun-
tries, the relatiye positions of their ports, made the nayal
situation particularly strong; and the alliance which was
dictated by sound policy, by family ties, and by just fear of
England's sea power, was further assured to France by recent
and still existing injuries that must continue to rankle with
1 Tronde : Batailles Naraks.
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884 FRANCE ACQUIRES CORSICA.
«
Spain. Gibraltar, Minorca, and Florida were still in the
hands of England; no Spaniard could be easy till this re-
proach was wiped out.
It may be readily believed, as is asserted by French his-
torians, that England viewed with disquietude the growth of
the French navy, and would gladly have nipped it betimes ;
but it is more doubtful whether she would have been willing
to force a war for that purpose. During the years succeeding
the Peace of Paris a succession of short ministries, turning
mainly upon questions of Internal policy or unimpoi*tant
party arrangement, caused her foreign policy to present a
marked contrast to the vigorous, overbearing, but straight-
forward path followed by Pitt Internal commotions, such
as are apt to follow great wars, and above all the contro-
versy with the North American colonies, which began as
early as 1765 with the well-known Stamp Act, conspired
with other causes to stay the )iand of England. Twice at
least during the years of Choiseul's ministry there occurred
opportunities which a resolute, ready, and not too scrupulous
government might easily have converted into a cause of war ;
the more so as they involved that sea power which is to Eng-
land above all other nations the object of just and jealous
concern. In 1764 the Genoese, weary of their unsuccessful
attempts to control Corsica, again asked France to renew the
occupation of the ports which had been garrisoned by her in
1766. The Corsicans also sent an ambassador to France in
order to solicit recognition of the independence of the island,
in consideration of a tribute equivalent to that which they
had formerly paid to Genoa. The latter, feeling its inability
to reconquer the island, at length decided practically to cede
it. The transaction took the shape of a formal permission
for the King of France to exercise all the rights of sover-
eignty over all the places and harbors of Corsica, as security
for debts owing to him by the republic. This cession, dis-
guised under the form of a security in order to palliate the
nggrandizement of France in the eyes of Austria and Eng-
land, recalls the conditional and thinly veiled surrender of
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DISPUTE ABOUT FALKLAND ISLANDS. 886
Ojpnis to England nine years ago, — a transfer likelj to be
as final and far-reaching as that of Corsica. England then
remonstrated and talked angrily ; but though Burke said,
Corsica as a province of France is terrible to me," only
one member of the House of Commons, the veteran admiral
Sir Charles Saunders, was found to say ^'that it would be
better to go to war with France than consent to her taking
possession of Corsica."^ Having in view the then well-
recognized interests of England in the Mediterranean, it is
evident that an island so well situated as Corsica for influ-
encing the shores of Italy and checking the naval station at
Minorca, would not have been allowed to go into the hands
of a strong master, if the nation had felt ready and willing
for war.
Again, in 1770, a dispute arose between England and Spain
relative to the possession of the Falkland Islands. It is not
material to state the nature of either claim to what was then
but a collection of barren islands, destitute of military as
well as of natural advantages. Both England and Spain
had had a settlement, on which l^e national colors were
flying ; and at the English station a captain in the navy com*
manded. Before this settlement, called Port Egmont, there
suddenly appeared, in June, 1770, a Spanish expedition, fitted
out in Buenos Ayres, of five frigates and sixteen hundred
soldiers. To such a force the handful of Englishmen could
make no serious resistance ; so after a few shots, exchanged
for the honor of the flag, they capitulated.
The news of this transaction, which reached England in
the following October, showed by its reception how much
more serious is an insult than an injury, and how much more
bitterly resented. The transfer of Corsica had scarcely oc-
casioned a stir outside the oflices of statesmen ; the attack
on Port Egmont roused the people and Parliament. The
minister to Madrid was ordered to demand the immediate
restoration of the islands, with a disavowal of the action of
the officer who had ordered the attack. Without waiting
1 Mahon: Hlitorj of England.
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886
DEATH OF LOUIS XV.
for a reply, ships were ordered into commission, press-gangs
swept the streets, and in a short time a powerful fleet was
ready at Spithoad to revenge the insult. Spain, relying upon
the Bourbon family compact and the support of France,
was disposed to stand firm; but the old king, Louis XY.,
was ayerse to war, and Ghoiseul, among whose enemies at
court was the last mistress, was dismissed. With his fall
disappeared the hopes of Spain, which at once complied with
the demands of England, reserving, however, the question
as to the rights of sovereignty. This conclusion shows
clearly that England, though still wielding an effective sea
power able to control Spain, was not eager for a war merely
in order to break down the rival navies.
It is not wholly alien to the question of sea power to note,
without dwelling upon it, a great event which now happened,
seemingly utterly removed from all relation to the sea. The
first partition of Poland between Prussia, Russia, and Austria,
carried out in 1772, was made easier by the preoccupation
of Choiseul with his naval policy and the Spanish alliance.
The friendship and suppQrt of Poland and Turkey, as checks
upon the House of Austria, were part of the tradition received
from Henry lY. and Richelieu; the destruction of the for-
mer was a direct blow to the pride and interest of France.
What Choiseul would have done had he been in office,
cannot be known; but if the result of the Seven Years'
War had been different, France might have interfered to
some purpose.
On the 10th of May, 1774, Louis XY. died, at the time when
the troubles in the North American colonies were fast com-
ing to a head. Under his youthful successor, Louis XYI.,
the policy of peace on the continent, of friendly alliance with
Spain, and of building up the navy in numbers and efficiency,
was continued. This was the foreign policy of Choiseul,
directed against the sea power of England as the chief
enemy, and toward the sea power of France as the chief
support, of the nation. The instructions which, according
to a French naval author, the new king gave to his ministers
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FOREIGN POLICY OF LOOIS XVL
show the spirit with which hia reign up to the Berolution
was inspired^ whether or not they originated with tlie king
himself : —
To watch all mdications of approaching danger ; to obscrye b j
cruisers the approaches to onr islands and the entrance to the Gnlf
of Mexico; to keep track of what was passing on the banks of
Newfoundland, and to follow the tendencies of English commerce ;
to observe in England the state of the troops and armaments, the
public credit and the ministry ; to meddle adroitly in the affairs of
the British colonies; to give the insurgent colonists the means of
obtaining supplies of war, while maintaining the strictest neutrality ;
to develop actively, but noiselessly, the navy; to repair our ships
of war ; to fill our storehouses and to keep on hand the means for
rapidly equipping a fleet at Brest and at Toulon, while Spain should
be fitting one at Ferrol ; finally, at the first serious fear of rupture,
to assemble numerous troops upon the shores of Brittany and
Normandy, and get everything ready for an invasion of England,
so as to force her to concentrate her forces, and thus restrict her
means of resistance at the extremities of the empire/'^
Such instructions, whether given all at once as a sym-
metrical, well-thought-ont plan, or from time to time, as
occasion arose, showed that an accurate forecast of the
situation had been made, and breathed a conviction which,
if earlier felt, would have greatly modified the history of the
two countries. The execution was less thorough than the
conception.
In the matter of developing the navy, however, fitfteen years
of peace and steady work showed good results. When war
openly broke out in 1778, France had eighty ships-of-the-line
in good condition, and sixty-seven thousand seamen were
borne on the rolls of the maritime conscription. Spain, when
she entered the war in 1779 as the ally of France, had in
her ports nearly sixty ships-of-the-line. To this combination
England opposed a total number of two hundred and twenty-
eight ships of all classes, of which about one hundred and
fifty were of the line. The apparent equality in material
' LapejnroQse-Bonflls, vol. iii. p. 0.
22
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888 CHARACTER OF THE NAVAL WAR OF 1778.
which would result from these numbers was affected, to the
disadvantage of England, by the superior size and artillery
of the French and Spaniards; but on the other hand her
strength was increased by the unity of aim imparted by be-
longing to one nation. The allies were destined to feel the
proverbial weakness of naval coalitions, as well as the de-
generate administration of Spain, and the lack of habit — may
it not even be said without injustice, of aptitude for the sea
— of both nations. The naval policy with which Louis XYI.
began his reign was kept up to the end ; in 1791, two years
after the assembly of tiie States-General, the French navy
numbered eighty-six ships-of-the-line, generally superior, both
in dimensions and model, to English ships of the same class.
We have come, therefore, to the beginning of a truly
^ maritime war ; which, as will be granted by those who have
followed this narrative, had not been seen since the days
of De Buyter and Tourville. The magnificence of sea power
and its value had perhaps been more clearly shown by the
uncontrolled sway, and consequent exaltation, of one bellig-
erent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less
vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea power
meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion
by a strife which endangered, not only its most valuable
colonies, but even its own shores. Waged, from the ex*
tended character of the British Empire, in all quarters of the
world at once, the attention of the student is called now to
the East Indies and now to the West ; now to tlie shores of
tlie United States and thence to those of England ; from New
York and Chesapeake Bay to Gibraltar and Minorca, to the
Gape Yerde Islands, the Gape of' Good Hope, and Ceylon.
Fleets now meet fleets of equal size, and the general chase
. and the mtlSe^ which marked the actions of Hawke, Boscawen,
and Anson, though they still occur at times, are for the
most part succeeded by wary and complicated manQBuvi*e8,
too often barren of decisive results as naval battles, which
are the prevailing characteristic of this coming war. The
superior tactical science of the French succeeded in impart-
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ORDERS TO FRENCH ADMIRALS.
339
ing to this conflict that peculiar feature of their naval pol-
icy, which subordinated the control of the sea by the
destruction of the enemy's fleets, of his organized naval
forces, to the success of particular operations, the retention
of particular points, the carrying out of particular ulterior
strategic ends. It is not necessary to endeavor to force upon
others the conviction of the present writer that such a policy,
however applicable as an exception, is faulty as a rule ; but
it is most desirable that all persons responsible for the con-
duct of naval affairs should recognize that the two lines ot
policy, in direct contradiction to each other, do exist. In
the one there is a strict analogy to a war of posts ; while in
the other the objective is that force whose destruction leaves
the posts unsupported and therefore sure to fall in due time.
These opposing policies being recognized, consideration should
also be had of the results of the two as exemplified in the
history of England and France.
It was not, however, with such cautious views that the
new king at first sought to impress his admirals. In the
instructions addressed to the Count d'Orvillicrs, commanding
the first fleet sent out from Brest, the minister, speaking in
the name of the king, says : —
Your duty now is to restore to the French flag the lustre with
which it once shone; past misfortunes and fanlts must be buried out
of sight ; only by the most ilJnstrions actions can the navy hope to
succeed in doing this. His Majesty has the right to expect the
greatest efforts from his officers. . . . Under whatever circumstances
the king's fleet may be placed, his Majesty's orders, which he ex-
pressly charges me to impress upon you, as well as upon all officers
in command, are that his ships attack with the greatest vigor, and
defend themselves, on all occasions, to the last extremity."
More follows to the same effect; upon which a French
officer, who has not before been quoted in connection with
this phase of French naval policy, says : —
"How different this language from that held to our admirals
during the last war ; for it would be an error to believe that they
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840
ORDERS TO FRENCH ADMIRALS.
followed by choice and temper the timid and defenaive system which
predominated in the tactics of the navy. The gOYcrnment, always
finding the expenses exacted by the employment of the navy ex-
cessive, too often prescribed to its admirals to keep the sea as long
as possible without coming to pitched battles, or even to brusheSi
generally very expensiye, and from which might follow the loss of
ships difllcttlt to replace. Often they were enjoined, if driven to
accept action, carefully to avoid compromising the ^te of their
squadron by too decisive encounters. They thought themselves,
therefore, obliged to retreat as soon as an engagement took too
serious a turn. Thus they acquired the unhappy habit of voluntarily
yielding the field of battle as soon as an enemy, even inferior,
boldly disputed it with them. Thus to send a fieet to meet the
enemy, only to retire shamefully from his presence; to receive
action instead of offering it ; to begin battles only to end tliem with
the semblance of defeat ; to ruin moral force in order to save physi-
cal force, — that was the spirit which, as has been very judiciously
said by M. Charles Dupin, guided the French minbtry of that epoch.
The results are known/'*
The brave words of Louis XYI. were followed almost im-
mediately by others, of different and qualifying tenor, to
Admiral d'Orvilliers before he sailed. He was informed that
the king, having learned the strength of the English fleet,
relied upon his prudence as to the conduct to be followed at
a moment when he had under his orders all the naval force
of which France could dispose. As a matter of fact the two
fleets were nearly equal ; it would be impossible to decide
which was the stronger, without detailed information as to the
armament of every ship. D'Orvilliers found himself, as many
a responsible man has before, with two sets of orders, on one
or the other of which he was sure to be impaled, if unlucky ;
while the government, in the same event, was sure of a
scape-goat.
The consideration of the relative force of the two navies,
material and moral, has necessarily carried us beyond the date
of the opening of the American Revolutionary War. Before
1 Troade, toI. U. pp. 8-6. For other qnotations from French authois to the
came effect, see ante, pages 77, 80, 81.
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MILITARY SITUATION IN AMERICA. 841
beginning wiCh that ertruggle, it may be well to supplement the
rough estimate of Bngland's total naval force, given, in lack
of more precise information, by the statement of the First
Lord of the Admiralty made in the House of Lords in Novem-
ber, 1777, a very few months before the war with France
began. Replying to a complaint of the opposition as to the
smallness of the Channel fleet, be said : —
We have now forty-two ships-of-the-lioe in commission in Great
Britain (without oounUng those on foreign service), thirty-five of
which are completely manned, and ready for sea at a moment's warn-
ing. • • • I do not believe that either France or Spain entertains any
hostile disposition toward ns ; bat from what I have now sabmitted .
to yon, I am aathorized to affirm that our navy is more than a match
for that of the whole House of Bourbon."^
It must, however, be said that this pleasing prospect was
not realized by Admiral Keppel when appointed to command
in the following March, and looking at his fleet with (to use
his own apt expression) a seaman^s eye ; and in June he
went to sea with only twenty ships.
It is plainly undesirable to insert in a narrative of this
character any account of the political questions which led to
the separation of the United States from the British Empire.
It has already been remarked that the separation followed
upon a succession of blunders by the English ministry, —
not unnatural in view of the ideas generally prevalent at that
day as to the relations of colonies to the mother-country. It
needed a man of commanding genius to recognize, not only the
substantial justice of the American claims, — many did that,
— but also the military strength of their situation, as before
indicated. This lay in the distance of the colonies from home,
their nearness to each other independently of the command
of the sea, the character of the colonists, ^ mainly of English
and Dutch stock, — and the probable hostility of France and
Spain. Unfortunately for England, the men most able to cope
with the situation were in the minority and out of oflice.
1 Mahon : History of England; Qentleman's Magasine, 1777, p. 553.
s Keppel's Defence.
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THE LINE OP THE HUDSON.
It has been said before that, had the thirteen colonies been
Islands, the sea power of Great Britain would have so com-
pletely isolated them that their fall, one after the other,
must have ensued. To this it may be added that the narrow-
ness of the strip then occupied by civilized man, and the man-
y ner in which it was intersected by estuaries of the sea and
navigable rivers, practically reduced to the condition of islands,
so far as mutual support went, great sections of the insurgent
country, which were not large enough to stand alone, yet too
large for their fall not to have been a fatal blow to the com-
mon cause. The most familiar case is that of the line of the
Hudson, where the Bay of Now York was held from the first
by the British, who also took the city in September, 1776, two
months after the Declaration of Independence. The difficul-
ties in the way of moving up and down such a stream were
doubtless much greater to sailing vessels than they now are
. to steamers ; yet it seems impossible to doubt that active and
/ capable men wielding the groat sea power of England could so
have held that river and Lake Chaniplain with ships-of-war at
intervals and accompanying galleys as to have supported a
sufficient army moving between the head-waters of the Hudson
and the lake, while themselves preventing any intercourse by
water between New England and the States west of the river.
This operation would have closely resembled that by which in
the Civil War the United States fleets and armies gradually cut
in twain the Southern Confederacy by mastering the course of
the Mississippi, and the political results would have been even
more important than the military ; for at that early stage of
the war the spirit of independence was far more general and
bitter in the section that would hare been cut off, — in New
England, — than in New York and New Jersey, perhaps than
anywhere except in South Carolina.^
1 "A candid riew of oar albdn, which I am going to ezhihlt, wiU make joa
• a jodga of the difflcoltiea under which we labor. Almoat all our sappliea of floor
and no inoonaiderable part of onr meat are drawn from the States westward of
Hndson't River. This renders a secure commonication across that river indlt-
pensablj nefiessarj, both to the support of joor squadron and the arm/. The
enemj, being masters of that navigation, would interrupt this essential inteieoone
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HOWE'S EXPEDITION TO PHILADELPHIA. 843
In 1777 the British attempted to accomplish this object
by sending General Burgoyne from Canada to force his way
by Lake Ghamplain to Uie Hudson. At the same time Sir
Henry Clinton moved north from New York with three thou*
sand men, and reached West Point, whence he sent by ship-
ping a part of his force up the river to within forty miles
of Albany. Here the officer in command learned of the
surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, and returned ; but what
he did at the head of a detachment from a main body of
only three thousand, shows what might have been done under
a better system. While this was happening on the Hudson,
the English commander-in-chief of the troops acting in
America had curiously enough made use of the sea power
of his nation to transport the bulk of his army — fourteen
thousand men — from New York to the head of Chesa-
peake Bay, so as to take Philadelphia in the rear. This eccen-
tric movement was successful as regarded its objective, Phila-
delphia; but it was determined by political considerations,
because Philadelphia was the seat of Congress, and was con-
trary to sound military policy. The conquest therefore was
early lost ; but it was yet more dearly won, for by this diver-
sion of the British forces the different corps were placed out
of mutual support, and the control of the water-line of the
Hudson was abandoned. While Burgoyne, with seven thou-
sand regular troops, besides auxiliaries, was moving down to
seize the head-waters of the river, fourteen thousand men were
removed from its mouth to the Chesapeake. The eight thou-
sand left in or near New York were consequently tied to the
city by the presence of the American army in New Jersey.
This disastrous step was taken in August ; in October Burgoyne,
isolated and hemmed in, surrendered. In the following Hay
between tbe States. Tbej famre been eensible of tbese adnuitaget. ... If thef
could bj any demonstration in another part draw onr attention and strength from
tbis important point, and hj anticipating onr retnm possess themseWes of it, tbe
consequences wonld be fataJ. Onr dispositions must therefore bare eqnal regard
to co-operating with jon [at Boston] in a defensire plan, and secoring the
North Rirer, which the remoteness of the two objects from each other renders
pecnilarlj dUBcnlt."— Wabhinoton to D'Estaino, Sept 11, 1778.
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844
AMERICAN PRIVATEERING.
the English evacuated Philadelphia, and after a painful and
perilous march through New Jersey, with Washington's army
in close pursuit, regained New York.
This taking of the British fleet to the head of the Chesa-
peake, coupled with tlie ascent of the Potomac in 1814 by
English sailing-frigates, shows another weak line in the chain
of the American colonies ; but it was not, like that of the
Hudson and Ohamplain, a line both ends of which rested in
the enemy's power, — in Canada on the one hand, on tlie sea
on the other.
Ab to the sea warfare in general, it is needless to enlarge
upon the fact that the colonists could make no head against
the fleets of Great Britain, and were consequently forced to
abandon the sea to them, resorting only to a cruising warfare,
mainly by privateers, for which their seamanship and enter-
prise well fitted them, and by which they did much injury to
English commerce. By the end of 1778 the English naval
historian estimates that American privateers had taken nearly
a thousand merchant-ships, valued at nearly £2,000,000 ; ho
claims, however, that the losses of the Americans were
heavier. They should have been; for the English cruisers
n^ere both better supported and individually more powerful,
while the extension of American commerce had come to be
the wonder of the statesmen of the mother-country. When
the war broke out, it was as great as that of England herself
at the beginning of the century.
An interesting indication of the number of the seafaring
population of North America at that time is given by the
statement in Parliament by the First Lord of the Admiralty,
that the navy had lost eighteen thousand of the seamen em-
ployed ia the last war by not having America," ^ — no incon-
siderable loss to a sea power, particularly if carried over to
the ranks of the enemy.
The course of warfare on the sea gave rise, as always, to
grievances of neutrals against the English for the seizures of
tlieir ships in the American trade. Such provocation, however^
1 Annnal Register, 1778, p. SOI.
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FRENCH SUPPORT OP THS AMERICANS. 846
was not necessary to excite the enmity and the hopes of France
in the harassed state of the British government. The hour of
reckoning, of yengeance, at which the policy of Ghoiseul had
aimed, seemed now at hand. The question was early enter-
tained at Paris what attitude should be assumed, what advan-
tage drawn from the revolt of the colonies. It was decided
that the latter should receive all possible support short of an
actual break with England; and to this end a Frenchman
named Beaumarchais was furnished with money to esteblish a
business house which should supply the colonists with warlike
stores. France gave a million francs, to which Spain added
an equal sum, and Beaumarchais was allowed to buy from gov-
ernment arsenals. Meanwhile agente were received from the
United Stetes, and French officers passed into ite service with
little real hindrance from their government Beaumarchus'
house was started in 1776 ; in December of that year Ben-
jamin Franklin landed in France, and in Hay, 1777, Lafayette
came to America. Meanwhile the preparations for war, espe*
cially for a sea war, were pushed on ; the navy was steadily
increased, and arrangements were made for threatening an in-
vasion from the Channel, while the real scene of the war was to
be in the colonies. There France was in the position of a man
who has little to lose. Already despoiled of Canada, she had
every reason to believe that a renewal of war, with Europe
neutral and the Americans friends instead of enemies, would
not rob her of her islands. Recognizing that the Americans,
who less than twenty years before had insisted upon the con-
quest of Canada, would not consent to her regaining it, she
expressly stipulated that she would* have no such hopes, but
exacted that in the coming war she should retein any Eng-
lish West Indian possessions which she could seize. Spain
was differently situated. Hating England, wanting to regain
Gibralter, Minorca, and Jamaica, — no mere jewels in her
crown, but foundation-stones of her sea power, — she never-
theless saw that the successful rebellion of the English colo-
nisto against the hitherto unrivalled sea power of the mother-
country would be a dangerous example to her own enormous
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846 TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND AMERICA.
colonial system, from which she yearly drew so great sub-
sidies. If England with her navy should fail, what could
Spain achieve ? In the introductory chapter it was pointed
out that the income of the Spanish government was drawn,
not as a light tax upon a wealthy sea power, built upon the
industry and commerce of the kingdom, but from a narrow
stream of gold and silver trickling through a few treasure-
ships loaded with the spoils of colonies administered upon the
narrowest system. Spain had much to lose, as well as to
gain. It was true still, as in 1760, that she was the power
with which England could war to the greatest advantage.
Nevertheless, existing injuries and dynastic sympathy carried
the day. Spain entered upon the secretly hostile course
pursued by France.
To this explosive condition of things the news of Burgoyne's
surrender acted as a spark. The experience of former wars
had taught France the worth of the Americans as enemies,
and she was expecting to fiud in them valuable helpers in
her schemes of revenge ; now it seemed that even alone tliey
might be able to take care of themselves, and reject any
alliance. The tidings reached Europe on the 2d of December,
1777 ; on the 16th the French foreign minister informed the
commissioners of Congress that the king was ready to recog-
nize the independence of the United States, and to make with
them a commercial treaty and contingent defensive alliance.
The speed with which the business was done shows that
France had made up her mind ; and the treaty, so momentous
in its necessary consequences, was signed on the 6th of Feb-
ruary, 1778.
It is not necessary to give the detailed terms of the treaty ;
but it is important to observe, first, that the express renuncia-
tion of Canada and Nova Scotia by France foreshadowed that
political theory which is now known as the Monroe doctrine,
the claims of which can scarcely be made good without an
adequate sea-force ; and next, that the alliance with France,
and subsequently with Spain, brought to the Americans that
which they above all needed, — a sea power to counterbalance
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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN 1778.
that of England. Will it be too much for American pride to
admit that, had France refused to contest the control of
the sea with England, the latter would have been able to
reduce the Atlantic seaboard f Let us not kick down tlie
ladder hj which we mounted, nor refuse to acknowledge what
our fathers felt in their hour of trial.
Before going on with the story of this maritime war, the
military situation as it existed in the different parts of the
world should be stated.
The three features which cause it to differ markedly from
that at the opening of the Seven Years* War, in 1766, are —
(1) the hostile relation of America to England ; (2) the early
appearance of Spain as the ally of France ; and (8) the neu-
trality of the other continental States, which left France
without preoccupation on the land side.
On the North American continent the Americans had held
Boston for two years. Narragansett Bay and Rhode Island
were occupied by the English, who also held New York and
Philadelphia. Chesapeake Bay and its entrance, being with-
out strong posts, were in the power of any fleet that appeared
against them. In the South, since the unsuccessful attack
upon Gharlestown in 1776, no movement of importance had
been made by the English ; up to the declaration of war by
France the chief erents of the war had been north of the
Cliesapeake (of Baltimore). In Canada, on the other hand,
the Americans had failed, and it remained to the end a firm
base to the English power.
In Europe the most significant element to be noted is the
state of preparedness of the French navy, and to some extent J
of the Spanish, as compared with previous wars. England
stood wholly on the defensive, and without allies ; while the
Bourbon kings aimed at the conquest of Gibraltar and Port
Mahon, and the invasion of England. The first two, however,
were the dear objects of Spain, the last of France ; and this
divergence of aims was fatal to the success of this maritime
coalition. In the introductory chapter allusion was made to
the strategic question raised by these two policies.
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848 MILITARY SITUATION IN THE WEST INDIES.
In the West Indies the grip of the two combatants on
the land was in fact about equal, though it should not
have been so. Both France and England were strongly
posted in the Windward Islands, — the one at MartiniquCi
the other at Barbadoes. It must be noted that the posi-
tion of the latter, to windward of all others of the group,
was a decided strategic advantage in the days of sail. As it
happened, the fighting was pretty nearly confined to the
neighborhood of the Lesser Antilles. Here, at the opening
of the struggle, the English island of Dominica lay between
the French Martinique and Guadeloupe ; it was therefore
coveted and seized. Next south of Martinique lay Sta.
Lucia, a French colony. Its strong harbor on the lee
side, known as Gros Hot Bay, was a capital place from
which to watch the proceedings of the French navy in Fort
Royal, Martinique. The English captured the island, and
from that safe anchorage Rodney watched and pursued the
French fleet before his famous action in 1782. The islands
to the southward were of inferior military consequence. In
the greater islands, Spain should have outweighed England,
holding as she did Cuba, Porto Rico, and, with France, Hayti,
as against Jamaica alone. Spain, however, counted here for
nothing but a dead-weight ; and England had elsewhere too
much on her hands to attack her. The only point in America
where tlie Spanish arms made themselves felt was in the
great region east of the Mississippi, then known as Florida,
which, though at that time an English possession, did not
join the revolt of the colonies.
In the East Indies it will be remembered that France had
received back her stations at the peace of 1768 ; but the politi-
cal predominance of the English in Bengal was not ofiFset by
similar control of the French in any part of the peninsula.
During the ensuing years the English had extended and
strengthened their power, favored in so doing by the charac-
ter of their chief representatives, Clive and Warren Hastings.
Powerful native enemies had, however, risen against them in
the south of the peninsula, both on the east and west, afford*
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EVENTS IN INDIA.
849
ing an excellent opportunity for France to regain her influence
when the war broke out; but her government and people
remained blind to the posaibilities of that vast region. Not
00 England. The very day the news of the outbreak of war
reached Calcutta, July 7, 1778, Hastings sent orders to the
governor of Madras to attack Pondicherry,and set the example
by seizing Chandemagore. The naval force of each nation
was insignificant ; but the French commodore, after a brief
action, forsook Fondichcrry, which surrendered after a siege
by land and sea of seventy days. The following March, 1779,
Mah^, the last French settlement, fell, and the French flag
again disappeared ; while at the same time there arrived a
strong English squadron of six ships-of-the-line under Admiral
Hughes. The absence of any similar French force gave the
entire control of the sea to the English until the arrival of
Suff ren, nearly three years later. In the mean while Holland
had been drawn into the war, and her stations, Negapatam on
the Ooromandel coast, and the very important harbor of Trin-
comalee in Ceylon, were both captured, the latter in January,
1782, by the joint forces of the army and navy. The success-
ful accomplishment of these two enterprises completed the
military situation in Hindostan at the time when the arrival
of SufiFren, just one month later, turned tlie nominal war into
a desperate and bloody contest Suffren found himself with
a decidedly stronger squadron, but without a port, either
French or allied, on which to base his operations against
the English.
Of these four chief theatres of the war, two, North America
and the West Indies, as might be expected from their near- y
ness, blend and directly afiFect each other. This is not so
obviously the case with the struggles in Europe and India.
The narrative therefore naturally falls into three principal
divisions, which may to some extent be treated separately.
After such separate consideration their mutual influence will
be pointed out, together with any useful lessons to be gathered
from the goodness or badness, the success or failure, of the
grand combinations, and from the part played by sea power.
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OUTBREAK OF WAR, 1778.
On the 18th of March, 1778, the French ambassador at
London notified the English government that France had
acknowledged the independence of the United States, and
made with them a treaty of commerce and defensiye alliance.
England at once recalled her ambassador; but though war
was imminent and England at disadvantage, the Spanish king
offered mediation, and Franco wrongly delayed to strika la
June, Admiral Eeppel sailed from Portsmouth, with twenty
ships, on a cruise. Falling in with two French frigates, his
guns, to bring them to, opened the war. Finding from their
papers that thirty-two French ships lay in Brest, he at once
returned for reinforcements. Sailing again with thirty ships,
he fell in with the French fleet under D'Orvilliers to the west-
ward of Ushant, and to windward, with a westerly wind. On
the 27th of July was fought the first fleet action of the war,
generally known as the battle of Ushant.
This battle, in which thirty ships-of-the-line fought on eitlier
side, was wholly indecisive in its results. No ship was taken
or sunk ; both fleets, after separating, returned to their re-
spective ports. The action nevertheless obtained great celeb-
rity in England from the public indignation at its lack of
result, and from the storm of naval and political controversy
which followed. The admiral and the officer third in command
belonged to different political parties; they made charges,
one against the other, and in the following courts-martial
all England divided, chiefly on party lines. Public and naval
sentiment generally favored the commander-in-chief, Eeppel.
Tactically, the battle presents some interesting features, and
involves one issue which is still living to-day. Eeppel was
to leeward and wished to force an action ; in order to do this
he signalled a general chase to windward, so that his fastest
ships might overtake the slower ones of the enemy. Oranting
equal original fleet-speed, this was quite correct. D'Orvilliers,
to windward, had no intention of fighting except on his own
terms. As will generally be the case, the fleet acting on the
offensive obtained its wish. At daybreak of the 27th both
fleets were on the port tack, heading west-northwest, with a
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BATTLE OF USHANT.
steady breeze at southwest (Plate IX., A, A, A).^ The Eng-
ish rear (R) had fallen to leeward^' and Keppel consequently
made signal to six of its ships to chase to windward, so as to
place them in a better position to support the main body if
it could get into action. D'Onrilliers observed this movement,
and construed it to show an intention to attack his rear with
a superior force. The two fleets being then from six to eight
miles apart, he wore his fleet in succession (French A to B),
by which he lost ground to leeward, but approached the enemy,
and was able to see them better (Positions B, B, B). At
tho completion of this evolution the wind hauled to the south*
ward, favoring the English; so Eeppel, instead of going
about, stood on for half an hour more (English B to G), and
then tacked together in wake of the French, This con-
firmed D'Orvilliers' suspicions, and as the wind, which cer-
tainly favored the English that morning, now hauled back
again to the westward, permitting them to lay up for the
French rear, he wore his fleet together (B to C), thus bring-
ing the rest to aid the rear, now become the van, and pre-
venting Eeppel from concentrating on or penetrating it.
The two fleets thus passed on opposite tacks (C),' exchanging
ineffective broadsides, the French running free to windward
and having the power to attack, but not using it. D'Orvilliers
then made the signal for his van, formerly the rear, to wear
to leeward of the English rear, which was to leeward of its
1 In this plate the plan followed In ererj other instance, of showing only the
eharacterifltic phases of a battle, in saocession, but disconnected, has been aban-
doned, and the attempt is to indicate eontinwmsljf the series of manoBurres and
the traclES hj which the fleets at last came into contact (from A to C)b As the
battU consisted merelj In the possage hj each other of two fleets, moving in
opposite parallel directions, an encounter always indecisire and fntile, the
prenons manoenrres constitute the chief interest in an afiair whose historical
importance is due to other than tactical reasons.
* The line drawn through the centre of the English fleet at A shows the
close-hauled line (south-southeast) on which, by strict tactical requirement, the
English ships should have borne from each other.
• The leading ships of the two fleets diverged from each other (C), which is,
by the French, attributed to the English van kteping away ; by the English it is
said that the French ran luffed. The latter account is followed in the diagrams.
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852
BATTLE OP USHANT.
own main body, intending himself to remain to wmdward and
so attack it on both sides ; but the commander of that division,
a prince of the blood royal, did not obey, and the possible ad-
vantage was lost. On the English side the same manoeuvre
was attempted. The admiral of the van and some of his ships
tacked, as soon as out of fire (D),^ and stood after the French
rear ; but for the most part the damage to rigging prevented
tacking, and wearing was impossible on account of the ships
coming up behind. The French now stood to leeward and
formed line again, but tlie English were not in condition to
attack. This was the end of the battle.
It has been said that there are some interesting points about
this resultless engagement. One is, that Keppel's conduct
was approved throughout, on oath before the court-martial, by
one of the most distinguished admirals England has brought
forth. Sir John Jervis, who commanded a ship in the fleet.
It does not indeed appear what he could have done more ; but
his lack of tactical understanding is shown by a curious re-
mark in his defence. If the French admiral really meant
to come to action," says he, I apprehend he would never
have put his fleet on the contrary tack to that on which
the British fleet was approaching.'* This remark can only
proceed from ignorance or thoughtlessness of the danger to
which the rear of the French fleet would have been exposed,
and is the more curious as he himself had said the English
were lying up for it. Keppel's idea seems to have been that
the French should have waited for him to come up abreast,
and then go at it, ship for ship, in what was to him the good
old style ; D'Orvilliers was too highly trained to be capable
of such action.
The failure of the Duo de Chartres,^ commanding the
French van during the firing, to wear in obedience to orders,
1 The position D, separated from the rest of the plan, shows the end of the
passage bj, which began at C. It could not be shown in connection with the
other traclu without producing confusion.
/ > Afterward Due d'Orleans; the Philippe £galittf of the French Berolution,
^ and fiuher of Louis Philippe.
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POSITION OF AN ADMIRAL IN BATTLE.
868
whether doe to misanderstanding or misconduct, raises the
question, which is still debated, as to the proper position for
a naval commander-in-chief in action. Had D'Orvilliers been
in the van, he could have insured the evolution he wished.
From the centre the admiral has the extremities of his fleet
equally visible, or invisible, as it may be. At the head he
enforces his orders by his example. The French toward the
end of this war solved the question by taking him out of
the line altogether and putting him on board a frigate, for
the avowed reasons that he could thus better see the move-
ments of his fleet and of the enemy without being blinded
by smoke or distracted by the occurrences on board his own
ship, and that his signals could be better seen.^ This posi-
tion, resembling somewhat that of a general on shore, being
remote from personal risk, was also assumed by Lord Howe
in 1778; but both that officer and the French abandoned
the practice later. Nelson at Trafalgar, the end of his
career, led his column ; but it may be doubted whether he
had any other motive than his ardor for battle. The two
other great attacks in which he commanded in chief were
directed against ships at anchor, and in neither did he take
the head of the column ; for the good reason that, his knowl-
edge of the ground beuig imperfect, the leading ship was in
most danger of grounding. The common practice in the days
of broadside sailing-ships, except when a general chase was
ordered, was for the admiral to be in the line, and in the
centre of it. The departure from this custom on the part of
both Nelson and OoUingwood, each of whom led his own
columns at Trafalgar, may have had some reason, and an
ordinary man rather shrinks from criticising the action of
officers of their eminence. The danger to which were exposed
the two senior officers of the fleet, upon whom so much de-
pended, is obvious ; and had any serious injury befallen their
persons, ot* the head of their columns, the lack of their influ-
ence would have been seriously felt As it was, they were
1 The cftptnre of the French commander-in-chief on hoard his flag-ehip, in the
battle of April 18^ 17S8, was also a motive for this new order.
28
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854 POSITION OF A NAVAL
speedily obliterated, as admirals^ in the amoke of the battle,
leaving to those who came after them no guidance or control
except the brilliancy of their courage and example. A French
admiral has pointed out that the practical effect of the mode
of attack at Trafalgar, two columns bearing down upon a
line at right angles to them, was to sacrifice the head of the
columns in making two breaches in the enemy's line. So far,
very well ; the sacrifice was well worth while ; and into these
breaches came up the rear ships of each column, nearly fresh,
forming in fact a reserve which fell upon the shattered ships
of the enemy on either side of the breaks. Now this idea of
a reserve prompts a thought as to the commander-in-chief.
The size of his ship was such as precluded its being out of
the order ; but would it not have been well had the admiral of
each column been with this reserve, keeping in his hands the
power of directing it according to the chances of the action,
making him a reality as well as name for some time longer,
and to a very useful purpose ? The difficulty of arranging any
system of signals or light despatch-boats which could take
the place of the aids or messengers of a general, coupled with
the fact that ships cannot stand still, as divisions of men do,
waiting orders, but that they must have steerage-way, precludes
the idea of putting an admiral of a fleet under way in a light
vessel. By so doing he becomes simply a spectator ; whereas
by being in the most powerful ship of the fleet he retains the
utmost weight possible after action is once engaged, and, if
this ship be in tlie reserve, the admiral keeps to the latest
possible moment the power of commander-in-chief in his own
hands. Half a loaf is better than no bread ; " if the admiral
cannot, from the conditions of sea warfare, occupy the calmly
watchful position of his brother on shore, let there be secured
for him as much as may be. The practice of Farragut after
New Orleans and Yicksburg, that is to say, in the latter part
of his career, when it may be believed experience had deter-
mined his views, was to lead in person. It is known that he
very reluctantly, at the solicitation of various officers, yielded
his convictions in this matter at Mobile so far as to take the
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second place, and afterward freely expressed his regrets for
having done so. It maj^ howerer, be argued that the char-
acter of all the actions in which Farragut commanded had
a peculiarity, differentiating them from battles in the strict
sense of the word. At New Orleans, at Yicksburg, at Port
Hudson, and at Mobile, the task was not to engage, but to
pass fortifications which the fleet confessedly could not stand
up to; and the passage was to be made under conditions
mainly of pilotage upon ground as to which, unlike Nelson,
he had good knowledge. There was thus imposed upon
the commander-in-chief the duty of leadership in the literal,
as well as the military, sense of the term. So leading, he
not only pointed out to the fleet the safe road, but, drawing
continually ahead of the smoke, was better able to see and
judge the path ahead, and to assume the responsibility of a
course which he may have prescribed and intended through-
out, but from which a subordinate might shrink. It has
not perhaps been commonly noted, that at Mobile the lead-
ers, not only of one but of both columns, at the critical
point of the road hesitated and doubted as to the admiral's
purpose ; not that they had not received it clearly, but because
circumstances seemed to them to be different from what he
had supposed. Not only Alden in the Brooklyn,^' but Craven
also in the Tecumseh," departed from the admiraPs orders
and left the course dictated to them, with disastrous results.
There is no necessity to condemn either captain; but the
irresistible inference is that Farragut was unqualifiedly right
in his opinion that the man who alone has the highest re-
sponsibility should, under the conditions of his battles, be
in the front. And here it must be remarked that at such
critical moments of doubt any but the highest order of mind
tends to throw off the responsibility of decision upon the
superior, though from the instancy of the case hesitation
or delay may be fatal. A man who as the commissioned
chief would act intelligently, as the mere subordinate will
balk. Nelson's action at St. Vincent will rarely be emulated,
a truth which is strongly shown by the fact that Gollingwood
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POSITION OF A NAVAL
was immediately in his rear that day, and did not imitate
his action till signalled by the commander-in-chief ; yet after
receiying the authority of the signal, he particularly distin-
guished himself by his judgment and daring.^ It will be
recalled, also, in connection with this question of pilot-ground
battles, that a central position nearly lost the flag-ship at New
Orleans, owing to the darkness and to the smoke from the pre-
ceding ships ; the United States fleet came near finding itself
without its leader after the passage of the forts. Now as the
mention of a reserve prompted one set of considerations,
so the name of pilotago suggests certain ideas, broader than
itself, which modify what has been said of keeping the ad-
miral with the reserve. The ease and quickness with which
a steam fleet can change its formation make it very probable
that a fleet bearing down to attack may find itself, almost
at the very moment of collision, threatened with some un-
looked-for combination; then where would be the happiest
position for an admiral ? Doubtless in that part of his own
1 The following incident, occarrbg daring Rodney's chaae of De GrasBe, in
April, 1782, shows how far sabordination may be carried. Hood was one of the
linest of the British officezs; nor does the author undertake to criticiso his
action. He was some miles from Rodney at the time. " The separated French
ship in the N.W., having got the breese at the same time as our yan division!
boldly stood for and endeavored to weather the British advanced ships ; that
being the only way to regain her own fleet, then to windward. To snch a
length did she carry her audacity that she compelled the Alfred, the head-
most ship of Sir Samuel Hood's division, to bear up in order to aUow her to
pass. Every eye was fixed upon the bold Frenchman, excepting those who
were anxiously looking out on the commander-in-chief to make the signal to
engage, but who, most likely from not supposing it could be an enemy, did not
throw out the ardeutly looked-for signal, and therefore not a gun was fired.
This is mentioned to show the state of discipline on board the ships composing
Sir Samuel Hood's division, and that he, though second in command, would
not fire a single shot until directed to do so by his commander-in-chief. 'It
is more than probable that Sir S. Hood's reason for having waited for the
pignal to engage from his commander-in-chief, ere he would fire, arose from
the supporition that had he been the occasion of prematurely bringing on an
flbction under the above circumstances, he would have been responsible for the
results.' " (White's Naval Researches, p. 97.)
Hood may have been influenced by Rodney's bearing toward inferiors whose
Ifiitiative displeased hinu The relations of the two seem to have been strained
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867
order where he could most readily pilot his ships into the
new disposition, or direction, by which he would meet the
changed conditions; that is, in the position of leading. It
would seem that there are always two moments of greatest
importance in a sea-fight ; one which determines the method
of the main attack, the other the bringing up and directing
the effort of the reserve. If the first is more important, the
second perhaps requires the higher order of ability ; for the
former may and should proceed on a before-determined plan,
while the latter may, and often must, be shaped to meet unfore-
seen exigencies. The conditions of sea-battles of the future
contain one element that land battles cannot have, — the ex«
treme rapidity with which encounters and changes of order
can take place. However troops may be moved by steam
to the field of battle, they will there fight on foot or on horse-
back, and with a gradual development of their plan, which
will allow the commander-in-chief time to make his wishes
known (as a rule, of course), in case of a change in the
enemy's attack. On the other hand, a fleet, comparatively
small in numbers and with its component units clearly de-
fined, may bo meditating an important change of which no
sign can appear until it begins, and which will occupy but
a few minutes. So far as these remarks are sound, they
show the need of a second in command thoroughly conver-
sant with not only the plans, but with the leading principles of
action of his chief, — a need plain enough from the fact that
the two extremities of the order-of^battle may be necessarily
remote, and that you want the spirit of the leader at both ex-
tremities. As he cannot be there in person, the best thing is
to have an efficient second at one end. As regards Nelson's
position at Trafalgar, mentioned at the beginning of this dis-
cussion, it is to be noted that the Victory " did nothing that
another ship could not have done as well, and that the light-
ness of the wind forbade the expectation of any sudden change
in the enemy's order. The enormous risk run by the person
of tlie admiral, on whose ship was concentrated the fire of
the enemy's line, and which led several captains to implore
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858
NELSON AND COLUNQWOOD.
a change, was condemned long before by Nelson himself in
one of his letters after the battle of the Nile : —
I think^ if it had pleased God I bad not been wounded, not a boat
would have escaped to have told the tale ; but do not believe that any
individual in the fleet is to blame. ... I onlj mean to saj that if my
experience could In person have directed those individuals, there was
every appearance that Almighty God would have continued to bless
my endeavors/' eta^
Yet, notwithstanding such an expression of opinion based
upon experience, he took tlie most exposed position at Trafal*
gar, and upon the loss of the leader there followed a curious
exemplification of its ofiFects. CoUingwood at once, rightly or
wrongly, avoidably or unavoidably, reversed Nelson's plans,
urged with his last breath. ^'Anchor I Hardy, do you
anchor said the dying chief. <^ Anchor!" said CoUing-
wood. It is the last thing I should have thought of."
1 Sir N. H. Nicholas: Despatches and Letters of Lord Nelson.
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CHAPTER X.
Haritimb War a North America and Webt Irdies, 1778-1781.
— Itb Ikflubnor upon the course of the American Reto-
i*UTioN. — Fleet Actions off Grenada, Dominica, and Chesa-
peake Bat.
/^N the 16th of April, 1778, Admiral Oomte d'Estaing
Bailed from Toulon for the American continent, having
under his command twelve ships-of-the-line and five frigates.
With him went as a passenger a minister accredited to Con-
gress, who was instructed to decline all requests for subsidies,
and to avoid explicit engagements relative to the conquest of
Oanada and other British possessions. The Oabinet of Ver-
sailles," says a French historian, ^^was hot sorry for the
United States to have near them a cause of anxiety, which
would make them feel the value of the French alliance.^^ ^
While acknowledging the generous sympathy of many French-
men for their struggle, Americans need not blind themselves*
to the self-interestedness of the French government Neither
should tliey find fault ; for its duty was to consider French
interests first.
D'Estaing's progress was very slow. It is said that he
wasted much time in drills, and even uselessly. However
that may be, he did not reach his destination, the Capes of
the Delaware, until the 8th of July, — making a passage of
twelve weeks, four of which were spent in reaching the At-
lantic. The English government had news of his intended
sailing ; and in fact, as soon as they recalled their ambas-
sador at Paris, orders were sent to America to evacuate Phila-
delphia, and concentrate upon New York. Fortunately for
1 Martin : Hiitoiy of Fnmoe.
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jyESTAINQ AT NEW YORK.
them, Lord Howe's movements were marked by a vigor and
system other than D'Estaing^s. First assembling his fleet and
transports in Delaware Bay, and then hastening the embarka-
tion of stores and supplies, he loft Philadelphia as soon as tlio
army had marched from there for New York. Ten days were
taken up in reaching the mouth of the bay ; ^ but he sailed
from it the 28th of June, ten days before D'Estaing arrived,
though more than ten weeks after he had sailed. Once out-
side, a favoring wind took the whole fleet to Sandy Hook in
two days. War is unforgiving ; the prey that D'Estaing had
missed by delays foiled him in his attempts upon both New
York and Rhode Island.
The day after Howe's arrival at Sandy Hook the English
army reached the heights of Navesink, after an harassing
march through New Jersey, with Washington's troops hang-
ing upon its rear. By the active co-operation of the navy it
was carried up to New York by the 5th of July ; and Howe
then went back to bar the entrance to the port against the
French fleet. As no battle followed, the details of his ar-
rangements will not be given ; but a very full and interesting
account by an officer of the fleet can be found in Ekins's
Naval Battles." Attention, however, may well be called to
the combination of energy, thought| skill, and determhiation
shown by the admiral. The problem before him waq to
defend a practicable pass with six sUty-four-gim ships and
three of fifty, against eight of seventy-four guns or over,
three sixty-fours, and one fifty, — it may be ssud against
nearly double his own force.
D'Estaing anchored outside, south of the Hook, on the 11th
of July, and there remained until the 22d, engaged in sound-
ing the bar, and with every apparent determination to enter.
On the 22d a high northeast wind, coinciding with a spring
tide, raised the water on the bar to thirty feet. The French
fleet got under way, and worked up to windward to a point
fair for crossing thci bar. Then D'Estaing's heart failed him
1 This delay was dae to calms. Howe's Despatch, Gentleman's Magazine
1778.
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jyESTAING AT NEWPORT.
under the discouragement of the pilots ; he gave up the attack
and stood away to the southward.
Naval officers cannot but sympathize with the hesitation
of a seaman to disregard the advice of pilots, especially on a
coast foreign to him; but such sympathy should not close
their eyes to the highest type of character. Let any one com-
pare the action of D'Estaing at New York with that of Nelson
at Oopenhagcn and the Nile, or that of Farragut at Mobile and
Port Hudson, and the inferiority of the Frenchman as a mili-
tary leader, guided only by military considerations, is painfully
apparent. New York was the very centre of the British
power; its fall could not but have shortened the war. In y
fairness to D'Estaing, however, it must be remembered that
other than military considerations had to weigh with him.
The French admiral doubtless had instructions similar to
those of the French minister, and he probably reasoned that
France had nothing to gain by Uie fall of New York, which
might have led to peace between America and England, and
left the latter free to turn all her power against his own coun-
try. Less than that would have been enough to decide his
wavering mind as to risking his fleet over the bar.
Howe was more fortunate than D'Estaing, in having no
divided purposes. Having escaped from Philadelphia and
saved New York by his diligence, he had in store the further
honor of saving Rhode Island by the like rapid movements.
Scattered ships-of-war from a fleet despatched from England
now began to arrive. On the 28th of July Howe was informed
that the French fleet, which had disappeared to the southward,
had been seen heading for Rhode Island. In four days his
fleet was ready for sea, but owing to contrary winds did not
reach Point Judith till the 9th of August. There he anchored,
and learned that D'Estaing had run the batteries the day be-
fore and anchored between Qould and Oanonicut Islands ; ^
1 Most acooants lay between Goat Island and Canonicnt ; but the position
giren seems more probable. The names " Goat " and " Goold " (often written
"Gold") are easilj confosed. Since writing the abore, the author has been
ftiTored with the sight of a contemporary manuscript map obtained in Paris,
which shows the anchorage as near Canonicnt and abreast Coaster's Harbor
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862
HOWE AND jyESTAING.
the Seakonnet and Western passages had also been occupied
hj French ships^ and the fleet was prepared to sustain the
American army in an attack upon the British works.
The arrival of Howe, although his i-einforcements did not
raise the English fleet to oyer two thirds the strength of the
French, upset D'Estaing's plans. With the prevailing sum-
mer southwest breezes blowing straight into the bay, he was
exposed to any attempts his adversary might make. That
same night the wind shifted unexpectedly to the northward,
and D'Estaing at once got under way and stood out to sea.
Howe, though surprised by this unlooked-for act, — for he
had not felt himself strong enough to attack, — also made
sail to keep the weather-gage. The next twenty-four hours
passed in manoeuvring for the advantage ; but on the night
of the 11th of August a violent gale of wind dispersed the
fleets. Great injury was done to the vessels of both, and
among others the Freuch flag-ship Languedoc," of ninety
guns, lost all her masts and her rudder. Immediately after
the gale two different English fifty-gun ships, in fighting
order, fell in, the one with the Languedoc," the other with
the " Tonnant,'* of eighty guns, having only one mast stand-
ing. Under such conditions both English ships attacked;
but night coming on, they ceased action, intending to begin
again in the morning. When morning came, other French
ships also came, and the opportunity was lost. It is sug-
gestive to note that one of the captains was Hotliain, who as
admiral of the Mediterranean fleet, seveuteen years later, so
annoyed Nelson by his cool satisfaction in having taken only
two ships: ^^We must be contented; we have done very
well." This was the immediate occasion of Nelson's char-
acteristic saying, Had we taken ten sail, and allowed the
eleventh to escape, being able to get at her, I could never
have called it well done."
laland; the latter being marked ''Lisle d'Or oa Golde lale." The aketch,
while accurate in ite main detail*, seema the more authentic from ito mistalies
being aach as a foreigner, during a harried and exciting sta/ of twenty-four
honra, might readil/ make.
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ACTIVITY SHOWN BY HOWS. 868
The English fell back on New Tork. The French rallied
again off the entrance of Narragansett Bay ; bnt D'Eetaing
decided that he coold not remain on accoont of the damage to
the squadron, and accordingly sailed for Boston on the 21st
of August. Rhode Island was thus left to the English, who
retained it for a year longer, evacuating then for strategic
reasons. Howe on his part diligently repaired his ships, and
sailed again for Rhode Island when he heard of the French
being there ; but meeting on the way a Tessel with word of
their going to Boston, he followed them to that harbor, in
which they were too strongly placed to be attacked. Taking
into consideration his enforced return to New York, the neces-
sary repairs, and the fact that he was only four days behind
the French at Boston, it may be believed that Howe showed
to the end the activity which characterised tlie beginning
of his operations.
Scarcely a shot had been exchanged between the two fleets, /
yet the weaker had thoroughly outgeneralled the stronger.
With the exception of the manoeuvres for the weather-gage
after D'Estaing left Newport, which have not been preserved,
and of Howe's dispositions to receive the expected attack in
New York Bay, the lessons are not tactical, but strategic, and
of present application. Chief among them undoubtedly stands
the value of celerity and watchfulness, combined with knowl-
edge of one's profession. Howe learned of his danger by
advices from home three weeks after D'Estaing sailed from
Toulon. He had to gather in his cruisers from the Ohesa^
peake and outside, get his ships-of-the-line from New York
and Rhode Island, embark the supplies of an army of ten
thousand men, move down the Delaware, — which unavoidably
took ten days, — and round to New York again* D'Estaing
was ten days behind him at the Delaware, twelve days at
Sandy Hook, and only one day ahead of him in entering
Newport, outside which harbor he had lain ten days before
sailing in. An English narrator in the fleet, speaking of
the untiring labor between June 80, when the English army
reached Navesink, and the arrival of the French fleet on the
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864 SUCCESS OF HOWE'S MOVEMENTS.
11th of July, says : Lord Howe attended in person as
usual, and by bis presence animated tbe zeal and quickened
tihe industry of officers and men" In this quality he was
a marked coptrast to his amiable but indolent brotheri Gen<
eral Howe.
The same industry and watchfulness marked his remaining
operations. As soon as the French ships hauled off to the
southward, lookout yessels followed them, and preparations
continued (notably of fireships) for pursuit. The lost ship
that joined from England crossed the bar at New York on
the 80th of July. On the 1st of August the fleet was
ready for sea, with four fire-ships. The accident of the
wind delayed his next movements; but, as has been seen,
he came up only one day after the entrance of the enemy
into Newport, which his inferior force could not have pre-
vented. But the object of the enemy, which he could not
oppose, was frustrated by his presence. D'Estaing was no
sooner in Newport than he wished himself out. Howe's
position was strategically excellent With his weatherly
position in reference to tike prevailing winds, the difficulty
of beating a fleet out througli the narrow entrance to the
harbor would expose the French ships trying it to be at-
tacked in detail ; wliile if the wind unluckily came fair, the
admiral relied upon his own skill to save his squadron.
Cooper, in one of his novels, The Two Admirals," makes
his hero say to a cavilling friend that if he had not been in
the way of good luck, he could not have profited by it The
sortie of the French, the subsequent gale, and the resulting
damage were all what is commonly called luck ; but if it had
not been for Howe's presence off Point Judith threatening
them, they would have ridden out the gale at their anchors
inside. Howe's energy and his confidence in himself as a sear
man had put him in the way of good luck, and it is not fair to
deny his active share in bringing it about But for him the
gale would not have saved the British force in Newport.^
1 "The arrival of the French fleet upon the coast of America ie a great and
•triking event; but the operatioua of It have been hijared by a numbec
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IXESTAING IN THE WEST INDIES. 866
D'Estaing, having repaired his ships, sailed with his whole
force for Martinique on the 4th of Noyember ; on the. Same day
Commodore Hotham left New York for Barbadoes, with five
sixtj-four and fifty-gun ships and a conyoy of five thousand
troops, destined for the conquest of Sta. Lucia Island. On the
way a heavy gale of wind injured the French fleet more than
the English, the French flag-ship losing her main and mizzen
topmasts. The loss of these spars, and the fact that twelve
unencumbered ships-of-war reached Martinique only one day
before the convoy of fifty-nine English transports reached
Barbadoes, a hundred miles farther on, tells badly for the
professional skill which then and now is a determining
feature in naval war.
Admiral Ban*ington, commanding at Barbadoes, showed the
same energy as Howe. The transports arrived on the 10th ;
the troops were kept on board ; sailed on the morning of the
12th for Sta. Lucia, and anchored there at three p. h. the 18th.
The same afternoon half the troops were landed, and the
rest the next morning. They seized at once a better port,
to which the admiral was about to move the transports when
the appearance of D'Estaing prevented him. All that night
of unforeBeen and tmfayontble drcamstanceB, which, thoagh they ought not to
detract from the merit and good intention of onr great ally, hare neverthelea
lessened the importance of its senrices in a great degree. The length of the pas-
sage, in the first instance, was a capital misfortune ; for had eren one of common
length taken place, Lord Howe, with the British shipe^if-war and all the trans-
ports in the riTer Delaware, must ineritablj hare fallen ; and Sir fienrj Clin-
ton mnst hare had better Inck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profes-
sion nnder snch circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least the fate
of Bnrgoyne. The long passage of Connt d'Estaing was succeeded by an un-
faTorable discovery at the Hook, which hurt us in two respects, — first, in a de-
feat of the enterprise upon New York and the shipping and troops at that place^
and next in the delay occasioned in ascertaining the depth of water orer the bar,
which was essential to their entrance into the harbor of New York. And, more-
over, after the enterprise upon Rhode Inland had been planned and was in the
moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British ships should interpose
merely to create a divermon and draw the French fleet from the island was again
unlucky, as the Count had not returned on the 17th to the island, though drawn
off from it on the 10th; by which means the land operations were retarded, and
the whole subjected to a miscarriage in case of the arrival of Byron's squadron.'
— Wasrikotov's Letter, Aug. 80, 1778.
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866 THE ENGLISH SEIZE SANTA LUCTA.
the transports were being warped inside the ships-of-war,
and the latter anchored across the entrance to the bay, espe-
cial care being taken to strengthen the two extremities of the
line, and to prevent the enemy from passing inside the weather
end, as the English ships in after years did at the battle of the
Nile. The French was much more than doable the English
fleet ; and if the latter were destroyed, the transports and
troops would be trapped.
D'Estaing stood down along the English order twice from
north to south, cannonading at long range, but did not anchor.
Abandoning then his intentions against the fleet, he moyed to
another bay, landed some French soldiers, and assaulted the
position of the English troops. Failing here also, he retired
to Martinique; and the French garrison, which had been
driven into the interior of the island, surrendered.
It seems scarcely necessary to point out the admirable dili*
gence of Admiral Barrington, to which and to the skill of his
dispositions he owed this valuable strategic success ; for such
it was. Sta. Lucia was the island next south of Martinique,
and the harbor of Gros Hot at its northern end was especially
adapted to the work of watching the French depot at Fort
Boyal, their principal station in the West Indies. Thence
Bodney pursued them before his great action in 1782.
The absence of precise information causes hesitation in con-
demning D'Estaing for this mortifying failure. His respon«
sibility depends upon the ¥rind, which may have been light
under the land, and upon his power to anchor. The fact,
however, remains that he passed twice along the enemy's
line within cannon-shot, yet did not force a decisive action.
His course was unfavorably criticised by tlie great Suffren,
then one of his captains.^
The English had thus retrieved the capture of Dominica,
which had been taken on the 8th of September by the French
governor of the West India Islands. There being no English
squadron there, no difficulty had been met. The value of
Dominica to the French has been pointed out; and it is
1 See page 486.
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ITESTAING AT GRENADA.
necessary here to use the example of both Dominica and Sta.
Lucia to enforce what has before been said^ that the posses-
sion of these smaller islands depended solely upon the naval
preponderance. Upon the grasp of this principle held by
any one will depend his criticism upon the next action of
D'Estaing, to be immediately related.
Six months of almost entire quiet followed the affair of Sta.
Lucia. The English were reinforced by the fleet of Byron,
who took chief command ; but the French, being joined by ten
more ships-of-the-line, remained superior in numbers. About
the middle of June, Byron sailed witii his fleet to protect a large
couToy of merchant-ships, bound for England, till they were
clear of the islands. D'Estaing then sent a very small expe-
dition which seized St. Vincent, June 16, 1779, without difii-
culty ; and on the 80th of June he aailed with his whole fleet to
attack Orenada. Anchoring off Georgetown on the 2d of July,
he landed his soldiers, and on the 4tli the garrison of seven
hundred men surrendered the island. Meanwhile Byron,
hearing of the loss of St. Vincent and probable attack on
Orenada, sailed wiUi a large convoy of vessels carrying
troops, and with twenty-one ships-of-ttie-line, to regain the
one and relieve the other. Receiving on the way definite in-
formation tliat the French were before Grenada, he kept on
for it, rounding the northwest point of the island at day-
break of July 6. His approach had been reported the day
before to D'Estaing, who remained at anchor,^ fearing lest
with the currents and light winds ho might drop too far
to leeward if he let go the bottom. When the English come
in sight, the French got under way ; but the confused mass-
ing of their ships prevented Byron from recognizing at once
the disparity of numbers, they having twenty-five ships-of-
the-line. He made signal for a general chase, and as the
disorder of the French fleet forced it to form on the lee-
wardmost ships, the English easily retained the advantage of
the wind with which they approached. As the action began,
therefore, the French were to the westward with a partly
formed line, on the starboard tack, heading north, the rear in
1 D'Bflabg's position at uchor is marked by the anchor in Plate X.
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NAVAL BATTLE OFF GRENADA.
disorder, and to windward of the van and centre (Plate X., A).
The English stood down with a fair wind, steering south by
west on the port tack (A), between the island and the enemy,
their leading ships approaching at a slight angle, but heading
more directly for his yet unformed rear ; while the English
couYoy was between its own fleet and the island, under special
charge of three ships (A, a), which were now called in. As
the signal so far commanded a general chase, the three fastest
of the English, among which was the flag of the second in
command. Admiral Barrington, came under fire of the French
centre and rear, apparently unsuppoii;ed (b), and suffered
much from the consequent concentration of fire upon them.
When they reached the sternmost ships they wore upon the
same tack with them and stood north, after and to windward
of them ; and at about the same time Byron, who had not be-
fore known of the surrender, saw the French flag flying over
the forts. Signals followed to wear in succession, and for the
advanced ships to form line for mutual support, ceasing the
general chase under which the engagement had hitherto been
fought. While the main body was still standing south on the
port tack, three ships, — " Cornwall," " Grafton," and " Lion "
(c), — obeying literally the signal for close action, had passed
much to leeward of the others, drawing upon themselves most
of the fire of the enemy's line. They thus suffered very
severely in men and spars ; and though finally relieved by the
advanced ships, as these approached from the southward on
the opposite tack, they were unable, after wearing (B, c', c^'),
to keep up with the fleet, and so dropped astern and toward the
French. The bulk of the injury sustained by the English fell
upon these three, upon the Uiree advanced ships under Bar-
rington, and upon two others in the rear (A, a), which, seeing
the van so heavily engaged, did not follow the successive
movement, but bore down straight out of the order, and took
their places at the head of the column (B, a, a^, — an act
strongly resembling that which won Nelson such high renown
at Cape St. Vincent, but involving less responsibility.^
1 Of one of thete, the " Monmoath/' sixty-foQr {k% it ii taid that the oiBeen
of the French flagship drank to the health of the captain of the "little black
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D'ESTAING'S FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY. 869
So far Byron had conducted his attack, using the initiative
permitted him hj the advantage of tlie wind and the disordek*
of the French rear. It will be observed that, though it was
desirable to lose no time in assailing the latter while in con-
fusion, it is questionable whether Barrington's three ships
should have been allowed to separate as far as thej seem to
have done from the rest of the fleet. A general chase is per-
missible and proper when, from superiority of numbers, origi-
nal or acquired, or from the general situation, the ships first
in action will not be greatly outnumbered, or subjected to
overpoweriug concentration before support comes up, or when
there is probability that the enemy may escape unless promptly
struck. This was not so here. Nor should the Cornwall,''
Grafton," and Lion " have been permitted to take a course
which allowed, almost compelled, the enemy to concentrate
rather than diffuse his fire. The details of the affair are not
precise enough to warrant more comment than naming these
mistakes, without necessarily attributing tiiem to fault on the
part of the admiral.
The French had up to this time remained strictiy on the
defensive, in accordance with their usual policy. There was
now offered an opportunity for offensive action which tested
D'Estaing's professional qualities, and to appreciate which
the situation at the moment must be understood. Both fleets
were by this on the starboard tack, heading north (B, B, B),
the French to leeward. The latter had received littie injury
in their motive power, though their line was not in perfect
order; but the English, owing to the faulty attack, had seven
ships seriously crippled, four of which — the " Monmouth " (a')
"Grafton," "Cornwall" (c'), and "Lion" (c") — were dis-
abled. The last three, by three p. m ., were a league astern and
ship." Ships' names, like those ot families, often hare a marked career. A for-
mer " Monmoath," twenty jears before, had attacked and taken, practically sin-
gle-handed, the " Fondrovant," eighty-f onr, one of the finest ships in the French
nayj. 8ho was then commanded bj a Captain Gardiner, who, haying com-
manded Bang's ship in the battle which led to his execntton, was moTsd by hi«
mortification at the result of that affair to dare snch desperate odds, and thereby
lost his life. The same ship, here punished so sererely off Grenada, will be foand
in like sturdy fight, under another captain, three yoari later in India.
24
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INDECISIVE ACTION OF lyESTAINQ.
much to leeward of their line, being in fact nearer the French
than the English ; while the speed of the English fleet was
necessarily reduced to that of the crippled ships remaining in
line. These conditions bring out strongly the embarrassments
of a fleet whose injuries are concentrated upon a few ships,
instead of being distributed among all; the ten or twelve
which were practically untouched had to conform to the
capabilities of the others. D'Estaing, with twenty-five ships,
now had Byron to windward of him with seventeen or eighteen
capable of holding together, but slower and less handy than
their enemies, and saw him tactically embarrassed by the care
of a convoy to windward and three disabled ships to leeward.
Under these circumstances three courses were open to the
French admiral: (1) He might stretch ahead, and, tacking
in succession, place himself between Byron and the convoy,
throwing his frigates among the latter ; (2) He might tack
his fleet together and stand up to the English line to bring
on a general action ; or (8) he could, after going about, cut
off the three disabled ships, which miglit bring on a general
action with less exposure.
None of these did he do. As regards the first, he, kno¥ring
the criticisms of the fleet, wrote home that his line was too
much disordered to allow it. Whatever the technical irregu-
larity, it is difficult to believe that, with the relative power of
motion in the two fleets, the attempt was hopeless. The third
alternative probably presented the greatest advantage, for it
insured the separation between the enemy's main body and
the crippled ships, and might very probably exasperate the
British admiral into an attack under most hazardous condi-
tions. It is stated by English authorities that Byron said he
would have borne down again, had any attack been made
on them. At three p. h. D'Estaing tacked all together, form-
ing line on the lee ship,^ and stood to the southward again.
> The line BC Bhows (he final direction of the French Une^f-baUle; the lee
ihip (o) having tacked and standing to o', whUe the other shipe took position in
her wake. Thongh not expressly stated, Bjron donbtleai formed in the same
waj on a paraUel line. Into this new line the disabled ships (c'), which coold
scflffceljr hare made good the oouae the/ were beading, woold be easil/ received
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ITESTAINCrS PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION. 871
The English imitated this moTement, except the van ship
Monmouth (a')) which being too badly hurt to manoeuvre
kept on to the northward, and the three separated ships. Two
of these (c^ kept on north and passed once more tinder the
French broadsides ; but the ^* Lion " (c''), unable to keep to the
wind, kept broad off before it across tiie bows of the enemy,
for Jamaica, a thousand miles awaj. She was not pursued ;
a single transport was the sole maritime trophy of the French.
Had the admiral's seamanship equalled his courage," wrote
the celebrated Suffren, who commanded the French van ship,
we would not have suffered four dismasted vessels to escape."
D'Estaing, at the age of thirty, had been transferred from
the army to the navy with the premature rank of rear-admiral.
The nary did not credit him with nautical ability when the
war broke out, and it is safe to say that its opinion was jus-
tified by his conduct during it."^ Brave as his sword,
D'Estaing was always the idol of the soldier, the idol of the
seaman; but moral authority over his officers failed him
on several occasions, notwithstanding the marked protection
extended to him by the king.*''
Another cause than incapacity as a seaman has usually
been assigned by French historians for the impotent action
of D^Estaing on this occasion. He looked upon Orenada,
they say, as the real objective of his efforts, and considered
the English fleet a very secondary concern. Bamatuelle, a
naval tactician who served actively in this war and wrote
under the Empire, cites this case, which he couples with
that of YorktoWn and others, as exemplifying the true
policy of naval war. His words, which probably reflect the
current opinion of his service in that day, as they certainly
do the policy of French governments, call for more than
passing mention, as they involve principles worthy of most
serious discussion: —
" The French navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or
preserving a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps, but actually
s CheraUer: Hist de U Marine Franfaise. < Gn^rin: Htrt. Haritime.
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FRENCH NAVAL POLICY.
less rea}y of taking a few ships ; and in that it has approached more
nearly the true end to be proposed in war. What in fact would the
loss of a few ships matter to the English ? The essential point is to
attack them in their possessions, the immediate source of their comr
mercial wealth and of their maritime power. The war of 1778 fur-
nishes examples which proye the devotion of the French admirals to
the true interests of the country. The preservation of the island of
Grenada, the reduction of Yorktown where the English army surren*
dered, the conquest of the island of St Christopher, were the re-
sult of great battles in which the enemy was allowed to retreat un-
disturbed, rather than risk giving him a chance to succor the points
attacked.'*
. TliQ issue could not be more squarqly raised than la the
case of Grenada, No one will deny that there are moments
when a probable military success is to be foregone, or post-
poned, in favor of one greater or moro decisive. The posi-
tion of Do Grassy at the Chesapeake, in 1781, with the fato of
Yorktown hanging in the balance, is in point ; and it is here
coupled with that of D'Estaing at Grenada, as though both
stood on the same grounds. Both are justified alike ; not on
their respective merits as fitting the particular cases, but upon
a general principle. Is that principle sound? The bias of
the writer quoted betrays itself unconsciously, in saying a
few ships." A whole navy is not usually to bo crushed at
a blow; a few /ships mean an ordinary naval victory. In
Rodney's famous battle only five ships were taken, though
Jamaica was saved thereby.
In order to determine the soundness of the principle, which
is claimed as being illustrated by these two cases (St. Chris-
topher will be discussed later on), it is necessary to examine
what was the advantage sought, and what the determining
factor of success in either case. At Yorktown the advantage
sought was the capture of Comwallis's army ; the objective
was the destruction of the enemy's organized military force
on shore. At Grenada the chosen objective was the posses-
sion of a piece of territory of no great military value ; for it
must be ren^arked that all these smaller Antilles, if held in
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FRENCH NAVAL POLICY.
force at all, multiplied large detachments, whose mutual sup
port depended wholly upon the navy. These large detach-
ments were liable to be crushed separately, if not supported
by the nayy ; and if naval superiority is to be maintained, the
enemy's navy must be crushed. Orenada, near and to lee-
ward of Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia, both held strongly by the
English, was peculiarly weak to the French ; but sound mili-
tary policy for all these islands demanded ono or two strongly
fortified and garrisoned naval bases, and dependence for the
rest upon the fleet Beyond this, security against attacks by
single cruisers and privateers alone was needed.
Such were the objectives in dispute. What was the deter-
inining factor in this strife 7 Surely the navy, the organized
military force afloat. Cornwallis's fate depended absolutely
upon the sea. It is useless to speculate upon the result, had
the odds on the 5th of September, 1781, in favor of De Orasse,
been reversed ; if the French, instead of five ships more, had
had five ships less than the English. As it was, De Orasse,
when that fight began, had a superiority over the English
equal to the result of a hard-won fight The question then
was, should he risk the almost certain decisive victory over
the organized enemy's force ashore, for the sake of a much
more doubtful advantage over the organized force afloat?
This was not a question of Yorktown, but of Cornwallis and
his army ; there is a great deal in the way things are put.
So stated, — and the statement needs no modifications, —
there can bo but one answer. Let it be remarked clearly,
however, that both De Grasse's alternatives brought before
him the organized forces as the objective.
Not so with D'Estaing at Orenada. Bis superiority in
numbers over the English was nearly as great as that of De
Orasse; his alternative objectives were the organized force
afloat and a small island, fertile, but militarily unimportant
Orenada is said to have been a strong position for defence ;
but intrinsic strength does not give importance, if the position
has not strategic value. To save the island, he refused to
use an enormous advantage fortune had given him over the
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FRENCH NAVAL POLICY.
fleet. Yet upon the strife between the two navies depended
the tenure of the islands. Seriously to hold the West India
Islands required, first, a powerful seaport, which the French
had ; second, the control of the sea. For the latter it was
necessary, not to multiply detachments in the islands, but to
destroy the enemy's navy, which may be accurately called
the army in the field. The islands were but rich towns ;
and not more than one or two fortified towns, or posts, were
needed.
It may safely be said that the principle which led to D'Es-
taing's action was not, to say the least, unqualifiedly correct ;
for it led him wrong. In the case of Yorktown, the principle
as stated by Bamatuelle is not the jmttfying reason of De
Orasse's conduct, though it likely enough was the real rea*
son. What justified De Orasse was that, the event depending
upon the unshaken control of the sea, for a short time only,
he already had it by his greater numbers. Had the numbers
been equal, loyalty to the military duty of the hour must
have forced him to fight, to stop the attempt which the Eng-
lish admiral would certainly have made. The destruction of
a few ships, as Bamatuelle slightingly puts it, gives just that
superiority to which the happy result at Yorktown was due.
kA a general principle, this is undoubtedly a better objective
than that pursued by the French, Of course, exceptions will
be found ; but iliose exceptions will probably be where, as at
Yorktown, the military force is struck at directly elsewhere,
or, as at Port Mahon, a desirable and powerful base of that
force is at stake; though even at Mahon it is doubtful
whether the prudence was not misplaced. Had Hawke or
Boscawen met with Byng's disaster, they would not have
gone to Gibraltar to repair it, unless the French admiral
had followed up his first blow with others, increasing their
disability.
Orenada was no doubt very dear in the eyes of D'Estaing,
because it was his only success. After making the failures
at the Delaware, at New York, and at Rhode Island, with the
mortifying affair at Sta. Lucia, it is difiicult to understand
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lyESTAINO AT SAVANNAH.
876
the oonfidenoe in him expressed hj some French writers,
Oifted with a brilliant and contagions personal darings he
distinguished himself most highlj, when an admiral, by lead*
ing in person assaults upon intrenchments at Sta. Lucia and
Grenada, and a few months later in the unsuccessful attack
upon Savannah.
During the absence of the French navy in the winter of
1778-79, the English, controlling now the sea with a few
of their ships that had not gone to the West Indies, deter-
mined to shift the scene of the continentel war to the South-
ern States, where there was believed to be a large number of
loyalists. The expedition was directed upon Qeorgia, and
was so far successful that Savannah fell into their hands in
the last days of 1778. The whole State speedily submitted.
Operations were thence extended into South Carolina, but
failed to bring about the capture of Charleston.
Word of these evente was sent to D'Estaing in the West
Indies, accompanied by urgent representetions of the danger
to the Carolinas, and the murmurings of the people against
the French, who were accused of forsaking their allies, hav-
ing rendered them no service, but on the contrary having
profited by the cordial help of the Bostonians to refit their
crippled fleet. There was a sting of truth in the alleged
failure to help, which impelled D'Estaing to disregard the
orders actually in his hands to retorn at once to Europe
with certein ships. Instead of obeying them he sailed for
the American coast with twenty-two ship&of-the-line, having
in view two objecte, — the relief of the Southern Stetes and
an attack upon New York in conjunction with Washington's
army.
Arriving off the coast of Georgia on the 1st of September,
D'Estaing took the English wholly at unawares ; but the fatal
lack of promptness, which had previously marked the com-
mand of this very daring man, again betrayed his good
fortune. Dallying at first before Savannah^ tibe fleeting of
precious days again brought on a change of conditions, and
the approach of the bad-weather season impelled him, too
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876 I>E QUICHEN SUCCEEDS HESTAINQ.
slow at first, into a premature assault. In it he displayed
bis accustomed gallantry, fighting at the head of his column,
as did the American general ; but the result was a bloody
repulse. The siege was raised, and D*Estaing sailed at once
for France, not only giving up his project upon New York,
but abandoning the Southern States to the enemy. The
yalue of this help from the great sea power of France, thus
cruelly dangled before the eyes of the Americans only to be
withdrawn, was shown by the action of the English, who
abandoned Newport in the utmost haste when they learned
the presence of the French fleet. Withdrawal had been
before decided upon, but D'Estaing's coming converted it
into flight.
After the departure of D*Estaing, which involved that of
the whole French fleet, — for the ships which did not go
back to France returned to the West Indies, — the Eng-
lish resumed the attack upon the Southern States, which
had for a moment been suspended. The fleet and army
left New York for Qeorgia in the last weeks of 1779, and
after assembling at Tybee, moved upon Charleston by way
of Edisto. The powerlessness of the Americans upon the
sea left this movement unembarrassed save by single cruis-
ers, which picked up some stragglers, — affording another
lesson of the petty results of a merely cruising warfare.
The siege of Charleston began at the end of March, — the
IJuglish ships soon after passing the bar and Fort Moul-
trie without serious damage, and anchoring within gunshot
of the place. Fort Moultrie was soon and easily reduced
by land approaches, and the city itself was surrendered
on the 12th of May, after a siege of forty days. The whole
State was then quickly overrun and brought into military
subjection.
The fragments of D'Estaing's late fleet were joined by a
reinforcement from France under the Comte de Guichen,
who assumed chief command in the West Indian seas March
22, 1780. The next day he sailed for Sta. Lucia, which he
hoped to find unprepared ; but a crusty, hard-fighting old
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RODNETS ARRIVAL IN WEST INDIES. 877
admiral of the traditional English type. Sir Hjde Parker,
had 80 settled himself at the anchorage, witli sixteen ships,
that Ouichen with his twenty-two would not attack. The
opportunity, if it were one, did not recur. De Ouichen, re-
turning to Martinique, anchored there on the 27th ; and the
same day Parker at Sta. Lucia was joined by the new Eng-
lish commander-in-chief, Rodney.
This since celebrated, but then only distinguished, admiral
was sixty-two yeai*s old at the time of assuming a command
where he was to win an undying fame. Of distinguished
courage and professional skill, but with extravagant if not
irregular habits, money embarrassments had detained him
in exile in France at the time the war began. A boast of
his ability to deal with the French fleet, if circumstances
enabled him to go back to England, led a French nobleman
who heard it to assume his debts, moved by feelings in
which chivalry and national pique probably bore equal shares.
Upon his return he was given a command, and sailed, in Janu-
ary, 1780, with a fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, to relieve
Oibraltar, then closely invested. Off Cadiz, with a good luck
for whicli ho was proverbial, he fell in with a Spanish fleet
of eleven ships-of-the-line, which awkwardly held flieir ground
until too late to fly.^ Throwing out the signal for a general
chase, and cutting in to leeward of the enemy, between them
and their port, Rodney, despite a dark and stormy night,
succeeded in blowing up one ship and taking six. Hasten-
ing on, he relieved Gibraltar, placing it out of all danger
from want; and then, leaving the prizes and the bulk of his
fleet, sailed with the rest for his station.
Despite his brilliant personal courage and professional
skill, which in the matter of tactics was far in advance of
his contemporaries in England, Rodney, as a commander-in-
chief, belongs rather to the wary, cautious school of the
French tacticians than to the impetuous, unbounded eager-
1 Drinkwater, in his hiitory of the siege of Gihraltar, explains that the Span-
ish admiral beliered that Rodney would not accompany the convoy to the Strait^
hut had separated from it. He did not detect his mistalLe nntU too late.
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RODNErS MILITARY CHARACTER.
ness of Nelson. As in Tourville we have seen the desperate
fighting of the seventeenth century, unwilling to leave its
enemy, merging into the formal, artificial — we may almost
say trifling — parade tactics of the eighteenth, so in Rodney
we shall see the transition from those ceremonious duels to
an action which, while skilful in conception, aimed at serious
results. For it would be unjust to Rodney to press the com-
parison to the French admirals of his day. With a skill
that De Guichen recognized as soon as they crossed swords,
Rodney meant mischief, not idle flourishes. Whatever inci-
dental favors fortune might bestow by the way, the objective
from which his eye never wandered was the French fleet, —
the organized military force of the enemy on the sea. And
on the day when Fortune forsook the opponent who had neg-
lected her offers, when the conqueror of Oornwallis failed
to strike while he had Rodney at a disadvantage, the latter
won a victory which redeemed England from the depths of
anxiety, and restored to her by one blow all those islands
which the cautious tactics of the allies had for a moment
gained, save only Tobago.
De Guichen and Rodney met for the first time on the 17th
of April, 1780, three weeks after the arrival of the latter.
The French fleet was beating to windward in the Channel
between Martinique and Dominica, when the enemy was
made in the southeast. A day was spent in manoeuvring
for the weather-gage, which Rodney got. The two fleets
being now well to leeward of the islands ^ (Plate XL), both
on the starboard tack heading to the northward and the
French on the lee bow of the English, Rodney, who was carry-
ing a press of sail, signalled to his fleet that he meant to
attack the enemy^s rear and centre with his whole force ; and
when he had reached the position he thought suitable, ordered
them to keep away eight points (90^) together (A, A, A).
De Guichen, seeing the danger of the rear, wore his fleet all
together and stood down to succor it. Rodney, finding him-
self foiled, hauled up again on the same tack as the enemy,
1 The place where the battle waa fought ia shown hj the croased flaga.
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RODNBT AND DM QUICHEN.
879
both fleets now heading to the Bonthward and eastward.^
Later, he again made signal for battle, followed an hoar
after, jast at noon, by the order (quoting his own despatch),
" for eyory ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in
the enemy's line." This, which sounds like the old story of
ship to ship, Rodney explains to have meant her opposite at
the moment, not her opposite in numerical order. His own
words are : In a slanting position, that my leading ships
might attack the van ships of tlie enemy's centre division,
and the whole British fleet be opposed to only two thirds
of the enemy " (6, B). The difiiculty and misunderstand-
ing which followed seem to have sprung mainly from the
defective character of the signal book. Instead of doing as
the admiral wished, the leading ships (a) carried sail so as
to reach their supposed station abreast their numerical oppo-
site in the order. Rodney stated afterward that when he
bore down the second time, the French fleet was in a very
extended line of battle ; and that, had his orders been obeyed,
the centre and rear must have been disabled before the van
could have joined.
There seems every reason to believe that Rodney's inten-
tions throughout were to double on the French, as asserted.
The failure sprang from the signal-book and tactical ineffi-
ciency of the fleet ; for which he, having lately joined, was not
answerable. But the ugliness of his fence was so apparent to
De Guichen, that he exclaimed, when the English fleet kept
away the first time, that six or seven of his ships were
gone ; and sent word to Rodney that if his signals had been
obeyed he would have had him for his prisoner.* A more
1 The black ships, in position A, represent the English ships bearing down
npon the French centre and rear. The line t r is the line-of-battle from ran to
rear before bearing down. The positions y', r^, are those of the ran and rear
ships after hauling np on the port tack, when the French wore.
* In a severe reprimand addressed to Captain Carkett, commanding the lead-
ing ship of the English line, by Rodney, he says : " Tour leading in the manner
yon did, induced others to follow so bad an example ; and thereby, forgetting
that the signal for the line was at only two cables' length distance from each
other, the ran division was led by yon to mor€ ik<m two Uaguf dUUtne^ from the
centra division, which was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy,
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BREAKING THE LINE.
convincing proof that he recognized the dangerouBneBs of his
enemy is to be found in the fact that he took care not to liave
the lee-gage in their subseqnent encounters. Rodney's cai*e-
f ul plans being upset, he showed that with them he carried all
the stubborn courage of the most downright fighter ; taking
his own ship close to the enemy and ceasing only when the
latter hauled off, her foremast and mainyard gone, and her
hull so damaged that she could hardly be kept afloat.
An incident of this battle mentioned by French writers
and by Botta,^ who probably drew upon French authorities,
but not found in the English accounts, shows the critical
nature of the attack in the apprehension of the French.
According to them, Rodney, marking a gap in their order
due to a ship in rear of the French admiral being out of
station, tried to break through (b) ; but the captain of the
Destin," seventy-four, pressed up under more sail and threw
himself across the path of the English ninety-gun ship.
"The action of the ' Destin ' was justly praised/* says Lapeyroase^
Bonflls. "The fleet ran the danger of almost certain defeat, but for
the bravery of M. de Goimpy. Such, after the a£Eair, was the opinion of
the whole French squadron. Yet, admitting that our line was broken,
what disasters then would necessarily threaten the fleet? Would it
not always have been easy for our rear to remedy the accident by
promptly standing on to flU the place of the vessels cut off? That
movement would necessarily have brought about a m&ie^ which would
have turned to the advantage of the fleet having the bravest and most
devoted captains. But then, as under the empire, it was an acknowl-
edged principle that ships cut off were ships taken, and the belief
wrought its own fulfilment."
The e£fect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle,
depends upon several conditions. The essential idea is to
and not properljr supported" (Life, vol. i. p. asi). Bj aU roles of tactical
common««ense It wonld seem that the other ships should hare taken their distance
from their next astern, that is, shoold hare closed toward the centre. In conTer^
sation with Sir Gilbert Blane, who was not in this action, Rodnej stated that the
French line extended four leagues in length, *'as if De Gnichen thought we
meant to ran away from him " (Naval Chronide, yoL zzt. p. 402).
^ History of the American Revolution.
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RODNEY IN NEW YORK.
divide the opposing force by penetrating through an interval
found, or made, in it, and then to concentrate upon that one
of the fractions which can be least easily helped by the
other. In a column of ships this will usually be the rear.
The compactness of the order attacked, the number of the
ships cut o£f, the length of time duritig which they can be
isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results. A
very great factor in the issue will be the moral ^ect, the
confusion introduced into a line thus broken. Sliips coming
up toward tlie break are stopped, the rear doubles up, while
the ships ahead continue their course. Such a moment
is critical, and calls for instant action; but the men are
rare who in an unforeseen emergency can see, and at once
take tlie right course, especially if, being subordinates^
they incur responsibility. In such a scene of confusion tlie
English, without presumption, hoped to profit by their bet-
ter seamanship ; for it is not only courage iind devotion,'^
but skill, which then tells. All these effects of break-
ing the line*' received illustration in Rodney's great battle
m 1782.
De Ouichen and Rodney met twice again in the following
month, but on neither occasion did the French admiral take
the favorite lee-gage of his nation. Meanwhile a Spanish
fleet of twelve ships-of-the-line was on its way to join the
French. Rodney, cruised to windward of Martinique to inter*
cept them ; but the Spanish admiral kept a northerly course;
sighted Ouadelonpe, and thence sent a despatch to De Ouichen^
who joined his allies and escorted them into port. The great
preponderance of the coalition, in numbers, raised the fears o{
the English islands ; but lack of harmony led to delays and
hesitations, a terrible epidemic raged in the Spanish squads
ron, and the intended operations came to nothing. In August
De Guichen sailed for France with fifteen ships. Rodney;
ignorant of his destination, and anxious about both North
America and Jamaica, divided his fleet, leaving one half in
the islands, and with the remainder sailing for New York^
where he arrived on the 12th of September. The risk thus
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882 RODNEY RETURNS TO THE WEST INDIES.
run was very great, and scarcely justifiable ; but no ill e£Feot
followed the dispersal of forces.^ Had De Guichen intended
to turn upon Jamaica, or, as was expected by Washington,
upon New York, neither part of Rodney's fleet could well have
withstood him. Two chances of disaster, instead of one, were
run, by being in small force on two fields instead of in full
force on one.
Rodney's anxiety about North America was well grounded.
On the 12th of July of this year the long expected French
succor arrived, — five thousand French troops under Rocham-
beau and seven ships-of-the-line under De Ternay. Hence
the English, though still superior at sea, felt forced to con-
centrate at New York, and were unable to strengthen their
operations in Carolina. The difiiculty and distance of move^
ments by land gave such an advantage to sea power that
Lafayette urged the French government further to increase
the fleet ; but it was still naturally and properly attentive to
its own immediate interests in the Antilles. It was not yet
time to deliver America.
Rodney, having escaped the great hurricane of October,
1780, by his absence, returned to the West Indies later in
the year, and soon after heard of the war between England
and Holland ; which, proceeding from causes which will be
mentioned later, was declared December 20, 1780. The ad-
miral at once seized the Dutch islands of St. Eustatius and
St Martin, besides numerous merchant-ships, with property
amounting in all to fifteen million dollars. These islands,
while still neutral, had played a rOle similar to tliat of Nas-
sau during the American Civil War, and had become a great
depot of contraband goods, immense quantities of which now
fell into the English hands.
The year 1780 had been gloomy for the cause of the United
States. The battle of Camden had seemed to settle the Eng-
lish yoke on South Carolina, and the enemy formed high hopes
of controlling both North Carolina and Virginia. The treason
of Arnold following had increased the depression, which was
^ For Bodne/s reMODi, see his IM; toL 1. pp. 865. 876.
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DE GRASSS SAILS FROM BREST.
888
bnt partially relieved by the victory at EUng^s Mountain. The
substantial aid of French .troops was the most cheerful spot
in the situation. Yet even that had a checkered light, the
second division of the intended help being blocked in Brest
by the English fleet ; while the final failure of De Guichen to
appear, and Rodney coming in his stead, made the hopes of
the campaign fruitless.
A period of vehement and decisive action was, however, at
hand. At the end of March, 1781, the Oomte de Orasse sailed
from Brest with twenty-six ships-of-the-line and a large con-
voy. When off the Azores, five ships parted company for
the East Indies, under Suffren, of whom more will be heard
later on. De Grasse came in sight of Martinique on the 28th
of April. Admiral Hood (Rodney having remained behind at
St. Eustatius) was blockading before Fort Royal, the French
port and arsenal on the lee side of the island, in which were
four ships-of-the-line, when his lookouts reported the enemy's
fleet. Hood had two objects before him, — one to prevent the
junction of the four blockaded ships with the approaching
fleet, the other to keep the latter from getting between him
and Gros Hot Bay in Sta. Lucia. Instead of effecting this
in the next twenty-four hours, by beating to windward of
the Diamond Rock, his fleet got so far to leeward that De
Grasse, passing through the channel on the 29th, headed up
for Fort Royal, keeping his convoy between the fleet and the
island. For this false position Hood was severely blamed by
Rodney, but it may have been due to light winds and the lee
current However that be, the four ships in Fort Royal got
under way and joined the main body. The English had now
only eighteen ships to the French twenty-four, and the latter
were to windward ; but though thus in the proportion of four
to three, and having the power to attack, De Grasse would not
do it. The fear of exposing his convoy prevented him from
running the chance of a serious engagement Great must
have been his distrust of his forces, one would say. When
is a navy to fight, if this was not a time f He carried on
a distant cannonade, with results so far against the English
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884 CORNWALLIS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES.
as to make his backwardness jet more extraordinary. Can
a policy or a tradition which justices such a line of conduct
be good?
The following day, April 80, De Orasse, having thrown away
his chance, attempted to follow Hood ; but the latter had no
longer any reason for fighting, and his original inferiority was
increased by the severe injuries of some ships on the 29th.
De Grasse could not overtake him, owing to the inferior speed
of his fleet, many of the ships not being coppered, — a fact
worthy of note, as French vessels by model and size were gen-
erally faster than English ; but this superiority was sacrificed
through the delay of the government in adopting the new
improvement.
Hood rejoined Rodney at Antigua; and De Grasse, after re-
maining a short time at Fort Royal, made an attempt upon
Gros Hot Bay, the possession of which by the English kept
all the movements of his fleet under surveillance. Foiled
here, he moved against Tobago, which surrendered June 2,
1781. Sailing thence, after some minor operations, he an«
chored on the 26th of July at Gap Fran^ais (now Cape Hay-
tien), in the island of Hayti. Here he found awaiting him a
French frigate from the United States, bearing despatches
from Washington and Rochambeau, upon which he was to
take the most momentous action that fell to any French
admiral during the war.
The invasion of the Southern States by the English, be*
ginning in Georgia and followed by the taking of Charles-
ton and the military control of the two extreme States, had
been pressed on to the northward by way of Camden into
North Carolina. On the 16th of August, 1780, General Gates
was totally defeated at Camden ; and during the following
pine months the English under Cornwallis persisted in their
attempts to overrun North Carolina. These operations, the
narration of which is foreign to our immediate subject, had
ended by forcing Cornwallis, despite many successes in actual
encounter, to fall back exhausted toward the seaboard, and
finally upon Wilmington, in which place depots for such a
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ARNOLD ON THE JAMES RIVER.
886
contingency hiid been established. His opponent, (General
Greene, then turned the American troops toward South Caro-
lina. Oomwallisy too weak to dream of controlling, or even
penetrating, into the interior of an unfriendly country, had
now to choose between returning to Charleston, to assure there
and in South Carolina the shaken British power, and moving
northward again into Virginia, there to join hands with a
small expeditionary force operating on the James River under
Generals Phillips and Arnold. To fall back would be a con-
fession that the weary marching and fighting of months past
had been without results, and the general readily convinced
himself that the Chesapeake was the proper seat of war, even
if New York itself had to be abandoned. The commander-in
chief. Sir Henry Clinton, by no means shared this opinion,
upon which was justified a step taken without asking him.
Operations in the Chesapeake,'' he wrote, '^are attended
with great risk unless we are sure of a permanent superiority
at sea. I tremble for the fatal consequences that may ensue."
For Cornwallis, taking the matter into his own hands, had
marched from Wilmington on the 25th of April, 1781, joining
the British already at Petersburg on the 20th of May. The
forces thus united numbered seven thousand men. Driven
back from the open country of South Carolina into Charles-
ton, there now remained two centres of British power, — at
New York and in the Chesapeake. With New Jersey and
Pennsylvania in the hands of the Americans, communication
between the two depended wholly upon the sea.
Despite his unfavorable criticism of Comwallis's action,
Clinton had himself already risked a large detachment in
the Chesapeake. A body of sixteen hundred men under Bene-
dict Arnold had ravaged the country of the James and
burned Richmond in January of this same year. In the
hopes of capturing Arnold, Lafayette had been sent to Vir-
ginia with a nucleus of twelve hundred troops, and on the
evening of the 8th of March the French squadron at Newport
sailed, in concerted movement, to control the waters of the
bay. Admiral Arbuthnot, commanding the English fleet lying
86
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886 NAVAL BATTLE OFF THE CHESAPEAKE.
in Gardiner's Bay^^ learned the departure by his lookouts^ and
started in pursuit on the morning of the lOth, thirty-six hours
later. Favored either by diligence or luck, he made such good
time that when the two fleets came in sight of each other,
a little outside of the capes of the Chesapeake, the English
were leading^ (Plate XII., A, A). They at once went about
to meet their enemy, who, on his part, formed a line-of-battle.
The wind at this time was west, so that neither could head
directly into the bay.
The two fleets were nearly equal in strength, there being
eight ships on each side ; but tiie English had one ninety-
gun ship, while of the French one was only a heavy frigate,
which was put into the line. Nevertheless, the case was emi-
:nently one for the general French policy to have determined
the action of a vigorous chief, and the failure to see the mat-
ter through must fall upon the good- will of Commodore Des-
touches, or upon some other cause than that preference for
the ulterior objects of the operations, of which the reader of
French naval history hears so much. The weather was bois-
terous and threatening, and the wind, after hauling once or
twice, settled down to northeast, with a big sea, but was then
fair for entering the bay. The two fleets were by this time
both on the port tack standing out to sea, the French leading,
and about a point on the weather bow of the English (B, B).
From this position they wore in succession (c) ahead of the
latter, taking the lee-gage, and thus gaining the use of their
lower batteries, which the heavy sea forbade to the weather-
gage. The English stood on till abreast the ebemy's line
(a, b), when they wore together, and soon after attacked in
the usual manner, and with the usual results (C). The three
van ships were very badly injured aloft, but in their turn,
throwing their force mainly on the two leaders of the enemy,
crippled them seriously in hulls and rigging. The French van
then kept away, and Arbuthnot, in perplexity, ordered his
1 At the eastern end of Long Island.
* The Fiench ascribe this disadTsntage to the (act that some of their ships
were not coppered.
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CORNWALLIS OCCUPIES YORKTOWN. 887
van to haul the wind again. M. Destouches now execated a
yerj neat movement hj defiling. Signalling his van to hanl
up on the other tack (e), he led the rest of hie squadron bj
the disabled English ships, and after giving them the suc^
cessive broadsides of his comparatively fresh sl^ips, wore (d)^
and out to sea (D). This was the end of the battle, in which
the English certainlj got the worst ; but with their usual
tenacity of purpose, being unable to pursue their enemy afloat,
they steered for the bay (D), made the junction with Arnold,
and thus broke up the plans of the French and Americans,
from which so much had been hoped by Washington. There
can be no doubt, after careful reading of the accounts, that
after the fighting the French were in better force than the
English, and they in fact claimed the victory ; yet the ulte-
rior objects of the expedition did not tempt them again to try
the issue with a fleet of about their own size.^
The way of the sea being thus open and held in force, two
thousand more English troops sailing from New York reached
Virginia on the 26th of March, and the subsequent arrival of
Comwallis in May raised the number to seven thousand. The
operations of the contending forces during the spring and
summer months, in which Lafayette commanded Uie Ameri*
cans, do not concern our subject. Early in August, Com-
wallis, acting under orders from Clinton, withdrew his troops
into the peninsula between the York and James rivers, and
occupied Yorktown.
Washington and Bochambeau had met on the 21st of May,
and decided that the situation demanded that the effort of the
French West Indian fleet, when it came, should be directed
against either New York or the Chesapeake. This was the
tenor of the despatch found by De Grasse at Cap Fran9ais,
> That the French gOTernment was not Batisfied with M. Destonches'a action
can be safely inferred from its delay to reward the ofilcen of the squadron,
which called forth much feeling and Terj lively remonstrances. The French
asserted that Arbnthnot was hooted fai the streets of New York and recalled by
his goTemment The latter is a mistake, as he went home by his own request ;
but the former is likely enough. Both commanders reversed in this case the
usual naral policy of their nations.
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888
DE GRASSB IN THE CHESAPEAKE.
and meantime the allied generals drew their troops toward
New York, where they would be on liand for the furtherance
of one object, and nearer the second if they had to make for it.
In either case the result, in the opinion both of Washington
and of the French government, depended upon superior sea
power; but Bochambeau had privately notified the admiral
that his own preference was for the Chesapeake as the scene
of the intended operations, and moreover the French gov»
ernment had declined to furnish the means for a formal siege
of New York.^ The enterprise therefore assumed the form
of an extensive military combination, dependent upon ease
and rapidity of movement, and upon blinding the eyes of the
enemy to the real objective, — purposes to which the peculiar
qualities of a navy admirably lent themselves. The shorter
distance to be 4iraversed, the greater depth of water and
easier pilotage of the Chesapeake, were further reasons which
would commend the scheme to the judgment of a seaman ;
and De Grasse readily accepted it, without making difficulties
or demanding modifications which would have involved dis-
cussion and delay.
Having made his decision, the French admiral acted with
great good judgment, promptitude, and vigor. The same
frigate that brought despatches from Washington was sent
back, so that by August 15th the allied generals knew of the
intended coming of the fleet. Thirty-five hundred soldiers
were spared by the governor of Cap Fran^ais, upon the
condition of a Spanish squadron anchoring at the place, which
De Orasse procured. He also raised from the governor of
Havana the money urgently needed by the Americans; and
finally, instead of weakening his force by sending convoys
to France, as the court had wished, he took every available
ship to the Chesapeake. To conceal his coming as long as
possible, he passed through the Bahama Channel, as a less
frequented route, and on the 80th of August anchored in
Lynnhaven Bay, just within the capes of the Chesapeake, with
twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. Three days before, August 27,
1 Bancroft : History of the United States.
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CORNW ALUS SHUT UP IN YORKTOWN.
889
the French squadron at Newport^ eight ships-of-the-line with
four frigates and eighteen transports under M. de Barras,
sailed for the rendezvous; making, however, a wide circuit
out to sea to avoid the English. This course was the more
necessary as the French siege-artillerj was with it. The
troops under Washington and Bochambeau had crossed the
Hudson on the 24th of August, moving toward the head of
Chesapeake Bay. Thus the different armed forces, both land
and sea, were converging toward tlieir objective, Gomwallis.
The English were unfortunate in all directions. Rodney^
learning of Do Grasse's departure, sent fourteen ships-of-the-
line under Admiral Hood to North America, and himself
sailed for England in August, on account of ill health. Hood,
going by the direct route, reached the Chesapeake three days
before De Orasse, looked into the bay, and finding it empty
went on to New York. There he met five ships-of-the-line
under Admiral Graves, who, being senior officer, took com-
mand of the whole force and sailed on the 81st of August
for the Chesapeake^ hoping to intercept De Barras before
ho could join De Grasse. It was not till two days later
that Sir Henry Clinton was persuaded that the allied armies
had gone against Cornwallis, and had too far the start to
be overtaken.
Admiral Graves was painfully surprised, on making the
Chesapeake, to find anchored there a fleet which from its
numbers could only be an enemy's. Nevertheless, he stood in
to meet it, and as De Grasse got under way, allowing his
ships to be counted, the sense of numerical inferiority —
nineteen to twenty-four — did not deter the English admiral
from attacking. The clumsiness of his method, however,
betrayed his gallantry; many of his ships were roughly
handled, without any advantage being gained. De Orasse,
expecting De Barras, remained outside five days, keeping the
English fleet in play without coming to action ; then return^
ing to port he found De Barras safety at anchor. Graves went
back to New York, and with him disappeared the last hope of
succor that was to gladden Cornwallis's eyes. The siege was
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890 MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ENGLISH NAVY.
Bteadilj endured, bat the control of the sea made only one
issue possible, and the English forces were surrendered Octo-
ber 19| 1781. With this disaster the hope of subduing the
colonies died in England. The conflict flickered through a
year longer, but no serious operations were undertaken.
In the conduct of the English operations, which ended thus
unfortunately, there was both bad management and ill fortune.
Hood's detachment might have been strengthened by seyeral
ships from Jamaica, had Rodney's orders been carried out.^
The despatch-ship, also, sent by him to Admiral Graves
commanding in New York, found that officer absent on a
cruise to the eastward, with a view to intercept certain very
important supplies which had been forwarded by the American
agent in France. The English Court had laid great stress
upon cutting oif this convoy ; but, with the knowledge that
he had of the force accompanying it, the admiral was probably
ill-advised in leaving his headquarters himself, with all his
fleet, at the time when the approach of the hurricane season
in the West Indies directed the active operations of the navies
toward the continent. In consequence of his absence, al-
though Rodney's despatches were at once sent on by the
senior officer in New York, the vessel carrying them being
driven ashore by enemy's cruisers, Oraves did not learn their
contents until his return to port, August 16. The informa-
tion sent by Hood of his coming was also intercepted. After
Hood's arrival, it does not appear that there was avoidable
delay in going to sea ; but there does seem to have been mis-
judgment in the direction given to the fleet. It was known
that De Barras had sailed from Newport with eight ships,
bound probably for the Ohesapeake, certainly to effect a
junction with De Grasse ; and it has been judiciously pointed
out that if Graves had taken up his cruisiug-ground near the
Gapes, but out of sight of land, he could hardly have failed
to fall in witli him in overwhelming force. Knowing what
is now known, this would undoubtedly have been the proper
thing to do ; but the English admiral had imperfect informa-
^ Life of Rodney, vol. ii. p. 163; Ckrk: NaTal Tactics, p. 84.
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CONDUCT OF ADMIRAL GRAVES.
tion. It was nowhere expected that the French would bring
nearly the force they did ; and Graves lost information, which
he ought to have received, as to their numbers, by the care*
lessness of his cruisers stationed off the Chesapeake. These
had been ordered to keep under way, but were both at anchor
under Gape Henry when De Grasse's appearance cut off their
escape. One was captured, the other driven up York Biver.
No single circumstance contributed more to the general result
than the neglect of these two subordinate officers, by which
Graves lost that all-important information. It can readily
be conceived how his movements might have been affected,
had he known two days earlier that De Grasse had brought
twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail of the line; how natural
would have been the conclusion, first, to waylay De Barras,
with whom his own nineteen could more than cope. Had
Admiral Graves succeeded in capturing that squadron, it
would have greatly paralyzed the besieging army [it had
the siege train on board], if it would not have prevented
its operations altogether; it would have put the two fleets
nearly on an equality in point of numbers, would have ar-
rested the progress of the French arms for the ensuing
year in the West Indies, and might possibly have created
such a spirit of discord between the French and Ameri-
cans ^ as would have sunk the latter into the lowest depths
of despair, from which they were only extricated by the
arrival of the forces under De Grasse.'' ^ These are true
and sober comments upon the naval strategy.
In regard to the admiral's tactics, it will be enough to say
that the fleet was taken into battle nearly as Byng took his ;
that very similar mishaps resulted; and that, when attack-
ing twenty-four ships with nineteen, seven, under that capable
officer Hood, were not able to get into action, owing to the
dispositions made.
1 De Bams had been nnwiUing to go to the Cheeapeake, fearing to be inter*
oepted hy a snperior force, and had only yielded to the aoUdtation of Washington
and Rochambean.
* KaTal Researches : Capt Thomas White, B. N.
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892 MILITARY SITUATION OF ENGLAND
On the French side De Grasse must be credited with a
degree of energy, foresight, and determination surprising in
yiew of his failures at other times. The decision to take
every ship with him, which made him independent of any
failure on the part of De Barras ; the passage through the
Bahama Channel to conceal his movements; the address
with which he obtained the money and troops required, from
the Spanish and the French military authorities; the pre-
vision which led him, as early as March 29, shortly after
leaving Brest, to write to Bochambeau that American coast
pilots should be sent to Gap Franfais; the coolness with
which he kept Graves amused until De Barras's squadron
had slipped in, are all points worthy of admiration. The
French were also helped by the admiral's power to detain the
two hundred merchantwships, the " West India trade," await-
ing convoy at Gap Franfais, where they remained from July
till November, when the close of operations left him at
liberty to convoy them with ships-of-war. The incident
illustrates one weakness of a mercantile country with repre-
sentative government, compared with a purely military nation.
If the British government," wrote an officer of that day,
had sanctioned, or a British admiral had adopted, such a
measure, the one would have been turned out and the other
hanged." ^ Rodney at the same time had felt it necessary to
detach five ships-of-the-liue with convoys, while half a dozen
more went home with the trade from Jamaica.
It is easier to criticise the division of the English fleet be-
tween the West Indies and North America in the successive
years 1780 and 1781, than to realize the embarrassment of
the situation. This embarrassment was but the reflection of
the military difficulty of England's position, all over the
world, in this groat and unequal war. England was every-
where outmatched and embarrassed, as she has always been
as an empire, by the number of her exposed points. In
Europe the Ghannel fleet was more than once driven into its
ports by overwhelming forces. Gibraltar, closely blockaded
I White: Naval R«BearchM.
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IN THE WAR OF 1778.
by land and aea, was only kept alive in ite desperate resist^
ance by the skill of English seamen triumphing over the in-
aptness and discords of their combined enemies. In the East
Indies, Sir Edward Hughes met in Suffren an opponent as
superior to him in numbers as was De Orasse to Hood, and of
far greater ability. Minorca, abandoned by the home gov-
ernment, fell before superior strength, as has been seen to
fall, one by one, the less important of the English Antilles.
The position of England from the time that France and Spain
opened their maritime war was everywhere defensive, except
in North America ; and was therefore, from the military point
of view, essentially false. She everywhere awaited attacks
which the enemies, superior in every case, could make at
their own choice and their own time. North America was
really no exception to this rule, despite some offensive opera-
tions which in no way injured her real, that is her naval, foes.
Thus situated, and putting aside questions of national pride
or sensitiveness, what did military wisdom prescribe to Eng-
land ? The question would afford an admirable study to a
military inquirer, and is not to be answered off-hand, but
certain evident truths may be pointed out. In the first place,
it should have been determined what part of the assailed em-
pire was most necessary to be preserved. After the British
islands themselves, the North American colonies were the
most valuable possessions in the eyes of the England of that
day. Next should have been decided what others by their
natural importance were best worth preserving, and by their
own inherent strength, or that of the empire, which was mainly
naval strength, could most surely be held. In the Mediterrsp
nean, for instance, Gibraltar and Mahon were both very valu-
able positions. Could both be held 7 Which was more easily
to be reached and supported by the fleet 7 If both could not
probably be held, one should have been frankly abandoned,
and the force and efforts necessary to its defence carried
elsewhere. So in the West Indies the evident strategic ad-
vantages of Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia prescribed the aban-
donment of the other small islands by garrisons as soon as
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894 NSCESSITY FOR A VIGOROUS
the fleet was fairly oatnumberedf if not before. The case of
80 large an ialand as Jamaica must be stadied separately,
as well as with reference to the general question. Such an
island may be so far self-supporting as to defy any attack
but one in great force and numbers, and that would rightly
draw to it the whole English force from the windward stations
at Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia.
With the defence thus concentrated, England's great weapon,
the navy, should have been vigorously used on the offensive.
Experience has taught that free nations, popular governments,
will seldom dare wholly to remove the force that lies be-
tween an invader and its shores or capital. Whatever the
military wisdom, therefore, of sending the Channel ^eet to
seek the enemy before it united, the step may not have been
possible. But at points less vital the attack of the English
should have anticipated that of the allies. This was most es«
pecially true of that theatre of the war which has so far been
considered. If North America was the first object, Jamaica
and the other islands should have been boldly risked. It is
due to Rodney to say tliat he claims that his orders to the
admirals at Jamaica and New York were disobeyed in 1781,
and that to this was owing the inferiority in number of Graves's
fleet
But why, in 1780, when the departure of De Ouichen for
Europe left Rodney markedly superior in numbers during his
short visit to North America, from September 14 to Novem-
ber 14, should no attempt have been made to destroy the
French detachment of seven ships-of-the-line in Newport?
These ships had arrived there in July ; but although they
had at once strengthened their position by earthworks, great
alarm was excited by the news of Rodney's appearance off
the coast. A fortnight passed by Rodney in New York and
by the French in busy work, placed the latter, in their own
opinion, in a position to brave all the naval force of England.
We twice feared, and above all at the time of Rodney's arri-
val," wrote the chief of staff of the French squadron, that
the English might attack us in the road itself ; and there was
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a space of time daring which sach an tmdertaking would not
have been an act of rashness. Now [October 20], the an-
chorage is fortified so that we can there brave all the naval
force of England." ^
The position thus taken by the French was nndoubtedlj
very strong.^ It formed a re-entrant angle of a little over
ninety degrees, contained by lines drawn from Goat Island to
what was then called Brenton's Point, the site of the present
Fort Adams on the one side, and to Rose Island on the other.
On the right flank of the position Rose Island received a
battery of thirty-six 24^unders; while twelve guns of the
same size were placed on the left flank at Brenton's Point.
Between Rose and Goat islands four ships, drawn up on a
west-northwest line, bore upon the entrance and raked an
approaching fleet; while three others, between Goat Island
and Brenton's Point, crossed their fire at right angles with
the former four.
On the other hand, the summer winds blow directly up the
entrance, often with great force. There could be no question
even of a considerably crippled attacking ship reaching her
destined position, and when once confused with the enemy's
line, the shore batteries would be neutralized. Tlie work on
Rose Island certainly, that on Brenton's Point probably, had
less height than the two upper batteries of a 8hip-of-the4ine,
and could be vastly outnumbered. They could not have been
casemated, and might indisputably hav6 been silenced by the
grapeshot of the ships that could hare been brought against
tiiem. Rose Island could be approached on the front and on
the west flank within two hundred yards, and on the north
within half a mile. There was nothing to prevent this right
flank of the French, including the line of ships, being en-
1 BoodoB t lift Mftrine de LooIb XVI., p. S81. Under a ntber mlsleftdiiig
title this work is reftUy ft lengthy biogtftphy of Llbezge de Qnuchftln, ehief of
•tftif to the French sqoftdron under Temfty.
s Diftiy of ft French oflloer, 1781 ; Msgaslne of Americftn Historj for March,
18S0. The works ftt the time of Rodnej's rislt to New Tork were doubtless less
complete than in 1781. This anthoritj, a year later, gires the work on Rose
Island twenty 36-poiinder8.
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896 NECESSITY FOR A VIGOROUS
filaded and crushed by the Eugliah ships taking position west
of Hose Island. The essential points of close range and su-
perior height were thus possible to the English fleet, which
numbered twenty to the enemy's seven. If successful in de-
stroying the shipping and reducing Rose Island, it could find
anchoi*age farther up the bay and await a favorable wind to
retire. In the opinion of a distinguished English naval offi-
cer of the day,^ closely familiar with the ground, there was
no doubt of flie success of an attack ; and he urged it fre-
quently upon Rodney, offering himself to pilot the leading
ship. The security felt by the French in this position, and
the acquiescence of the English in that security, mark cleai*ly
the difference in spirit between this war and the wars of
Nelson and Napoleon.
It is not, however, merely as an isolated operation, but in
relation to the universal war, that such an attempt is here
considered. England stood everywhere on the defensive, with
inferior jiumbers. From such a position there is no salvation
except by action vigorous almost to desperation. It is im-
possible for us," wrote with great truth the First Lord of the
Admiralty to Rodney, to have a superior fleet in every part ;
and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great line,
as you do, and consider the king's whole dominions under
their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere,
and carry their point against us."^ Attacks which consid-
ered in themselves alone might be thought unjustifiable,
were imposed upon English commanders. The allied navy
was the key of the situation, and its large detachments, as
at Newport, should have been crushed at any risk. The
effect of such a line of action upon the policy of the French
government is a matter of speculation, as to which the pres-
ent writer has no doubts ; but no English officer in chief com-
I Sir ThomM Grayes, afterward second in command to Nebon in tbe attack
at Copenhagen in 1801, — an enterprise folly as desperate and encompassed with
greater difficulties of pilotage than the one here adrocated. See hiogzaphical
memoir, Naral Chronicle, vol. viii.
s Bodnej's Life, roL l p. 40S.
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897
mand rose to the level of the situation, with the exception
of Hood, and possibly of Howe. Bodnej was now old, infirm,
and though of great ability, a careful tactician rather than a
great admiral.
The defeat of Graves and subsequent surrender of Corn-
wallis did not end the naval operations in the western hemi-
sphere. On the contrary, one of the most interesting tactical
feats and the most brilliant victory of the whole war were
yet to grace the English flag in the West Indies ; but with
the events at Yorktown the patriotic interest for Americans
closes. Before quitting that struggle for independence, it
tnust again be affirmed that its successful ending, at least
at so early a date, was due to the control of the sea, — to sea
power in the hands of the French, and its improper distribu-
tion by the English authorities. This assertion may be safely
rested on the authority of the one man who, above aU others,
thoroughly knew the resources of the country, the temper of
the people, the difficulties of the struggle, and whose name
is still the highest warrant for sound, quiet, unflutteriBd good*
sense and patriotism.
The keynote to all Washington's utterances is set in the
Memorandum for concerting a plan of operations with the
French army," dated July 16, 1780, and sent by the hands
of Lafayette: —
The Marquis de Lafayette will be pleased to oommanicate the
following general ideas to Count de Bochambeau and the Chevalier
de Tersay, as the sentiments of the underwritten :
I. In any operatitm, and under all eireymiianeei^ a deeiiive naval
iuperiarxiyU to he eamidered at a fundamental principle, and the baeie
upon which every hope of iueceti mutt ultimately dependJ*
This, however, though the most formal and decisive ex-
pression of Washington's views, is but one among many
others equally distinct Thus, writing to Franklin, Decem-
ber 20,1780, he saya: —
Disappointed of the second dirision of French troops [blockaded
in Brest], but more espedaily in the expected naval superiority, which
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898
WASHINGTON'S OPINIONS AS TO
WM the pivot upon which eyerything turned, we have been compelled
to spend an inactive campaign after a flattering prospect at the open*
ing of it. • • . Latterly we have been obliged to become spectators of
a succession of detachments from the army at New York in aid of
Lord Cornwallis ; while oor naval weakness, and the political dissolu-
tion of a large part of our army, put it out of our power to counteract
them at the southward, or to take advantage of them here.'*
A month later, January 15, 1781, in a memorandum letter
to Oolonel Laurens, sent on a special mission to France, he
says: —
<<Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority upon these
coasts is the object most interesting. This would instantly reduce
the enemy to a difficult defensive, • • • Indeed, it is not to be con-
ceived how they could subsist a large force in this country, if we had
the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of sup-
plies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid in money, would
enable us to convert the war into a vigorous offensive. With re-
spect to us it seems to be one of two deciding points,"
In another letter to the same person, then in Paris, dated
April 9, he writes : —
If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture
of our affairs, it will avail us noUiing^ should she attempt it here-
after. • • • Why need I run into detail, when it may be declared in
a word that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never
our deliverance must come? How easy would it be to retort the
enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made to comport with
the general plan of the war to keep a superior fleet always in these
seas, and France would put us in condition to be active by advancing
us money."
Ships and money are the burden of his cry. May 28, 1781,
he writes to the Chevalier de la Luzerne : I do not see how
it is possible to give effectual support to the Southern States,
and avert the evils which threaten, while we are inferior in
naval force in these seas." As the season for active opera-
tions advances, his utterances are more frequent and urgent.
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THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER.
899
To Major General Greene^ Btruggling with his difficulties in
South Oarolina, he writes, June 1, 1781 : Our affairs hare
been attentively considered in eyery point of view, and it was
finally determined to make an attempt upon New York, in
preference to a Southern operation, as we had not decided
command of the water/' To Jefferson, June 8 : ^ Should I
be supported in the manner I expect, by the neighboring
States, the enemy will, I hope, be reduced to the necessity of
recalling part of their force from the southward to support
New York, or they will run the most imminent risk of being
expelled from that post, which is to them invaluable; and
should we, by a lucky coincidence of circumstances, gain a
naval superiority, their ruin would be inevitable. • • . While
we remain inferior i^t sea . • • policy dictates that relief
should be attempted by diversion rather than by sending re-
inforcements immediately to the point in distress," that is, to
the South. To Rochambean, June 18: ^^Your Excellency
will recollect that New York was looked upon by us as the
only practicable object under present circumstances; but
should we be able to secure a naval superiority, we may
perhaps find others more practicable and equally advisable."
By the 16th of August the letters of De Grasse announcing
his sailing for the Chesapeake were received, and the corre-
spondence of Washington is thenceforth filled with busy
preparations for the campaign in Virginia, based upon the
long-delayed fleet. The discouragement of De Grasse, and
his purpose to go to sea, upon learning that the English fleet
in New York had been reinforced, drew forth an appealing let-
ter dated September 26, which is too long for quotation ; but
the danger passed, Washington's confidence returns. The
day after the capitulation he writes to De Grasse: ^'The
surrender of York . . . the honor of which helongi to your
Exeelhney^ has greatly anticipated [in time] our most san-
guine anticipations." He then goes on to urge further opera-
tions in the South, seeing so much of the. good season was
still left: ^^The general naval superiority of the British,
previous to your arrival, gave them decisive advantages in
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400
OPINIONS OF WASHINGTON.
the Southy in the rapid transport of their troops and sup-
plies; while the immense land marches of our succors, too
tardy and expensive in every point of view, subjected us to
be beaten in detail. It will depend upon your Excellency,
therefore, to terminate the war/' De Grasse refusing this re-
quest, but intimating an intention to co-operate in the next
year's campaign, Washington instantly accepts : With your
Excellency I need not insist upon the indispensable necessity
of a maritime force capable of giving you an absolute ascen-
dency in these seas. • • • You will have observed that, what-
ever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have
the casting vote in the present contest." A fortnight later,
November 15, he writes to Lafayette, who is on the point of
sailing for France : —
Ab you expressed a desire to know my sentiments respecting the
operations of the next campaign, I will, without a tedious display of
reasoning, declare in one word that it most depend absolutely upon
the naval force which is employed in these seas, and the time of its
appearance next year. No land force can act decisively unless ac-
companied by a maritime superiority. • • • A doubt did not exist,
nor does it at this moment, in any man's mind, of the total extirpation
of the British force in the Carolinas and Georgia, if Count de Grasse
could have extended his co-operation two months longer."
Such, in the opinion of the revered commander-in-chief of
the American armies, was the influence of sea power upon the
contest which he directed with so much skill and such infinite
patience, and which, amidst countless trials and discourage-
ments, he brought to a glorious close.
It will be observed that the American cause was reduced to
these straits, notwithstanding the great and admitted losses
of British commerce by the cruisers of the allies and by
American privateers. This fact, and the small results from
the general war, dominated as it was by the idea of commerce-
destroying, show strongly the secondary and indecisive effect
of such a policy upon the great issues of war.
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CHAPTER XI.
Mabitimb War in Eubopk, 1779-1782.
^HE last chapter closed with the opinions of Washington,
expressed in many ways and at many times, as to the
effect of sea power upon the struggle for American inde-
pendence. If space allowed, these opinions could be amply
strengthened by similar statoments of Sir Henry Clinton, the.
English commander-in-chief.^ In Europe tlie results turned
yet more entirely upon the same factor. There the allies had
three several objectives, at each of which England stood strictly
upon the defensive. The first of these was England herself,
involving, as a preliminary to an invasion, the destruction of
the Channel fleet, — a project wliich, if seriously entertained,
can scarcely be said to have been seriously attempted ; the
second was the reduction of Gibraltar ; the third, the capture
of Minorca. The last alone met with success. Thrice was
England threatened by a largely superior fleet, thrice the
threat fell harmless. Thrice was Gibraltar reduced to straits ;
thrice was it relieved by the address and fortune of English
seamen, despite overpowering odds.
After EeppeFs action off Ushant, no general encounter
took place between fleets in European seas during the year
1778 and the first half of 1779. Meantime Spain was draw-
ing toward a rupture with England and an active alliance
with France. War was declared by her on the 16th of June,
1779; but as early as April 12, a treaty between the two
Bourbon kingdoms, involving active war upon England, had
been signed. By its terms the invasion of Great Britain or
Ireland was to be undertaken, every effort made to recover
1 The cnrionB reader can consalt Clinton's letters and notes, in the " Clinton-
Comwallis Controversj," hj B. F. Stevens. London, 1888.
26
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402 ALLIED FLEETS IN THE CHANNEL, 1779.
for Spain , Minorca^ Pensacolay and Mobile, and the two courts
bound themselves to grant neither peace, nor truce, nor sus-
pension of hostilities, until Gibraltar should be restored.^
The declaration of war was withheld until ready to strike ;
but the English government, doubtless, should have been upon
its guard in the strained relations of the two countries, and
prepared to prevent a junction of the two fleets. As it was,
no efficient blockade of Brest was established, and twenty-eight
French sail-of-the-line went out unopposed' June 8, 1779,
under D'Orvilliers, Keppel's opponent of the year before. The
fleet steered for the coasts of Spain, where it was to find the
Spanish ships ; but it was not till the 22d of July that the full
contingent joined. Seven precious summer weeks thus slipped
by unimproved, but that was not all the loss ; the Fi*ench had
been provisioned for only thirteen weeks, and this truly great
armada of sixty-six ships-of-the-line and fourteen frigates
had not more than forty working-days before it Sickness,
moreover, ravaged the fleet ; and altiiough it was fortunate
enough to enter the Channel while tlie English were at sea,
the latter, numbering little more than half their * enemies,
succeeded in passing within them. The flabbiness of coali-
tions increased the weakness due to inefficient preparation ;
a great and not unnatural panic on the English Channel
coast, and the capture of one ship-of-the-line, were the sole
results of a cruise extending, for the French, over fifteen
weeks.* The disappointment, due to bad preparation, mainly
1 Bancroft : Histoxy of the United States, rol. x. p. 191.
* Althongb the English thus culpably failed to use their superiority to the
French alone, the Channel fleet numbering over forty of the line, the fear that
it might prevent the junction caused the Brest fleet to sail in haste and under-
manned, — a fact which had an important effect upon the issue of the cruise.
(ChovaUer, p. 159.)
* The details of the mismanagement of this huge mob of ships are so numerous
as to confuse a narrative, and are therefore thrown into a foot-note. The French
fleet was hurried to sea four thousand men short. The Spaniards were seven
weeks in joining. When they met, no common system of signals had been
arranged ; five fair summer days were spent in remedying this defect. Not till
a week after the junction could the fleet sail for England. No steps were taken
to supply the provisions consumed by the French during the seven weeks. The
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RODNEY RELIEVES GIBRALTAR. 408
on the part of Spain, though the French ministry utterly
failed to meet the pressing wants of its fleet, fell, of course,
upon the innocent Admiral d'Orvilliers. That brave and
accomplished but unfortunate officer, whose, only son^ a
lieutenant, had died of the pestilence which scourged the
allies, could not support the odium. Being of a deeply re-
ligious character, the refuge which Yilleneuve after Tra-
falgar found in suicide was denied him; but he threw up
his command and retired into a religious house.
The scanty maritime interest of the year 1780, in Europe,
centres round Cadiz and Oibraltax*. This fortress was in-
vested by Spain immediately upon the outbreak of war, and,
while successfully resisting direct attack, the supply of pro-
visions and ammunition was a matter of serious concern to'
England, and involved both difficulty and danger. For this
purpose, Rodney sailed on the 29th of December, 1779, having
under his command twenty ships-of-the-lino with a large con-
voy and reinforcements for Gibraltar and Minorca, as well as
the West India trade. The latter parted company on the 7th
of January, under the care of four frigates, and the following
morning the fleet fell in with and captured a Spanish squad- .
ron of seven ships-of-war and sixteen supply-ships. Twelve
of the latter being laden with provisions were carried on to
Gibraltar. A week later, at one p. m. of the 16th, a Spanish
original orders to B'Orvilliera contemplated a landing at Portemonth, or the
seiznre of the Isle of Wight, for which a large armj was assembled on the coast
of Normandy. Upon reaching the Channel, these orders were saddenlj changed,
and Falmonth indicated as the point of landing. Bj this time, Angnst 16,
summer was nearly over ; and Falmonth, if taken, would offer no shelter to a
great fleet Then an easterlj gale drove the fleet out of the Channel. Bj this
time the sickness which raged had so reduced the crews that manj ships could
be neither handled nor fought Ships companies of eight hundred or a thousand
men could muster only from tliree to five hundred. Thus bad administration
crippled the fighting powers of the fleet; while the unaccountable military
blunder of changing the objectiTe from a safe and accessible roadstead to a
fourth-rate and exposed harbor completed the disaster by taking away the only
hope of a secure base of operations during the fall and winter months. France
then had no first-lass port on the Channel ; hence the violent westerly gales
which prevail in the autumn and winter would have driven the allies Into the
North Sea.
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404
DEFEAT OF LANQARA'S FLEET.
fleet of eleven sail-of-the-line was seen in the southeast. They
held their ground, supposing the approaching vessels to be only
supply-ships for Gibraltar, without a strong force of men-of*
war, — an unfortunate error from which they did not awake
until too late to escape, owing to the yet more unfortunate
oversight of having no lookout frigates thro¥m out. When
the Spanish admiral, Don Juan de Langara, recognized his
mistake, he attempted to escape ; but the English ships were
copper-bottomed, and Rodney making the signal for a gen-
eral chase overtook the enemy, cut in between him and his
port, regardless of a blowy night, lee shore, and dangerous
shoals, and succeeded in capturing the commander-in-chief
with six ships-of-the-line. A seventh was blown up. The
weather continuing very tempestuous, one of the prizes was
wrecked, and one forced into Cadiz ; several of the English
ships were also in great danger, but happily escaped, and
within a few days the entire force entered Gibraltar Bay.
The convoy for Minorca was at once despatched, and imme-
diately after the return of the ships-of-war guarding it, on
the 18th of February, Rodney sailed for the West Indies
with four ships-of-the-line, sending the rest of his force,
with the prizes, to England under Admiral Digby.
The state of politics and parties in England at this time
was such that, combined with the unavoidable inferiority of
the Channel fleet, it was diflicult to find an admiral willing
to accept the chief command. An admirable officer, Bar-
rington, the captor of Sta. Lucia, refused the first place,
though willing to serve as second, even to a junior.^ The
allied fleet, to the number of thirty-six sail-of-the-line, assem-
bled at Cadiz. Their cruises, however, were confined to the
Portuguese coast ; and their only service, a most important
one, was the capture of an entire convoy, largely laden with
military stores, for the East and West Indies. The entrance
of sixty English prizes, with nearly three thousand prisoners,
into Cadiz, was a source of great rejoicing to Spain. On the
^ Life of Admiral Keppel, vol. ii. pp. 72, 346, 403. See also Barrow : Life of
Lord Howe, pp. 123-126.
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THE ARMED NEUTRALITY.
406
24th of October, De Guiohen, returning from his contest with
Rodney, came into the same port with his West Indian squad-
ron, of nineteen ships-of-the-line ; but the immense armament
thus assembled did nothing. The French ships returned to
Brest in January, 1781.
While thus unproductive of military results in Europe, the
war in 1780 gave rise to an event which cannot wholly be >/
passed over by any history of sea power. This was the
Armed Neutrality, at the head of which stood Russia, joined by
Sweden and Denmark. The claim of England to seize enemy's
goods in neutral ships bore hard upon neutral powers, and
especially upon those of the Baltic and upon Holland, into
whose hands, and those of the Austrian Netherlands, the war
had thrown much of the European carrying-trade ; while the
products of the Baltic, naval stores and grain, were those
which England was particularly interested in forbidding to her
enemies. The declarations finally put forth by Russia, and
signed by Sweden and Denmark, were four in number :
1. That neutral vessels had a right, not only to sail to
unblockaded ports, but also from port to port of a belligerent
nation ; in other words, to maintain the coasting trade of a
belligerent.
2. That property belonging to the subjecto of a power at
war should be safe on board neutral vessels. This was the
principle involved in the now familiar maxim, Free ships
make free goods."
8. That no articles are contraband, except arms, equip-
mente, and munitions of war. This ruled out naval stores
and provisions unless belonging to the government of a
belligerent.
4. Tliat blockades, to be binding, must have an adequate
naval force stationed in dose proximity to the blockaded port.
The contracting parties being neutral in the present war,
but binding themselves to support these principles by a com-
bined armed fleet of a fixed minimum number, the agreement
received the name of the Armed Neutrality. The discussion
of the propriety of the various declarations belongs to Inter-
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406 WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND.
national law ; but it is evident that no great maritime State,
situated as England then was, would submit to the first and
third as a matter of right. Policy only could induce her to
do so. Without meeting the declarations by a direct contra-
diction, the ministry and the king determined to disregard
them, -T- a course which was sustained in principle even by
prominent members of the bitter opposition of that day. The
undecided attitude of the United Provinces, divided as in the
days of Louis XIY. between the partisans of England and
France, despite a century of alliance with the former, drew
the especial attention of Great Britain. They had been asked
to join the Armed Neutrality ; they hesitated, but the majority
of the provinces favored it. A British officer had already
gone so far as to fire upon a Dutch man-of-war which had
resisted the search of merchant-ships under its convoy ; an
act which, whether right or wrong, tended to incense the
Dutch generally against England. It was determined by the
latter that if the United Provinces acceded to the coalition of
neutrals, war should be declared. On the 16th of December,
1780, the English ministry was informed that the States-
General had resolved to sign the declarations of the Armed
Neutrality without delay. Orders were at once sent out to
Rodney to seize the Dutch West India and South American
possessions ; similar orders to the East Indies ; and the am-
bassador at the Hague was recalled. England declared war
four days later. The principal effect, therefore, of the Armed
Neutrality upon the war was to add the colonies and com-
merce of Holland to the prey of English cruisers. The ad-
ditional enemy was of small account to Great Britain,
whose geographical position effectually blocked the junction
of the Dutch fleet with . those of her other enemies. The
possessions of Holland fell everywhere, except when saved by
the French; while a bloody but wholly uninstructive battle
between English and Dutch squadrons in the North Sea, in
August, 1781, was the only feat of arms illustrative of the
old Dutch courage and obstinacy.
The year 1781, decisive of the question of the independence
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DERBY RELIEVES GIBRALTAR. 407
of the United States, was marked in the European seas by im<
posing moTements of great fleets followed by puny results. At
the end of March De Qrasse sailed from Brest with twenty-
six ships-of-the-line. On the 29th he detached five under
SidBFren to the East Indies, and himself continued on to meet
success at Yorktown and disaster in the West Indies. On
the 28d of June De Ouichen sailed from Brest with eighteen
ships-of-the-line for Cadiz, where he joined thirty Spanish
ships. This immense armament sailed on the 22d of July
for the Mediterranean, landed fourteen thousand troops at
Minorca, and then moved upon the English Channel.
The English had this year first to provide against the danger
to Gibraltar. That beset fortress had had no supplies since
Rodney's visit, in January of the year before, and was now in
sore want, the provisions being scanty and bad, the biscuits
weevilly, and the meat tainted. Amid the horrors and uproar
of one of the longest and most exciting sieges of history,
the sufferings of the combatants were intensified by the
presence of many peaceful inhabitants, including the wives
and families of soldiers as well as of officers. A great fleet
of twenty-eight ships-of-the-line sailed from Portsmouth on
the 18th of March, convoying three hundred merchant-ships
for the East and West Indies, besides ninety-seven transports
and supply-ships for the Rock. A delay on the Irish coast
prevented its falling in with De Orasso, who had sailed nine
clays after it. Arriving off Cape Si Vincent, it met no
enemy, and looking into Cadiz saw the great Spanish fleet
at anchor. The latter made no move, and the English ad-
miral, Derby, threw his supplies into Gibraltar on the 12th
of April, undisturbed. At the same time he, like De Grasse,
detached to the East Indies a small squadron, which was
destined before long to fall in with Suffren. The inaction
of the Spanish fleet, considering the eagerness of its gov-
ernment about Gibraltar and its equal if not superior num-
bers, shows scanty reliance of the Spanish admiral upon
himself or his command. Derby, having relieved Gibraltar
' and Minorca, returned to the Channel in May.
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408 THE ALLIES IN ENGLISH CHANNEL, 1781.
Upon the approach of the combined fleet of nearlj fifty
Bail in August following, Derby fell back upon Torbaj and
there anchored hia fleet, numbering thirtj ships. De Guichen,
who held chief command, and whose caution when engaged
with Rodney has been before remarked, was in favor of
fighting ; but the almost unanimous opposition of the Span-
iards, backed by some of his own officers, overruled him
in a council of war,^ and again the great Bourbon coalition
fell back, foiled by their own discord and the unity of their
enemy. Gibraltar relieved, England untouched, were the
results of these gigantic gatherings; they can scarcely be
called efforts. A mortifying disaster closed the year for
the allies. De Guichen sailed from Brest with seventeen
sail, protecting a large convoy of merchantmen and ships
with military supplies. The fleet was pursued by twelve
English ships under Admiral Eempenfeldt, an officer whose
high professional abilities have not earned the immortality
with which poetry has graced his tragical death. Falling in
with the French one hundred lEind fifty miles west of Ushant,
he cut off a part of the convoy, despite his inferior num-
bers.' A few daj'S later a tempest dispersed the Fi*cnch
1 BeAtoon givea qnito aft length (voL v. p. 395) the debate in the allied council
of war. The customary hesitation of inch councils, in face of the difficulties of
the situation, was increased by an appeal to the delusion of commerce-destroying
as a decisive mode of warfture. M. de Beauaaet urged that " the allied fleets
should direct their whole attention to that great and attainable object, the inter-
cepting of the British homeward-bound West India fleets. This was a measure
which, as they were now masters of the sea, could scarcely fail of success ; and it
would prove a blow lo fatal to that nation, that she could not recover it during
the whole course of the war." The French account of lApeyrouse-Boufils is
esaentiaUy the same. Chevalier, who is silent as to details, justly remarks:
" The cruise just made by the aUied fleet was such as to injure the reputation of
France and Spain. These two powers had made a great display of force which
had produced no result." The English trade alio received little injury. Guichen
wrote home : " I have returned from a cruise fatiguing but not glorious."
* This mishap of the French was largely due to mismanagement by De Guichen,
a skilful and usually a careful admiral. When Kempenfeldt fell in with him, all
the French ships^f-war were to leeward of their convoy, whUe the English were
to windward of it. The former, therefore, were unable to interpose in time ; and
the alternative remedy, of the convoy running down to leeward of their escort,
could not be applied by all the merchant-ships in so large a body.
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SURRENDER OF PORT MABON.
409
fleet. Only two ships-of-the-line and five merchantmen out
of one hundred and fifty reached the West Indies.
The year 1782 opened with the loss to the English of
Port Mahon, which surrendered on the 6th of February,
after a siege of six months. — a surrender induced by the
ravages of scurry, consequent upon the lack of vegetables,
and confinement in the foul air of bombproofs and casemates,
under the heavy fire of an enemy. On the last night of
the defence the call for necessary guards was four hundred
and fifteen, while only six hundred and sixty men were
fit for duty, thus leaving no reliefs.
The allied fleets assembled this year in Oadiz, to the
number of forty ships-of-the-line. It was expected that this
force would be increased by Dutch ships, but a squadron
under Lord Howe drove the latter back to their ports. It
does not certainly appear that any active enterprise was
intended against the English coast; but the allies cruised
off the mouth of the Ohannel and in the Bay of Biscay
during the summer months. Their presence insured the
safe arrival and departure of the homeward and outward
bound merchantmen, and likewise threatened English com-
merce ; notwithstanding which, Howe, with twenty-two ships,
not only kept the sea and avoided an engagement, but also
succeeded in bringing the Jamaica fleet safe into port. The
injury to trade and to military transportation by sea may be
said to have been about equal on either side ; and the credit
for successful use of sea power for these most important
ends must therefore be given to the weaker party.
Having carried out their orders for the summer cruise,
the combined fleets returned to Oadiz. On the 10th of
September they sailed thence for Algesiras, on the opposite
side of the bay from Gibraltar, to support a grand com-
bined attack by land and sea, which, it was hoped, would
reduce to submission the key to the Mediterranean. With
the ships already there, the total rose to nearly fifty ships-
of-the-line. The details of the mighty onslaught scarcely
belong to our subject, yet cannot be wholly passed byt
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410
ATTACK ON GIBRALTAR.
without at least such mention as may recognize and draw
attention to their interest.
The three years* siege which was now drawing to its end
had been productive of many brilliant feats of arms, as
well as of less striking but more trying proofs of steadfast
endurance, on the part of the garrisou. How long the latter
might hare held out cannot be said, seeing the success with
which the English sea power defied the efforts of the allies
to cut off the communications of the fortress; but it was
seemingly certain that the place must be subdued by main
force or not at all, while the growing exhaustion of the
belligerents foretold «tho near end of the war. Accordingly
Spain multiplied her efforts of preparation and military in-
genuity; while the report of them and of the approaching
decisive contest drew to the scene volunteers and men of emi-
nence from other countries of Europe. Two French Bour-
bon prmces added, by their coming, to the theatrical interest
with which the approaching drama was invested. The pres-
ence of royalty was needed adequately to grace the sublime
catastrophe ; for the sanguine confidence of the besiegers had
determined a satisfactory dSnotiement with all the security of
a playwright.
Besides the works on the isthmus which joins the Rock
to the mainland, where three hundred pieces of artillery were
now mounted, the chief reliance of the assailants was upon
ten floating batteries elaborately contrived to be shot and
fire proof, and carrying one hundred and fifty-four heavy
guns. These were to anchor in a close north-and-south line
along the west face of the works, at about nine hundred yards
distance. They were to be supported by forty gunboats and
as many bomb vessels, besides the efforts of the ships-of-the-
line to cover the attack and distract the garrison. Twelve
thousand French troops were brought to reinforce the Span-
iards in the grand assault, which was to be made when the
bombardment had sufficiently injured and demoralized the
defenders. At this time the latter numbered seven thousand,
their land opponents thirty-three thousand men.
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ATTACK ON GIBRALTAR.
4U
The final act was opened bj the English. At seven o'clock
on the morning of September 8, 1782, the commanding gen«
eral, Elliott^ began a severe and most injurious fire upon
the works on the isthmus. Having effected his purpose, he
stopped ; but the enemy took up the glove the next morning,
and for four days successively poured in a fire from the isth-
mus alone of six thousand five hundred cannon-balls and one
thousand one hnndred bombs every twenty-four hours. So
approached the great closing scene of September 18. At
seven a. m. of that day the ten battering-ships unmoored from
the head of the bay and stood down to their station. Be-
tween nine and ten tliey anchored, and the general fire at
once began. The besieged replied with equal fury. The bat-
tering-ships seem in the main, and for some hours, to have
justified the hopes formed of them; cold shot glanced or
failed to get through their sides, while the self-acting appara-
tus for extinguishing fires balked the hot shot.
About two o'clock, however, smoke was seen to issue from
the ship of the commander-in-chief, and though controlled
for some time, the fire continued to gain. The same misfor-
tune befell others ; by evening, the fire of the besieged gained
a marked superiority, and by one o'clock in the morning the
greater part of the battering-ships were in flames. Their
distress was increased by the action of the naval oflScer com-
manding the English gunboats, who now took post upon the
flank of the line and raked it effectually, — a service which
the Spanish gunboats should have prevented. In the end,
nine of the ten blew up at their anchors, with a loss esti-
mated at fifteen hnndred men, four hundred being saved
from the midst of the fire by the English seamen. The tenth
ship was boarded and burned by the English boats. The
hopes of the assailants perished with the failure of the
battering-ships.
There remained only the hope of starving out the garrison.
To this end the allied fleets now gave themselves. It was
known that Lord Howe was on his way out with a great fleet,
numbering thirty-four ships-of-the-line, besides supply vessels.
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412 LORD HOWE RELIEVES GIBRALTAR.
On tbe 10th of October a violent westerly gale injured the conh
bined shipsi driving one ashore under the batteries ot Gibral-
tar, whore she was surrendered. The next day Howe's force
came in sight, and the transports had a fine chance to make
the anchorage, which, through carelessness, was missed by
all but four. The rest, with the men-of-wai*, drove eastward
into the Mediterranean. The allies followed on the 18th;
but though thus placed between the port and the relieving
force, and not encumbered, like the latter, with supply-ships,
they yet contrived to let the transports, with scarcely an ex-
ception, slip in and anchor safely. Not only provisions and
ammunition, but also bodies of troops carried by the ships-
of-war, were landed without molestation. On the 19th the
English fleet repassed the straits with an easterly wind,
having within a week's time fulfilled its mission, and made
Gibraltar safe for another year. The allied fleet followed,
and on the 20th an action took place at long range, the allies
to windward, but not pressing their attack close. The num-
ber of ships engaged in this magnificent spectacle, the closing
scene of tiie great drama in Europe, the after-piece to the
successful defence of Gibraltar, was eighty-three of the line,
— forty-nine allies and thirty-four English. Of the former,
thirty-three only got into action; but as the duller sailers
would have come up to a general engagement, Lord Howe
was probably right in declining, so far as in him lay, a trial
which the allies did not too eagerly court.
Such were the results of this great contest in the European
seas, marked on the part of the allies by efforts gigantic in
size, but loose-jointed and flabby in execution. By England,
so heavily overmatched in mere numbers, were shown firm-
ness of purpose, high courage, and seamanship; but it can
scarcely be said that the military conceptions of her councils,
or the cabinet management of her sea forces, were worthy of
the skill and devotion of her seamen. The odds against her
were not so great — not nearly so great — as the formidable
lists of guns and ships seemed to show ; and while allowance
must justly be made for early hesitations, the passing years
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NAVAL POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.
418
of indeciBion and inefficiency on the part of the allies should
have betrayed to her their weakness. The reluctance of the
French to risk their ships, so plainly shown by D'Estaing,
De Orasse, and De Ouiohen, the sluggishness and inefficiency
of the Spaniards, should have encouraged England to pursue ^
her old policy, to strike at the organized forces of the enemy
afloat. As a matter of fact, and probably from the neces-
sities of the case, the opening of every campaign found the
enemies separated, — the Spaniards in Oadiz, the French in
Brest.^ To blockade the latter in full force before they could
get out, England sliould have strained every effort ; thus she
would have stopped at its head the main stream of the allied
strength, and, by knowing exactly where this great body was,
would have removed that uncertainty as to its action which
fettered her own movements as soon as it had gained the
freedom of the open sea. Before Brest she was interposed
between the allies ; by her lookouts she would have known
the approach of the Spaniards long before the French could
know it ; she would have kept in her hands the power of
bringing against each, singly, ships more numerous and indi-
vidually more effective. A wind that was fair to bring on the
Spaniards would have locked their allies in the port The
most glaring instances of failure on the part of England to do
this were when De Orasse was permitted to get out unopposed
in March, 1781; for an English fleet of superior force had
sailed from Portsmouth nine days before him, but was delayed
1 *' In the spring of 1780 the British admiralty had assembled in the Channel
ports forty-flve ships-of-the-line. The squadron at Brest was reduced to t¥relTe
or fifteen. ... To please Spain, twenty French ships-of-the-Une had Joined the
flag of Admiral Cordova in Cadis. In consequence of these dispositions, the
English with their Channel fleet held in checlc the forces which we had in Brest
and in Cadis. Enemy's cruisers trarersed freely the space between the Lizard
and the Straits of Gibraltar." (CheTalier, p. SOS.)
In 1781 "the Cabinet of Versailles called the attention of HoUand and Spain
to the necessity of assembling at Brest a fleet strong enough to Impose upon the
ships which Great Britain kept in the Channel The Dutch remained in the
Texel, and the Spaniards did not leaye Cadiz. From this state of things it
resulted that the English, with forty shipsK>f-the-line, blocked seventy belonging
to the aUied powers." (p. S66.)
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414 PROPER DISPOSAL OF THE BRITISH
by the admiralty on the Irish coast ; ^ and again at the end of
that year, when Kempenfeldt was sent to intercept De Guichen
with an inferior force, while ships enough to change the odds
were kept at home. Several of the ships which were to ac-
company Rodney to the West Indies were ready when Kem-
penfeldt sailed, yet they were not associated with an enterprise
so nearly affecting the objects of Rodney's campaign. The
two forces united would have made an end of De Guichen's
seyenteen ships and his inyaluable convoy.
Gibraltar was indeed a heavy weight upon the English
operations, but the national instinct which clung to it was
correct. The fault of the English policy was in attempting
to hold so many other points of land, while neglecting, by
rapidity of concentration, to fall upon any of the detach*
ments of the allied fleets. The key of the situation was
upon the ocean; a great victory there would have solved
all the other points in dispute. But it was not possible to
win a great victory while trying to maintain a show of force
everywhere.*
North America was a yet heavier clog, and there undoubt-
edly the feeling of the nation was mistaken ; pride, not wis-
dom, maintained that struggle. Whatever the sympathies
of individuals and classes in the allied nations, by their gov-
ernments American rebellion was valued only as a weakening
of England's arm. The operations there depended, as has
^ " A qaestion was yery mach agitated both in and oat of Parliament ; namely,
Whether the intercepting of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse should
not 'have been the first object of the British fieet under Vice-Admiral Darby,
instead of losing time in going to Irehind, by which tliat opportunity was missed.
The defeat of the French fleet would certainly totally have disconcerted the great
plans wliich the enemies had formed in the East and West Indies. It would
have insured the safety of the British West India islands ; the Cape of Good
Hope must haVe fallen into the hands of Britain ; and the campaign in North
America might liave had a very different termination." (Beatson's Memoirs,
vol. V. p. 341, where the contrary arguments are also stated.)
* This is one of the most common and flagrant violations of the principles of
war, — stretching a thin line, everywhere inadequate, over an immense frontier.
Tlie clamors of trade and local interests make popular governments especially
liable to it.
Digitized by
NAVY IN THE WAR OF 1778.
been shown, upon the control of the sea; and to maintain
that, large detachments of English ships were absorbed from
the contest with France and Spain. Could a successful war
have made America again what it once was, a warmly at-
tached dependency of Oreat Britain, a firm base for her sea
power, it would have been worth much greater sacrifices ; but
that had become impossible. But although she had lost, bj
her own mistakes, the affection of the colonists, which would
have supported and secured her hold upon their ports and sea-
coast, there nevertheless remained to the mother-country, in
Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indies, enough strong mili-
tary stations, inferior, as naval bases, only to those strong
ports which are surrounded by a friendly country, great in
its resources and population. The abandonment of the con-
test in North America would have strengthened England very
much more than the allies. As it was, her large naval de-
tachments there were always liable to be overpowered by a
sudden move of the enemy from the sea, as happened in 1778
and 1781.
To the abandonment of America as hopelessly lost, be-
cause no military subjection could have brought back the old
loyalty, should have been added the giving up, for the time,
all military occupancy which fettered concentration, while
not adding to military strength. Most of the Antilles fell
under this head, and the ultimate possession of them would
depend upon the naval campaign. Garrisons could have been
spared for Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia, for Gibraltar and per-
haps for Mahon, that could have effectually maintained them
until the empire of the seas was decided ; and to them could
have been added one or two vital positions in America, like
New York and Charleston, to be held only till guarantees
wei*e given for such treatment of the loyalists among the in-
habitants as good faith required England to exact.
Having thus stripped herself of every weight, rapid con-
centration with offensive purpose should have followed. Sixty
ships-of-the-line on the coast of Europe, half before Cadiz
and half before Brest, with a reserve at home to replace in-
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416 PROPEH DISPOSAL OF THE BRITISH
jured ahips, would not have exhausted by a great deal the
roll of the English navy ; and that such fleets would not have
had to fight, may not only be said by us, who have the whole
history before us, but might have been inferred by those who
had watched the tactics of D'Estaing and De Guichen, and
later on of De Grasse. Or, had even so much dispersal been
thought unadvisable, forty ships before Brest would have left
the sea open to the Spanish fleet to try conclusions with the
rest of the English navy when tlie question of controlling Gib-
raltai* and Mahon came up for decision. Knowing what we
do of the efiiciency of the two services, there can be little
question of the result; and Gibraltar, instead of a weight,
would, as often before and since tliose days, have been an
element of strength to Great Britain.
The conclusion continually recurs. Whatever may be the
determining factors in strifes between neighboring continental
States, when a question arises of control over distant regions,
politically weak, — whether they be crumbling empires, an-
archical republics, colonies, isolated military posts, or islands
below a certain size, — it must ultimately be decided by naval
power, by the organized military force afloat, which repre-
sents the communications that form so prominent a feature
in all strategy. Tlie magnificent defence of Gibraltar hinged
upon this; upon this depended the military results of the war
in America ; upon tliis the final fate of the West India Islands;
upon this certainly the possession of India. Upon this will
depend the control of the Central American Isthmus, if that
question take a military coloring; and though modified by
the continental position and surroundings of Turkey, the same
sea power must be a weighty factor in shaping the outcome
of the Eastern Question in Europe.
If this be true, military wisdom and economy, both of time
and money, dictate bringing matters to an issue as soon as
possible upon the broad sea, with the certainty that the
power which achieves military preponderance there will win
in the end. In the war of the American Revolution the nu->
merical preponderance was very great against England ; the
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NA VY IN THE WAR OF 1778.
417
actual odds were less, though still against her. Military con-
siderations would have ordered the abandonment of the colo-
nies; but if the national pride could not stoop to this, the
right course was to blockade the hostile arsenals. If not
strong enough to be in superior force before both, that of the
more powerful nation should have been closed. Here was the
first fault of the English admiralty ; the statement of the First
Lord as to the available force at the outbreak of the wai* was
not borne out by facts. The first fleet, under Eeppel, barely
equalled the French ; and at the same time Howe's force in
America was inferior to the fleet under D'Estaing. In 1779
and 1781, on the contrary, the English fleet was superior to
that of the French alone; yet the allies joined unopposed,
while in the latter year De Gmsse got away to the West
Indies, and Suffren to the Easi In Eempenfeldt's affair
with De Ouichen, the admiralty knew that the French convoy
was of the utmost importance to the campaign in the West
Indies, yet they sent out their admiral with only twelve ships ;
while at that time, besides the reinforcement destined for the
West Indies, a number of others were stationed in the Downs,
for what Fox justly called " the paltry purpose " of distress-
ing the Dutch trade. The various charges made by Fox in
the speech quoted from, and which, as regarded the Franco-
Spanish War, were founded mainly on the expediency of
attacking the allies before they got away into the ocean wil-
derness, were supported by the high professional opinion of
Lord Howe, who of the Eempenfeldt affair said : " Not only
the fate of the West India Islands, but perhaps the whole
future fortune of the war, might have been decided, almost
without a risk, in the Bay of Biscay." ^ Not without a risk,
but with strong probabilities of success, the whole fortune
of the war should at the first have been staked on a concen-
tration of the English fleet between Brest and Cadiz. No
relief for Gibraltar would have been more efficacious ; no
diversion surer for the West India Islands ; and the Ameri-.
cans would have appealed in vain for the help, scantily given
1 Annnal Register, 1782.
27
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418 QRASSE'S SHORT STAY IN AMERICA.
as it was, of the French fleet For the great results that
flowed from the coming of De Grasse must not obscure the
fact that he came on the 81st of August, and announced
from the beginning that he must be in the West Indies
again by the middle of October. Only a providential com-
bination of circumstances prevented a repetition to Washing-
ton, in 1781y of the painful disappointments by D'Estaing and
Pe Ouiohen in 1778 and 1780.
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CHAPTER Xn.
EiTKim xn THK East Ikdiks, 1778-1781. — SurpRsir sails nou
Brbst, 1781. — His Briluakt Naval Campaioit nr trb IhdiAu
8ba8, 178S, 1788.
" I "HE Terj interesting and instruotive campaign of Soffreu
in the East Indies, although in itself by far the most
noteworthy and meritorious naval performance of the war
of 1778, failed, through no fault of his, to affect the gen-
oral issue. It was not till 1781 that the French Oourt felt
able to direct upon the East naval forces adequate to the im-
portance of the issue. Yet the conditions of the peninsula
at that time were such as to give an unusual opportunity
for shaking the English power. Hyder Ali, the most skilful
and daring of all the enemies against whom the. English had
yet fought in India, was then ruling over the kingdom of
Mysore, which, from its position in the southern part of the
peninsula, threatened both the Carnatic and the Malabar
coast. Hyder, ten years before, had maintained alone a most
successful war against the intruding foreigners, concluding
with a peace upon the terms of a mutual restoration of con-
quests ; and he was now angered by the capture of Mah<,
On the other hand, a number of warlike tribes, known by the
name of the Mahrattas, of the same race and loosely knit
together in a kind of feudal system, had become involved in
war with the English. The territory occupied by these tribes,
whose chief capital was at Poonah, near Bombay, extended
northward from Mysore to the Ganges. With boundaries
thus conterminous, and placed centrally with reference to
the three English presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta, and Ma-
dras, Hyder and the Mahrattas were in a position of advan^
tage for mutual support and for offensive operations against
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420
ENGLISH DISASTERS IN INDIA.
the common enemy. At the beginning of the war between
England and France, a French agent appeared at Poonah. It
was reported to Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, that
the tribes had agreed to terms and ceded to the French a
seaport on the Malabar coast. With his usual promptness,
Hastings at once determined on war, and sent a division
of the Bengal army across the Jumna and into Berar. An-
other body of four thousand English troops also marched
from Bombay; but being badly led, was surrounded and
forced to surrender in January, 1779. This unusual reverse
quickened the hopes and increased the strength of the ene-
mies of the English ; and although the material injury was
soon remedied by substantial successes under able leaders,
the loss of prestige remained. The anger of Hyder Ali,
roused by the capture of Mah^, was increased by imprudent
thwarting on the part of the governor of Madras. Seeing
the English entangled with the Mahrattas, and hearing that
a French armament was expected on the Coromandel coast,
he quietly prepared for war. In the summer of 1780 swarms
of his horsemen descended without warning from the hills,
and appeared near the gates of Madras. In September one
body of English troops, three thousand strong, was cut to
pieces, and another of five thousand was only saved by a
rapid retreat upon Madras, losing its artillery and trains.
Unable to attack Madras, Hyder turned upon the scattered
posts separated from each other and the capital by the open
country, which was now wholly in his control.
Such was the state of affairs when, in January, 1781, a
French squadron of six ships-of-the-line and three frigates
appeared on the coast. The English fleet under Sir Edward
Hughes had gone to Bombay. To the French commodore,
Count d'Orves, Hyder appealed for aid in an attack upon Cud-
dalore. Deprived of support by sea, and surrounded by the
myriads of natives, the place must have fallen. D'Orves, how-
ever, refused, and returned to the Isle of France. At the same
time one of the most skilful of the English Indian soldiers.
Sir Eyre Ooote, took the field against Hyder. The latter at
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SUFFREN SAILS FROM BREST FOR INDIA. 421
once raised the siege of the beleaguered posts, and after a
series of operations extending through the spring months^was
brought to battle on the 1st of July, 1781. His total defeat
restored to the English the open country, saved the Gamatic,
and put an end to the hopes of the partisans of the French in
their late possession of Fondicherry. A great opportunity
had been lost.
Meanwhile a French officer of very dififerent temper from
his predecessors was on his way to the East Indies. It will
be remembered that when De Grasse sailed from Brest,
March 22, 1781, for the West Indies, there went with his
fleet a division of five shipe-of-the-line under SufPren. The
latter separated from the main body on the 29th of the month,
taking with him a few transports destined for the Gape of
Qood Hope, then a Dutch colony. The French government
had learned that an expedition from England was destined
to seize this important halting-place on the road to India,
and Suffren's first mission was to secure it. In fact, the
squadron under Gommodore Johnstone ^ had got away first,
and had anchored at Porto Praya, in the Gape Verde Islands,
a Portuguese colony, on the 11th of April. It numbered two
ships-of-the-line, and three of fifty guns, with frigates and
smaller vessels, besides thirty-five transports, mostly armed.
Without apprehension of attack, not because he trusted to
the neutrality of the port but because he thought his destina-
tion secret, the English commodore had not anchored with a
view to battle.
It so happened that at the moment of sailing from Brest
one of the ships intended for the West Indies was transferred
to Suffren's squadron. She consequently had not water
enough for the longer voyage, and this with other reasons
1 This Commodore Johnstone, more comraonl/ known u Goremor John-
stone, was one of the three commissionen sent by Lord North in 1778 to promote
a reconciliation with America. Owing to certain snspidons proceedings on his
part, Congress declared it was incompatible with their honor to hold any manner
of correspondence or interooarse with him. His title of GoTsmor arose from his
being at one time goremor of Pensacola. He had a most onenTiable reputation
in the English nary. (See Chamock's Biog. Navalis.)
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422 ACTION AT PORTO PRAYA.
determined SufPren also to anchor at Porto Praya. On ilie
16th of April| five days after Johnstone, he made the island
early in the morning and stood for the anchoragOi sending
a coppered ship ahead to reconnoitre. Approaching from
the eastward, the land for some time hid the English squad-
ron ; but at quarter before nine the advance ship, the Ar-
t^sien," signalled that enemy's ships were anchored in the
bay. The latter is open to the southward, and extends
from east to west about a mile and a half ; the conditions
are such that ships usually lie in the northeast part, near
the shore (Plate XIII).^ The English were there, stretch-
ing irregularly in a west-northwest line. Both SufiFren and
Johnstone were surprised, but the latter more so; and the
initiative remained with the French officer. Few men were
fitter, by natural temper and the teaching of experience, for
the prompt decision required. Of ardent disposition and
inborn military genius, Suffren had learned, in the conduct
of Boscawen toward the squadron of De la Clue,^ in which
he had served, not to lay weight upon the power of Portugal
to enforce respect for her neutriJity. He knew that this
must be the squadron meant for the Cape of Qood Hope.
The only question for him was whether to press on to the
Gape with the chance of getting there first, or to attack the
English at their anchors, in the hope of so crippling them as
to prevent their further progress. He decided for the latter ;
and although the ships of his squadron, not sailing equally well,
were scattered, he also determined to stand in at once, rather
than lose the advantage of a surprise. Making signal to pre-
pare for action at anchor, he took the lead in his flag-ship,
the H^ros,'' of seventy-four guns, hauled close round the
southeast point of the bay, and stood for the English flag-
ship (f). He was closely followed by the " Hannibal," sev-
enty-four (line a b) ; the advance ship " Art^sien " (c), a
sixty-four, also stood on with him; but the two rear ships
were still far astern.
1 This plate i8 taken almost whoUj from Cimaf ■ Vie de Soffren."
> Page 299.
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ACTION AT PORTO PRA7A. 428
The English commodore got readj for battle as soon as he
made out the enemy, but had no time to rectify his order.
Suffren anchored five hundred feet from the flagnship's star-
board beam (by a singular coincidence the English flag-ship
was also call^ Hero thus having enemy's ships on both
sides, and opened fire. The Hannibal " anchored ahead
of her commodore (b), and so close that the latter had to
veer cable and drop astern (a) ; but her captain, ignorant of
Suffren's intention to disregard the neutrality of the port,
had not obeyed the order to clear for action, and was wholly
unprepared, — his decks lumbered with water-casks which had
been got up to expedite watering, and the guns not cast loose.
He did not add to this fault by any hesitation, but followed
the flag-ship boldly, receiving passively the fire, to which for
a time he was unable to reply. Luffing to the wind, he passed
to windward of his chief, chose his position with skill, and
atoned by his death for his first fault. These two ships were
so placed as to use both broadsides. The Art^sien,'' in the
smoke, mistook an East India ship for a man-of-war. Ban-
ning alongside (c'), her captain was struck dead at the mo-
ment he was about to anchor, and the critical moment being
lost by the absence of a head, the ship drifted out of close ac-
tion, carrying the East-Indiaman along with her (c'^. The
remaining two vessels, coming up late, failed to keep close
enough to the wind, and they too were thrown out of action
(d,e). Then Suffren, finding himself with only two ships to
bear the brunt of the fight, cut his cable and made sail. The
«<Hannibar' followed his movement; but so much injured
was she that her fore and main masts went over the side, —
fortunately not till she was pointed out from the bay, which
she left shorn to a hulk.
Putting entirely aside questions of international law, the
wisdom and conduct of Suffren's attack, from the military
point of view, invite attention. To judge them properly, we
must consider what was the object of the mission with which
he was charged, and what were tlie chief factors in thwarting
or forwarding it. His first object was to protect the Gape
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MERITS OF SUPPREN'S ACTION.
of Gk)od Hope against an English expedition ; the chief reli-
ance for effecting his purpose was to get there first; the
obstacle to his success was the English fleet. To anticipate
the arrival of the latter, two courses were open to him, — to
run for it in the hope of winning the race, or to beat the
enemy and so put him out of the running altogether. So
long as his whereabouts was unknown, a search, unless with
very probable information, would be a waste of time; but
when fortune had thrown his enemy across his path, the
genius of Suffreu at once jumped to the conclusion that
Uie control of the sea in southern waters would determine
the question, and should be settled at once. To use his own
strong expression, <<The destruction of the English squad-
ron would etU off the root of all the plans and projects of that
expedition, gain us for a long time the superiority in India,
a superiority whence might result a glorious peace, and hin-
der the English from reaching the Gape before me, — an ob-
ject which has been fulfilled and was the principal aim of
my mission." He was ill-informed as to the English force,
believing it greater than it was ; but he had it at disadvantage
and surprised. The prompt decision to fight, therefore, was
right, and it is the most pronounced merit of Suffren in this
affair, that he postponed for the moment — dismissed, so to
speak, from his mind — tlie ulterior projects of the cruise ;
but in so doing he departed from the traditions of the French
navy and the usual policy of his government. It cannot be
imputed to him as a fault that he did not receive from his
captains the support he was fairly entitled to expect The
accidents and negligence which led to their failure have been
mentioned; but having his three best ships in hand, there
can be little doubt he was right in profiting by the surprise,
and trusting that the two in reserve would come up in time.
The position taken by his own ship and by the Hannibal,'*
enabling them to use both broadsides, — in other words, to
develop their utmost force, — was excellently judged. He
thus availed himself to the full of the advantage given by the
surprise and by the lack of order in the enemy's squadron.
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SUFFREIPS DISTINCTIVS MERITS.
426
This lack of order, according to English occounts, tiirew out
of action two of their fifty-gnn ships, — a circumstance which^
while discreditable to Johnstone^ confirmed Suffren's judg-
ment in precipitating his attack. Had he received the aid
upon which, after all deductions, he was justified in counting,
he would have destroyed the English squadron ; as it was, he
saved the Cape Oolony at Porto Praya. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the French Oourt, notwithstanding its tradi«
tional sea policy and the diplomatic embarrassment caused
by the violation of Portuguese neutrality, should have heartily
and generously acknowledged a vi^or of action to which it was
unused in its admirals.
It has been said that Suffren, who had watched the cautious
movements of D'Eetaing in America, and had served in the
Seven Years' War, attributed in part the reverses Bu£Fered
by the French at sea to the introduction of Tactics, which he
stigmatized as the veil of timidity ; but that the fesults of the
fight at Porto Praya, necessarily engaged without previous
arrangement, convinced him that system and method had
their use.^ Certainly his tactical combinations afterward
were of a high order, especially in his earlier actions in the
East (for he seems again to have abandoned them in the
later fights under the disappointment caused by his captains'
disaffection or blundering). But his great and transcendent
merit lay in the clearness with which he recognized in the >/
English fleets, the exponent of the British sea power, the
proper enemy of the French fleet, to be attacked first and
always when with any show of equality. Far from blind to
the importance of those ulterior objects to which the action of
the French navy was so constantly subordinated, he yet saw
plainly that the way to assure those objects was not by econo-
mizing his own ships, but by destroying those of the enemy.
Attack, not defence, was the road to sea power in his eyes ;
and sea power meant control of the issues upon the land, at
least in regions distant from Europe. This view out of the
English policy he had the courage to take, after forty years
> Ia Sem : Emtk Hif t et CriUqiiM rar U liarine FraiiftUfle.
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426 CLEARNESS OF SUPPREIPS VIEWS.
of servioe in a navy sacrificed to the opposite system ; bat
be brought to its practical application a method not to be
found in any English admirsJ of the day, except perhaps
Bodney, and a fire superior to the latter. Yet the course
thus followed was no mere inspiration of the moment ; it was
the result of clear views previously held and expressed. How*
ever informed by natural ardor, it had the tenacity of an
intellectual conviction. Thus he wrote to D'Estaing, after
the failure to destroy Barrington's squadron at Sta. Lucia,
remonstrating upon the half-manned condition of his own
and other ships, from which men bad been landed to attack
the English troops : — -
^ Notwithstanding the small results of the two cannonades of the
15th of December [directed against BarriDgton's squadron], and the
unhappy check our land forces have nndergone, we may yet hope for
success. Bat the only means to have it is to attack vigorously the
squadron, which, with our superiority, cannot resist, notwithstanding
its land batteries, whose effects will be neutralized if we run them
aboard, or anchor upon their buoys. If we delay, they may escape.
• • • Besides, our fleet being unmanned, it is in condition neither to
sail nor to fight. What would happen if Admiral Byron's fleet
should arrive ? What would become of ships having neither crews
nor admiral ? Their defeat would cause the loss of the army and the
colony. Let us destroy that squadron ; their army, laddng every*
thing and in a bad country, would soon be obliged to surrender.
Then let Byron come, we shall be pleased to see him. I think it is
not necessary to point out that for this attack we need men and plans
well concerted with those who are to execute them."
Equally did he condemn the failure of D'Estaing to cap-
ture the four crippled ships of Byron's squadron, after the
action off Grenada.
Owing to a combination of misfortunes, the attack at Porto
Praya had not the decisive result it deserved. Commodore
Johnstone got under way and followed Suffren ; but he thought
his force was not adequate to attack in face of the resolute
bearing of the French, and feared the loss of time conse-
quent upon chasing to leeward of his port He succeeded,
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8UFFRBN ARRIVES IN INDIA. 427
however, in retaking the East India ship which the ^ Art^sien
had carried out. Suffren continued his course and anchored
at the Gape, in Simon's Baj, on the 2lBt of June. John-
stone followed him a fortnight later; but learning hy an
advance ship that the French troops had been landed, he gave
up the enterprise against the colony, made a successful com-
merce-destroying attack upon five Dutch India ships in Sal«
danha Bay, which poorly repaid the failure of the military
undertaking, and tiien went back himself to England, after
sending the ships-of-tbe-line on to join Sir Edward Hughes
in the East Indies.
Having seen the Cape secured, Suffren sailed for the Isle
of France, arriving tiiere on the 26th of October, 1781.
Count d'Orves, being senior, took command of the united
squadron. The necessary repairs were made, and the fleet
sailed for India, December 17. On the 22d of January, 1782,
an English fifty-gun ship, the Hannibal," was taken. On
the 9th of February Count d'Qrves died, and Suffren became
commander-in-chief, with the rank of commodore. A few
days later the land was seen to the northward of Madras ;
but owing to head-winds the city was not sighted until Feb-
ruary 16. Nine large ships-of-war were found anchored in
order under the guns of the forts. They were the fleet of Sir
Edward Hughes, not in confusion like that of Johnstone.^
Here, at the meeting point between these two redoubtable
champions, each curiously representative of the characteris-
tics of his own race, — the one of the Jitubbom tenacity and
seamanship of the English, the other of the ardor and tac-
tical science of the French, too long checked and betrayed
by a false system,— is the place to give an accurate state-
> The qnestioii of ftttackiog the English tqimdroD at its anchors wm dehated
itt a conncO of war. Its ophiion confirmed Snffren's decision not to do so. In
eontrastbg this with the failnre of the English to attack the French detachment
in Newport (p. 394), it mnst he home in mind that hi the latter case there was no
means of forcing the ships to leaye their strong position ; whereas hy threatening
Trincomalee, or other less important pointo, Snlfren conld rely npon drawing
Hnghes ont. He was therefore right in not attacking, whUe the English before
Newport were probably wrong.
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428 IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING THE SEA.
ment of the material forces. The French fleet had three
seventy-fours, seven sixty-fours, and two fifty-gun ships, one
of which was the lately captured English Hannibal." To
these Sir Edward Hughes opposed two seventy-fours, one
seventy, one sixty-eight, four sixty-fours, and one fifty-gun
ship. The odds, therefore, twelve to nine, were decidedly
against the English ; and it is likely that the advantage in
single-ship power, class for class, was also against them.
It must be recalled that at the time of his arrival Suffren
found no friendly port or roadstead, no base of supplies or
repair. The French posts had all fallen by 1779; and his
rapid movement, which saved the Gape, did not bring him
up in time to prevent the capture of the Dutch Indian posses-
sions. The invaluable harbor of Trincomalee, in Ceylon, was
taken just one month before Suffren saw the English fleet at
Madras. But if he thus had everything to gain, Hughes had
as much to lose. To Suffren, at the moment of first meeting,
belonged superiority of numbers and the power of taking the
offensive, with all its advantages in choice of initiative. Upon
Hughes fell the anxiety of the defensive, with inferior num-
bers, many assailable points, and uncertainty as to the place
where the blow would fall.
It was still true, though not so absolutely as thirty years
before, that control in India depended upon control of the
sea. The passing years had greatly strengthened the grip of
England, and proportionately loosened that of France. Rela-
tively, therefore, the need of Suffren to destroy his enemy was
greater than that of his predecessors, D'Ach^ and others;
whereas Hughes could count upon a greater strength in the
English possessions, and so bore a somewhat less responsi-
bility than the admirals who went before him.
Nevertheless, the sea was still by far the most important
factor in the coming strife, and for its proper control it was
necessary to disable more or less completely the enemy's
fleet, and to have some reasonably secure base. For the latter
purpose, Trincomalee, though unhealthy, was by far the best
harbor on the east coast; but it had not been long enough
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CONDITIONS INFLUENCING HUGHES. 429
in the hands of England to be well supplied. Hughes^ there-
f ore, inevitablj fell back on Madras for repairs after an action,
and was forced to leave Trincomalee to its own resources
until ready to take the sea again. Suffren, on the other
hand, found all ports alike destitute of naval supplies, while
the natural advantages of Trincomalee made its possession
an evident object of importance to him; and Hughes so
understood it.
Independently, therefore, of the tradition of the English
navy impelling Hughes to attack, the influence of which ap^
pears plainly between the lines of his letters, Suffren had, in
moving toward Trincomalee, a threat which was bound to
draw his adversary out of his port. Nor did Trincomalee
stand alone ; the existing war between Hyder Ali and the
English made it imperative for Suffren to seize a port upon
the mainland, at which to land the three thousand troops car-
ried by the squadron to co-operate on shore against the common
enemy, and from which supplies, at least of food, might be
had. Everything, therefore, concurred to draw Hughes out,
and make him seek to cripple or hinder the French fleet.
The method of his action would depend upon his own and
his adversary's skill, and upon the uncertain element of the
weather. It was plainly desirable for him not to be brought
to battle except on his own terms ; in other words, without
some advantage of situation to make up for his weaker force.
As a fleet upon the open sea cannot secure any advantages of
ground, the position favoring the weaker was that to wind-
ward, giving choice of time and some choice as to method
of attack, the offensive position used defensively, with the
intention to make an offensive movement if circumstances
warrant. The leeward position left the weaker no choice but
to run, or to accept action on its adversary's terms.
Whatever may be thought of Hughes's skill, it must be
conceded that his task was difficult. Still, it can be clearly
thought down to two requisites. The first was to get in a
blow at the French fleet, so as to reduce the present in^
equality; the second, to keep Suffren from getting Trin*
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480
THE FIRST BATTLE BETWEEN
oomalee, wnich depended wholly on the fleet.^ Suffren^ on
the other hand, if he could do Hughes, in an action^ more
injury than he himself receivedy would be free to turn in any
direction he chose.
Suffren having sighted Hughes's fleet at Madras, February
16, anchored his own four miles to the noi*thward. Con-
sidering the enemy's line, supported by the batteries, to be
too strong for attack, he again got under way at four p. m.,
and stood south. Hughes also weighed, standing to the south-
ward all that night under easy sail, and at daylight found
that the enemy's squadron had separated from the convoy,
the ships of war being about twelve miles east, while the ,
transports were nine miles southwest, from him (Plate XIY.
A, A). This dispersal is said to have been due to the care-
lessness of the French frigates, which did not keep touch
of the English. Hughes at once profited by it, chasing the
convoy (c), knowing that the line-of-battle ships must follow.
His copper-bottomed ships came up with and captured six
of the enemy, five of which were English prizes. The sixth
carried three hundred troops with military stores. Hughes
had scored a point.
Suffren of course followed in a general chase, and by three
p. M. four of his best sailers were two or three miles from
the stemmost English ships. Hughes's ships were now much
scattered, but not injudiciously so, for they joined by signal
at seven p. m. Both squadrons stood to the southeast during
the night, under easy sail.
At daylight of the 17th — the date of the first of four actions
fought between these two chiefs within seven months — the
fleets were six or eight miles apart, the French bearing north-
1 The dependence of Trincomalee upon the English fleet in this campaign
affords an exceUent iUostration of the embanassment and false position in which
a nayy finds itself when the defence of its seaports rests upon it. Thb bears
upon a much debated point of the present day, and is worthy the study of those
who maintain, too unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy. In one
sense this is doubtless true, — to attack the enemy abroad is the best of defences ;
but in the narrow sense of the word " defence " it is not true. Trincomalee unfor-
tified was simply a centre round which Hughes had to revolve like a tethered
animal ; and the same wiU always happen under like conditions.
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HUGHES AND SUFFRBN.
481
northeast from the English (B, B). The latter formed line-
ahead on the port tack (a), with difficulty, owing to the light
winds and frequent calms. Admiral Hughes explains that he
hoped to weather the enemy by this course so as to engage
closely, counting probably on finding himself to windward
when the sea-breeze made. The wind continuing light, but
with frequent squalls, from north-northeast, the French, run-
ning before it, kept the puffs longer and neared the English
rapidly, Suffren's intention to attack the rear being aided by
Hughes's course. The latter finding his rear straggling, bore
up to line abreast (b), retreating to gain time for the ships
to close on the centre. These movements in line abreast con-
tinued till twenty minutes before four p. m., when, finding he
could not escape attack on the enemy's terms, Hughes hauled
his wind on the port tack and awaited it (G). Whether by
his own fault or not, he was now in the worst possible posi-
tion, waiting for an attack by a superior force at its pleasure.
The rear ship of his line, the ^ Exeter," was not closed up ;
and there appears no reason why she should not have been
made the van, by forming on the stai*board tack, and thus
bringing the other ships up to her.
The method of Suffren's attack (0) is differently stated
by him and by Hughes, but the difference is in detail only ;
the main facts are certain. Hughes says the enemy steered
down on the rear of our line in an irregular double line-
abreast," in which formation they continued till the moment
of collision, when three of the enemy's ships in the first
line bore right down upon the * Exeter,' while four more of
their second line, headed by the * H^ros,' in which M. de Suffren
had his flag, hauled aUmg the cuUide of the firet line toward
our centre. At five minutes past four the enemy's three ships
began their fire upon the ^ Exeter,' which was returned by her
and her second ahead; the action became general from our
rear to our centre, the commanding sliip of the enemy, with
three others of their second line, leading down on our centre,
yet never advancing farther than opposite to the ^ Superbe,'
our centre ship, with little or no wind and some heavy rain
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482
SUFFREN*S TACTICS.
daring the engagement. Under these circumstances, the en-
emy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five
of ours, as the van of our line, consisting of the ^ Monmouth/
< Eagle/ ' Burford/ and * Worcester/ could not be brought into
action without tacking on the enemy/' for which there was
not enough wind.
Here we will leaye them, and give Su£Fren's account of
how he took up his position. In his report to the Minister
of Marine he says : —
^ I should have destroyed the English squadron, less by superior
numbers than by the advantageous dlspositioii in which I attacked it.
I attacked the rear ship and stood along the English line as far as the
sixth. I thas made three of them useless, so that we were twelve
against six. I began the fight at half-past three in the afternoon,
taking the lead and making signal to form line as best could be done ;
without that I would not have engaged. At four I made signal to
three ships to double on the enemy's rear, and to the squadron to
approach within pbtol-shot. This signal, though repeated, was not
executed. I did not myidf give the example, in order that I might
hold in check the three van ships, which by tacking would have
doubled on me. However, except the ' Brilliant,' which doubled on
the rear, no ship was as dose as mine, nor received as many shots."
The principal point of difference in the two accounts is,
that Suffren asserts that his flag-ship passed along the whole
English line, from the rear to the sixth ship ; while Hughes
says the French divided into two lines, which, upon coming
near, steered, one on the rear, the other on the centre, of his
squadron. The latter would be the better manoeuvre ; for if
the leading ship of the attack passed, as Suffren asserts, along
the enemy's line from the rear to the sixth, she should receive
in succession the first fire of six ships, which ought to cripple
her and confuse her line. Suffren also notes the intention
to double on the rear by placing three ships to leeward of
it Two of the French did take this position. Suffren further
gives his reason for not closing with his own ship, which led ;
but as those which followed him went no nearer, Hughes's
attention was not drawn to his action.
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SUFFREN'S STRATEGIC IDEAS.
The French commodore was seriouslj, and it would seem
justly, angered by the inaction of several of his captains.
Of the second in command he complained to the minister:
Being at tlie head, I could not well see what was going
on in the rear. I had directed M. de Tromelin to make sig-
nals to ships which might be near him ; he only repeated my
own without having them carried out." This complaint was
wholly justified. On the 6th of February, ten days before the
fight, he had written to his second as follows : —
If we are so fortunate aa to be to wbdward, as the English are
not more than eight, or at most nine, my intention is to doable on
their rear. Supposing your division to be in the rear, yon will see
by your position what number of sbips will overlap the enemy's line,
and yon will make signal to them to double ' [that is, to engage on
the lee side]. • • • In any case, I beg you to order to your division
the manoeuvres which you shall think best fitted to assure the success
of the action. The capture of Trincomalee and that of Negapatam,
and perhaps of all Ceylon, should make us wish for a general action.''
The last two sentences reveal SufiFren's own appreciation
of the military situation in the Indian seas, which demanded,
first, the disabling of the hostile fleet, next, the capture of
certain strategic ports. That this diagnosis was correct is
as certain as that it reversed the common French maxims,
which would have put the port first and the fleet second
as objectives. A general action was the first desideratum of
Suffren, and it is therefore safe to say that to avoid such
action should have been the first object of Hughes. Tlie
attempt of the latter to gain the windward position wto con-
sequently correct ; and as in the month of February the sea-
breeze at Madras sets in from the eastward and southward
about eleven a. M.,he probably did well to steer in that general
direction, though the result disappointed him. De Guichen in
> Plate XIY., Fig. shows the order of battle Suffren (nteiided in this action.
The fiye rear ships of the enemj wonld each hsre two opponents close aboard.
The leading French ship on the weather side was to be kept farther off, so that
while attacking the sixth Englishman she eonld "contain" the van ships if thej
attempted to reinforce the rear bj tacking.
28
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484 DUTIES OF THE SECOND IN COMMAND.
one of bis engagements with Rodney shaped the course of his
fleet with reference to being to windward when the afternoon
breeze made^ and was successful. What use Hughes would
have made of the advantage of the wind can only be inferred
from his own words, — that he sought it in order to engage
more closely. There is not in this the certain promise of
* any skilful use of a tactical advantage.
Suffren also illustrates, in his words to Tromelin, his con-
ception of the duties of a second in command, which may
fairly be paralleled with that of Nelson in his celebrated order
before Trafalgar. In this first action he led the main attack
himself, leaving the direction of what may be called the re-
serve — at any rate, of the second half of the assault — to
his lieutenant, who, unluckily for him, was not a CoUingwood,
and utterly failed to support him. It is probable that Suf-
fren's leading was due not to any particular theory, but to
the fact that his ship was tlie best sailer in the fleet, and that
the lateness of the hour and lightness of the wind made it
necessary to bring the enemy to action speedily. But here
appears a fault on the part of Suffren. Leading as he did
involves, not necessarily but very naturally, the idea of ex-
ample ; and holding his own ship outside of close range, for
excellent tactical reasons, led the captains in his wake natu-
rally, almost excusably, to keep at the same distance, not-
withstanding his signals. The conflict between orders and
example, which cropped out so singularly at Yicksburg in our
civil war, causing tlie misunderstanding and estrangement
of two gallant officers, should not be permitted to occur. It
is the business of a chief to provide against. such misappre-
hensions by most careful previous explanation of both the letter
and spirit of his plans. Especially is this so at sea, where
smoke, slack wind, and intervening rigging make signals
hard to read, though they are almost the only means of com-
munication. This was Nelson's practice ; nor was Suffren a
stranger to the idea. Dispositions well concerted with those
who are to carry them out are needed,'' he wrote to D'Estaing,
three years before. The excuse which may be pleaded for
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SUFFREN^S COMPLAINTS OP HIS OFFICERS. 486
those who followed him, and engaged, cannot avail for the
rear shipe, and especially not for the second in command,
who knew Suffren's plans. He should have compelled the
rear ships to take position to leeward, leading himself, if ne-
cessary. There was wind enough ; for two captains actually
engird to leeward, one of them without orders, acting,
through the impulse of his own good will and courage, on
Nelson's saying, <^ No captain can do very wrong who places
his ship alongside that of an enemy/' He receiyed the
special commendation of Suffren, in itself an honor and a
reward. Whether the failure of so many of his fellows was
due to inefficiency, or to a spirit of faction and disloyalty,
is unimportant to the general military writer, however in-
teresting to French officers jealous for tiie honor of their
service. Suffren's complaints, after several disappointments,
became vehement.
My hearty" wrote he, is wrung by the most general defection.
I have just lost the opportunity of destroying the English squadron.
• . . All — yes, all — might have got near, since we were to wind*
ward and ahead, and none did so. Several among them had behaved
bravely in other combats. I can only attribute this horror to the
wish to bring the cruise to an end, to ill-will, and to ignorance ; for
I dare not suspect anything worse. The result has been terrible* I
most tell yon, Monseignenr, that officers who have been long at the
Isle of France are neither seamen nor military men. Not seamen,
for they have not been at sea ; and the trading temper, independent
and insubordinate, is absolutely opposed to the military spirit"
This letter, written after his fourth battle with Hughes,
must be taken with allowance. Not only does it appear that
Suffren himself, hurried away on this last occasion by his
eagerness, was partly responsible for the disorder of his fleet,
but there were other circumstances, and above all the char-
acter of some of the officers blamed, which made the charge
of a general disaffection excessive. On the other hand, it
remains true that after four general actions, with superior
numbers on the part of the French, under a chief of the skill
and ardor of Suffren, the English squadron, to use his own
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436 MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO FLEETS.
plaintive expression, still existed ; " not only so, but had not
lost a single ship. The only conclusion that can be drawn
is that of a French naval writer : Quantity disappeared be-
fore quality.'* ^ It is immaterial whether the defect was due
to inefficiency or disaffection.
The inefficiency which showed itself on the field of battle
disappeared in the general conduct of the campaign where the
qualities of the chief alone told. The battle of February 17th
ended with a shift of wind to the southeast at six p. m., after
two hours action. The English were thus brought to wind-
wardy and their van ships enabled to share in the fight. Night
falling, Suffren, at half-past six, hauled bis squadron by the
wind on the starboard tacic, heading northeast, while Hughes
steered south under easy sail. It is said by Captain Clie-
yalier, of the French navy, that Suffren intended to renew tlie
fight next day. In that case he should have taken measures
to keep within reach. It was too plainly Hughes's policy not
to fight without some advantage, — to allow the supposition
that with one ship, the Exeter," lost to liim through the
concentration of so many enemies upon her, he would quietly
await an attack. This is so plain as to make it probable that
Suffren saw sufficient reason, in the results to his fleet and
the misconduct of his officers, not to wish to renew action at
once. The next morning the two fleets were out of sight
of each other. The continuance of the north wind, and the
crippled state of two of his ships, forced Hughes to go to Trin-
comalee, where the sheltered harbor allowed them to repair.
Suffren, anxious about his transports, went to Pondicherry,
where he anchored in their company. It was his wish then
to proceed against Negapatam; but the commander of the
troops chose to act against Cuddalore. After negotiations and
arrangements with Hyder Ali the army landed south of Porto
Novo, and marched against Cuddalore, which surrendered on
the 4th of April.
' Meanwhile Suffren, anxious to act against his principal
objective, had sailed again on the 2Sd of March. It was his
1 Troade : BataiUef Navalet.
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MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO FLEETS.
hope to cut off two ships-of-the-Iine which were expected
from England. For this he was too late; the two seventy-
fours joined the main body at Madras, March 80th. Hughes
had refitted at Trincomalee in a f ortnight, and reached Madras
again on the 12th of March. Soon after the reinforcement
had joined him, he sailed again for Trincomalee with troops
and military stores for the garrison. On the 8th of April
Suffren's squadron was seen to the northeast, also standing
to the southward. Hughes kept on, through that and the two
following days, with light northerly winds. On the 11th he
made the coast of Ceylon, fifty miles north of Trincomalee,
and bore away for the port. On the morning of the 12th the
French squadron in the northeast was seen crowding sail in
pursuit. It was the day on which Rodney and De Orasse met
in the West Indies, but the parts were reversed ; here the
French, not tlie English, sought action.
The speed of the ships in both squadrons was very un-
equal ; each had some coppered ships and some not cop-
pered. Hughes found that his slow sailers could not escape
tlie fastest of his enemy, — a condition which will always
compel a retreating force to hazard an action, unless it can
resolve to give up the rear ships, and which makes it im-*
perative for the safety, as well as the efiiciency, of a squad-
ron that vessels of the same class should all have a certain
minimum speed. The same cause — the danger of a sepa-
rated ship — led the unwilling De Orasse, the same day, in
another scene, to a risky manoeuvre and a great mishap.
Hughes, with better reason, resolved to fight ; and at nine
A. M. formed his line on the starboard tack, standing in-shore
(Plate XV., A), the squadron in good order, with intervals of
two cables between the ships.^ His account, which again varies
from that of Suffren, giving a radically different idea of the
tactics used by the French commodore, and more to the credit
of the latter's skill, will first be followed. He says : —
'^The enemy, bearing north by east, distant six miles, with wind
at north by east, oontbued manoeuvring their ships and changing
> Between four and five hundred yards.
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488 THE SECOND BATTLE BETWEEN
tbdr positions In line, till fifteen minutes past noon, when they bore
away (a) to engage us, five sail of their van stretching along (b) to
engage the ships of our van, and the other seven sail (W) steering
directly on our three centre ships, the < Superbe/ the ^ Monmouth,' her
second ahead, and the ' Monarca,' her second astern* At half-past one
the engagement began in the van of both squadrons ; three minutes
after, I made the signal for battle. The French admiral in the ^ H^ros '
and his second astern in 'L'Orient' (both seventy-fours) bore down on
the ' Superbe ' ^ within pistol-shot. The * H^ros ' continued in her posi«
Uon, giving and receiving a severe fire for niue minutes, and then
stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the ' Monmouth,' at that time en-
gaged with another of the enemy's ships, making room for the ships
iu his rear to come up to the attack of our centre, where the engage-
ment was hottest. At three the ' Monmouth ' had her mizzen-mast
shot away, and in a few minutes her maiumast, and bore out of the
line to leeward (C, o) ; and at forty minutes past three the wind un-
expectedly continuing far northerly without any sea-breeze, and being
careful not to entangle our ships with the land, I made signal to wear
and haul by the wind in a line-of-battle on the larboard tack, still
engaging the enemy."
Now here, practically^ was concentration with a vengeance.
In this, the hardest fight between these two hard fighters, the
English loss was 187 killed and 480 wounded in eleven ships.
Of this total) the two centre ships, the flag-ship and her next
ahead, lost 104 killed and 198 wounded, — fifty-three per
cent of the entire loss of the squadron, of which they formed
eighteen per cent. The casualties were very much heavier,
in proportion to the size of the ships, than those of the lead-
ers of the two columns at Trafalgar.^ The material injury to
hulls, spars, etc., was yet more serious. The English squad-
ron, by this concentration of the enemy upon a small fraction
of it, was entirely crippled. Inferior when the action began,
> Tho EngliBh aod French flag-sliips are denoted in the plan by their ezoep-
tionsl size.
s The Victory/' Kelaon'i ship at TrafiOgar, a lOO-gon ship, loet 57 kiUed and
109 wounded ; Hnghee's ship, a 74, loet 59 kiUed and 96 wonnded. CoUingwood's
■hip, the " Royal Sorereign/' also of 100 gons, loat 47 kiUed and 94 wonnded ; th«
M Monmonth/' a 64, in Hughes's action lost 45 kiUed and 102 wonnded.
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SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
489
Its inferiority was yet more decisive by the subtraction of two
ships, and Sufifren's freedom to moTC was increased.
But how far was this concentration intended by Suffren ?
For this we must go to the pages of two French writers,^ who
base their narratives upon his own despatches on record in
the French Marine Office. The practical advantage gained
by the French must also be tested by comparing the lists
of casualties, and the injuries received by their individual
ships ; for it is evident that if both the squadrons received
the same total amount of injury, but that with the English
it fell on two ships, so that they could not be ready for action
for a month or more, while with the French the damage was
divided among the twelve, allowing them to be ready again in
a few days, the victory tactically and strategically would rest
with the latter.^
As regards Suffren's purpose, there is nothing to indicate
that he meant to make such an attack as Hughes describes.
Having twelve ships to the English eleven, his intention seems
to have been to pursue the usual English practice, — form line
parallel to the enemy, bear down together, and engage ship to
ship. To tills he added one simple combination ; the twelfth
French ship, being unprovided with an opponent, was to
engage the rear English ship on her lee side, placing her
thus between two fires. In truth, a concentration upon the
van and centre, such as Hughes describes, is tactically in-
ferior to a like effort upon the centre and rear of a column.
This is true of steamers even, which, though less liable to
loss of motive power, must still turn round to get from van
to rear, losing many valuable seconds; but it is specially
true of sailing vessels, and above all in the light, baffling
airs which are apt to mark the change of monsoon at the
season when this fight was fought. Nelson emphasized his
contempt of the Russians of his day by saying he would
not hesitate to attack their van, counting upon throwing the
1 Tronde i Bataflles NavaleB ; Cheralier : Hist de In Marine Fran^aise.
* This remark seems too self-eTident to need emphasis ; yet it maj be qiies
tiooed whether naval men generaUj carry it in their stock of axioms.
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440 SUFFEEJSrS TACTICS, APRIL It, 178$.
whole line in confusion from their want of seamanship ; but
though entertaining a not much better opinion of the Span«
iards, he threw the weight of attack on the rear of the allied
fleets at Trafalgar. In dealing with such seamen as the cap-
tains of Hughes's fleet, it would have been an error to assail
the van instead of the rear. Only a dead calm could have
kept the latter out of action.
Suffren's attack is thus described bj Captain Chevalier.
After mentioning Hughes's forming line on the starboard
tack, he says: —
^^This manoauvre was imitated by the French, and the two squad-
rons ran on parallel lines, heading about west-northwest (A, A). At
eleven, our line being well formed, Suffren made signal to keep
away to west-southwest, by a movement all together. Our ships did
not keep their bearing upon the prescribed line, and the van, com-
posed of the best sailers, came first within range of the enemy At
one, the leading ships of the English fleet opened fire upon the < Yen-
geur ' and * Art^sien ' [French van]. These two ships, having luffed *
to return the fire, were at once ordered to keep away again. Suffren,
who wished for a decisive action, kept his course, receiving without
reply the shots directed upon his ship by the enemy. When at pistol-
range of the * Superbe,' he hauled to the wind (B), and the signal to
open fire appeared at his mainmast head. Admiral Hughes having
only eleven ships, the * Bizarre/ according to the dispositions taken
by the commander-in-chief, was to attack on the quarter the rear ship
of the English fleet and double on it to leeward. At the moment when
the first cannon-shots were heard, our worst sailers were not up with
their stations. Breathing the letter, and not the spirit, of the com*
modore's orders, the captains of these ships luffed at the same time as
those which preceded them Hence it resulted that the French line
formed a curve (B), whose extremities were represented in the van
by the ^Artdsien' and ^Yengeur,* and in the rear by the < Bizarre,'
* Ajax/ and * S^v&re.* In consequence, these ships were very far from
those which corresponded to them in the enemy's line."
It is evident from all this, written by a warm admirer of
Suffren, who has had full access to the oflicial papers, that
1 As alwajTB.
* That is. tamed their side to the enemy instead of approaching him.
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INJURIES OF THE TWO FLEETS.
the French chief intended an attack elementary in conception
and difficult of execution. To keep a fleet on a line of bearing,
sailing free, requires much drill, especially when the ships have
different rates of speed, as had Suffren's. The extreme injury
suffered by the Superbe" and Monmouth,'^ undeniably due
to a concentration, cannot be attributed to Suffren's disposi"
tions. The injuries which the ^ H^ros ' received at the begins
ning of the action did not allow her to remain by the ^ Superbe.'
Not being able to back her topsails in time, the braces having
been cut, she passed ahead, and was only stopped on the beam
of the ^ Monmouth.' " ^ This accounts for the suffering of the '
latter ship, already injured, and now contending with a much
larger opponent. The " Superbe " was freed from Suffren only
to be engaged by the next Frenchman, an equally heavy ship ;
and when the Monmouth " drifted or bore up, to leeward, the
French flag-ship also drifted so that for a few moments she
fired her stern guns into the " Superbe's " bow (0, d). The
latter at the same time was engaged on the beam and quar-
ter by two French ships, who, either with or without signal,
came up to shield their commodore.
An examination of the list of casualties shows that the loss
of the French was much more distributed among their ships
than was the case with the English. No less than three of
the latter escaped without a man killed, while of the French
only one. The kernel of the action seems to have been in the
somewhat fortuitous concentration of two French Seventy-
fours and one sixty-four on an English seventy-four and sixty-
four. Assuming the ships to have been actually of the same
force as their rates, the French brought, counting broadside
only, one hundred and six guns against sixty-nine.
Some unfavorable criticism was excited by the management
of Admiral Hughes during the three days preceding the fight,
because he refrained from attacking the French, although
they were for much of the time to leeward with only one ship
more than the English, and much separated at that. It was
thought that he had the opportunity of beating them in detail.'
> Chevalier. * AnniiAl Begieter, 178S.
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442 CRITICISMS UPON HUGHES'S CONDUCT.
The accounts accesBible are too meagre to permit an accu-
rate judgment upon this opinion, which probably reflected
tlie mesfr-table and quarter-deck talk of the subordinate oflS-
cers of the fleet. Hughes's own report of the position of the
two fleets is vague, and in one important particular directly
contradictory to the French. If the alleged opportunity
offered, the English admiral in declining to use it adhered to
the resolve, with which he sailed, neither to seek nor shun the
enemy, but to go directly to Trincomalee and land the troops
and supplies he had on board. In other words, he was gov*
erned in his action by the French rather than the English
naval policy, of subordinating the attack of the enemy's fleet
to the particular mission in hand. If for this reason he did
allow a favorable chance of fighting to slip, he certainly had
reason bitterly to regret his neglect, in the results of the battle
which followed; but in the lack of precise information the
most interesting point to be noted is the impression made
upon public and professional opinion, indicating how strongly
the English held that the attack of the enemy's fleet was the
first duty of an English admiraL It may also be said that he
could hardly have fared worse by attacking than he did by
allowing the enemy to become the assailant; and certainly
not worse than he would have fared had Suffren's captains
been as good as his own.
After the action, towards sunset, both squadrons anchored
in fifteen fathoms of water, irregular soundings, three of the
French ships taking the bottom on coral patches. Here they
lay for a week two miles apart, refitting. Hughes, from the
ruined condition of the ^ Monmouth,'* expected an attack ; but
when Suffren had finished his repairs on the 19th, he got
under way. and remained outside for twenty-four hours, in-
viting a battle which he would not begin. He realized the
condition of the enemy so keenly as to feel the necessity of
justifying his action to the Minister of Marine, which he did
for eight reasons unnecessary to particularize here. The last
was the lack of efficiency and hearty support on the part of
his captains.
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ENFORCED INACTIVITY OF THE ENGLISH. 443
It is not likely that Suff ren erred on the side of ezcessive
caution. On the contrary, his most marked defect as a com-
mander-in-chief was an ardor which, when in sight of the
enemy, became impatience, and carried him at times into ac-
tion hastily and in disorder. But if, in the details and exe-
cution of his battles, in his tactical combinations, Suffren was
at times foiled by his own impetuosity and the short-comings
of most of his captains, in the general conduct of the cam*
paign, in strategy, where the personal qualities of the com-
mander-in-chief mainly told, his superiority was manifest,
and achieved brilliant success. Then ardor showed itself in
energy, untiring and infectious. The eagerness of his hot
ProYen9al blood overrode difficulty, created resources out of
destitution, and made itself felt through every vessel under his
orders. No military lesson is more instructive nor of more
enduring value than the rapidity and ingenuity with which he,
without a port or supplies, continually refitted his fleet and
took the field, while his slower enemy was dawdling over his
repairs.
The battle forced the English to remain inactive for six
weeks, till the Monmouth" was repaired. Unfortunately,
Suffren's situation did not allow him to assume the offensive
at once. He was short of men, provisions, and especially of
spare spars and rigging. In an official letter after the action
he wrote: ^'I have no spare stores to repair rigging; the
squadron lacks at least twelve spare topmasts." A convoy of
supply-ships was expected at Point de Galles, which, with the
rest of Ceylon, except Trincomalee, was still Dutch. He there-
fore anchored at Batacalo, south of Trincomalee, a position in
which he was between Hughes and outward-bound English
ships, and was favorably placed to protect his own convoys,
which joined him there. On the 8d of June he sailed for
Tranquebar, a Danish possession, where he remained two or
three weeks, harassing the English communications between
Madras and the fleet at Trincomalee. Leaving there, he sailed
for Cuddalore, to communicate with the commander of the
land forces and Hyder Ali. The latter was found to be much
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444 ENERGY SHOWN BY SUFFREN.
discontented with the scanty co-operation of the French general,
Suffren, however, had won his favor, and he expressed a wish
to see him on his return from the expedition then in contem-
plation ; for, true to his accurate instinct, the commodore was
bent upon again seeking out the English fleet, after beating
which he intended to attack Negapatam. There was not in
him any narrowness of professional prejudice ; he kept always
in view the necessity, both political and strategic, of nursing
the alliance with the Sultan and establishing control upon the
seaboard and in the interior ; but he clearly recognized that
the first step thereto was the control of the sea, by disabling
the English fleet. The tenacity and vigor with which he
followed this aim, amid great obstacles, joined to the clear-
sightedness with which he saw it, are the distinguishing
merits of Suffren amid the crowd of French fleet-commanders,
— his equals in courage, but trammelled by the bonds of a
false tradition and tlie perception of a false objective.
Hughes meantime, having rigged jury-masts to the Mon-
mouth," had gone to Trincomalee, where his squadron re-
fitted and the sick were landed for treatment ; but it is evident,
as has before been mentioned, that the English had not held
the port long enough to make an arsenal or supply port, for
he says, ^< I will be able to remast the ^ Monmoutli ' from the
spare stores on board the several ships/' His resources were
nevertheless superior to those of liis adversary. During the
time that SufiPren was at Tranquebar, worrying the English
communications between Madras and Trincomalee, Hughes
still stayed quietly in the latter port, sailing for Negapatam
on the 28d of June, the day after SufiPren reached Cuddalore.
The two squadrons had thus again approached each other,
and SufiPren hastened his preparations for attack as soon
as he heard that his enemy was where he could get at him.
Hughes awaited his movement.
Before sailing, however, SufiPren took occasion to say in
writing home: Since my arrival in Ceylon, partly by the
help of the Dutch, partly through the prizes we have taken,
the squadron has been equipped for six months' service, and I
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SUFFREirS MILITARY CHARACTER. 445
bare rations of wheat and rice assured for more than a year."
This achievement was indeed a just source of pride and self*
congratulation. Without a port^ and destitute of resources^
the French commodore had lived off the enemy; the store
ships and commerce of the latter had supplied his wants.
To his fertility of resource and the activity of his cruisers,
inspired by himself, this result was due. Yet he had but two
frigates, the class of vessel upon which an admiral must
mainly depend for this predatory warfare. On the 28d of
March, both provisions and stores had been nearly exhausted.
Six thousand dollars in money, and the provisions in the con-
voy, were then his sole resources. Since then he had fought a
severe action, most expensive in rigging and men, as well as
in ammunition. After that fight of April 12 he had left only
powder and shot enough for one other battle of equal severity.
Three months later he was able to report as above, that he
could keep the sea on his station for six months without fur-
ther supplies. This result was due wholly to himself, — to his
self-reliance, and what may without exaggeration be called his
greatness of soul. It was not expected at Paris ; on the con-
trary, it was expected there that the squadron would return
to the Isle of France to refit. It was not thought possible that
it could remain on a hostile coast, so far from its nearest base,
and be kept in efficient condition. Suffren thought otherwise ;
he considered, with true military insight and a proper sense
of the value of his own profession, that the success of the
operations in India depended upon the control of the sea, and
therefore upon the uninterrupted presence of his squadron.
He did not shrink from attempting that which had always
been thought impossible. This firmness of spirit, bearing the
stamp of genius, must, to be justly appreciated, be considered
with reference to the circumstances of his own time, and of
the preceding generations in which he grew up.
Suffren was bom July 17, 1729, and served during the wars
of 1789 and 1766. He was first under fire at Matthews's
action off Toulon, February 22, 1744. He was the contempo-
rary of D'Estaing, De Guichen, and De Grasse, before the
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446 THE THIRD BATTLE BETWEEN
days of the French BevolutioDi when the uprising of a people
had taught men how often impossibilities are not impossible ;
before Napoleon and Nelson had made a mock of the word.
His attitude and action had therefore at the time the addi-
tional merit of origiualitj^ but his lofty temper was capable
of yet higher proof. Convinced of the necessity of keeping
the squadron on its station, he yentured to disregard not only
the murmurs of his officers but the express orders of the
Oourt. When he reached Batacalo, he found > despatches
directing him to return to the Isle of France. Instead of
taking them as a release from the great burden of responsi-
bility, he disobeyed, giving his reasons, and asserting that he
on the spot could judge better than a minister in Europe
what the circumstances demanded. Such a leader deserved
better subordinates, and a better colleague than he had in the
commander of the forces on shore. Whether or no the con-
ditions of the general maritime struggle would have permitted
the overthrow of the English East Indian power may be doubt-
ful ; but it is certain that among all the admirals of the three
nations there was none so fitted to accomplish that result as
Suffren.' We shall find him enduring severer tests, and always
equal to them.
In the afternoon of the 5th of July Suffren's squadron came in
sight of the English, anchored off Guddalore. An hour later,
a sudden squall carried away the main and mizzen topmasts of
one of the French ships. Admiral Hughes got under way, and
the two fleets manoeuvred during the night. The following
day the wind favored the English, and the opponents found
themselves in line of battle on the starboard tack, heading
south-southeast, with the wind at southwest. The disabled
French ship having by unpardonable inactivity failed to re-
pair her injuries, the numbers about to engage were equal, —
eleven on each side. At eleven a. m. the English bore down to-
gether and engaged ship against ship ; but as was usual under
those conditions, the rear ships did not come to as close ac-
tion as those ahead of them (Plate XYI., Position I.). Oap-
tain Ohevalier carefully points out that their failure was a fair
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SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
offset to the failure of the French rear on the 12th of April,^
bat fails to note in this cpnnection that the French van, both
on that occasion and again oh the 8d of September, bungled
as well as the rear. There can remain little doubt, in the
mind of the careful reader, that most of the French captains
were inferior, as seamen, to their opponents. During this part
of the engagement the fourth ship in the French order, the
Brilliant" (a), lost her mainmast, bore up out of the line (a'),
and dropped gradually astern and to leeward (a'').
At one P. H., when the action was hottest, the wind sud-
denly shifted to soutli-southeast, taking the ships on the port
bow (Position II.)* Four English ships, the <<Burford,"
"Sultan" (s), "Worcester," and "Eagle," seeing the breeze
coming, kept off to port, toward the French line ; the others
were taken aback and paid off to starboard. The French
ships, on the other hand, with two exceptions, the " Brilliant"
(a) and " S^vdre " (b), paid off from the English. The effect
of tlie change of wind was therefore to separate the main parts
of the two squadrons, but to bring together between the lines
four English and two French ships. Technical order was
destroyed. The " Brilliant," having dropped far astern of her
position, came under the j&re of two of the English rear, the
" Worcester " and the " Eagle," who had kept off in time and
so neared the French. Suffren in person came to her assist-
ance (Position III., a) and drove off the English, who were
also threatened by the approach of two other French ships that
had worn to the westward in obedience to signal. While this
partial action was taking place, the other endangered French
ship, the " S^vdre " (b), was engaged by the English Sultan "
(s), and, if the French captain M. de Oillart can be believed,
1 The British aooonnt differs materiaUjr as to the ctnse of the distance sepa-
rating the two rears. "In this action it did not fall to the * Monmouth's' lot
to sustain a Terr considerable sliare, the enemy's rear being so &r to leeward
that the ships of the British rear conld not, even whilst the wind was fayorable,
dose with them without considerably breaking the order of their own line"
(Memoir of Captain Alms, Naval Cbownicle, vol. ii.). Soch contradictions are
common, and, except for a particular purpose, need not to be reconciled. Alms
seems to have been not only a first-rate seaman, but an oiBcer capable of resolute
and independent action ; his account is probably corteci.
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448
THE '*SJ^r£RE'' STRIKES HER FLAG.
by two other English ships. It is probabloi from her place
in the line, that the Bui^ord " also assailed her. However
this may be, the ^< S^vdre " hauled down her flag ; but while the
"Sultan" was wearing away from her, she resumed her fire,
raking the English ship. The order to surrender, given by
the French captain and carried into execution by the formal
well-established token of submission, was disregarded by his
subordinates, who fired upon their enemy while the flag was
down. In effect, the action of the French ship amounted to
using an infamous ruu de guerre ; but it would be unjust to
say that this was intended. The positions of the different
vessels were such that the " Sultan " could not have secured
her prize; other French ships were approaching and must
have retaken it. The indignation of the French juniors at the
weakness of their captain was therefore justified ; their refusal
to be bound by it may be excused to men face to face with an
unexpected question of propriety, in the heat of battle and
under the sting of shame. Nevertheless, scrupulous good faith
would seem to demand that their deliverance should be awaited
from other hands, not bound by the action of their commander ;
or at least that the forbearing assailant should not have suf-
fered from them. The captain, suspended and sent home by
Suffren, and cashiered by the king, utterly condemned him-
self by his attempted defence : " When Captain de Cillart saw
the French squadron drawing off, — for all the ships except the
< Brilliant' had fallen off on the other tack, — he thought it
useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down.
The shipe engaged witKhim immediately ceased their fire^ and
the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment
the ^ S^vdre ' fell off to starboard and her sails filled ; Cap-
tain de Cillart then ordered the fire to be resumed by his
lower-deck guns, the only ones still manned, and he rejoined
his squadron."^
^ Troade : BataiUes Navalet. It was seen from Suff reo's ship that the
^'Stfv^re's" flag was down; bat it was supposed that the ensign halliards had
been shot away. The next day Hughes sent the captain of the '* Saltan " to de-
mand the deUyerjr to him of the ship which had strack. The demand, of eouise*
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HUGHES'S MILITARY CHARACTER. 449
TliiB action was the only one of the five fought by Suffren
on the coast of India, in which the English admiral was the
assailant There can be found in it no indication of military
conceptions, of tactical combinations ; but on the other hand
Hughes is continually showing the aptitudes, habits of thought,
and foresight of the skilful seaman, as well as a courage be-
yond all proof. He was in truth an adniirable representatiye
of the average English naval officer of the middle of the eigh-
teenth century ; and while it is impossible not to condemn the
general ignorance of the most important part of the profession,
it is yet useful to remark how far thorough mastery of its
other details, and dogged determination not to yield, made up
for so signal a defect. As the Roman legions often redeemed
the blunders of their generals, so did English captains and
seamen often save that which had been lost by the errors of
their admirals, — errors which neither captain nor seamen rec-
ognized, nor would probably have admitted. Nowhere were
these solid qualities so clearly shown as in Suffren's battles,
because nowhere else were such demands made upon them.
No more magnificent instances of desperate yet useful resist-
ance to overwhelming odds are to be found in naval annals,
than that of the Monmouth" on April 12, and of the Exe-
ter " on February 17. An incident told of the latter ship is
worth quoting. At the heel of the action, when the ^ Exe-
ter' was already in the state of a wreck, the master came to
Commodore King to ask him what he should do with the ship,
as two of the enemy were again bearing down upon her. He
laconically answered, * there is nothing to be done but to fight
her till she sinks.' " ^ She was saved.
Suffren, on the contrary, was by this time incensed beyond
endurance by the misbehavior of his captains. Cillart was
sent home ; but besides him two others, both of them men of
influential connections, and one a relative of Suffren himself,
eonld not be complied with. "The 'Saltan/ " Troude njn, "which had hove^o
to take poflsosflion of the '8<^v^re/ was the victim of thie action; she received
during some time, without replying, the whole Are of the French ship."
1 Annual Register, 178S.
29
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450 SUFFREN TAKES TRINCOMALEE.
were dispossessed of their commands. However necessary
and proper this step, few but Suffren would have had the reso-
lution to take it ; for, so far as he then knew, he was only a
captain in rank, and it was not permitted even to admirals to
deal thus with their juniors. You may perhaps be angry,
Monseigneur/' he wrote^ that I have not used rigor sooner ;
but I beg you to remember that the regulations do not give
this power even to a general officer, which I am not.''
It is immediately after the action of the 6th of July that
Suffren's superior energy and military capacity begin mark-
edly to inQuence the issue between himself and Hughes.
The tussle had been severe ; but military qualities began to
tell, as they surely must. The losses of the two squadrons
in men, in the last action, had been as one to three in favor
of the English ; on the other hand, the latter had apparently
suffered more in sails and spars,— in motive power. Botii
fleets anchored in the evening, the English off Negapatam,
the French to leeward, off Cuddalore. On the 18th of July
Suffren was again ready for sea; whereas on the same day
Hughes had but just decided to go to Madras to finish his
repairs. Suffren was further delayed by the political neces-
sity of an official visit to Hyder Ali, after which he sailed
to Batacalo, arriving there on the 9th of August, to await
reinforcements and supplies from France. On the 21st, these
joined him ; and two days later he sailed, now with fourteen
ships-of-the-line, for Trincomalee, anchoring off the town on
the 26th. The following night the troops were landed, bat-
teries thrown up, and the attack pressed with vigor. On
the 80th and 81st the two forts which made the defensive
strength of the place surrendered, and this all-important
port passed into the hands of the French. Convinced that
Hughes would soon appear, Suffren granted readily all the
honors of war demanded by the governor of the place, con-
tenting himself witti the substantial gain. Two days later,
on the evening of September 2d, the English fleet was sighted
by the French lookout frigates.
During the six weeks in which Suffren had been so actively
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SUFFREIP3 UNTIRING ACTIVITY.
461
and profitably employed, the English admiral had remained
quietly at anchor, repairing and refitting. No precise informa-
tion is available for deciding how far this delay was unavoid-
able ; but having in view the well-known aptitude of English
seamen of that age, it can scarcely be doubted that, had
Hughes possessed the untiring energy of his great rival, he
could have gained the few days which decided the fate of
Trincomalee, and fought a battle to save the place. In fact,
this conclusion is supported by his own reports, which state
that on the 12th of August the ships were nearly fitted;
and yet, though apprehending an attack on Trincomalee, he
did not sail until the 20th. The loss of this harbor forced
him to abandon the east coast, which was made unsafe by
the approach of the northeast monsoon, and conferred an
important strategic advantage upon Suffren, not to speak of
the political effect upon the native rulers in India.
To appreciate thoroughly this contrast between the two
admirals, it is necessary also to note how differently they
were situated with regard to material for repairs. After the
action of the 6th, Hughes found at Madras spars, cordage,
stores, provisions, and material. Suffren at Ouddalore found
nothing. To put his squadron in good fighting condition,
nineteen new topmasts were needed, besides lower masts,
yards, rigging, sails, and so on. To take the sea at all, the
masts were removed from the frigates and smaller vessels,
and given to the ships-of-the-line, while English prizes were
stripped to equip the frigates. Ships were sent off to the
Straits of Malacca to procure other spars and timber. Houses
were torn down on shore to find lumber for repairing the
hulls. The difficulties were increased by the character of the
anchorage, an open roadstead with frequent heavy sea, and
by the near presence of the English fleet ; but the work was
driven on under the eyes of the commander-in-chief, who, like
Lord Howe at New York, inspired the working parties by his
constant appearance among them. Notwithstanding his pro-
digious obesity, Suffren displayed the fiery ardor of youth;
he was everywhere where work was going on. Under his
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452 REINFORCEMENTS SENT FROM ENGLAND.
powerful impulse, the most difficult tasks were done with in^
credible rapidity. Nevertheless, his officers represented to
him the bad state of the fleet, and the need of a port for the
ships-of-the-line. ^ Until we have taken Trincomalee,' he re-
plied, ^the open roadsteads of the Coromandel coast will an-
swer."'^ It was indeed to this activity on the Coromandel
coast that the success at Trincomalee was due. The weapons
y with which Suffren fought are obsolete; but the results
wrought by his tenacity and fertility in i*esourccs are among
the undying lessons of history.
While the characters of the two chiefs were thus telling
upon the strife in India, other no less lasting lessons were
being afforded by the respective governments at home, who
did much to restore the balance between them. While the
English ministry, after the news of the battle of Porto Praya,
fitted out in November, 1781, a large and compact expedition,
convoyed by a powerful squadron of six ships-of-the-line,
under the command of an active officer, to reinforce Hughes,
the French despatched comparatively scanty succors in small
detached bodies, relying apparently upon secrecy rather than
upon force to assure their safety. Thus Suffren, while strug-
gling with his innumerable embarrassments, had the morti*
fication of learning that now one and now another of the
small detachments sent to his relief were captured, or driven
back to France, before they were clear of European waters.
There was in truth little safety for small divisions north of
the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus the advantages gained by his
activity were in the end sacrificed. Up to the fall of Trin-
comalee the French were superior at sea; but in the six
months which followed, the balance turned the other way, by
the arrival of the English reinforcements under Sir Richard
Bickerton.
With his usual promptness the French commodore had pre-
pared for further immediate action as soon as Trincomalee
surrendered. The cannon and men landed from the ships
vrere at once re-embarked, and the port secured by a garrison
1 Canat: Vie de Suffron.
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HUGHES APPEARS OFF TRINCOMALEE. 458
strong enough to relieve him o! any anxiety about holding it.
This great seaman, who had done as much in proportion to the
means intrusted to him as any known to history, and had so
signally illustrated the sphere and influence of naval power^
had no intention of fettering the movements of his fleet, or
risking his important conquest^ by needlessly taking upon the
shoulders of the ships the burden of defending a seaport.
When Hughes appeared, it was past the power of the English
fleet by a single battle to reduce the now properly garrisoned
post. Doubtless a successful campaign, by destroying or
driving away the French sea power, would achieve this re-
sult ; but Suffren might well believe that, whatever mishaps
might arise on a single day, he could in the long run more
than hold his own with his opponent.
Seaports should defend themselves ; the sphere of the fleet
is on the open sea, its object offence rather than defence, its
objective the enemy's shipping wherever it can be found.
Suffren now saw again before him the squadron on which
depended the English control of the sea ; he knew that power-
ful reinforcements to it must arrive before the next season,
and he hastened to attack. Hughes, mortified by his failure
to arrive in time, — for a drawn battle beforehand would have
saved what a successful battle afterward could not regain, —
was in no humor to balk him. Still, with sound judgment,
he retreated to the southeast, flying in good order, to use
Suffren's expression ; regulating speed by the slowest ships,
and steering many different courses, so that the chase which
began at daybreak overtook the enemy only at two in the
afternoon. The object of the English was to draw Suffren
so far to leeward of the port that, if his ships were disabled,
he could not easily regain it.
The French numbered fourteen ships-of-the-line to twelve
English. This superiority, together with his sound apprecia-
tion of the military situation in India, increased Suffren's
natural eagerness for action ; but his ships sailed badly, and
were poorly handled by indifferent and dissatisfied men.
These circumstances, during the long and vexatious pursuit,
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464 THE FOURTH BATTLE BETWEEIT
chafed and fretted the hot temper of the commodore, which
Btill felt the spur of urgency that for two months had quick-
ened the operations of the squadron. Signal followed sig-
nal, manoeuTre succeeded manoeuvre, to bring his disordered
vessels into position. Sometimes they edged down, some-
times they brought to," says the English admiral, who*was
carefully watching their approach, in no regular order, as
if undetermined what to do." Still, Suffren continued on,
and at two p. m., having been carried twenty-five miles away
from his port, his line being then partly formed and within
striking distance of the enemy, the signal was made to come
to the wind to correct the order before finally bearing down.
A number of blunders in executing this made matters worse
rather than better; and the commodore, at last losing pa-
tience, made signal thirty minutes lat^r to attack (Plate
XYII., A), following it with another for close action at pis-
tol range. - This being slowly and clumsily obeyed, he ordered
a gun fired, as is customary at sea to emphasize a signal ;
unluckily this was understood by his own crew to be the
opening of the action, and the flag-ship discharged all her
battery. This example was followed by the other ships,
though yet at the distance of half cannon-shot, which, under
the gunnery conditions of that day, meant indecisive action.
Thus at the end and as the result of a mortifying series of
blunders and bad seamanship, the battle began greatly to the
disadvantage of the French, despite their superior numbers.
The English, who had been retreating under short and handy
sail, were in good order and quietly ready; whereas their
enemies were in no order (B). Seven ships had forereached
in rounding to,^ and now formed an irregular group ahead
of the English van, as well as far from it, where they were
of little service ; while in the centre a second confused group
was formed, the ships overlapping and masking each other's
fire. Under the circumstances the entire brunt of the action
1 The cazres in (B) nprefent the moTementa of the shipe cJUr the shift of
wind, which pxaeticaUjr ended the battle. The ahipe themeelyee ebow the order
in fighting.
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SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
fell npon Suffren's flag-nhip (a) and two others which sup-
ported him; while at the extreme rear a small ship-of-the*
line, backed by a large frigate, alone engaged the English
rear ; bat these, being wholly overmatched, were soon forced
to retire.
A military operation could scarcely be worse carried out.
The French ships in the battle did not support each other ;
they were so grouped as to hamper their own fire and need-
lessly increase the target offered to the enemy ; so far from
concentrating their own effort, three ships were left, almost
unsupported, to a concentrated fire from the English line.^
^ Time passed on, and our three ships [B, a], engaged on the
beam by the centre of the English fleet and raked [enfiladed]
by van and rear, suffered greatly. After two hours the
* H^ros' ' sails were in rags, all her running rigging cut, and
she could no longer steer. The ' lllustre * had lost her
mizzen-mast and maintopmast." In this disorder such gaps
existed as to offer a great opportunity to a more active oppo*
nent. ^ Had the enemy tacked now,'' wrote the chief -of -staff
in his journal, ^^we would have been cut off and probably
destroyed." The faults of an action in which every proper
distribution was wanting are summed up in the results. The
French had fourteen ships engaged. They lost eighty-two
killed and two hundred and fifty-five wounded. Of this total,
sixty-four killed and one hundred and seventy-eight wounded,
or three fourths, fell to three ships. Two of these three lost
their main and mizzen masts and f oretopmast ; in other words,
were helpless.
This was a repetition on a larger scale of the disaster to
two of Hughes's ships on the 12th of April ; but on that day
the English admiral, being to leeward and in smaller force,
had to accept action on the adversary's terms, while here
the loss fell on the assailant, who, to the advantage of the
wind and choice of his mode of attack, added superiority in
1 Tho enemj formod a semiciicle aionnd ns and raked ns ahead and astern,
as the ihip came np and feU off, with the helm to leeward. — t/btf ma/ d€ Bard
dm BailU de Si^jffren.
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466 CONTHAST BETWEEN HUGHES AND SUFFREN.
numbers. Full credit must in this action be allowed to
Hughes, who, though lacking in enterprise and giving no
token of tactical skill or coup d^oMj showed both judgment
and good management in the direction of his retreat and in
keeping his ships so well in band. It is not easy to ap-
portion the blame which rests upon his enemies. Suffren
laid it freely upon his captains.^ It has been rightly pointed
out, however, that many of the officers thus condemned in
mass had conducted themselves well before, both under Suf-
fren and other admirals; that the order of pursuit was
irregular, and Suffren's signals followed each other with
confusing rapidity ; and finally that chance, for which some-
thing must always be allowed, was against the French, as
was also the inexperience of several captains. It is pretty
certain that some of the mishap must be laid to the fiery
and inconsiderate haste of Suffren, who had the defects of
his great qualities, upon which his coy and wary antagonist
Unwittingly played.
It is noteworthy that no complaints of his captains are to
be found in Hughes's reports. Six fell in action, and of each
he speaks in terms of simple but evidently sincere apprecia-
tion, while on the survivors he often bestows particular as
well as general commendation. The marked contrast be-
tween the two leaders, and between the individual ship-com-
manders, on either side, makes this singularly instructive
among naval campaigns; and the ultimate lesson taught is
in entire accordance with the experience of all military his-
tory from the beginning. Suffren had genius, energy, great
tenacity, sound military ideas, and was also an accomplished
seaman. Hughes had apparently all the technical acquire-
ments of the latter profession, would probably have com-
manded a ship equally well with any of his captains, but
shows no trace of the qualities needed by a general officer.
On the other hand, without insisting again upon the skill
and fidelity of the English subordinates, it is evident that,
1 See page 430. He added : '* It is frightful to haye had four times in oni
power to deetroj the English squadron^ and that it stiU exists."
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FRENCH SHIPS WRECKED.
467
to whatever it be attributed, the French' single ships were as
a rule incomparablj worse-handled than those of their oppo-
nents. Four times, Suffren claims, certainly thrice, the Eng-
lish squadron was saved from overwhelming disaster bj the
difference in quality of the under officers. Good troops have
often made amends for bad generalship ; but in the end the
better leader will prevail. This was conspicuously the case
in the Indian seas in 1782 and 1788. War cut short the
strife, but not before tlie issue was clearly indicated.
The action of September 8, like that of July 6, was brought '
to a close by a shift of wind to the southeast. When it came,
the English line wore, and formed again on the other tack.
The French also wore ; and their van ships, being now to
windward, stood down between their crippled ships and the
enemy's line (C). Toward sundown Hughes hauled off to
the northward, abandoning the hope of regaining Trincoma-
lee, but with the satisfaction of having inflicted tliis severe
retaliation upon his successful opponent.
That firmness of mind which was not the least of Suffren's
qualities was severely tried soon after the action off Trin-
comaloe. In returning to port, a seventy-four, the Orient,''
was run ashore and lost by mismanagement, the only con-
solation being that her spars were saved for the two dismasted
ships. Other crippled masts were replaced as before by rob-
bing the frigates, whose crews also were needed to replace
the losses in battle. Repairs were pushed on with the usual
energy, the defence of the port was fully provided for, and on
the 80th of September the squadron sailed for Uie Coromandel
coast, where the state of French interests urgently called for
it. Cttddalore was reached in four days ; and here another
incapable officer wrecked the <^ Bizarre," of sixty-four guns,
in picking up his anchorage. In consequence of the loss of
these two ships, Suffren, when he next met the enemy, could
oppose only fifteen to eighteen ships-of-the-line ; so much
do general results depend upon individual ability and care.
Hughes was at Madras, ninety miles north, whither he had
gone at once after the late action. He reports his ships badly
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468 APPROACH OF THE BAD SEASON.
damaged ; but the loss was bo eveuly distributed among them
that it is difficult to justify his failure to follow up the iu-
juries done to the French.
At tliis season the monsoon wind, which has come for four
or five months from southwest, changes to northeast, blow*
ing upon the east coast of the peninsula, where are no good
harbors. The consequent swell made the shore often unap«
proachable, and so forbade support from fleet to army. The
change of the monsoon is also frequently marked by violent
hurricanes. The two commanders, therefore, had to quit
a region where their stay might be dangerous as w^ell as
useless. Had Trincomalee not been lost, Hughes, in the
condition of his squadron, might have awaited there the
reinforcements and supplies expected soon from England;
for although the port is not healthy, it is secure and well
situated. Bickerton had already reached Bombay, and was
on his way now to Madras with five ships-of-the-line. As
things were, Hughes thought necessary to go to Bombay
for the season, sailing or rather being driven to sea by a
hurricane, on the 17th of October. Four days later Bicker-
ton reached Madras, not having fallen in with the admiral.
With an activity which characterized him he sailed at once,
and was again in Bombay on the 28th of November. Hughes's
ships, scattered and crippled by tempest, dropped in one by
one, a few days later.
Suffren held Trincomalee, yet his decision was not easy.
The port was safe, he had not to fear an attack by the Eng*
lish fleet ; and on the other hand, besides being sickly during
the approaching monsoon, it was doubtful whether the pro-
visions needed for the health of the crews could be had there.
In short, though of strategic value from its strength and posi«
tion, the port was deficient in resources. Opposed to Trin*
comalee there was an alternative in Achem, a harbor on the
other side of the Bay of Bengal, at the west epd of the island
of Sumatra. This was healthy, could supply provisions, and,
from its position with reference to the northeast monsoon,
would permit ships to regain the Coromandel coast sooner
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MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIA. 469
than those in Bombay, when the milder ending of the season
made landing more practicable.
These simple considerations were not, however, the only
elements in the reallj difficult problem before Suffren. The
small results that followed this campaign must not hide Uie
fact that great issues were possible, and that much might
depend upon his decision. Owing to the French policy of
sending out reinforcements in several small bodies, not only
was there much loss, but great uncertainty prevailed among
the scattered commands as to conditions elsewhere. This
uncertainty, loss, and delay profoundly affected the political
situation in India. When Suffren first reached the coast, the
English had on their hands not only Hyder Ali, but the Hah-
rattas as well. Peace with the latter was signed on the 17th of
Hay, 1782 ; but, owing probably to an opposition party among
them, the ratifications were not exchanged until December.
Both there and in the court of Hyder Ali there was division
of interest ; and representations were made from both to the
French, who, though suspicious, could obtain no certain in-
formation of the treaty, that everything depended upon the
relative military strength of themselves and the English.
The presence and the actions of Suffren were all that France
had to show, — the prestige of his genius, the capture of Trin-
comalee, his success in battle. The French army, cooped up
in Cuddalore, was dependent upon the sultan for money, for
food, and for reinforcements; even the fleet called on him
for money, for masts, for ammunition, for grain. The Eng-
lish, on the other hand, maintained their ground ; though on
the whole worsted, they lost no ships ; and Bickerton's power-
ful squadron was known to have reached Bombay. Above all,
while the French asked for money, the English lavished it.
It was impossible for the French to make head against
their enemy without native allies; it was essential to keep
Hyder from also making peace. Here the inadequate sup-
port and faulty dispositions of the home government made
themselves felt. The command in India, both by land and
sea, was intrusted to General de Bussy, once the brilliant
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460
SUFFREN GOES TO ACHEM.
fellow-worker with Dupleiz, now a gouty invalid of sixty-
four. With a view to secrecj, Bussj sailed from Cadiz in
Norember, 1781, with two ships-of-the-line, for Teneriffe,
where he was to be joined by a convoy leaving Brest in De-
cember. This convoy was captured by the English, only
two of the vessels escaping to Bussy. The latter pursued
his journey, and learning at the Cape of Good Hope that
Bickerton's strong force was on the way, felt compelled to
land there a great part of his troops. He reached the Isle of
France on the 81st of May. The next convoy of eighteen
transpoi'ts, sailing in April for India, was also intercepted.
Two of the four ships-of-war were taken, as also ten of the
transports ; the remainder returned to Brest. A third detach-
ment was more fortunate, reaching the Cape in May ; but it
was delayed there two months by the wretched condition of
the ships and crews. These disappointments decided Bussy
to remain at the Island until joined by the expected ships
from the Cape, and Suffren at tills critical moment did not
know what the state of things there was. Tlio general had
only written him that, as he could not reach the coast before
the bad season, ho should rendezvous at Achem. These
uncertainties made a painful impression upon Hyder Ali,
who bad been led to expect Bussy in September,- and had
instead received news of Bickerton's arrival and the defec-
tion of his old allies, the Mahrattas. Suffren was forced
to pretend a confidence which he did not feel, but which,
with the influence of his own character and achievements,
determined the sultan to continue the war. This settled,
the squadron sailed for Achem on the 15th of October,
anchoring there the 2d of November.
Three weeks afterward a vessel arrived from Bussy, with
word that his departure was indefinitely delayed by an epi-
demic raging among the troops. Suffren therefore deter-
mined to hasten his own return to the coast, and sailed on
the 20th of December. January 8, 1788, he anchored off
Gfmjam, five hundred miles northeast of Cuddalore, whence
|ie would have a fair wind to proceed when he wished. It
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SUFFRBN RETURNS TO TRINCOMALEE. 461
was his purpose to attack not only tho coasting yessels but
tlie English factories on shore as well, th^ surf being now
often moderate ; but learning on the 12th, from an English
prize, the important and discouraging news of Hyder All's
death, he gave up all minor operations, and sailed at once for
Guddalore, hoping to secure bj his presence the continuance
of the alliance as well as the safety of the garrison. He
reached the place on the 6th of February.
During his four months absence the failure of Bussy to
appear with his troops, and the arrival of Bickerton, who
had shown himself on both coasts, had seriously injured the
French cause. The treaty of peace between the English and
the Mahrattas had been ratified; and the former, released
from this war and reinforced, had attacked the sultan on the
west, or Malabar, coast. The efiFect of this diversion was of
course felt on the east coast, despite the efforts of the French
to keep the new sultan there. The sickness among the troops
at the Isle of France had, however, ceased early in Novem-
ber ; and had Bussy then started without delay, he and Suf«
fren would now have met in the Carnatic, with full command
of the sea and large odds in their favor ashore. Hughes did
not arrive till two months later.
Being thus alone, Suffren, after communicating with Tippoo-
Saib, the new sultan of Mysore, went to Trincomalee; and
there he was at last joined, on the 10th of March, by Bussy
accompanied by three ships-of-the-line and numerous trans-
ports. Eager to bring the troops into the field, Suffren sailed
on the 16th with his fastest ships, and landed them the next
day at Porto Novo. He returned to Trincomalee on the 11th
of April, and fell in with Hughes's fleet of seventeen ships-of-
the-line off the harbor's mouth. Having only part of his
force with him, no fight ensued, and the English went on to
Madras. The southwest monsoon was now blowing.
It is not necessary to follow the trivial operations of the
next two months. Tippoo being engaged on the other side
of the peninsula and Bussy displaying little vigor, while
Hughes was in superior force off the coast, the affairs of the
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462
ENGLISH SIEGE OP CUDDALORE.
French on shore went from bad to worse. Suffren, having
but fifteen ships to eighteen English, was unwilling to go to
leeward of Trincomalee, lest it should fall before he could
return to it. Under these conditions the English troops ad-
vanced from Madras, passing near but around Guddalore, and
encamped to the southward of it, by the sea. The supply-
ships and light cruisers were stationed oS the shore near
the army ; while Admiral Hughes, with the heavy ships, an-
chored some twenty miles south, where, being to windward,
he covered the others.
In order to assure to SufiFren the full credit of his subse-
quent course, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that Bussy,
though commander-in-chief both by land and sea, did not
venture to order him to leave Trincomalee and come to his
support. Allowing him to feel the extremity of the danger,
he told him not to leave port unless he heard that the army
was shut up in Cuddalore, and blockaded by the English
squadron. This letter was received on the 10th of June.
Suffren waited for no more. The next day ho sailed, and
forty-eight hours later his frigates saw the English fleet. The
same day, the 18th, after a sharp action, the French army was
shut up in the town, behind very weak walls. Everything
now depended on the action of the fleets.
Upon Suffren's appearance, Hughes moved away and an-
chored four or five miles from the town. Baffling winds
prevailed for three days ; but the monsoon resuming on the
16th, Suffren approached. The English admiral not liking
to accept action at anchor, and to leeward, in which he was
right, got under way ; but attaching more importance to the
weather-gage than to preventing a junction between the ene-
my's land and sea forces, he stood out into the offing with
a southerly, or south-southeast wind, notwithstanding his su-
perior numbers. Suffren formed on the same tack, and some
manoeuvring ensued during that night and the next day.
At eight P. M. of the 17th the French squadron, which had
refused to be drawn to sea, anchored off Cuddalore and com-
municated with the commander-in-chief. Twelve hundred
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NEWS OF THE PEACE REACHES INDIA. 468
of the garrison were hastily embarked to fill the numerous
vacancies at the guns of the fleet.
Until the 20th the wind, holding unexpectedly at west, de-
nied Hughes the advantage which he sought ; and finally on
that day he decided to accept action and await the attack.
It was made by Suffren with fifteen ships to eighteen, the
fire opening at quarter-past four p. m. and lasting until half-
past six. The loss on both sides was nearly equal; but
the English ships, abandoning both the field of battle and
their army, returned to Madras. Suffren anchored before
Cuddalore.
The embarrassment of the British army was now very
great. The supply-ships on which it had depended fled be-
fore the action of the 20th, and the result of course made
it impossible for them to return. The sultan's light cavalry
harassed their communications by land. On the 25th, the
general commanding wrote that his mind was on the rack
without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet,
considering the character of H. de Suffren, and the infinite
superiority on the part of the French now that we are left to
ourselves." From this anxiety he was relieved by the news
of the conclusion of peace, which reached Cuddalore on the
29th by flag-of-truce from Madras.
If any doubt had remained as to the relative merits of the
two sea-commanders, the last few days of their campaign
would have removed them. Hughes alleges the number of
his sick and shortness of water as his reasons for abandon^
ing the contest Suffren's difficulties, however, were as great
as his own ; ^ and if he had an advantage at Trincomalee,
that only shifts the dispute a step back, for he owed its pos-
session to superior generalship and activity. The simple
facts that with fifteen ships he forced eighteen to abandon a
blockade, relieved the invested army, strengthened his own
crews, and fought a decisive action, make an impression which
1 There wm not a ringle ihip of SnfFren's which had more than thtee-
fonrths of her regular complement of men. It mnet he added that soldien and
■epojs made np half of theie reduced cfewi. — Ckevalitr, p. 463.
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SUFFBBN RETURNS TO FRANCE.
does not need to be diminished in the interests of trutii.^ It
is probable that Hughes's self-reliance had been badly shaken
by his various meetings with SufiFren.
Although the tidings of peace sent by Hughes to Bussy
rested only upon unofficial letters, they were too positive
to justify a continuance of bloodshed. An arrangement was
entered into by the authorities of the two nations in India,
and hostilities ceased on the 8th of July. Two months later,
at Pondicherry, the official despatches reached Suffren. His
own words upon them are woi*th quoting, for they show the
depressing convictions under which he had acted so noble a
part : Qod be praised for the peace ! for it was clear that in
India, though we had the means to impose the law, all would
have been lost. I await your orders with impatience, and
heartily pray they may permit me to leave. War alone can
make bearable the weariness of cei*tain things."
On the 6th of October, 1788, Suffren finally sailed from
Trincomalee for France, stopping at the Isle of France and
the Cape of Good Hope. The homeward voyage was a con-
tinued and spontaneous ovation. In each port visited the
most 'flattering attentions were paid by men of every degree
and of every nation. What especially gratified him was the
homage of the English captains. It might well be so ; none
had so clearly established a right to his esteem as a warrior.
On no occasion when Hughes and Suffren met, save the last,
did the English number over tAvelve ships; but six English
captains had laid down their lives, obstinately opposing his
efforts. While he was at the Cape, a division of nine of
Hughes's ships, returning from the war, anchored in the
1 Toa will hare learned my promotion to commodore and rear-admiral.
Now, I teU yon in the sincerity of my heart and for yonr own ear alone, that
what I have done since then U worth infinitely more than what I had done he*
fore. Ton know the capture and battle of Trincomalee ; but the end of the cam-
paign, and that which took place between the month of March and the end of
June, is far above anything that has been done In the navy since I entered it
The result has been Tcry advantageous to the State, for the squadron was endan-
gered and the army lost. ^ Private Letter of S^jffHn, Sept, IS, 1783 ; quoted im
the "Journal de Bord du BaiUi de S^ff^reu."
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harbor. Their captains called eagerly ttpon the admiral, the
atottt Commodore King of the ^ Exeter at their head.
'*Tlie good Dutchmen have received me as their savior/'
wrote Suiffren ; hot among the tributes which have most
flattered me, none has given me more pleastire than the
esteem and consideration testified by the English who are
here.'' On reaching home, rewards were heaped tipon him.
Having left France as a captain, he came back a rear*
admiral ; and immediately after his i'eturn the king created
a fourth vice-admiralship, a special post to be filled bj
Suffren, and to lapse at his death. These honors were won
by himself alone ; they were the tribute paid to his tiur
yielding energy and genius, shown not only in acttial figlit
but in the steadfastness which held to his station through
every discouragement, and rose equal to every demand made
by recurring want and misfortune.
Alike in the general conduct of his operations and on the
battlefield under the fire of the enemy, this lofty resolve
was the distinguishing merit of Suffren ; and when there is
coupled with it the clear and absolute conviction which he
held of the necessity to seek and crush the enemy's fleet, we
have probably the leading traits of his military character.
The latter was the light that led him, the former the spirit
that sustained him. As a tactician, in the sense of a driller
of ships, imparting to them uniformity of action and manoeu-
vring, he seems to have been deficient, and would probably
himself have admitted, with some contempt, the justice of
the criticism made upon him in these respects. Whetlier or
no he ever actually characterized tactics — meaning thereby
elementary or evolutionary tactics — as the veil of timidity,
there was that in his actions which makes the mot probable.
Such a contempt, however, is unsafe even in the case of
genius. The faculty of moving together with uniformity
and precision is too necessary to the development of the full
power of a body of ships to be lightly esteemed ; it is essen*
tial to that concentration of e£Fort at wliich Suffren rightly
aimed, but which he was not always careful to secure by pre
so
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LATER CAREER OF SUFFREN.
yiouB dispoBitions. Paradoxical though it Bounds, it is true
that only fleets which are able to perform regular movements
can afford at times to cast them aside ; only captains whom
the habit of the drill-ground has familiarized with the shift-
ing phases it presents, can be expected to seize readily the
opportunities for independent action presented by the field of
battle. Howe and Jervis must make ready the way for the
successes of Nelson. Suffren expected too much of his cap-
tains. He had the right to expect more than he got, but not
that ready perception of the situation and that firmness of
nerve which, except to a few favorites of Nature, are the re-
sult only of practice and experience.
Still, he was a very great man. When every deduction has
been made, there must still remain his heroic constancy, his
fearlessness of responsibility as of danger, the rapidity of his
action, and the genius whose unerring intuition led him to
break through the traditions of his service and assert for
the navy that principal part which befits it, that offensive
action which secures the control of the sea by the destruc-
tion of the enemy's fleet. Had he met in his lieutenants
such ready instruments as Nelson found prepared for him,
there can be little doubt that Hughes's squadron would
have been destroyed while iuferior to Suffren's, before re-
inforcements could have arrived; and with the English
fleet it could scarcely have failed that the Goromandel
coast also would have fallen. What effect this would have
had upon the fate of the peninsula, or upon the terms of
the peace, can only be surmised. His own hope was that,
by acquiring the superiority in India, a glorious peace might
result.
No further opportunities of distinction in war were given
to Suffren. ' The remaining years of his life were spent
in honored positions ashore. In 1788, upon an appearance
of trouble with England, he was appointed to the command
of a great fleet arming at Brest ; but before he could leave
Paris he died suddenly on the 8th of December, in the six-
tieth year of his age. There seems to have been no suspicion
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467
at the time of other than natural cansen of death, he being
exceedingly stout and of apoplectic temperament ; but many
years after a story, apparently well-founded, became current
that he was killed in a duel arising out of his official action
in India. His old antagonist on the battlefield, Sir Edward
Hughes, died at a great age in 1794.
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CHAPTER Xm.
Events in the West Indies avteb the Subrendeb or Yobktown.
— Encountebs or De Gbasse with Hood. — The Sea Battle
or the Saints.— 1781, 1788,
THE surrender of Comwallis marked the end of the active
war upon the American continent. The issue of the
struggle was indeed assured upon the day when France de-
voted her sea power to the support of the colonists ; but,
as not uncommonly happens, the determining characteristics
of a period were summed up in one striking event. From
the beginning, the military question, owing to the physical
characteristics of the country, a long seaboard with estuaries
penetrating deep into the interior, and the consequent greater
ease of movement by water than by land, had hinged upon
the control of the sea and the use made of that control.
Its misdirection by Sir William Howe in 1777, when he
moved his army to the Chesapeake instead of supporting
Burg^yne's advance, opened the way to the startling success
at Saratoga, when amazed Europe saw six thousand regular
troops surrendering to a body of provincials. During the
four years that followed, until the surrender of Yorktown,
the scales rose and fell according as the one navy or the
other appeared on the scene, or as English commanders
kept touch with the sea or pushed their operations far from
its support. Finally, at the great crisis, all is found depend-
ing upon the question whether the French or the English
fleet should first appear, and upon their relative force.
The maritime struggle was at once transferred to the
West Indies. The events which followed there were ante-
cedent in time both to Suffren's battles and to the final
relief of Gibraltar ; but they stand so much by themselves as
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ATTACK ON ISLAND OF ST. CHRISTOPHER. 469
to call for separate treatment, and have stich close relation
to the conclusion of the war and the conditions of peace,
as to form the dramatic finale of the one and the stepping-
stone of transition to the other. It is fitting indeed that
a brilliant though indecisive naval victory should close the
story of an essentially naval war.
The capitulation of Yorktown was completed oh the 19th
of October, 1781, and on the 6th of November, De Grasse^
resisting the suggestions of Lafayette and Washington that
the fleet should aid in carrying the war farther south, sailed
from tlie Chesapeake. He reached Martinique on the 26th,
the day after the Marquis de Bouill^, commanding the French
troops in the West Indies, had regained by a bold surprise
the Dutch island of St. Eustatius. The two commanders
now concerted a joint expedition against Barbadoes, which
was frustrated by the violence of the trade winds.
Foiled here, the French proceeded against the island of
St. Christopher, or St. Kitt's (Plate XVIII.). On the 11th
of January, 1782, the fleet, carrying six thousand troops,
anchored on the west coast off Basse Terre, the chief town.
No opposition was met, the small garrison of six hundred
men retiring to a fortified post ten miles to the northwest,
on Brimstone Hill, a solitary precipitous height overlooking
the lee shore of the island. The French troops landed and
pursued, but the position being found too strong for assault,
siege operations were begun.
The French fleet remained at anchor in Basse Terre road.
Meanwhile, news of the attack was carried to Sir Samuel
Hood, wlio had followed De Grasse from the continent, and,
in the continued absence of Rodney, was naval commander-
in-chief on the station. He sailed from Barbadoes on the
14th, anchored at Antigua on the 21st, and there embarked
all the troops that could be spared, — about seven hundred
men. On the afternoon of the 28d the fleet started for
St Kitt's, carrying such sail as would bring it within striking
distance of the enemy at daylight next morning.
The English having but twenty-two ships to the French
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HOOD AND DB QRASSE
twenty-Dine, and the latter being generally superior in force,
class for class, it is necessary to mark closely the lay of
the land in order to understand Hood's original plans and
their subsequent modifications ; for, resultless as his attempt
proved, his conduct during the next three weeks forms the
most brilliant military effort of the whole war. The islands
of St Kitf s and Nevis (Plates XYIII. and XIX.) being sep-
arated only by a narrow channel, impracticable for ships-of-
the-line, are in effect one, and their common axis lying
northwest and southeast, it is necessary for sailing-ships, with
the trade wind, to round the southern extremity of Nevis,
from which position the wind is fair to reach all anchorages
on the lee side of the islands. Basse Terre is about twelve
miles distant from the western point of Nevis (Fort Charles),
and its roadstead lies east and west. Tlie French fleet were
anchored there in disorder (Plate XYIII., A), three or four
deep, not expecting attack, and the ships at the west end
of the road could not reach those at the east without beating
to windward, — a tedious, and under fire a perilous process.
A further most important point to note is that all the east-
em ships were so placed that vessels approaching from the
southward could reach them with the usual wind.
Hood, therefore, we are told, intended to appear at early
daylight, in .'order of and ready for battle, and fall upon
the eastern ships, filing by them with his whole fleet (a, a^,
thus concentrating the fire of all upon a f^w of the enemy ;
then turning away, so as to escape the guns of the others,
he proposed, first wearing and then tacking, to keep his
fleet circling in long procession (a', a") past that part of the
enemy's ships chosen for attack. The plan was audacious,
but undeniably sound in principle ; some good could hardly
fail to follow, and unless De Orasse showed more readiness
than he had hitherto done, even decisive results might be
hoped for.^
I The curre, a, repreaenta the line which Hood proposed to foUow with
hia fleet, the wind being rappoeed eMt^ontheaat; The positions B, B, B, refer
to tlie proceedings of a subsequent day. and haye nothing to do with the diagram
iitA.
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AT ST. CHRISTOPHER.
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Tho best-laid plans, however, may fail, and Hood's was
balked by the awkwardness of a lieutenant of the watch,
who hoTO-to (stopped) a frigate at night ahead of the fleet,
and was consequently run down by a ship-of-the-line. The
latter also received such injury as delayed the movement,
several hours being lost in repairing damages. The French
were thus warned of the enemy's approach, and although
not suspecting his intention to attack, De Grasse feared
that Hood would pass down to leeward of him and disturb
the siege of Brimstone Hill, — an undertaking so rash for
an inferior force that it is as difficult to conceive how he
could have supposed it, as to account for his overlooking
the weakness of his own position at anchor.
At one P. M. of the 24th the English fleet was seen rounding
the south end of Nevis ; at three De Grasse got under way and
stood to the southward. Toward sundown Hood also went
about and stood south, as though retreating ; but he was
well to windward of his opponent, and maintained this ad-
vantage tlirough the night. At daybreak both fleets were
to leeward of Nevis, — the English near the island, the French
about nme miles distant (Plate XIX.). Some time was
spent in manoeuvring, with the object on Hood's part of get-
ting the French admiral yet more to leeward ; for, having
failed in his first attempt, he had formed the yet bolder
intention of seizing the anchorage his unskilful opponent
had left, and establishing himself there in an impregnable
manner. In this he succeeded, as will be shown; but to
understand the justification for a movement confessedly haz-
ardous, it must be pointed out that he thus would place
himself between the besiegers of Brimstone Hill and their
fleet; or, if the latter anchored near the hill, the Eng-
lish fleet would be between it and its base in Martinique,
ready to intercept supplies or detachments approaching from
the southward. In short, the position in which Hood hoped
to establish himself was on the flank of the enemy's com-
munications, a position the more advantageous because the
island alone could not long support the large body of troops.
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HOOD AND DE GRASSE
80 suddenly thrown upon it Moreover, both fleets were
expecting reinforcements ; Rodney was on his way and might
arrive first, which he did, and in time to save St. Kitt's,
which be did not. It was also but four months since York'
town; the affairs of England were going badly; something
must be done, something left to chance, and Hood knew
himself and his officers. It may be added that he knew
his opponent.
At noon, when the hillsides of Nevis were covered with
expectant and interested sightseers, the English fleet rapidly
formed its line on the starboard tack and headed nortli
for Basse Terre (Plate XIX., A, A'). The French, at the
moment, were in column steering south, but went about
at once and stood for the enemy in a bow-and-quarter line ^
(A, A). At two the British had got far enough for Hood
to make signal to anchor. At twenty minutes past two the
van of the French came within gunshot of the English
centre (B, B, B), and shortly afterward the firing began,
the assailants very properly directing their main effort upon
the English rear ships, which, as happens with most long
columns, had opened out, a tendency increased in this case
by the slowness of the fourth ship from the rear, the ^< Pru-
dent.'* The French flag-ship, " Ville de Paris," of one hun-
dred and twenty guns, bearing De Orasse's flag, pushed for
the gap thus made, but was foiled by the <^ Canada," seventy-
four, whose captain, Cornwallis, the brother of Lord Corn-
wallis, threw all his sails aback, and dropped down in front
of the huge enemy to the support of the rear, — an example
nobly followed by the ** Resolution " and the " Bedford " im-
mediately ahead of him (a). The scene was now varied and
animated in the extreme. The English van, which had
escaped attack, was rapidly anchoring (b) in its appointed
position. The commander-in-chief in the centre, proudly
reliant upon the skill and conduct of his captains, made
1 When a fleet is in line aliead, doee to the wind, on one tack, and the ships
go ahoot together, thej will, on the other tack, he on the same line, hut not one
ahead of the other. This formation was caUed bow-and-qnarter line.
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AT ST. CHRISTOPHER.
signal for the ships ahead to carry a press of sail, and
gain their positions regardless of the danger to the threat-
ened rear. The latter, closely pressed and outnumbered,
stood on unswervingly, shortened sail, and came to anchor,
one by one, in a line ahead (B, B"), under the roar of the
guns of their baffled enemies. The latter filed by, delivered
their fire, and bore off again to the southward, leaving their
former berths to their weaker but* clever antagonists.
The anchorage thus brilliantly taken by Hood was not
exactly the same as that held by De Orasse the day before ;
but as it covered and controlled it, his claim that he took
up the place the other had left is substantially correct. The
following night and morning were spent in changing and
strengthening the order, which was finally established as
follows (Plate XVIII., B, B'). The van ship was anchored
about four miles southeast from Basse Terre, so close to
the shore that a ship could not pass inside her, nor, with
the prevailing wind, even reach her, because of a point and
shoal just outside, covering her position. From tilts point
the line extended in a west-northwest direction to the twelfth
or thirteenth ship (from a mile and a quarter to a mile
and a half), where it turned gradually but rapidly to north,
the last six ships being on a north and south line. Hood's
flag-ship, the Barfleur,'' of ninety guns, was at the apex of
the salient angle thus formed.
It would not have been impossible for the French fleet
to take the anchorage they formerly held ; but it and all
others to leeward were forbidden by the considerations al-*
ready stated, so long as Hood remained where he was. It
became necessary therefore to dislodge him, but this was
rendered exceedingly difficult by the careful tactical dis-
positions that have been described. . His left flank was
covered by the shore. Any attempt to enfilade his front
by passing along the other flank was met by the broadsides
of the six or eight ships drawn up en potenee to the rear.
The front commanded the approaches to Basse Terre. To
attack him in the rear, from the northwest, was forbidden
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HOOD AND DE GRASSB
bj the trade-wind. To these difficulties was to be added
that the attack must be made under sail against ships at
anchor, to whom loss of spars would be of no immediate
concern ; and which, having springs ^ out, could train their
broadsides over a large area with great ease.
Nevertheless, both sound policy and mortification impelled
De Grasse to fight, which be did the next day, January 26.
The method of attack, in single column of twenty-nine ships
against a line so carefully arranged, was faulty in the ex-
treme; but it may be doubted whether any commander of
that day would have broken through the traditional fighting
order.' Hood had intended the same, but he hoped a sur-
prise on an ill-ordered enemy, and at the original French
anchorage it was possible to reach their eastern ships, with
but slight exposure to concentrated fire. Not so now. The
French formed to the southward and steered for the eastern
flank of Hood's line. As their van ship drew up with the
point already mentioned, the wind headed her, so that she
could only reach the third in the English order, the first
four ships of which, using their springs, concentrated their
guns upon her. This vessel was supposed by the English
to be the Fluton," and if so, her captain was D* Albert de
Bions, in Sufifren's opinion the foremost officer of the French
navy. ^<The crash occasioned by their destructive broad-
sides,'' wrote an English officer who was present, ^< was so
tremendous that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from
her off side ere she could escape the cool, concentrated fire
of her detennined adversaries, As she proceeded along the
British line, she received the first fire of every ship in
1 A ipring i« s rope taken from the item or quarter of a ihip at anchor, to
an anchor properly placed, by which meant the ahip can be tnrned in a desired
direction. «
* In the council of war of the allied fleets on the expediency of attacking the
English squadron anchored at Torbay (p. 408) an opponent of the measure urged
" that the whole of the combined fleets could not bear down upon the English in
a line-of-battle abreast, that of course they must form the lineof-battle ahead,
and go down upon the enemy singly, by which they would run the greatest risk
of being shattered and torn to pieces/' etc. (Beatson, rol. t. p. 896).
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AT ST. CHRISTOPHER.
passing. She was indeed in so shattered a state as to be
compelled to bear awaj for St Eustatius.'^ And so ship
after ship passed hj^ ronning the length of the line (Plate
XVIII., B, B), distributing their successive fires in gallant
but dreary, ineffectual monotony over the whole extent. A
second time that day De Grasse attacked in the same order,
but neglecting the English van, directed his effort upon
tlie rear and centre. This was equally fruitless, and seems
to have been done with little spirit.
From that time until the 14th of February, Hood maintained
his position in sight of the French fleet, which remained
cruising in the offing and to the southward. On the 1st a
despatch vessel arrived from Eempenfeldt, informing him
of the dispersal of the French reinforcements for the West
Indies, which must have renewed his hopes that his bold
attempt would be successful through Rodney's arrival. It
was not, however, to be so. Brimstone Hill surrendered on
the 12th, after a creditable defence. On the 18th De Grasse
took his fleet, now amounting to thirty-three ships-of-the-line,
to Nevis, and anchored there. On the night of the 14th
Hood summoned all his captains on board, had them set
their watches by his, and at eleven P. M., one after another,
without noise or signal, cut their cables and made sail to
the northward, passing round that end of the island un-
noticed, or at least unmolested, by the French.
Both strategically and tactically Hood's conceptions and
dispositions were excellent, and their execution was most
honorable to the skill and steadiness of himself and his cap-
tains. Regarded as a single military operation, this was
brilliant throughout ; but when considered with reference to
the general situation of England at the time, a much higher
estimate must be formed of the admiral's qualities.^ St Elitt's
1 In war, as in cftrdt, the state of the sooie most at timee dictate the play ; and
the chief who never takee into consideration the effect which hit particidar action
will have on the general result, nor what is demanded of him by the condition
of things elsewhere, both political and military, lacks an essential quality of a
great general. "The andacions manner in wliich Wellington stormed the re-
doubt of Francisco [at Ciudad Rodrigo], and broke ground on the flzst night of
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476 CRITICISM OF DB GRASSE'S ACTION.
in itself might not be worth a great risk ; but it was of the
first importance that energy and audacity should be carried
into the conduct of England's naval war, that some great
success should light upon her flag. Material success was
not obtained. The chances, though fair enough, turned against
Hood ; but every man in that fleet must have felt the glow
of daring achievement, the assured confidence which follows
a great deed nobly done. Had this man been in chief com-
mand when greater issues were at stake, had he been first
instead of second at the Ohcfsapeake, Oornwallis might have
been saved. The operation — seizing an anchorage left by the
enemy — would have been nearly the same; and both situa-
tions may be instructively compared with Suffren's relief of
Guddalore.
The action of De Grasse, also, should be considered not only
with reference to the particular occasion, but to the general
condition of the war as well, and when thus weighed, and
further compared with other very similar opportunities ne-
glected by this general officer, a fair estimate of his military
capacity can be reached. This comparison, however, is better
deferred to the now not very distant close of the campaign.
The most useful comment to be made here is, that his action
in failing to crush Hood at his anchors, witli a force at least
fifty per cent greater, was in strict accordance with the gen-
eral French principle of subordinating the action of the fleet
to so-called particular operations; for nothing is more in-
structive than to note how an unsound principle results in
disastrous action. Hood's inferiority was such as to weaken,
for offensive purposes, his commanding position. So long
the inTMtment, the mora andAdoiu manner In which he aesaulted the place
before the fire of the defence had in any wajr leasened, and before the counter-
•carp had been blown In, were the tme caneee of the sndden fall of the place.
Both the military and political $tai$ of affair$ warranted this neglect of rules.
When the general terminated his order for the aaeanlt with thia eeotence^
' Cindad Rodrigo muet be stormed this eyening,' he knew well that it would be
nobly understood" (Napier's Peninsular War). "Judging that the honour of
his Kajesty's arms, and tAs evreumstaneoM of the war in these seat, required a
considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself ]ustifle4 in departing from the
agnlar system" (Sir John Jerris's Report of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent).
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CRITICISM OF DE GRASSE'S ACTION.
as De Qrasse kept to windward, he maintained his commas
nications with Martinique, and he was strong enough, too,
to force communication when necessary with the troops be*
fore Brimstone Hill. It was probable, as the event showed^
that the particular operation, the reduction of St. Eitf s,
would succeed despite the presence of the English fleet ; and
^< the French navj has always preferred the glory of assuring
a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps but less real, of
taking a few ships."
So far De Grasse may be acquitted of any error beyond
that of not rising above the traditions of his service. Some
days, however, before the surrender of the island and the
departure of the English fleet, he was joined by two ships^
of-the-line which brought him word of the dispersal of the
expected convoy and reinforcements from Europe.^ He then
knew that he himself could not be strengthened before Rod-
ney's arrival, and that by that event the English would be
superior to him. He had actually thirty-three ships-of-the-
line in hand, and a few miles off lay twenty-two English in
II position where he knew they would await his attack ; yet
he let them escape. His own explanation implies clearly that
he had no intention of attacking them at anchor : —
The day after the capitulation of Brimstone Hill was the mo-
ment to watch Hood closely, and to fight him as soon as hs got under
way fiDm the conquered island. But our provisions were exhausted ;
we had only enough for thirty-six hoars. Some supply-ships had ar-
rived at Nevis, and you will admit one must live before fighting. I
went to Nevis, always to windward and in sight of the enemy, a league
and a half from him. In order to take on board the necessary supplies
as rapidly as possible. Hood decamped at night without signals, and
the next morning I found only the sick whom he left behind.'* '
In other words. Hood having held his ground with con-
summate audacity and skill, when he had some chance of
1 By Kempenfeldt's attack opon De Gntchen's ooiiFoy, and the following gale
in December, 1781. See p. 408.
> Kergnelen : Gnerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Graaae to Kergnelen.
dated Paris, Janoarj 8, 1783. p. 268.
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478 CRITICISM OF DE GRASSE'S ACTIOR.
Buccessful resistance, declined to await his adversary's attack
under conditions overwhelmingly unfavorable. What shall
be said of this talk about provisions? Did not the Comte de
Orasse know a month before how long, to a day, the supplies
on board would last ? Did he not know, four days before
Hood sailed, that he had with him every ship he could proba-
bly count on for the approaching campaign, while the Eng-
lish would surely be reinforced? And if the English position
was as strong as good judgment, professional skill, and bold
hearts could make it, had it not weak points? Were not
the lee ships to leeward ? If they did attempt to beat to
windward, had he not ships to contain'' them? If the
van ship could not be reached, had he not force enough to
double and treble on the third and following ships, as far
down the line as he chose ? A letter of Suffren's, referring
to a similar condition of things at Santa Lucia,^ but written
three years before these events, seems almost a prophetic
description of them : —
Notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of
December 15 [1778], we can yet expect success; but the only way
to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in consequence
of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their land works, which
will become of no effect %/ we lojf them an hoards or anchor upon their
buoyi. If we delay, a thousand circumstances may save them. They
may proJU by the night to depart,'*
There can be no doubt that the English would have sold
their defeat dearly ; but results in war must be paid for, and
the best are in the long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a
few simple principles — that the enemy's fleet was the con-
trolling factor in tlie coming campaign, that it was therefore
his true objective, that one fraction of it must be crushed
without delay when caught thus separated — would have
saved De Grasse a great blunder ; but it is only fair to note
that it would have made him an exception to the practice
of the French navy.
The hour was now close at hand when the French admiral
1 See pp. a«6, 42a
JUNCTION OF RODNEY AND HOOD.
479
should feel, even if he did not admit, the consequenceB of this
miBtake, by which he had won a paltry island and lost an
English fleet Rodney had sailed from Europe on the 15th
of January, with twelve ships-of-the-line. On the 19th of
February he anchored at Barbadoes, and the same day Hood
reached Antigua from St. Eitt's. On the 26th the squad-
rons of Rodney and Hood met to windward of Antigua,
forming a united fleet of thirty-four ships-of-the-line. The
next day De Grasse anchored in Fort Royal, thus escaping
the pursuit which Rodney at once began. The English ad-
miral then returned to Sta. Lucia, where he was joined by
three more ship&of-the-line from England, raising his force
to thirty-seven. Knowing that a large convoy was expected
from France, before the arrival of which nothing could be
attempted, Rodney sent a part of his fleet to cruise to wind-
ward and as far north as Guadeloupe; but the officer in
charge of the French convoy, suspecting this action, kept
well north of that island, and reached Fort Royal, Marti-
nique, on the 20th of March. The ships-of-war with him
raised De Grasse's fleet to thirty-three effective sail-of-the-line
and two fifty-gun ships.
The object of the united efforts of France and Spain this
year was the conquest of Jamaica. It was expected to unite
at Cap Fran^ais (now Gap Haltien), in Hayti, fifty ships-of-
tho-line and twenty thousand troops. Part of the latter were
already at the rendezvous ; and De Grasse, appointed to com-
mand the combined fleets, was to collect in Martinique all
the available troops and supplies in the French islands, and
convoy them to the rendezvous. It was this junction that
Rodney was charged to prevent.
The region within which occurred the important operations
of the next few days covers a distance of one hundred and
fifty miles, from south to north, including the islands of Sta.
Lucia, Martinique, Dominica, and Guadeloupe, in the order
named. (See Plate XI. p. 878.) At this time the first was in
English, Ihe others in French, hands. The final, and for the
moment decisive, encounter took place between, and a little
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480 POSITIONS OF RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
to westwaitl of, Dominica and Ouadeloupe. These are twenty-
three miles apart ; but the channel is narrowed to thirteen
by three islets called the Saints, lying ten miles south of
Guadeloupe. It is said to haye been De Grasse's intention,
instead of sailing direct for Gap Fran^ais^^ to take a circui-
tous course near the islands, which, being friendly or neutral,
would give refuge to the convoy if pressed. Tlie close pur-
suit of the English, who came up with him off Dominica, led
him to forsake this plan, sending the convoy into Basse Terre
at the south end of Guadeloupe, while with the fleet he tried
to beat through the channel and pass east of the island, thus
drawing the English away from the transports and ridding
himself of the tactical embarrassment due to the latter's
presence. Accidents to various ships thwarted this attempt,
and brought about a battle disastrous to him and fatal to the
joint enterprise.
The anchorages of the two fleets, in Martinique and Sta.
Lucia, were thirty miles apai*t. The prevailing east wind is
generally fair to pass from one to the other ; but a strong
westerly current, and the frequency of calms and light airs,
tend to throw to leeward sailing-ships leaving Sta. Lucia for
the northern island. A chain of frigates connected the Eng-
lish lookout ships off Martinique, by signal, with Rodney's
flag-ship in Gros Hot Bay. Everything was astir at the two
stations, the French busy with the multitudinous arrange-
ments necessitated by a great military undertaking, the Eng-
lish with less to do, yet maintaining themselves in a state of
expectancy and preparation for instant action, that entails
constant alertness and mental activity.
On the 5th of April Rodney was informed that the soldiers
were being embarked, and on the 8th, soon after daylight,
the lookout frigates were seen making signal that the enemy
was leaving port. The English fleet at once began to get
under way, and by noon was clear of the harbor to the num-
ber of thirty-six of the line. At half-past two p. m. the ad-
vanced frigates were in sight of the French fleet, which was
1 See Map iy..of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.
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SAILING OF THE FRENCH FLEET. 481
Been from the masiheadB of the main body jtiBt before Bun«
down. The English stood to the northward all night, and
at daybreak of the 9th were abreast Dominica, but for the
most part becalmed. In-shore of them, to the northward
and eastward, were seen the French fleet and convoji
the men-of-war numbering thirty-three of the line, besides
smaller yessels ; the convoj a hundred and fifty sail, under
special charge of the two fifty-gun ships. The irregular and
uncertain winds, common to the night and early hours of
the day near the land, had scattered these unwieldy num-
bers. Fifteen sail-of-tlie-line were in the channel between
Dominica and the Saints, with a fresh trade-wind, appar-
ently beating to windward; the remainder of the ships-of-
war and most of the couToy were still becalmed close
under Dominica (Plate XX., Position I, b). Gradually,
however, one by one, the French ships were catching light
airs off the land; and by favor of these, which did not
reach so far as the English in the offing, drew out from the
island and entered the more steady breeze of the channel,
reinforcing the group which was thus possessed of that prime
element of naval power, mobility. At the same time light
airs from the southeast crept out to the English van under
Hood, fanning it gently north from the main body of the
fleet toward two isolated French ships (i), which, having
fallen to leeward during the night, had shared the calms that
left the English motionless, with their heads all round the
compass. They had come nearly within gunshot, when a
light puff from the northwest enabled the Frenchmen to draw
away and approach their own ships in the channel.
The farther the English van advanced, the fresher grew
their wind, until they fairly opened the channel of the Saints
and felt the trade-wind. De Grasse signalled to the convoy
to put into Guadeloupe, which order was so well carried out
that they were all out of sight to the nortliward by two in the
afternoon, and will appear no more in the sequel. The two
French ships, already spoken of as fallen to leeward, not
being yet out of danger from the English van, which had now
81
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482
ACTION OF APRIL 9, 178$.
a commanding breeze, and the latter being much separated
from their rear and centre, De Orasae ordered his van to bear
down and engage. This waa obeyed by the ahipa signalled
and by three others, in all by fourteen or fifteen, the ac-
tion beginning at half-past nine a. m., and lasting with in-
termissions until quarter-past one p. m. Hood was soon
forced to heave-to, in order not to increase too much his
separation from the main fleet ; the French kept under way,
approaching from the rear and passing in succession at half
cannon-shot to windward (Plate XX., Position !.)• As each
ship drew ahead of the English division, she tacked, stand-
ing back to the southward until in position to resume her
place in the order of attack, thps describing a continuous
irregular curve of elliptical form, to windward of their
opponents. The brunt of the attack fell upon eight or
nine of the English, this number bemg successively in*
creased as one ship after another, as the baffling airs served,
drew out from the calm space under Dominica; but the
French received similar accessions. While this engagement
was going on, part of the English centre, eight ships with
Rodney's flag among them (Position I., a), by carefully
watching the puffs and cat's-paws, had worked in with the
land and caught the sea breeze, which was felt there sooner
than in the offing. As soon as they had it, about eleven
A.M., they stood to .the north, being now on the weather
quarter 1 both of the English van and its assailants (Posi-
tion II., a). The latter, seeing this, tacked, and abandon-
ing the contest for the moihent, steered south to join their
centre, lest Rodney's eight ships should get between them.
At half-past eleven the French again formed line on the
starboard tack, most of their ships being now clear of the
land, while the English rear was still becalmed. The greater
numbers of the French enabled them to extend from north
to south along the length of the English line, whereas the
latter was still broken by a great gap between the van
and centre (Position II.). The attack upon Hood was
1 WMlher qaaiter it behind, bat on the windward side.
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CRITICISM UPON DB GRASSFS CONDUCT. 483
therefore hotly renewed; but the French centre and rear
(b)) having the wind^ kept their difltance^ and held Rodney's
division at long range. At quarter-past one the French^
finding that the whole British line was coming up with the
wind, ceased firing, and at two Bodnej hauled down the
signal for battle, the enemy having withdrawn.
This action of the 9th of April amounted actually to no more
than an artillery duel. One French ship, the Gaton," a sixty-
four (d), received injuries which sent her into Guadeloupe ;
two English were disabled, but repaired their injuries without
leaving the fleet The material advantage, therefore, lay with
the latter. Opinions differ as to the generalship of the Oomte
de Grasse on this day, but they divide on the same basis of
principle as to whether ulterior operations, or the chances of
beating the enemy's fleets are to determine an admiral's action*
The facts of the case are these : Sixteen of the English fleet,
all the rear and four of tlie centre (Position IL, c), were not
able at any time to fire a shot* Apparently every French
ship, first and last, might have been brought into action. At
the beginning, eight or nine English were opposed to fifteen
French. At the end there were twenty English to thirty-
three French, and these general proportions doubtless obtained
throughout the four hours. De Grasse therefore found himself
in the presence of a fleet superior to his own, in numbers at
least, and by the favor of Providence that fleet so divided that
nearly half of it was powerless to act. He had the wind, he
had a fine body of captains ; what was to prevent him from
attacking Hood's nine ships with fifteen, putting one on each
side of ttie six in the rear. Had those nine been thoroughly
beaten, Bodney's furtlier movements must have been hope-
lessly crippled. The French lost only five in their defeat
three days later. The subsequent court-martial, however, laid
down the French doctrine thus : The decision to persist in
engaging with only a part of our fleet may be considered as an
act of prudence on the part of the admiral, which might be dic-
tated by the ulterior projects of the campaign." On this a
French professional writer naturally remarks, that if an attack
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484
ACCIDENTS IN THE FRENCH FLEET
were made at all, it would be more prudent to make it in
force ; less injury would fall on individual ships, while in the
end the whole fleet would inevitably be drawn in to support
any which, by losing spars, could not return to windward.
Three times in one year had Fortune thrown before De
Orasse the opportunity of attacking English fleets with de-
cisive odds on his side.^ Her favors were now exhausted.
Three days more were to show how decidedly the ulterior
projects of a campaign may be affected by a battle and the loss
of a few ships. From the 9th to the morning of the 12th the
French fleet continued beating to windward between Dominica
and the Saints, in no regular order. On the night of the 9th
the English hove-to to repair damages. The next day the
chase to windward was resumed, but the French gained very
decidedly upon their pursuers. On the night of the 10th two
ships, the Jason" and ''Z£l«," collided. The Z^l^ " was
the bane of the French fleet during these days. She was one
of those that were nearly caught by the enemy on the 9th, and
was also the cause of the flnal disaster. The injuries to the
Jason" forced her to put into Quadeloupe. On the 11th
the main body was to windward of the Saints, but the U\6 "
and another had fallen so far to leeward that De Orasse bore
down to cover them, thus losing much of the ground gained.
On the night following, the U\6 " was again in collision,
this time with De Orasse's flag-ship ; the latter lost some sails,
but the other, which had not the right of way and was wholly
at fault, carried away both foremast and bowsprit. The
admiral sent word to the frigate Astrde " to take the Z&\6 "
in tow ; and here flits across the page of our story a celebrated
and tragical figure, for the captain of. the Astr^e" was the
ill-fated explorer Lapey rouse, the mystery of whose disappear-
ance with two ships and their entire crews remained so long
unsolved. Two hours were consumed in getting the ship
under way in tow of the frigate, — not very smart work under
the conditions of feather and urgency ; but by five a. m. the
' ^ April S9, 1781, off Martbiqae, twenty-foar ships to eighteen ; Jaonaiy, 1782,
thin/ to twenty-two; April 9, 1782, thirty to twenty.
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THE NAVAL BATTLE OF THE SAINTS.
two were standing awaj for Basse Terre, where the " Caton"
and Jason," as well as the convoy, had already arrived. The
French fleet had thus lodt three from its line-of-battle since
leaving Martinique.
The disabled ship had not long been headed for Basse Terre^
when the faint streaks of dawn announced the approach of
the 12th of April, a day doubly celebrated in naval ahnals.
The sun had not quite set upon the exhausted squadrons of
Suffren and Hughes, anchoring after their fiercest battle off
Ceylon, when his early rays shone upon the opening strife
between Rodney and De Grasse.^ The latter was at the timd
the greatest naval battle in its results that had been fought in
a century ; its influence on the course of events was very great,
tliougli far from as decisive as it might have been ; it was
attended with circumstances of unusual though somewhat
factitious brilliancy, and particularly was marked by a ma*
noeuvre that was then looked upon as exceptionally daring and
decisive, — breaking the line." It must be added that it had
given rise to a storm of controversy ; and the mass of details,
as given by witnesses who should be reliable, are so confused
and contradictory, owing mainly to the uncertainties of the
wind, that it is impossible now to do more than attempt to
reconcile them in a full account. Nevertheless, the leading
features can be presented with sufficient accuracy, and this
will first be done briefly and barely ; the outline thus pre^
sented can afterward be clothed with the details which give
color, life, and interest to the great scene.
At daylight' (about half-past five) the English fleet, which
had gone about at two A. M., was standing on the starboard
1 Th0 difference of time from Trincomalee to the Saints is nine hoon and
a half.
s Th^ account of the transactiona from April 9 to April 19 is based mainly
npon the contemporary plates and descriptions of Lieutenant Matthews, R. N.,
and the much later "Naval Researches" of Capt. Thomas White, also of the
British Nary, who were eye-witnesses, both being checked by French and other
English narratives. Matthews and White are at variance with Rodney's offldal
report as to the tack on which the English were at daybreak ; bnt the latter is
explicitly confirmed by private letters of Sir Charles Douglas, sent immediately
after the battle to prominent persons, and is foUowed in the text
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486 THE NAVAL BATTLE OP THE SAINTS,
tacky wiih the wind at soatheaat,^ an nnusQal amount of south-
ing for that hoar (Plate XXL, A). It waa then about fifteen
miles from the Saints, which bore north-northeast, and ten from
the French fleet, which bore northeast. The latter, owing to
the events of the night, was greatly scattered, as much as eight
or ten miles separating the weather, or easternmost, ships
from the lee,^ the flagnship Y ille de Paris " being among the
latter. Anxiety for the ^< Z6\6 " kept the French admiral, with
the ships in his company, under short canvas, standing to the
southward on the port tack (A). The English on the star-
board tack, with the wind as they had it,* headed east-north-
east, and thus, as soon as there was light to see, found the
French broad on the lee bow, and one of M. de Qrasse^s
ships (the Z616 ") towed by a frigate, square under our lee
(a), with his bowsprit and foremast prostrate across his fore-
castle." ^ To draw the French farther to leeward, Rodney de-
tached four ships (b) to chase the As soon as De
Grasse saw this he signalled hia .fleet to keep away (c), as
Rodney wished, and at the same time to form the line^f-battle,
thus calling down to him the ships to windward. The English
line was also formed rapidly, and the chasing ships recalled
at seven a. m. De Orasse, seeing that if he stood on he would
lose the weather-gage altogether, hauled up again on the port
tack (c^) ; and the breeze changing to east-southeast and east
in his favor and knocking the English off, the race of the two
fleets on opposite tacks, for the advantage of the wind, be-
came nearly equal. The French, however, won, thanks to a
superiority in sailing which had enabled them to draw so far
to windward of the English on the previous days, and, but for
the awkwardness of the Z6l6j* might, have cleared them
altogether (Plate XXI., B). Their leading ships first reached
and passed the point where the rapidly converging tracks
intersected, while the English leader, the Marlborough,*'
1 Letter of Sir Charles Douglas, Bodney's chief-of -staff : "United Service
Journal," 1833, Part L p. 515.
* De Grasse calls this distance three leagues, while some of his csptains esti'
mated it to be as great as fire.
* The French, in nud-channel, had the ipind more to the eastward.
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APRIL 12, irsi.
487
struck the French line between the sixth and tenth ship6
(variouslj stated). The battle, of coarse, had by this time
begun, the ninth ship in the French line, the ^ Brave,'' open*
ing fire at twenty minutes before eight A. M. upon the Marl-
borough." As there was no previous intention of breaking
the line, the English leader kept away, in obedience to a sig-
nal from Bodney, and ran close along under the enemy's lee,
followed in succession by all the ships as they reached her
wake. The battle thus assumed the common and indecisive
phase of two fleets passing on opposite tacks, the wind very
light, however, and so allowing a more heavy engagement
than common under these circumstances, the ships sliding
by" at the rate of three to four knots. Since the hostile
lines diverged again south of their point of meeting, De
Orasse mdde signal to keep away four points to south-south-
west, thus bringing his van (B, a) to action with the Eng-
lish rear, and not piBrmitting the latter to reach his rear
unscathed. Tiiere were, however, two dangers threatening
the French if they continued their course. Its direction,
south or south-southwest, carried them into the calms that
hung round the north end of Dominica ; and the uncertainty
of the wind made it possible that by its hauling to the south-
ward the enemy could pass through their line and gain the
wind, and with it the possibility of forcing the decisive battle
which the French policy had shunned ; and this was in fact
what happened. De Orasse therefore made signal at half-
past eight to wear together and take the same tack as the Eug-
lish. This, however, was impossible ; the two fleets were too
close together to admit the evolution. He then signalled to
haul close to the wind and wear in eueeeetion^ which also failed
to be done, and at five minutes past nine the dreaded contin-
gency arose ; the wind hauled to the southward, knocking off
all the French ships that had not yet kept away ; that is, all
who had English ships close under their lee (Plate XXL 0).
Rodney, in the Formidable," was at this time just drawing
up with the fourth ship astern of De Qrasse's flag. Lufiing to
the new wind, he passed through the French line, followed bj^
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488 THE NAVAL BATTLE OF THE SAINTS.
the fiye ships next astern of him (0^ a), while nearly at the
same moment, and from the same causes, his sixth astern
(0, b) led through the interval abreast him, followed by the
whole English rear. The French line-of-battle was thus broken
in two places by columns of enemies' ships in such close order
as to force its vessels aside, even if the wind had not conspired
to embarrass their action. Every principle upon which a line-
of-battle was constituted, for mutual support and for the clear
field of fire of each ship, was thus overUirown for the French,
and preserved for the Ihiglisb divisions which filed through ;
and the French were forced off to leeward by the interposition
of the enemy's columns, besides being broken up. Compelled
thus to forsake tlie line upon which they had been ranged, it
was necessary to re-form upon another, and unite- the three
groups into which they were divided, — a difiicult piece of
tactics under any circumstances, but doubly so under the
moral impression of disaster, and in presence of a superior
enemy, who, though himself disordered, was in better shape,
and already felt the glow of victory.
It does not appear that any substantial attempt to re-form
was made by the French. To reunite, yes; but only as a
flying, disordered mass. The various shifts of wind and move-
ments of the divisions left their fleet, at midday (Plate XXI.
D), with the centre (c) two miles nortliwest of and to leeward
of the van (v), the rear (r) yet farther from the centre and to
leeward of it. Calms and short puffs of wind prevailed now
through both fleets. At half-past one P. M. a light breeze from
the east sprang up, and De Grasse made signal to form the line
again on the port tack ; between three and four, not having suc-
ceeded in this, he made signal to form on the starboard tack.
The two signals and the general tenor of the accounts show
that at no time were the French re-formed after their line was
broken ; and all the manoeuvres tended toward, even if they
did not necessitate, taking the whole fleet as far down as the
most leewardly of its parts (D). In such a movement, it
followed of course that the most crippled ships were left be-
hind, and these were picked up, one by one, by the English,
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DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OP APRIL 1$. 489
who puraaed withoat any regular order, for which there waft
no need) as mutaal support was assured without it. Shortly
after six p. m. De Grasse's flag-ship, the ^'Yille de Paris/'
struck her colors to the ^ Barfleur/' oarlying the flag of Sir
Samuel Hood. The French accounts state that nine of the
enemy's ships then surrotinded her, and there is no doubt
that she had been fought to the bitter end. Her name,
commemorating the great city whose gift she had been to
the king, her unusual size, and the fact that no French naval
commander-in-chief had before been taken prisoner in bat-
tle, conspired to bestow a peculiar brilliancy upon Rod-
ney's yictory. Four other ships-of-the-line were taken,^ and,
singularly enough, upon these particular ships was found
the whole train of artillery intended for the reduction of
Jamaica.
Such were the leading features of the Battle of the Saints,
or, as it is sometimes styled, of the 12th of April, known to
the French as the Battle of Dominica. Certain points which
have so far been omitted for the sake of clearness, but which
affect the issue, must now be given. When the day opened,
the French fleet was greatly scattered and without order.'
De Orasse, under the influence of his fears for the Zdl£," so
precipitated his movements that his line was not properly
formed at the moment of engaging. The van ships had not
yet come into position (B, a), and the remainder were so far
from having reached their places that De Yaudreuil, com-
manding the rear division and last engaged, states that the
line was formed under the fire of musketry. The English, on
the contrary, were in good order, the only change made being
to shorten the interval between ships from two to one cable's
length (seven hundred feet). The celebrated stroke of break-
ing through the French line was due, not to previous intention,
but to a shift of wind throwing their ships out of order and so
^ The poiitloDfl of the French shipt captured we ahown hj A cron in each of
the three sncceasiTe stages of the hattle, B, C, D.
* The distance of the weathermoet French ships from the "TiUe de Paris,''
when the signal to form line^f-battle was made, is rarions^ stated at from sis
to nine mUes.
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BREAKING THE LINE,
increasing the Bpaces between them ; while the gap through
which Bodney*8 group penetrated was widened by the Dia^
ddme on its north side being taken aback and paying round
on the other tack (0, c.) Sir Charles Douglas says the imme-
diate e£Fect, where the flag-ship broke through, was ^ the bring-
ing together, almost if not quite in contact with each other,
the four ships of the enemy which were nearest," on the north,
to the point alluded to (c), and coming up in succession.
This unfortunate group, composing now only one large single
object at which to fire, was attacked by the * Duke,' < Namur,'
and ^Formidable' (ninety-gun ships) all at once, receiving
seyeral broadsides from each, not a single shot missing; and
great must have been the slaughter." The Duke " (0, d),
being next ahead of the flag-ship, had followed her leader
under the French lee ; but as soon as her captain saw that
the Formidable " had traversed the enemy's order, he did
the same, passing north of this confused group and so bring-
ing it under a fire from both sides. The log of the *^ Magna-
nime," one of the group, mentions passing under the fire of two
three-deckers, one on either side.
As soon as the order was thus broken, Rodney hauled down
the signal for the line, keeping flying that for close action,
and at the same time ordered his van, which had now passed
beyond and north of the enemy's rear, to go about and rejoin
the English centre. This was greatly delayed through the in-
juries to spars and sails received in passing under the ene-
my's fire. His own flag-ship and the ships with her went
about The rear, under Hood, instead of keeping north again
to join the centre, stood to windward for a time, and were
then becalmed at a considerable distance from the rest of the
fleet.
Much discussion took place at a later day as to the wisdom
of Rodney's action in breaking through his enemy's order,
and to whom the credit, if any, should be ascribed. The lat-
ter point is of little concern ; but it may be said that the son
of Sir Oharles Douglas, Rodney's chief-of-staff, brought for«
ward an amount of positive evidence, the only kind that could
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EFFECTS OF RODNETS MANtBUVRE. 491
be accepted to diminish the credit of the person wholly re-
sponsible for the resultS) which proves that the suggestion
came from Dooglas, and Rodney's consent was with difficulty
obtained. The value of the mancBuvre itself is of more conse-
quence than any question of personal reputation. It has been
argued by some that, so far from being a meritorious act, it was
unfortunate, and for Rodney's credit should rather be attrib-
uted to the force of circumstances than to choice. It had
been better, these say, to have continued along under the lee
of the French rear, thus inflicting upon it tlie fire of the
whole English line, and that the latter should have tacked
and doubled on the French rear. This argument convene
iently forgets that tacking, or turning round in any way,
after a brush of this kind, was possible to only a part of the
ships engaged; and that these would have much difficulty
in overtaking the enemies who had passed on, unless the
latter were very seriously crippled. Therefore this suggested
attack, the precise reproduction of the battle of Ushant, really
reduces itself to the fleets passing on opposite tacks, each dis-
tributing its fire over the whole of the enemy's line without
attempting any concentration on a part of it. It may, and
must, be conceded at once, that Rodney's change of course
permitted the eleven rear ships of the French (0, r) to run.
off to leeward, having received the fire of only part of their
enemy, while the English van had undergone that of nearly
the whole French fleet. These ships, however, were thus
thrown entirely out of action for a measurable and impor*
tant time by being driven to leeward, and would have been
still more out of position to help any of their fleet, had not
De Orasse himself been sent to leeward by Hood's divi-
sion cutting the line three ships ahead of him. The thirteen
leading French ships, obeying the last signal they had seen,
were hugging the wind ; the group of six with De Grasse
(0, e) would have done the same had they not been headed
off by Hood's division. The result of Rodney's own action
alone, therefore, would have been to divide the French fleet into
two parts, separated by a space of six miles, and one of them
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492 EFFECTS OF RODNETS MAN(EOVRB.
hopelessly to leeward. The English, haymg gained the windi
would have been in position easily to contain " the eleven
lee ships, and to surround the nineteen weather ones in over-
whelming force. The actual condition, owing to the two
breaches in the line, was slightly different; the group of six
with De Orasse being placed between his weather and lee di-
visions, two miles from the former, four from the latter (D)*
It seems scarcely necessary to insist upon the tactical advan-
tages of such a situation for the English, even disregarding
the moral effect of the confusion through which the French
had passed. In addition to this, a very striking lesson is de-
ducible from the immediate effects of the English guns in
passing through. Of the five ships taken, three were those
under whose stems the BSnglish divisions pierced.^ Instead '
of giving and taking, as the parallel lines ran by, on equal
terms, each ship having the support of those ahead and
astern, the French ships near which the penetrating columns
passed received each the successive fire of all the enemy's
division. Thus Hood's thirteen ships filed by the two rear
ones of the French van, the C^sar " and Hector,'' fairly
crushing them under this concentration of fire ; while in likQ
manner, and with .like results, Rodney's six passed by the
<^ Glorieux." This concentration by defiling " past the ex-
tremity of a column corresponds quite accurately to the con-
centration upon the flank of a line, and has a special interest,
because if successfully carried out it would be as powerful an
attack now as it ever has been. If quick to seize their ad-
vantage, the English might have fired upon the ships on both
sides of the gaps through which they passed, as the For-
midable" actually did; but they were using the starboard
broadsides, and many doubtless did not realize their oppor-
1 The other two French ahipe taken were the ViUe de raris," which, in her .
leolated condition, and bearing the flag of the commander-in-chief, became the
duarry around which the enemy's ehipe natoraUy gathered, and the " Ardent," of
fizty-fonr guns, which appears to have been intercepted in a gallant attempt to
pass from the van to the aide of her admiral in hia extremity. The latter was
the solitary prize taken by the allied Great Armada in the English Channel^
In 1779.
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ARMAMENTS OF THE TWO FLEETS.
tunity until too late. The natural results of Rodney's act,
therefore, were: (1) The gain of the wind, with the power
of offensive action ; (2) Ooncentration of fire upon a part of
the enemy's order ; and (8) The introduction into the latter
of confusion and diyisiouy which might, and did, become very
great, offering the opportunity of further tactical advantage!
It is not a valid reply to say that, had the French been more
apt, they could have united sooner. A manoeuvre that pre>
sents a good chance of advantage does not lose its merit be-
cause it can be met by a prompt movement of the enemy, any
more than a particular lunge of the sword becomes worthless
because it has its appropriate parry. The chances were that
by heading off the rear ships, while the van stood on, the
French fleet would be badly divided ; and the move was none
the less sagacious because the two fragments could have
tmited sooner than they did, had they been well handled.
With the alternative action suggested, of tacking after pass-
ing the enemy's rear, the pursuit became a stem chase, in
which both parties having been equally engaged would pre^
sumably be equally crippled. Signals of disability, in fact,
were numerous in both fleets.
Independently of the tactical handling of the two fleets,
there were certain differences of equipment which conferred
tactical advantage, and are therefore worth noting. The
French appear to have had finer ships, and, class for class,
heavier armaments. Sir Charles Douglas, an eminent offi-
cer of active and ingenious turn of mind, who paid particular
attention to gunnery details, estimated that in weight of bat-
tery the thirty-three French were superior to the thirty-six
English by the force of four 84-gun ships ; and that after
the loss of the '<Z«1^," Jason," and <'Oaton" there still
remained an advantage equal to two seventy-fours. The
French admiral La Oravidre admits 'the generally heavier
calibre of French cannon at this era. The better construc-
tion of the French ships and their greater draught caused
them to sail and beat better, and accounts in part for the
success of De Grasse in gaining to windward ; for in the after-
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494 ARMAMENTS OF THE TWO FLEETS.
noon of the 11th only three or four of the body of his fleet
were visible /rm the nuutJiead of the English flag-ship, which
had been within gunshot of them on the 9th. It was the
awkwardness of the unlucky ^< Z6\6 and of the Magnanime/*
which drew down De Grasse from his position of vantage, and
justified Rodney's perseverance in relying upon the chapter
of accidents to effect his purpose. The greater speed of the
French as a body is somewhat hard to account for, because,
though undoubtedly with far better lines, the practice of cop>
pering the bottom had not become so general in France ai9
in England, and among the French there were several un-
coppered and worm-^aten ships.' The better sailing of the
French was, however, remarked by the English officers, though
the great gain mentioned must have been in part owing to
Rodney's lying-by, after the action of the 9th, to refit, due
probably to the greater injury received by the small body of
his vessels, which had been warmly engaged, with greatly su-
perior numbers. It was stated, in narrating that action, that
the French kept at half cannon-range ; this was to neutralize
a tactical advantage the English had in the large number of
parronades and other guns of light weight but large calibre,
which in close action told heavily, but were useless at greater
distances. The second in command, De Yaudreuil, to whom
was intrusted the conduct of that attack, expressly states
that if he had come within reach of the carronades his
ships would have been quickly unrigged. Whatever judg-
ment is passed upon the military policy of refusing to crush
an enemy situated as the English division was, there can be
no question that, if the object was to prevent pursuit, the
tactics of De Yaudreuil on tiie 9th was in all respects excel-
lent. He inflicted the utmost injury with the least exposure
of his own force. On the 12th, De Orasse, by allowing him-
self to be lured within reach of carronades, yielded this ad-
vantage, besides sacrificing to an impulse his whole previous
strategic policy. Rapidly handled from their lightness, firing
1 OiBcUa letter of the Bfarqaif da Yaadrenil. Ga^ : Hiftoire de la MariM
Fnwfaiae, toL t. p. 518.
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LESSONS DEDUCED FROM THE BATTLE. 495
grape and shot of large diameter^ these guns were peculiarly
harmful in close action and useless at long range. In a later
despatch De Yaudreuil says : *^ The effect of these new arms
is most deadly within musket range ; it is they which so badly
crippled us on the 12th of ApriL'' There were other gunnery
innovations) in some at least of the English ships, which by
increasing the accuracy, the rapidity, and the field of fire,
greatly augmented the power of their batteries. These were
the introduction of locks, by which the man who aimed also
fired; and the fitting to the gun-carriages of breast-pieces
and sweeps, so that the guns could be pointed farther ahead
or astern, — that is, over a larger field than had been usual.
In fights between single ships, not controlled in their move-
ments by their relations to a fleet, this improvement would at
times allow the possessor to take a position whence he could
train upon his eneiny without the latter being able to reply,
and some striking instances of such tactical advantage are
given. In a fleet fight, such as is now being considered, the
gain was that the guns could be brought to bear farther for-
ward, and could follow the opponent longer as he passed
astern, thus doubling, or more, the number of shots he might
receive, and lessening for him the interval of immunity en«
joyed between two successive antagonists.^ These matters of
antiquated and now obsolete detail carry with them lessons
that are never obsolete ; they differ in no respect from the
more modern experiences with the needle-gun and the torpedo.
And indeed this whole action of April 12, 1782, is fraught
with sound military teaching. Perseverance in pursuit, gain-
ing advantage of position, concentration of one's own effort,
dispersal of the enemy's force, the efficient tactical bearing of
small but important improvements in the material of war,
have been dwelt on. To insist further upon the necessity of
not letting slip a chance to beat the enemy in detail, would
be thrown away on any one not already convinced by the
bearing of April 9 on April 12. The abandonment of the
attack upon Jamaica, after the defeat of the French fleet,
1 See United Berriee Joomal, 1884, Fart II. pp. 109 and foUowing.
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496 EODNSrS FAILURE TO PURSUE THE ENEMY,
8bowB concluBively that the true way to secure ulterior ob*
jects is to defeat the force which threatens them. There
remains at least one criticism, delicate in its character, but
essential to draw out the full teachings of these events; that
i«, upon the manner in which the victory was followed up, and
the consequent effects upon the war in general.
The liability of sailing-ships to injury in spars and sails,
in other words, in that mobility which is the prime charac-
teristic of naval strength, makes it difficult to say, after a
lapse of time, what might or might not have been done* It
is not only a question of actual damage received, which log-
books may record, but also of the means for repair, the
energy and aptitude of the officers and seamen, which differ
from ship to ship. As to the ability of the English fleet,
however, to follow up its advantages by a more vigorous pur*
suit on the 12th of April, we have the authority of two most
distinguished officers, — Sir Samuel Hood, the second in com-
mand, and Sir Charles Douglas, the captain of the fleet, or chief-
of-staff to the admiral. The former expressed the opinion that
twienty ships might have been taken, and said so to Rodney
the next day ; while the chief-of-staff was so much mortified
by the failure, and by the manner in which the admiral re-
ceived his suggestions, as seriously to contemplate resigning
his position.^
Advice and criticism are easy, nor can the full weight of
a responsibility be felt, except by the man on whom it is laid ;
but great results cannot often be reached in war without risk
and effort. The accuracy of the judgment of these two offi-
cers, however, is confirmed by inference from the French
reports. Rodney justifies his failure to pursue by alleging
the crippled condition of many ships, and other matters in^p
cident to the conclusion of a hard-fought battle, and then
goes on to suggest what might have been done that night,
had he pursued, by the French fleet, which *^ went off in a
1 8m letter of Sir Howard Dooglaa in United Senrioe Jonnud, 1884, Part II.
p. 97 ; alio "Naral ETolntiona/' by same author. The letters of 8ir Samuel
Hood have not come under the author's eye.
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RODNSrS FAILURE TO PURSUE THE ENEMY. 497
body of twenty-six BhipB-of-the-line.*' ^ These potoibilities are
rather creditable to his imaginatioiiy considering what the
French fleet had done by day ; but as regards the body of
twenty-six ' ships, De Yaudreuil, who^ after De Orasse's sur-
render, made the signal for the ships to rally round his flag^
found only ten with him next morning, and was not joined
by any more before the 14th. During the following days five
more joined him at intervals.* With these he went to the
rendezvous at Cap Frangais, where he found others, bringing
the whole number who repaired thither to twenty. The five
remaining, of those that had been in the action, fled to Ourar
foa, six hundred miles distant, and did not rejoin until May.
The body of twenty-six ships,'* therefore, had no existence
in fact ; on the contrary, the French fleet was very badly
broken up, and several of its ships isolated. As regards the
crippled condition, there seems no reason to think the English
had suffered more, but rather less, than their enemy ; and a
curious statement, bearing upon this, appears in a letter from
Sir Gilbert Blane : —
It was with difficnlty we could make the French officers believe
that the retarns of killed and wounded, made by our ships to the ad-
miral, were true ; and one of them flatly contradicted me, saying we
always gave the world a false account of our loss. I then walked
with him over the decks of the 'Formidable/ and bid him remark
what number of shotpholes there were, and aho how UUU her rigging
had iufered, and asked if that d^^ree of damage was likely to be
connected with the loss of more than fourteen men, which was our
number kUled, and the greateei qf ang in the fleets except the * Royal
Oak' and 'Monarch.' He • • • owned our fire must have been
much better kept up and directed than theirs." '
There can remain little doubt, therefore, that the advan-
tage was not followed up with all possible vigor. Not till five
days after the battle was Hood's division sent toward San
1 Rodnsjr's Lifs, toI. li. p. S48.
' There were 011I7 twen^-fife hi all.
• GatfriB,Tol.T. p.6U.
« Rodnqr'e LUe, toL IL p. 146.
89
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498 EFFECT OF THE VICTORY ON THE PEACE.
Domingo, where they picked up in the Mona Passage the
"Jason'' and the "Caton/' which had separated before the
battle and were on their way to Gap Franfais. These, and two
small vessels with them, were the sole after-f iniits of the vic-
tory, Under the conditions of England's war this cautious
failure is a serious blot on Rodney's military reputation, and
goes far to fix his place among successful admirals. He had
saved Jamaica for the time ; but he had not, having the oppor-
tunity, crushed the French fleet He too, like De Grasse, had
allowed the immediate objective to blind him to the general
military situation, and to the factor which controlled it
To appreciate the consequences o{ this neglect, and the
real ind^cisiveness of this celebrated battle, we must go for-
ward a year and listen to the debates in Parliament on the
conditions of peace, in February, 1788. The approval or
censure of the terms negotiated by the existing ministry in-
volved the discussion of many considerations ; but the gist
of the dispute was, whether the conditions were such as the
comparative financial and military situations of the belligerr
ents justified, or whether it would have been better for Eng-
land to continue the war rather than submit to the sacrifices
she had made. As regards the financial condition, despite
the gloomy picture drawn by the advocates of the peace, tliere
was probably no piore doubt then than there is now about
the comparative resources of the different countries. The
question of military strength was really that of naval power.
The ministry argued that the whole British force hardly
numbered one hundred sail-of-the-line, while the navies of
France and Spain amounted to one hundred and forty, not
to speak of that of Holland.
<^ With 80 glaring an inferiority, what hopes of succeBS could we
derive, either from the experience of the last campaign, or from any
new distribution of our force in that which would have followed ? In
the West Indies we could not have had more than forty-six sail to
oppose to forty, which on the day that peace was signed lay in Cadiz
Bay, wiih sixteen thousand troops on board, ready to sail for that
quarter of the world, where they would have been joined by twelve
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RODNSrS MERITS AS AN ADMIRAL.
499
of the line from Havana and ten from San Domingo. . • . Might we
not too reasonably apprehend that the campaign in the West Indies
would hare closed with the loss of Jamaica itself, the avowed object
of this immense armament ? " ^
These are certainly the reasonings of an avowed partisan,
for which large allowances must be made. The accuracy of
the statement of comparative numbers was denied by Lord
Eeppel, a member of the same party, and but lately at the
head of the admiralty, a post which he had resigned because
he disapproved the treaty.' English statesmen, too, as well
as English seamen, must by this time have learned to dis-
count largely the apparent, when estimating the real, power
of the other navies. Nevertheless, how different would have
been the appreciation of the situation, both moral and ma-
terial, had Rodney reaped the full fruits of the victory which
he owed rather to chance than to his own merit| great as that
undeniably was.
A letter published in 1809, anonjrmous, but bearing strong
internal evidence of being written by Sir Oilbert Blane, the
physician of the fleet and long on intimate terms with Rod-
ney, who was a constant sufferer during his last cruise, states
that the admiral thought little of his victory on the 12th of
April, 1782.*' He would have preferred to rest his reputation
upon his combinations against De Ouichen, April 17, 1780,
and looked upon that opportunity of beating, with an infe-
rior fleet, such an officer, whom he considered the best in the
French service, as one by which, but for the disobedience of
his captains, he might have gained immortal renown." ' Few
students will be inclined to question this estimate of Rodney's
merit on the two occasions. Fortune, however, decreed that
his glory should depend upon a battle, brilliant in itself,
to which his own qualities least contributed, and denied him
success when he most deserved it. The chief action of his
life in which merit and success met, the destruction of Lan-
1 Anniua Register, 1788, p. 151.
* Annual Register, 1783, p. 157 ; Life of Admiral Keppel, YoL iL p. 408.
* Kayal Clironide, vol. xxt. p. 404.
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600 RODNEY RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND.
gara's fleet off Oape St. Yinoent, has almost passed into
oblivion ; yet it called for the highest qualities of a seaman,
and is not unworthy of comparison with Hawke's pursuit
of Oonflans.^
Within the two years and a half which had elapsed since
Rodney was appointed to his command he had gained sev-
eral important successes, and, as was remarked, had taken
a French, a Spanish, and a Dutch admiral. In that time
he had added twelve line-of-battle ships, all taken from the
enemy, to the British navy, and destroyed five more; and
to render the whole still more singularly remarkable, the
< Yille de Paris ' was said to be the only first-rate man-of-
war that ever was taken and carried into port by any com-
mander of any nation." Notwithstanding his services, the
party spirit that was then so strong in England, penetrating
even the army and navy, obtained his recall ' upon the fall of
Lord North's ministry, and his successor, a man unknown to
fame, had already sailed when news arrived of the victory.
In the fallen and discouraging state of English affairs at the
time, it excited the utmost exultation, and silenced the
strictures which certain parts of the admiral's previous con-
duct had drawn forth. The people were not in a humor to
be critical, and amid the exaggerated notions that prevailed
of the results achieved, no one thought of the failure to obtain
greater. This impression long prevailed. As late as 1880,
when Rodney's Life was first published, it was asserted that
the French navy had been so effectually crippled and re-
duced by the decisive victory of the 12th of April, as to be
1 Page 404. Tet here alio the gossip of the daj, as reflected in the Naral
Atalantis, impnted the chief credit to Toong, the captain of the flag-ship. Sir
GUbert Blane stated, man/ years Liter, ** When it was close upon sunset, it
became a question whether the chase should be continued. After some dis-
cussion between the admiral and captain, at which I was present, the admiral
being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same course with
the signal to engage to leeward." (United Service Journal, 1830, Part II.
p. 479.)
* Bodnej was a strong T017. Almost aU the other distinguished admirals of
the daj, notably Eeppel, Howe, and Barrington, were Whigs, —a fact unfortunate
for the naral power of England.
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SUBSEQUENT CAREER OF DB GRASSE. 601 '
no longer in a condition to contest with Great Britain the
empire of the seaa/' This is nonsense^ excusable in 1782,
but not to the calm thought of after days. The favorable
terms obtained were due to the financial embarrassment of
France, not to her naval humiliation ; and if there was
exaggeration in the contention of the advocates of peace
that England could not save Jamaica, it is probable that
she could not have recovered by arms the other islands
restored to her by the treaty.
Tlie memory of De Orasse will always be associated with
great services done to America. His name, rather than
that of Rochambeau, represents tlie material succor which
France gave to the struggling life of the young Republic^
as Lafayette's recalls the moral sympathy so opportunely
extended. The incidents of his life, subsequent to the great
disaster which closed his active career, cannot be without
interest to American readers.
After the surrender of the Yille de Paris," De Grasse
accompanied the English fleet and its prizes to Jamaica,
whither Rodney repaired to refit his ships, thus appear-
ing as a captive upon the scene of his intended conquest.
On the 19th of May he left the island, still a prisoner,
for England. Both by naval officers and by the English
people he was treated with Uiat flattering and benevolent
attention which comes easily from the victor to the van-
quished, and of which his peraonal valor at least was not
unworthy. It is said that he did not refuse to show himself
on several occasions upon the balcony of his rooms in Lon-
don, to the populace shouting for the valiant Frenchman.
This undignified failure to appreciate his true position
naturally excited the indignation of his countrymen; the
more so as he had been unsparing and excessive in de-
nouncing the conduct of his subordinates on the unlucky
12th of April.
He bears hia miBfortune,** wrote Sir GUbert Blane, *^ with erjua-
nimity ; coosdoas, as he says, that he has done his doty. ... He
attributes his misfortane, not to the inferiority of bis force, bat to the
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602
FINDINGS OF THE COURT-MARTIAL
base deseriion of his officers in the other ships, to whom he made
the signal to rally, and eyen hailed them to abide bj him, bat was
abandoned" ^
This was the key-note to all his utterances. Writing from
the English flag-ship, the day after the battle, he threw
upon the greater part of his captains the misfortunes of the
day. Some had disobeyed his signals; others, and notably
the captains of the * Languedoo ' and < Oouronne/ that is to
say his next ahead and astern, had abandoned him." * He
did not, however, confine himself to official reports, but
while a prisoner in Loudon published several pamphlets
to the same efifect, which he sent broadcast over Europe.
The government, naturally thinking that an officer could
not thus sully the honor of his corps without good reason,
resolved to search out and relentlessly punish all the guilty.
The captains of the Languedoc and *^ Couronne " were
imprisoned as soon as they reached France, and all papers,
logs, etc., bearing upon the case were gathered together.
Under all the circumstances it is not to be wondered at
that on his return to France, De Orasse, to use his own
words, found no one to hold out a hand to him." ' It
was not till the beginning of 1784 that all the accused and
witnesses were ready to appear before the court-martial ; but
the result of the trial was to clear entirely and in the most
ample manner almost every one whom be had attacked,
while the faults found were considered of a character entitled
to indulgence, and were awarded but slight punishment.
"Nevertheless," cautiously observes a French writer, "one
cannot but say, with the Court, that the capture of an ad-
miral commanding thirty ships-of-the-line is an historical
incident which causes the regret of the whole nation." ^ As
1 Rodney's Life, toI. ii. p. S42. • Chevalier, p. 31 1.
* Kergnelen : GuersB Blaritime de 1778. Letter of De Qraaae to Kergnelen,
p. 263.
* lYoade : BataUles Narales. It is interesting to note in this connection that
one of the ships near the French admiral, when he surrendered, was the *' Pluton/'
which, though the extreme rear ship, had nevertheless thus reached a position
worthj of the high repntation of her captain, IVAlbert de Bions.
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UPON DB GRASSB AND SIS OFFICERS. 603
to the conduct of the battle by the admiral, the Court foulid
that the danger of the *^ Z616 *^ on the morning of the 12th
was not such as to justify bearing down for so long a tim^
as was done; that the crippled ship had A breeze which
was not then shared by ttie English, five miles away t6
the southward, and which carried her into Basse Terre at
ten A. H. ; that the engagement should not have been' begun
before all the ships had come into line ; and finally, that the
fleet should have been formed on the same tack as the
English, because, by continuing to stand south, it entered
the zone of calms and light airs at the north end of
Dominica.^
De Grasse was much dissatisfied with the finding of the
Court, and was indiscreet enough to write to the minister
of marine, protesting against it and demanding a new trial.
The minister, acknowledging his protest, replied in the name
of the king. After commenting upon the pamphlets that had
been so widely issued, and the entire contradiction of their
statements by the testimony before the Court, he concluded
with these weighty words : —
The loss of the battle cannot be attributed to the fault of private
officers.' It results, from the findings, that you have allowed yourself
to injure, by ill-founded accusations, the reputation of several officers,
in order to clear yourself in public opinion of an unhappy result, the
excuse for which you might perhaps have found in the inferiority of
your force, in the uncertain fortune of war, and in drcumstanoes over
which you had no control. His Majesty is wUling to believe that
you did what you could to prevent the misfortunes of the day ; but
he cannot be equally indulgent to your unjust imputations upon those
officers of his navy who have been cleared of the charges against them.
His Majesty, dissatisfied with your conduct in this respect, forbids
you to present yourself before him. I transmit his orders with re-
gret, and add my own advice to retire, under the circumstances, to
your province."
De Grasse died in January, 1788. His fortunate opponent,
rewarded with peerage and pension, lived until 1792. Hood
1 Tronde, toL ii. p. 147. * That is, commanden of single ships.
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604 HOOL^S SUBSEQUENT CAREER.
was also created a peer, and commanded with distinction
in the early part of the wars of the French Bevolution,
winning the enthusiastic admiration of Nelson, who served
under him ; but a sharp difference with the admiralty caused
him to be retired before achieying any brilliant addition
to his reputation* He died in 1816, at the great age of
ninety-two.
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CHAPTER XIV.
CRitioAL Discussion or ths Maritims Wab of 1778.
npHE war of 1778, between Great Britain and the Hoase of
Bourbon, which is so inextricably aasociated with the
American Revolution, stands by itself in one respect. It was
purely a maritime war. Not only did the allied kingdomisi
carefully refrain from continental entanglements, which Eng-
land in accordance with her former policy strove to excite,
but there was between the two contestants an approach to
equality on the sea which had not been realized since the days
of Tourville. The points in dispute, the objects for which the
war was undertaken or at which it aimed, were for the most
part remote from Europe ; and none of them was on the con-
tinent with the single exception of Gibraltar, the strife over
which, being at the extreme point of a rugged and diiBcult
salient, and separated from neutral nations by the whole of
France and Spain, never threatened to drag in other parties
than those immediately interested.
No such conditions existed in any war between the acces- *
sion of Louis XIY. and the downfall of Napoleon. There
was a period during the reign of the former in which the
Fi*ench navy was superior in number and equipment to the
English and Dutch ; but the policy and ambition of the sover-
eign was always directed to continental extension, and his
naval power, resting on inadequate foundations, was epheme-
ral. During the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century
there was practically no check to the sea power of England ;
great as were its effects upon the issues of the day, the ab-
sence of a capable rival made its operations barren of military
lessons. In the later wars of the French Republic and Emf
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606 SPECIAL INTEREST OF THE WAR OP 1778.
piroi the apparent equality in numbers of ships and weight of
batteries was illusiTe, owing to the demoralization of the
French officers and seamen by causes upon which it is not
necessary here to enlarge. After some years of courageous
but impotent effort, the tremendous disaster of Trafalgar
proclaimed to the world the professional inefficiency of the
French and Spanish nayieSi already detected by the keen eyes
of Nelson and his brother officers, and upon which rested the
contemptuous confidence that characterized his attitude, and
to some extent his tactiqs, toward them. Thenceforward the
emperor turned his eyes from the only field of battle where
fortune had been unfaithful to him, and deciding to pursue
England elsewhere than upon the seas, undertook to restore his
navy, but without reserving to it any share in a strife become
more than ever furious. ... Up to the last day of the Empire
he refused to offer to this restored navy, full of ardor and
confidence, the opportunity to measure itself with the enemy.'' ^
Oreat Britain resumed her old position as unquestioned mis-
tress of the seas.
The student of naval war will therefore expect to find a
particular interest in the plans and methods of the parties to
this great contest, and especially where they concern the gen-
eral conduct of the whole war, or of certain large and clearly
defined portions of it; in the strategic purpose which gave,
or should have given, continuity to their actions from first to
' last, and in the strategic movements which affected for good
or ill the fortunes of tl^e more limited periods, Which may be
called naval campaigns. For while it cannot be conceded that
the particular battles are, even at this day, wholly devoid of
tactical instruction, which it has been one of the aims of the
preceding pages to elicit, it is undoubtedly true that, like all
y the tactical systems of history, they have had their day, and
their present usefulness to the student is rather in the mental
training, in the forming of correct tactical habits of thought,
than in supplying models for close imitation. On the other
hand, the movements which precede and prepare for great
i Jnxien de k Qrari^re ; Qaeira MaritimM, voL iL p. 255.
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OBJECT AND OBJECTIVE, 507
battles, or which, by their skilful and energetio combinations,
attain great ends without the actual contact of arms,, depend
upon factors more permanent than the weapons of the age,
and therefore furnish principles of more enduring value.
In a war undei*taken for any object, even if that object be
tlie possession of a particular territory or position, an attack
directly upon the place coveted may not be, from the military
point of view, the best means of obtaining it. The end upon
which the military operations are directed may therefore be
other than the object which the belligerent government wishes
to obtain, and it has received a name of its own, — the objec-
tive. In the critical consideration of any war it is necessary,
first, to put clearly before the student's eye the objects desired
by each belligerent ; then, to consider whether (lie objective
chosen is the most likely, in case of success, to compass those
objects ; and finally, to study the merits or faults of the vari-
ous movements by which the objective is approached. The
minuteness with which such an examination is conducted will
depend upon the extent of the work which the inquirer pro^
poses to himself ; but it will generally conduce to clearness if
an outline, giving only the main features unencumbered by
detail, should precede a more exhaustive discussion. When
such principal lines are thoroughly grasped, details are easily
referred to them, and fall into place. The effort here will be
confined to presenting such an outline, as being alone fitted
to the scope of this work.
The principal parties to the War of 1778 were, on the one
hand, Great Britain; on the other, the House of Bourbon,
controlling the two great kingdoms of France and Spain.
The American colonies, being already engaged in an unequal
struggle with the mother-country, gladly welcomed an event
so important to them ; while in 1780 Holland was deliberately
forced by England into a war from which she had nothing to
gain and all to lose. The object of the Americans was per«
f ectly simple, — to rid their country out of the hands of the
English. Tlieir poverty and their lack of military sea power,
With the exception of a few cruisers that preyed upon the
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DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
enemy's commerce, necessarily confined their efforts to land
warfare, which constituted indeed a powerful diyersion in
favor of the allies and an exhausting drain upon the resources
of Oreat Britain, but which it was in the power of the latter
to stop at once by abandoning the contest Holland, on the
other hand, being safe from inyasion by land, showed little
desire for anything more than to escape with as little external
loss as possible, through the assistance of the allied navies.
The object of these two minor parties may therefore be
said to have been the cessation of the war; whereas tlie
principals hoped from its continuance certain changed con«
ditions, which constituted their objects.
With Oreat Britain also the object of the war was very
simple. Having been led into a lamentable altercation with
her most promising colonies, the quarrel had gone on step
by step till she was threatened with their loss. To main**
tain forcible control when willing adhesion had departed,
she had taken up arms against them, and her object in so
doing was to prevent a break in those foreign possessions
with which, in the eyes of that generation, her greatness
was indissolubly connected. The appearance of France and
Spain as active supporters of the colonists' cause made no
change in England^s objects, whatever change of objective her
military plans may, or should, have undergone. The danger
of losing the continental colonies was vastly increased by
these accessions to the ranks of her enemies, which brought
with them also a threat of loss, soon to be realized in part,
of other valuable foreign possessions. England, in short, as
regards the objects of tlie war, was strictly on the defensive ;
she feared losing much, and at best only hoped to keep what
she had. By forcing Holland into war, however, she obtained
a military advantage ; for, without increasing the strength of
her opponents, several important but ill-defended military and
commercial positions were thereby laid open to her arms.
The views and objects of France and Spain were more com-
plex. The moral incentives of hereditary enmity and desire
of revenge for the recent past doubtless weighed strongly, as
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in France did also the Bjmpathy of the faZofM and philosophers
with the colonists' struggle for freedom ; but powerfully as
sentimental considerations affect the action of nations, only
the tangible means by which it is expected to gratify them
admit of statement and measurement France might wish to ^
r^ain her North American possessions ; but the then living
generation of colonists had too keen personal recollection of
the old contests to acquiesce in any such wishes as to Canada.
The strong inherited distrust of the French, which charac^
terized the Americans of the revolutionary era, has been too
much overlooked in the glow of gratitude which followed the
effectual sympathy and assistance then given; but it was
understood at the time, and France felt, tliat to renew those
pretensions might promote, between people^ of the same race
only recently alienated, a reconciliation by just concessions,
which a strong and high-minded party of Englislmien had
never ceased to advocate. She therefore did not avow, per-
haps did not entertain, this object On the contrary, she
formally renounced all claim to any part of the continent
which was then, or had recently been, under the power of tlie
British crown, but stipulated for freedom of action in con-
quering and retaining any of the West India Islands, while
all the other colonies of Great Britain were, of course, open
to her attack. The principal objects at which France aimed
were therefore the English West Indies and that control of
India which had passed into English hands, and also to secure
in due time the independence of the United States, after they
had wrought a sufficient diversion in her favor. With the
policy of exclusive trade which characterized that generation,
the loss of these important possessions was expected to lessen
that commercial greatness upon which the prosperity of Eng-
land depended, — to weaken her and to strengthen France.
In fact, the strife which should be greater may be said to
have been the animating motive of France ; all objects were
Iummed up in the one supreme end to which they contrib-
ited, — maritime and political superiority over England.
Preponderance over England, in combination with France,
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DISCUSSION OP THE WAR OP 1778.
was also the aim of the equally humbled but less yigorous
kingdom of Spain ; but there was a definiteness in the injuries
Buffered and the objects specially sought by her which is less
easily found in the broader yiews of her ally. Although no
Spaniard then living could remember the Spanish flag flying
over Minorca, Gibraltar, or Jamaica, the lapse of time had
not reconciled the proud and tenacious nation to their loss ;
nor was there on the part of the Americans the same tradi-
tional objection to the renewal of Spanish soyereignty oyer the
two Bloridas that was felt with reference to Canada.
Such, then, were the objects sought by the two nations, whose
interposition changed the whole character of the American
Beyolutionary War. It is needless to say that they did not
all appear among the causes, or pretexts, avowed for engaging
in hostility ; but sagacious English opinion of the day rightly
noted, as embodying in a few words the real ground of action
of the united Bourbon Courts, the following phrase in the
French manifesto: To avenge their respective injuries, and
to put an end to thc^t tyrannical empire which England has
usurped, and claims to maintain upon the ocean." In short,
as regards the ohjeetB of the war the allies were on the offen-
sive, as England was thrown upon the defensive.
The tyrannical empire which England was thus accused,
and not unjustly, of exercising over the seas, rested upon her
great sea power, actual or latent ; upon her commerce and
armed shipping, her commercial establishments, colonies, and
naval stations in all parts of the world. Up to this time her
scattered colonies had been bound to her by ties of affectionate
sentiment, and by the still stronger motive of self-interest
through the close commercial connection with the mother-
country and the protection afforded by the constant presence
of her superior navy. Now a break was made in the girdle of
strong ports upon which her naval power was based, by the
revolt of the continental colonies ; while the numerous trade
interests between them and the West Indies » which were in*
jured by the consequent hostilities, tended to divide the sym-
pathies of the islands also. The struggle was not only for
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THE CHOICE OF OBJECTIVES.
611
political possession and commercial use* It involved a mili-
tary question of the first importance^ — whether a chain of
naval stations covering one of the shores of the Atlantic, link-
ing Canada and Halifax with the West Indies, and backed by
a thriving seafaring population, should remain in the hands
of a nation which had so far used its unprecedented sea power
with consistent, resolute aggressiveness, and with almost un-
broken success.
While Oreat Britain was thus embarrassed by the diflSiculty
of maintaining her hold upon her naval bases, which were the
defensive element of her naval strength, her offensive naval
power, her fleet, was threatened by the growth of the armed
shipping of France and Spain, which now confronted her upon
the field which she had claimed as her own, with an organized
military force of equal or superior material strength. The
moment was therefore favorable for attacking the great Power
whose wealth, reaped from the sea, had been a decisive factor
in the European wars of the past century. The next question
was tiie selection of the points of attack — of the principal o&-
jeetiveM upon which the main effort of the assailants should
be steadily directed, and of the secondary objectives by which
the defence should be distracted and its strength dissipated.
One of the wisest French statesmen of that day, Turgot, held
that it was to the interest of France that the* colonies should
not achieve their independence. If subdued by exhaustion, their
strength was lost to England ; if reduced by a military tenure
of controlling points, but not exhausted, the necessity of con-
stant repression would be a continual weakness to the mother-
country. Though this opinion did not prevail in the councils
of the French government, which wished the ultimate inde-
pendence of America, it contained elements of truth which
effectually moulded the policy of the war. If benefit to the
United States, by effecting their deliverance, were the princi-
pal object, the continent became the natural scenei and its
decisive military points the chief objectives, of operations; but
as the first object of France was not to benefit America, but
to injure England, sound military judgment dictated that the
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612 DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
continental strife, bo far from being helped to a conoluBiou,
should be kept in yigorous life. It was a diversion ready made
to the band of France and exhausting to Qreat Britain, requir-
ing only so much support as would sustain a resistance to
which (he insurgents were bound by the most desperate alter-
natives. The territory of the thirteen colonies therefore
should not be the principal objectiye of France ; much less
that of Spain.
The commercial value of the English West Indies made
them tempting objects to the French, who adapted themselves
with peculiar readiness to the social conditions of that region,
in which their colonial possessions were already extensive.
Besides the two finest of the Lesser Antilles, Ouadeloupe and
Martinique, which she still retains, France tlien held Sta.
Lucia and the western half of Hay ti. She might well hope by
successful war to add most of the English Antilles, and thus
to round off a truly imperial tropical dependency; while,
though debarred from Jamaica by the susceptibilities of Spain,
it might be possible to win back that magnificent island for
an allied and weaker nation. But however desirable as pos-
sessions, and therefore as objects, the smaller Antilles might
be, their military tenure depended too entirely upon control
of the sea for them to be in themselves proper objectives. The
French government, therefore, forbade its naval commanders
to occupy such as they might seize. They were to make the
garrisons prisoners, destroy the defences, and so retire. In
the excellent military port of Fort Royal, Martinique, in Gap
Fran9ais, and in the strong allied harbor of Havana, a fleet
of adequate size found good, secure, and well-distributed bases ;
while the early and serious loss of Sta. Lucia must be attrib-
uted to the mismanagement of the French fleet and the pro-
fessional ability of the English admiral. On shore, in the
West Indies, the rival powers therefore found themselves about
equally provided with the necessary points of support ; mere
occupation of others could not add to their military strength,
thenceforth dependent upon the numbers and quality of the
fleets. To extend occupation further with safety, the first need
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OBJECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONS. 618
was to obtain maritime supremacy^ not only locally, but over
the general field of war. Otherwise occupation was precarious,
unless enforced by a body of troops so large as to entail ex-
pense beyond the worth of the object The key of the situa-
tion in the West Indies being thus in the fleets, these became
the true objectives of the military effort ; and all the more so
because the real military usefulness of the West Indian ports
in this war was as an intermediate base, between Europe and
the American continent, to which the fleets retired when the
armies went into winter quarters. No sound strategic opera*
tion on shore was undertaken in the West Indies except the
seizure of Sta. Lucia by the English, and the abortive plan
against Jamaica in 1782 ; nor was any serious attempt against
a military port, as Barbadoes or Fort Royal, possible, until
naval preponderance was assured cither by battle or by happy
concentration of force. The key of the situation, it must be
repeated, was in the fleet.
The influence of naval power, of an armed fleet, upon the
war on the American continent has also been indicated in the
opinions of Washington and Sir Henry Clinton; while the
situation in the East Indies, regarded as a field by itself, has
been so largely discussed under the head of Suffren's cam-
paign, that it needs here only to repeat that everything there
depended upon control of the sea by a superior naval force.
The capture of Trincomalee, essential as it was to the French
squadron which had no other base, was, like that of Sta. Lucia,
a surprise, and could only have been effected by the defeat,
or, as happened, by the absence of the enemy's fleet. In North
America and India sound military policy pointed out, as the
true objective, the enemy^s fleet, upon which also depended the
communications with the mother-countries. There remains
Europe, which it is scarcely profitable to examine at length as
a separate field of action, because its relations to the universal
war are so much more important. It may simply be pointed
out that the only two points in Europe whose political trans-
fer was an object of the war were Gibraltar and Minorca ; the
former of which was throughout, by the urgency of Spain,
88
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614 DISCUSSION OP THE WAR OF 177S.
made a principal objective of the allies* The tenure of both
these depended, obyiousljr, upon control of the sea.
In a sea war, as in all others, two things ai*e from the first
y essential, — a suitable base upon the frontier, in this case the
seaboard, from which the operations start, and an organized
military force, in this case a fleet, of size and quality adequate
to the proposed operations. If the war, as in the present in-
stance, extends to distant parts of the globe, there will be
needed in each of those distant regions secure ports for the
shipping, to serre as secondary, or contingent, bases of the local
war. Between these secondary and the principal, or home,
bases there must be reasonably secure communication, which
will depend upon military control of the intervening sea.
This control must be exercised by the navy, which will enforce
it either by clearing the sea in all directions of hostile cruisers,
thus allowing the ships of its own nation to pass witli reason-
able security, or by accompanying in force (convoying) each
train of supply-ships necessary for the support of the distant
operations. The former method aims at a widely diffused effort
of the national power, the other at a concentration of it upon
that part of the sea where the convoy is at a given moment.
Whichever be adopted, the communications will doubtless be
strengthened by the military holding of good harbors, properly
spaced yet not too numerous, along the routes, — as, for in-
stance, the Cape of Oood Hope and the Mauritius. Stations of
this kind have always been necessary, but are doubly so now,
as fuel needs renewing more frequently than did the provisions
and supplies in former days. These combinations of strong
points at home and abroad, and the condition of the commu-
/ nications between them, may be called the strategic features
of the general military situation, by which, and by the rela-
tive strength of the opposing fleets, the nature of the opera-
tions must be determined. In each of the three divisions of
the field, Europe, America, and India, under which for sake of
clearness the narrative has been given, the control of the sea
has been insisted upon as the determining factor, and the
hostile fleet therefore indicated as the true objective. Let the
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THE BASES OF OPERATIONS.
foregoing considerations now be applied to the whole field of
war, and see how far the same conclusion holds good of it,
and if so, what should have been the nature of the operations
on either side.^
In Europe the home base of Great Britain was on the Eng-
lish Channel, with the two principal arsenals of Plymouth
and Portsmouth. The base of the allied powers was on the
Atlantic, the principal military ports being Brest, Ferrol, and
Cadiz. Behind these, within the Mediterranean, were the
dock-yards of Toulon and Cartagena, over against which stood
the English station Poi*t Mahon, in Minorca. The latter,
however, may be left wholly out of account, being confined to
a defensive part during the war, as the British fleet was not
able to spare any squadron to the Mediterranean. Gibraltar,
on the contrary, by its position, effectually watched over de-
tachments or reinforcements from within the Straits, provided
it were utilized as, the station of a body of ships adequate to
the duty. This was not done; the British European fleet
being kept tied to the Channel, that is, to home defence, and
making infrequent visits to the Bock to convoy supplies essen-
tial to the endurance of the garrison. There was, however, a
difference in the parts played by Port Mahon and Gibraltar.
The former, being at the time wholly unimportant, received
no attention from the allies until late in the war, when it fell
after a six months' siege ; whereas the latter, being considered
of the first importance, absorbed from the beginning a very
large part of the allied attack, and so made a valuable diver-
sion in favor of Great Britain. To this view of the principal
features of the natural strategic situation in Europe may
properly be added the remark, that such aid as Holland might
be inclined to send to the allied fleets had a very insecure
line of communication, being forced to pass along the English
base on the Channel. Such aid in fact was never given.
In North America the local bases of the war at its outbreak
were New York, Narragansett Bay, and Boston. The two
former were then held by the English, and were the most im-
1 See map of the Adaatic Ocean, p. 632.
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DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
portant stations on the continent, from their position, snsoep-
tibility of defence, and resources. Boston had passed into the
hands of the Americans, and was tlierefore at the service of
the allies. From the direction actually given to the war, by
diverting the active English operations to the Southern States
in 1779, Boston was thrown outside the principal theatre of
operations, and became from its position militarily unimpor"'
tant; but had the plan been adopted of isolating New Eng-
land by holding the line of the Hudson and Lake Ghamplaini
and concentrating military effort to the eastward, it will be
seen that these three ports would all have been of decisive
importance to the issue. South of New York, the Delaware
and Chesapeake Bays undoubtedly offered tempting fields
for maritime enterprise ; but the width of the entrances, the
want of suitable and easily defended points for naval sta-
tions near the sea, the wide dispersal of the land forces
entailed by an attempt to hold so many points, and the sick-
liness of the locality during a great part of the year, should
have excepted them from a principal part in tlie plan of
the first campaigns. It is not necessary to include them
among the local bases of the war. To the extreme south
the English were drawn by the ignii fatuus of expected sup-
port among the people. They failed to consider that even if
a majority there preferred quiet to freedom, that very quality
would prevent them from rising against the revolutionary
government by which, on the English theory, they were op-
pressed I yet upon such a rising the whole success of this
distant and in its end most unfortunate enterprise was staked.
The local base of this war apart was Charleston, which passed
into the hands of the British in May, 1780, eighteen months
after the first expedition had landed in Oeorgia.
The principal local bases of the war in the West Indies are
already known through the previous narrative. They were
for the English, Barbadoes, Sta. Lucia, and to a less degree
Antigua. A thousand miles to leeward was the large island
of Jamaica, with a dock -yard of great natural capabilities at
Kingston. The allies held, in the first order of importancci
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TBE BASES OF OPERATIONS.
Fort Royal in Hartinique, and Havana ; in the second order,
Guadeloupe and Gap FranQais. A controlling feature of the
strategic situation in that day, and one which will not be
ivholly without weight in our own, was the trade-wind, with
its accompanying current. A passage to windward against
these obstacles was a long and serious undertaking even for
single ships, much more for larger bodies. It followed that
fleets would go to the western islands only reluctantly, or
wlien assured that the enemy had taken the same direction,
as Rodney went to Jamaica after the Battle of the Saints,
knowing tiie French fleet to have gone to Gap Franqais. This
condition of the wind made the windward, or eastern, islands
points on the natural lines of communication between Europe
and America, as well as local bases of the naval war, and
tied the fleets to them. Hence also it followed that between
the two scenes of operations, between the continent and the
Lesser Antilles, was interposed a wide central region into
which the larger operations of war could not safely be carried
except by a belligerent possessed of great naval superiority,
or unless a decisive advantage had been gained upon one
flank. In 1762, when England held all the Windward Islands,
with undisputed superiority at sea, she safely attacked and
subdued Havana ; but in the years 1779-1782 the French sea
power in America and the French tenure of the Windward
Islands practically balanced her own, leaving the Spaniards
at Havana free to prosecute their designs against Pensacola
and the Bahamas, in the central region mentioned.^
1 It may be mid h«re In paasfng, that the key to the Engllah poMetsioiia in what
was then called West Florida was at Pensacola and Mobile, which depended npon
Jamaica for support; the conditions of the country, of navigation, and of the
general continental war forbidding assistance from the Atlantic. The English
force, military and naval, at Jamaica was only adequate to the defence of the
island and of trade, and coold not afford sufficient relief to Florida. The cap-
tare of the latter and of the Bahamas was effected with little difficulty by over-
whelming Spanish forces, as many as fifteen shipaof-the-line and seven thousand
troops having been employed against Pensacola. These events will receive do
other mention. Their only bearing upon the general war was the diverrion of
this imposing force from joint operations with the French, Spain here, as at
Gibraltar, pursuing her own aims instead of concentrating npon the x»mimon
enemy, — a policy as shortsighted as it was seUlsk
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618
DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1718.
Posts like Martinique and Sta. Lucia had therefore for the
present war great strategic advantage oyer Jamaica, Havana,
or others to leeward. They commanded the latter in virtue
of their position, by which the passage westward could be
made so much more quickly than the return ; while the de-
cisive points of the continental struggle were practicallj little
farther from the one than from the other. This advantage
was shared equally by most of those known as the Lesser
Antilles ; but the small island of Barbadoes, being well to
windward of all, possessed peculiar advantages, not only for
offensive action, but because it was defended by the difficulty
with which a large fleet could approach it, even from so near
a port as Fort Boyal. It will be remembered that the ezpe*
dition which finally sat down before St. Eitt's had been in-
tended for Barbadoes, but could not reach it through the
violence of the trade-wind. Thus Barbadoes, under the con-^
ditions of the time, was peculiarly fitted to be the local base
and depot of the English war, as well as a wayside port of
refuge on the line of communications to Jamaica, Florida,
and even to North America; while Sta. Luci{i, a hundred
miles to leeward, was held in force as an advanced post for
the fleet, watching closely the enemy at Fort Boyal.
In India the political conditions of the peninsula neces-
sarily indicated the eastern, or Coromandel, coast as the
scene of operations. Trincomalee, in the adjacent island of
Qeylon, though unhealthy, offered an excellent and defensible
harbor, and thus acquired first-rate strategic importance, all
the other anchorages on the coast being mere open roadsteads.
From this circumstance the ti*ade-winds, or monsoons, in this
region also had strategic bearing. From the autumnal to
tlie spring equinox the wind blows regularly from the north-
east, at times with much violence, throwing a heavy surf upon
the beach and making landing difficult ; but during the sum-
mer months the prevailing wind is southwest, giving com-
paratively smooth seas and good weather. The change of
the monsoon," in September and October, is often marked
by violent hurricanes. Active operations, or even remaining
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on the coast, were therefore nnadvisable from this time until
the close of the northeast monsoon. The question of a port
to which to retire during this season was pressing. Trin-
comalee was the only one, and its unique strategic value was
heightened by being to windward, during the fine season, of
the principal scene of war. The English harbor of Bombay
on the west coast was too distant to be considered a local base,
and rather falls, like the French islands Mauritius and Bour-
bon, under the head of stations on the line of communica-
tions with the mother-country.
Such were the principal points of support, or bases, of the
belligerent nations, at home and abroad. Of those abroad
it must be said, speaking generally, that they were deficient
in resources, — an important element of strategic value. Na-
val and military stores and equipments, and to a great extent
provisions for sea use, had to be sent them from the mother-
countries. Boston, surrounded by a thriving, friendly popu-
lation, was perhaps an exception to this statement, as was
also Havana, at that time an important naval arsenal, where
much ship-building was done ; but these were distant from
the principal theatres of war. Upon New York and Narra-
gansett Bay the Americans pressed too closely for the re-
sources of the neighboring country to be largely available,
while the distant ports of the East and West Indies depended
wholly upon home. Hence the strategic question of commu-
nications assumed additional importance. To intercept a
large convoy of supply-ships was an operation only secondary
to the destruction of a body of ships-of-war ; while to protect
such by main strength, or by evading the enemy's search,
taxed the skill of the governments and naval commanders
in distributing the ships-of-war and squadrons at their dis-
posal, among the many objects which demanded attention.
The address of Kempenfeldt and the bad management of
Ottichen in the North Atlantic, seconded by a heavy gale
of wind, seriously embarrassed De Grasse in the West Indies.
Similar injury, by cutting off small convoys in the Atlantic,
was done to Suffren in the Indian seas ; while the latter at
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620 DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OP 1778.
once made good part of these losses^ and worried his oppo-
nents by the success of his cruisers preying on the English
supply-sliips.
Thus the navies^ by which alone these vital streams could
be secured or endangered, bore the same relation to the main*
tenance of the general war that has already been observed
of the separate parts. They were the links that bound the
whole together, and were therefore indicated as the proper
objective of both belligerents.
The distance from Europe to America was not such as
to make intermediate ports of supply absolutely necessary;
while if difficulty did arise from an unforeseen cause, it was
always possible, barring meeting an enemy, either to return
to Europe or to make a friendly port in the West Indies.
The case was difiPerent with the long voyage to India by the
Oape of Good Hope. Bickerton, leaving England with a con-
voy in February, was thought to have done well in reaching
Bombay the following September ; while the ardent Suffren,
sailing In March, took an equal time to reach Mauritius,
whence the passage to Madras consumed two months more.
A voyage of such duration could rarely be made without a
stop for water, for fresh provisions, often for such refitting
as called for the quiet of a harbor, even when the stores on
board furnished the necessary material. A perfect line of
communications required, as has been said, several such har-
bors, properly spaced, adequately defended, and with abun-
dant supplies, such as England in the present day holds on
some of her main commercial routes, acquisitions of her past
wars. In the war of 1778 none of the belligerents had such
ports on this route, until, by the accession of Holland, the
Oape of Oood Hope was put at the disposal of the French
and suitably strengthened by Suffren. With this and the
Mauritius on the way, and Trincomalee at the far end of the
road, the communications of the allies with France were rea-
sonably guarded. England, though then holding St. Helena,
depended, for the refreshment and refitting of her India-
bound squadrons and convoys m the Atlantic, upon the
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THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
benevolent nentralitj of Portugal, extended in the islands of
Madeira and Cape Verde and in the Brazilian ports. This
neutrality was indeed a frail reliance for defence, as was
shown hj the encounter between Johnstone and Suffren at
the Gape Verde ; but there being sevei'al possible stopping-
places, and the enemy unable to know which, if any, would
be used, this ignorance itself conferred no small security, if
the naval commander did not trust it to the neglect of proper
disposition of his own force, as did Johnstone at Porto Praya.
Indeed, with the delay and uncertainty which then character-
ized the transmission of intelligence from one point to another^
doubt where to find the enemy was a greater bar to offensive
enterprises than the often slight defences of a colonial port.
This combination of useful harbors and the conditions of
the communications between them constitute, as has been
said, the main strategic outlines of the situation. The niivy,
as the organized force linking the whole together, has been
indicated as the principal objective of military effort. The
method employed to reach the objective, the conduct of the
war, is still to be considered.*
Before doing this a condition peculiar to the sea, and af-
fecting the following discussion, must be briefly mentioned ;
that is, the difficulty of obtaining information. Armies pass
through countries more or less inhabited by a stationary pop-
ulation, and they leave behind them traces of their march.
Fleets move through a desert over which wanderers flit, but
where they do not remain; and as the waters close behind
them, an occasional waif from the decks may indicate their
passage, but tells nothing of their course. The sail spoken
by the pursuer may know nothing of the pursued, which yet
passed the point of parley but a few days or hours before.
Of late, careful study of the winds and currents of the ocean
1 In other words, having considered the objects for which the beUigerents
were at war and the proper objectives upon which their militaxy efforts should
have been directed to compass the objects, the discnssion now considers how the
military forces should have been handled ; by what means and at what point the
objectiTe, being mobile, should have been assailed.
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DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
has laid down certain advantageous routes, which will be ha-
bitually followed hj a careful seaman, and afford some pre-
sumption as to his movements ; but in 1778 the data for such
precision were not coUectedi and even had they been, the
quickest route must often have been abandoned for one of the
many possible ones, in order to elude pursuit or lying-in-wait.
In such a game of hide-and-seek the advantage is with the
sought, and the great importance of watching the outlets of
an enemy's country, of stopping the chase before it has got
away into the silent desert, is at once evident. If for any
reason such a watch there is impossible, the next best thing
is, not attempting to watch routes which may not be taken, to
get first to the enemy's destination and await him there ; but
this implies a knowledge of his intentions which may not
always be obtainable. The action of Suffren, when pitted
against Johnstone, was throughout strategically sound, both
in his attack at Porto Praya and in tlie haste with which
he made for their common destination ; while the two fail-
ures of Rodney to intercept the convoys to Martinique in
1780 and 1782, though informed tliat they were coming,
show the difficulty which attended lying-in-wait even when
the point of arrival was known.
Of any maritime expedition two points only are fixed, —
the point of departure and that of arrival. The latter may
be unknown to the. enemy; but up to the time of sailing,
the presence of a certain force in a port, and the indications
of a purpose soon to move, may be assumed as known.
It may be of moment to either belligerent to intercept such
a movement ; but it is more especially and universally neces-
sary to the defence, because, of the many points at which he
is open to attack, it may be impossible for him to know which
is tiireatened ; whereas the offence proceeds with full knowl-
edge direct to his aim, if he can deceive his opponent. The
importance of blocking such an expedition becomes yet more
evident should it at any time be divided between two or more
ports, — a condition which may easily arise when the facili*
ties of a single dock-yard are insufficient to fit out so many
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STRATEGIC POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN.
ships in the time allowed, or when, as in the present war,
allied powers famish separate Qontingents. To prevent the
junction of these contingents is a matter of prime necessity,
and nowhere can this be done so certainly as off the ports
Irhence one or both is to saiL The defence, from its very
name, is presumably the less strong, and is therefore the
more bound to take advantage of such a source of weakness
as the division of the enemy's force. Rodney in 1782 at Sta*
Lucia, watching the French contingent at Martinique to pre-
vent its union with the Spaniards at Cap Fraugais, is an in- ,
stance of correct strategic position ; and had the islands been
so placed as to put him between the French and their desti-
nation, instead of in their rear, nothing better could have
been devised. As it was, he did the best thing possible
under the circumstances.
The defence, being the weaker, cannot attempt to block all
the ports where divisions of the enemy lie, without defeating
his aim by being in inferior force before each. This would
be to neglect the fundamental principles of war. If he cor-
rectly decide not to do this, but to collect a superior force
before one or two points, it becomes necessary to decide
which shall be thus guarded and which neglected, — a ques-
tion involving the whole policy of the war after a full un-
derstanding of the main conditions, military, moral, and
economic, in every quarter.
The defensive was necessarily accepted by England in 1778.
It had been a maxim with the best English naval authorities
of the preceding era, with Hawke and his contemporaries, that
the British navy should be kept equal in numbers to the com-
bined fleets of the Bourbon kingdoms, — a condition which,
with the better quality of the per$cnnd and the larger marir
time population upon which it could draw, would have given
a real superiority of force. This precaution, however, had not
been observed during recent years. It is of no consequence
to this discussion whether the failure was due to the ineffi-
ciency of the ministry, as was charged by their opponents, or.
to the misplaced economy often practised by representative
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624
DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
goyernments in time of peace. The fact remains that, not-
withstanding the notorious probability of France and Spain
joining in the war, the English navy was inferior in number
to tliat of the allies. In what have been called the strategic
features of the situation, the home bases, and the secondary
bases abroad, the advantage upon the whole lay with her.
Her positions, if not stronger in themselves, were at least
better situated, geographically, for strategic effect ; but in the
second essential for war, the organized military force, or fleet,
adequate to offensive operations, she had been allowed to
become inferior. It only remained, therefore, to use this in-
ferior force with such science and vigor as would frustrate the
designs of the enemy, by getting first to sea, taking positions
skilfully, anticipating their combinations by greater quick-
ness of movement, harassing their communications with
their objectives, and meeting the principal divisions of the
enemy with superior forces.
It is sufficiently clear that the maintenance of this war,
everywhere except on the American continent, depended upon
the mother-countries in Europe and upon open communica-
tion with them. The ultimate crushing of the Americans, too,
not by direct military effort but by exhaustion, was proba-
ble, if England were left unmolested to strangle their com-
merce and industries with her overwhelming naval strength.
This strength she could put forth against them, if relieved
from the pressure of the allied navies ; and relief would be
obtained if she could gain over them a decided preponder- '
ance, not merely material but moral, such as she had twenty
years later. In that case the allied courts, whose financial
weakness was well known, must retire from a contest in
which their main purpose of reducing England to an inferior
position was already defeated. Such preponderance, how-
ever, could only be had by fighting ; by showing that, despite
inferiority in numbers, the skill of her seamen and the re-
sources of her wealth enabled her government, by a wise use
of these powers, to be actually superior at the decisive points
of the war. It could never be had by distributing the ships-
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ENGLAND UPON THE DEFENSIVE. 625
of-tho-llne all over the world, exposing them to be beaten in
detail while endeavoring to protect all the exposed points of
the scattered empire.
The key of the situation was in Europe, and in Europe in
the hostile dock-yards. If England were unable, as she proved
to be, to raise up a continental war against France, then
her one hope was to find and strike down the enemy's navy.
Nowhere was it so certainly to be found as in its home ports ;
nowhere so easily met as immediately after leaving them.
This dictated her policy in the Napoleonic wars, when the
moral superiority of her navy was so established that she
dared to oppose inferior forces to the combined dangers of the
sea and of the more numerous and well-equipped ships lying
quietly at anchor inside. By facing this double risk she ob-
tained the double advantage of keeping the enemy under her
eves, and of sapping his efficiency by the easy life of port,
while her own officers and seamen were hardened by the
rigorous cruising into a perfect readiness for every call upon
their energies. We have no reason," proclaimed Admiral
Yilleneuve in 1806, echoing the words of the emperor, to
fear the sight of an English squadron. Their seventy-fours
have not five hundred men on board ; they are worn out by a
two years' cruise." * A month later he wrote : The Toulon
squadron appeared very fine in the harbor, the crews well
clothed and drilling well ; but as soon as a storm came, all
was changed. They were not drilled in storms." * The em-
peror," said Nelson, now finds, if emperors hear truth, that
his fleet suffers more in a night than ours in one year. • . «
These gentlemen are not used to the hurricanes, which we
have braved for twenty-one months without losing mast or
yard." ' It must be admitted, however, that the strain was
tremendous both on men and ships, and that many English
officers found in the wear and tear an argument against
keeping their fleets at sea off the enemy's coast. Every
1 Orden of Adminl YfllenetiTe to the captaini of hii fleet, Dec SO, 1804.
* Letter of YiUeoeaTe, Jaimarj, 1805.
* Letten and Deepetchee of Lord Nelion.
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DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
one of the blasts we endure" wrote OoUingwoody ^Messens
the securitj of the country. The last cruise disabled five
large ships and two more lately ; several of them must be
docked." I have hardly known what a night of rest is these
two months " wrote he again ; this incessant cruising seems
to me beyond thp powers of human nature, Oalder is worn
to a shadow, quite broken down, and I am told Graves is not
much better." ^ The high professional opinion of Lord Howe
was also adverse to the practice.
Besides the exhaustion of men and ships, it must also
be admitted that no blockade could be relied on certainly to
check the exit of an enemy's fleet Yilleneuve escaped from
Toulon, Missiessy from Rochefort. <^ I am here watching the
French squadron in Rochefort" wrote GoUingwood, ^^but
feel that it is not practicable to prevent their sailing ; and
yet, if they should get by me, I should be exceedingly mor-
tifted. . • • The only thing that can prevent their sailing is
the apprehension that they may get among us, as they can-
not know exactly where we are." ^
Nevertheless, the strain then was endured. The English
fleets girdled the shores of France and Spain ; losses were
made good ; ships were repaired ; as one officer fell, or was
worn out at his post, another took his place. The strict
guard over Brest broke up the emperor's combinations ; the
watchfulness of Nelson, despite an unusual concurrence of
difficulties, followed the Toulon fleet, from the moment of its
starting, across the Atlantic and' back to the shores of Eu-
rope. It was long before they came to blows, before strategy
stepped aside and tactics completed the work at Trafalgar ;
but step by step and point by point the rugged but disci-
plined seamen, Uie rusty and battered but well-handled ships,
blocked each move of their unpractised opponents. Disposed
in force before each arsenal of the enemy, and linked together
by chains of smaller vessels, they might fail now and again
to check a raid, but they effectually stopped all grand com-
binations of the enemy's squadrons.
^ Life and Lettm of Lord CoUiogwood.
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ENGLISH POLICY IN OTHER WARS.
The ships of 1806 were essentially the same as those of
1780. There had doubtless been progress and improvement ;
but the changes were in degree, not in kind. Not only so,
but the fleets of twenty years earlier, under Hawke and his
fellows, had dared the winters of tlie Bay of Biscay. ^ There
is not in Hawke's correspondence," says his biographer, ^< the
slightest indication that he himself doubted for a moment
that it was not only possible, but his duty, to keep the sea,
even through the storms of winter, and that he should soon
be able to ^ make downright work of it.' " ^ If it be urged that
the condition of the French navy was better, the character
and training of its officers higher, than in the days of Hawke
and Nelson, the fact must be admitted ; neverthdess, the ad-
miralty could not long have been ignorant that the number
of such officers was Still so deficient as seriously to affect the
quality of the deck service, and the lack of seamen so great
as to necessitate filling up the complements with soldiers.
As for the per$onnel of the Spanish navy, there is no reason
to believe it better than fifteen years later, when Nelsoui
speaking of Spain giving certain ships to France, said, ^ I take
it fpr granted not manned [by Spaniards], as that would be
the readiest way to lose them again."
In truth, however, it is too evident to need much arguing,
that the surest way for the weaker party to neutralize the
enemy's ships was to watch them in their harbors and fight
them if they started. The only serious objection to doing
this, in Europe, was the violence of the weather off the coasts
of France and Spain, especially during the long nights of
winter. This brought with it not only risk of immediate dis-
aster, which strong, well-managed ships would rarely undergo,
but a continual strain which no skill could prevent, and which
therefore called for a large reserve of ships to relieve those
sent in for repairs, or to refresh the crews.
The problem would be greatly simplified if the blockading
fleet could find a convenient anchorage on the flank of the
route the enemy must take, as Nelson in 1804 and 1805
1 Bnmwt : Life of Lord Hawke.
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528 DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
used Maddalena Bay in Sardinia when watching the Toulon
fleet, — a step to which he was further forced by the excep-
tionally bad condition of many of his ships. So Sir James
Saumarez in 1800 even used Douamenez Bay, on the French
coast, only five miles from Brest, to anchor the in-sbore squad-
ron of the blockading force in bea^y weather. Tbe positions
at Plymouth and Torbay cannot be considered perfectly satis-
factory from this point of view ; not being, like Maddalena
Bay, on the flank of the enemy's route, but like Sta. Lucia,
rather to its rear. Nevertheless, Hawke proved that diligence
and well-managed ships could overcome this disadvantage,
as Rodney also afterward showed on his less tempestuous
station.
In the use of the ships at its disposal, taking the war of
1778 as a whole, the English ministry kept their foreign de-
tachments in America, and in the West and East Indies, equal
to those of the enemy. At particular times, indeed, this was
not so ; but speaking generally of the assignment of ships,
the statement is correct. In Europe, on the contrary, and
in necessary consequence of the policy mentioned, the British
fleet was habitually much inferior to that in the French and
Spanish ports. It therefore could be used offensively only
by great care, and through good fortune in meeting tbe
enemy in detail; and even so an expensive victory, unless
very decisive, entailed considerable risk from the consequent
temporary disability of the ships engaged. It followed that
the English home (or Channel) fleet, upon which depended
also the communications with Gibraltar and the Mediter-
ranean, was used very economically both as to battle and
weather, and was confined to the defence of the home coast,
or to operations against the enemy's communications.
India was so far distant that no exception can be taken to
the policy there. Ships sent there went to stay, and could be
neither reinforced nor recalled with a view to sudden emer-
gencies. The field stood by itself. But Europe, North Amer-
ica, and the West Indies should have been looked upon as one
large theatre of war, throughout which events were mutually
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DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH NAVY.
dependent, und whose different parts stood in dose relations
of greater or less importance, to which due attention should
have been paid. •
Assuming that the navies, as the guardians of the communi*
cations, were the controUhig factors in the war, and that the
source, both of the navies and of those streams of supplies
which are called communications, was in the mother-countries,
and there centralized in the chief arsenals, two things follow :
First, the main effort of the Power standing on the defensive,
of Great Britain, should have been concentrated before those
arsenals ; and secondly, in order to such concentration, the
lines of communication abroad should not have been need-
lessly extended, so as to increase beyond the strictest ne*
cessity the detachments to guard them. Closely connected
with the last consideration is the duty of strengthening, by
fortification and otherwise, the vital points to which the com-
munications led, so that these points should not depend in
any way upon the fleet for protection, but only for supplies
and reinforcements, and those at reasonable intervals. Gib-
raltar, for instance, quite fulfilled these conditions, being
practically impregnable, and storing supplies that lasted
very long.
If this reasoning be correct, the English dispositions on the
American continent were very faulty. Holding Canada, with
Halifax, New York, and Narragansett Bay, and with the line
of the Hudson within their grip, it was in their power to
isolate a large, perhaps decisive, part of the insurgent ter-
ritory. New York and Narragansett Bay could have been
made unassailable by a French fleet of that day, thus as-
suring the safety of the garrisons against attacks from tlie
sea and minimizing the task of the navy ; while the latter
would find in them a secure refuge, in case an enemy's force
eluded the watch of the English fleet before a European
arsenal and appeared on the coast. Instead of this, these
two ports were left weak, and would hare fallen before a
Nelson or a Farragut, while the army in New York was
twice divided, first to the Chesapeake and afterward to
84
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630
DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
Georgia, neither part of the separated forces being strong
enough for the work before it. The control of the sea was
thus used in both cases to put the enemy between the
divided portions of the English armj, when the latter, un-
divided, had not been able to force its waj over the ground
thus interposed. As the communication between the two
parts of the army depended wholly upon the sea, the duty
of the navy was increased with the increased length of the
lines of communication. The necessity of protecting the
seaports and the lengthened lines of communication thus
combined to augment the naval detachments in America, and
to weaken proportionately the naval force at the decisive
points in Europe, Thus also a direct consequence of the
southern expedition was the hasty abandonment of Narra-
gansett Bay, when D'Estaing appeared on the coast in 1779,
because Clinton had not force enough to defend both it and
New Tork.1
.In the West Indies the problem before the English govern^
ment was not to subdue revolted territory, but to preserve the
use of a number of small, fruitful islands ; to keep possession
of them itself, and to maintain their trade as free as possible
from the depredations of the enemy. It need not be repeated
that this demanded predominance at sea over both the ene-
my's fleets and single cruisers, — ^ commerce-destroyers," as
the latter are now styled. As no vigilance can confine all
these to their ports, the West Indian waters must be patrolled
by British frigates and lighter vessels ; but it would surely be
better, if possible, to keep the French fleet away altogether
than to hold it in check by a British fleet on the spot, of only
equal force at any time, and liable to fall, as it often did,
below equality. England, being confined to the defensive,
1 Of this Bodoey aaid : ^ The eTiciuitiiig Rhode Islaod was the most fatal
measiue that could possibly be adopted. It gave np the best and noblest harbor
in America, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hoars, coold blockade the
. three capital dties of America, namely, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia."
The whole letter, prirate to the First Lord of the Admiralty, is worth reading.
CUfe of Rodney, rol. ii. p. 4S9.)
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was always liable to loss when thus inferior. She actually
did lose one by one, by sudden attack, most of her islands,
and at different times had her fleet shut up Under the batteries
of a port; whereas the eoiemy, when he found himself in-
ferior, was able to wait for reinforcements, knowing that he
had nothing to- fear while so waiting.^
Nor was this embarrassment confined to the West Indies.
The nearness of the islands to the American continent
made it always possible .for the offence to combine his fleets
in the two quarters before the defence Could be sure of his
purpose ; and although such combinations Were controlled in
some measure by well-understood conditions of weather and
the seasons, the events of 1780 and 1781 show the perplexity
felt from this cause by the ablest English admiral, whose
dispositions, though faulty, but reflected the Uncertaintieil of
his mind. When to this embarrassment^ which is common
to the defensive in all cases, is added the care of the great
British trade upon which the prosperity of the empire
mainly depended, it must be conceded that the task of the
British admiral in the West Indies was neither light nor
simple.
In Europe, the safety of England herself and of Gibraltar
was gravely imperilled by the absence of these large de-
tachments in the Western Hemisphere, to which may also be
attributed the loss of Minorca. When sixty-six allied ships-
of-the-line confronted the thirty-five which alone England could
collect, and drove them into their harbors, there was l^alized
that mastery of the Channel which Napoleon claimed would
make him beyond all doubt master of England. For thirty
days, the thirty ships which formed the French contingent
had cruised in the Bay of Biscay, awaiting the arrival of the
tardy Spaniards ; but they were not disturbed by the English
fleet. Oibraltar was more than once brought within sight of
starvation, through the failure of communications with Eng-
1 The low of Sta. Lnda does not mlUteta agalnft this sUifteiiieiift» bebg doe to
liappj andacitj and skiU on the part of the English admiral, and the profeMional
ittcapadtgr of the commander of the great^ raperior French fleet'
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DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
land ; and its deliverance was due, not to the power of the
English navy suitably disposed hj its govemmenti but to the
skill of Britisli officers and the inefficiency of the Spaniards.
In the great final relief, Lord Howe's fleet numbered only
thirty-four to the allied forty-nine.
Which, then, in the difficulties under which England labored,
was the better course, — to allow the enemy free exit from his
ports and endeavor to meet him by maintaining a sufficient
naval force on each of the exposed stations, or to attempt to
watch his arsenals at home, under all the difficulties of the
situation, not with the vain hope of preventing every raid, or
intercepting every convoy, but with the expectation of frus^
trating the greater combinations, and of following close at
the heels of any large fleet that escaped ? Such a watch must
not be confounded with a blockade, a term frequently, but
not quite accurately, applied to it. I beg to inform your
Lordship," wrote Nelson, that the port of Toulon has never
been blockaded by me ; quite the reverse. Every opportunity
has been offered the enemy to put to sea, for it is there we
hope to realize the hopes and expectations of our country."
Nothing," he says again, ever kept the French fleet in
Toulon or Brest when they had a mind to come out ; " and
although the statement is somewhat exaggerated, it is true
that the attempt to shut .them up in port would have been
hopeless. What Nelson expected by keeping near their ports,
with enough lookout ships properly distributed, was to know
when they sailed and what direction they took, intending, to
use his own expression, to follow them to the antipodes."
I am led to believe," he writes at another time, ^ that the
Ferrol squadron of French ships will push for the Mediter-
ranean. If it join that in Toulon, it will much outnumber us ;
but I shall never lose sight of them, and Pellew (commanding
the English squadron off Ferrol) will soon be after them."
So it happened often enough during that prolonged war that
divisions of French ships escaped, through stress of weather,
temporary absence of a blockading fleet, or misjudgment on
the part of' its commander ; but the alarm was quickly given,
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ENGLISH NAVAL POLICY IN OTHER WARS. 633
some of the manj frigates caught sight of them, followed to
detect their probable destination, passed the word from point
to point and from fleet to fleet, and soon a division of equal
force was after them, to the antipodes " if need were. As,
according to the traditional use of the French navj hy French
goyemments, their expeditions went not to fight the hostile
fleet, but with " ulterior objects," the angry buzz and hot
pursuit that immediately followed was far from conducive to
an undisturbed and methodical execution of the programme
laid down, even by a single division ; while to great combi-
nations, dependent upon uniting the divisions from different
ports, they were absolutely fatal. The adventurous cruise of
Bruix, leaving Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line in 1799,
the rapidity with which the news spread, the stirring action
and individual mistakes of the English, the frustration of
tlie French projects' and the closeness of the pursuit,' the
escape of Missiessy from Rochefort in 1805, of the divisions
of Willaumez and Leissegues from Brest in 1806, — all
these may be named, along with the great Trafalgar cam-
paign, as affording interesting studies of a naval strategy
following the lines here suggested ; while the campaign of
1798, despite its brilliant ending at the Nile, may be cited
as a case where failure nearly ensued, owing to the English
having no force before Toulon when the expedition sailed,
and to Nelson being insufficiently provided with frigates.
The nine weeks' cruise of Ganteaume in the Mediterranean,
in 1808, also illustrates the difficulty of controlling a fleet
which has been permitted to get out, unwatched by a strong
force, even in such narrow waters.
No parallel instances can be cited from the war of 1778,
although the old monarchy did not cover the movements of
1 The plftn of campaign traced bj the DirectoTj for Bmix became Impoosible
of execntion ; the delaj in the jnnetion of the French and Spanish squadrons
having permitted England to concentrate sixty ships in the Mediterranean.
Trwde, rol iii. p. 198.
* The combined squadrons of France and Spain, onder Bmix, reached Brest
on their retnm onlj twenty-four hours before Lord Keith, who had followed
them from the Mediterranean. (James : Naval History of Great Britain.)
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684 DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
its fleets with the secrecy enforced by the stern military
despotism of the Empire. In both epochs England stood on
the defensive ; but in the earlier war she gave up the first line
of the defence, off the hostile ports, and tried to protect all
parts of her scattered empire by dividing the fleet among
them. It has been attempted to show the weakness of the
one policy, while admitting the difficulties and dangers of the
other. The latter aims at shortening and deciding the war
by either shutting up or forcing battle upon the hostile nary,
recognizing that this is the key of the situation, when the sea
at once unites and separates the different parts of the theatre
of war. It requires a navy equal in number and superior
in efficiency, to which it assigns a limited field of action,
narrowed to the conditions which admit of mutual support
among the squadrons occupying it. Thus distributed, it
relies upon skill and watchfulness to intercept or overtake
any division of the enemy which gets to sea. It defends
remote possessions and trade by offensive action against
the fleet, in which it sees their real enemy and its own
principal objective. Being near the home ports, the relief
and renewal of ships needing repairs are accomplished with
the least loss of time, while the demands upon the scan-
tier resources of the bases abroad are lessened. The other
policy, to be effective, call sfor superior numbers, because the
different divisions are too far apart for mutual support. Each
must therefore be equal to any probable combination against
it, which implies superiority everywhere to the force of the
enemy actually opposed, as the latter may be unexpectedly
reinforced. How impossible and dangerous such a defensive
strategy is, when not superior in force, is shown by the fre-
quent inferiority of the English abroad, as well as in Europe,
despite the effort to be everywhere equal. Howe at New York
in 1778, Byron at Grenada in 1779, Graves off the Ohesa^
peake in 1781, Hood at Martinique in 1781 and at St. Kitt's
in 1782, all were inferior, at the same time that the allied fleet
in Europe overwhelmingly outnumbered the English. In con-
sequence, unseaworthy ships were retained, to the danger of
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TWO NAVAL POLICIES COMPARED.
586
their crews anid their own increasing injury^ ratlier than di-
minish the force by sending them home ; for the deficiencies
of the colonial dock-yards did not allow extensive repairs
without crossing the Atlantic. As regards the comparative
expense of the two strategieSi the question is not only
which would cost the more in the same time, but which
would most tend to shorten the war by the effectiveness of
its action.
The military policy of the allies Is open to severer condem-
nation than that of England, by so much as the party assum-
ing the offensive has by that very fact an advantage over the
defensive. When the initial difiiculty of combining their
forces was overcome, — and it has been seen that at no time
did Great Britain seriously embarrass their junction, — the
allies had the choice open to them where, when, and how to
strike with their superior numbers. How did they avail
themselves of this recognized enormous advantage ? By nib-
bling at the outskirts of the British Empire, and knocking
their heads against the Bock of Gibraltar. The most seri-
ous military effort made by France, in sending to the United
States a squadron and division of troops intended to be double
the number of those which actually reached their destination,
resulted, in little over a year, in opening the eyes of England
to the hopelessness of the contest with the colonies, and thus
put an end to a diversion of her strength which had been
most beneficial to her opponents. In the West Indies one
petty island after another was reduced, generally in the ab-
sence of the English fleet, with an ease which showed how
completely the whole question would have been solved by a
decisive victory over that fleet; but the French, though fa-
vored with many opportunities, never sought to slip the knot
by the simple method of attacking the force upon which all
depended. Spain went her own way in the Floridas, and
with an overwhelming force obtained successes of no nailitary
value. In Europe the plan adopted by the English govern-
ment left its naval force hopelessly inferior in numbers year
after year ; yet the operations planned by the allies seem in
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636 DISCUSSION OF THE WAR OF 1778.
no case seriously to hare contemplated the destruction of that
force. In the crucial instance, when Derby's squadron of
thirty sail-of-the-line was hemmed in the open roadstead of
Torbay by the allied forty-nine, the conclusion of the council
of war not to fight only epitomized the character of the action
of the combined navies. To further embarrass their ex-
ertions in Europe, Spain, during long periods, obstinately
persisted in tying down her fleet to the neighborhood of
Gibraltar ; but there was at no time practical recognition of
the fact that a severe blow to the English navy in the Straits,
or in the English Channel, or on the open sea, was the surest
road to reduce the fortress, brought more than once within
measurable distance of starvation.
In the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts
suffered from the divergent counsels and jealousies which
have hampered the movements of most naval coalitions. The
. conduct of Spain appears to have been selfish almost to dis-
loyalty, that of France more faithful, and therefore also
militarily sounder; for hearty co-operation and concerted
action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have
better forwarded the objects of both. It must be admitted,
too, that the indications point to inefficient administration
and preparation on the part of the allies, of Spain especially ;
and that the quality of the personnel^ was inferior to that of
1 The high piofeasioiial attainmenta of many of the French oflScen is not
overlooked in this statement. The quality of the per$onnd waa dilated by an
inferior element, owing to the insufficient number of good men. The penor^
nd of our crews had been seriously affected by the events of the campaign of
1779. At the beginning of 17bO it was necessary either to disarm some ships, or
to incrcaae the proportion of aoldiers entering into the composition of the crews.
The minister adopted the latter alternative. New regimental drawn from the
land army, were put at the disposal of the navy. The corps of officers, far from
numerous at the beginning of hoatUities, had become completely inadequate.
Bear-Admiral de Ouichen met the greatest difficulty in forming the comple-
menta, both officera and crewa, for hia aquadron. He took the aea, Feb-
ruary 3, with ahipa ' badly manned,' aa be wrote to the miniater." (Chevalier :
Hiat. de la Marine Fran9aiae, p. 184.) "During the laat war [of 1778] we had
met the greatest difficulty in aupplying officers to our ahipa. If it bad been
aaay to name admirals, commodorea, and captaina, it had been imposaible to
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MISTAKES OF THE ALLIES.
England. Questions of preparation and administration, how*
ever, though of deep military interest and importance, are
verj different from the strategic plan or method adopted by
the allied courts in selecting and attacking their objectives,
and so compassing the objects of the war ; and their exami-
nation would not only extend this discussion unreasonably,
but would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up
unnecessary details foreign to its subject.
As regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily
that the phrase ulterior objects " embodies the cardinal fault
of the naval policy. Ulterior objects brought to nought the
hopes of the allies, because, by fastening their eyes upon them,
they thoughtlessly passed the road which led to them. De-
sire eagerly directed upon the ends in view — or rather upon
the partial, though great, advantages which they constituted
their ends — blinded them to tlie means by which alone they
could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war,
everywhere failure to attain them. To quote again the
summary before given, their object was ^^to avenge their
respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical em-
pire which England claims to maintain upon the ocean."
The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to them-
selves. They had, so that generation thought, injured Eng-
land by liberating America ; but they had not righted their
wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica, the English fleet had not
received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self-
reliance, the armed neutrality of the northern powers had
been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English em-
pire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more abso-
lute than before.
Barring questions of preparation and administration, of
the fighting quality of the allied fleets as compared with
the English, and looking only to the indisputable fact of
largely superior numbers, it must be noted as the supreme
fill the Tftcancles caused by death, sicknees, of pfomotion among offlcen o!
the rank of lientenaat and entign." (Chevalier ; Marine Fran^aise ioqs la
B^pabliqne, p. SO.)
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588 FUNDAMENTAL BRROR OP THE ALLIES.
factor in the military oondnct of the war, that, while the allied
powers were on the offeneive and England on the defenaiTei
the attitude of the allied fleets in presence of the English
nayj was habitually defensiye. Neither in the greater strate-
gic combinationsi nor npon the battlefield, does there appear'
any serious purpose of using superior numbers to crush frac-
tions of the enemy's fleet, to make the disparity of numbers
yet greater, to put an end to the empire of the seas by the
destruction of the organized force which sustained it With
the single brilliant exception of Suffren, the allied nayies
aroided or accepted action ; they never imposed it Yet so
long as the English navy was permitted thus with impunity
to range the seas, not only was there no security that it would
not frustrate the ulterior objects of the campaign, as it did
again and again, but there was always the possibility that by
some happy chance it would, by winning an important vic-
tory, restore the balance of strength. That it did not do so
is to be imputed as a fault to the English ministry ; but if
England was wrong in permitting hor European fleet to fall
so far below that of the allies, the latter were yet more
to blame for their failure to profit by the mistake. The
stronger party, assuming the offensive, cannot plead the
perplexities which account for, though they do not justify,
the undue dispersal of forces by the defence anxious about
many points.
The national bias of the French, which found expression in
the line of action here again and for the last time criticised,
appears to have been shared by both the government and the
naval ofiicers of the day. It is the key to the course of the
French navy, and, in the opinion of the author, to its failure
to achieve more substantial results to France from this war.
It is instructive, as showing how strong a hold tradition has
over the minds of men, that a body of highly accomplished
and gallant seamex^ should have accepted, apparently without
a murmur, so inferior a rOle for their noble profession. It
carries also a warning, if these criticisms are correct, that
current opinions and plausible impressions should always be
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FALLACY OP COMMERCE-^DESTROYINQ. 688
thoroughly tested ; for if erroneous thej work sure f ailuroi
and perhaps disaster.
There was such an impression largely held by French offi-
cers of that day, and yet more widely spread in the United
States now, of tiie efficacy of commerce-destroying as a main
reliance in war, especially when directed against a commercial
country like Great Britain. *'The surest means in my opin*
ion," wrote a distinguished officer, Lamotte-Picquet, ^ to con-
quer the English is to attack them in their commerce." The
harassment and distress caused to a country by serious inter-
ference with its commerce will be conceded by all. It is
doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war,
and is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease ;
but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient
in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a
most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating
garb of cheapness to the representatiyes of a people. Espe-
cially is it misleading when the nation against whom it is to
be directed possesses, as Great Britain did and does, the two
requisites of a strong sea power, — a wide-spread healthy com-
merce and a powerful navy. Where the revenues and indus-
tries of a country can be concentrated into a few treasure-
ships, like the flota of Spanish galleons, the sinew of war may
perhaps be cut by a stroke ; but when its wealth is scattered
in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the
system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand
many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without
the life being touched. Only by military- command of the sea
by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce,
can such an attack be fatal ; ^ and such control can be wrung
1 The vital centre of English commerce is In the waters aonroiinding the Brit-
ish Islands; and as the United Kingdom now depends largely upon external
soorces of f ood-snpply, it foUows that France is the nation most ftiTorablj situated
to harass it hy oommerce^estrojring, on aeoonnt of her nearness and her posses-
sion of ports hoth on the Atlantic and the North Sea. From these issued the pri.
Tateers which in the past preyed upon English shipping. The position is stronger
now than formerly, Cherboufg presenting a good Channel port which France
lacked in the old wars. On the other hand, steam and railroads hare made th«i
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540
CONDITIONS OF PEACE, 178S.
from a powerful nary only by fighting and overcoming it.
For two hundred years England has been the great commer-
cial nation of the world. More than any other her wealth has
been intrusted to the sea in war as in peace ; yet of all nations
she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of
commerce and the rights of neutrals. Regarded not as a
matter of rights but of policy, history has justified the refusal ;
and if she maintain her navy in full strength, the future will
doubtless repeat the lesson of the past.
The preliminaries of the peace between Great Britain and
the allied courts, which brought to an end this great war,
were signed at Versailles, January 20, 1788, an arrangement
having been concluded between Great Britain and the Ameri-
can Commissioners two months before, by which the indepen-
dence of the United States was conceded. This was the great
outcome of the war. As between the European belligerents.
Great Britain received back from France all the West India
Islands she had lost, except Tobago, and gave up Sta. Lucia.
The French stations in India were restored ; and Trincomalee
being in the possession of the enemy« England could not
dispute its return to Holland, but she refused to cede Negae
patam. To Spain, England surrendered the two Floridas and
Minorca, the latter a serious loss had the naval power of Spain
been sufiicient to maintain possession of it ; as it was, it again
ports on the northern coasts of the United Kingdom more aTaUable, and BriUsh
shipping need not, as formerly, focns about the Channel.
Much importance has been attached to the captures made during the late sum-
mer manoBums ( 1888) hj cruisers In and near the English Channel The United
States must remember that such cruisers were near their home ports. Their
line of coaUupply majr have been two hundred miles ; it would be a very different
thing to maintain them in activity three thousand miles from home. The fur-
nishing of coal, or of such facilities as cleaning the bottom or necessary repairs,
in such a case, would be so unfriendly to Great Britain, that it may wdl be
doubted if any neighboring neutral nation would aUow them.
Commeroenlestroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide dissemina-
tbn of force. Commeroenlestroying through control of a strategic centre by a
great fleet depends upon concentration of force. Regarded as a primary, not as
a secondary, operation, the former is condemned, the latter Justified, by the experi-
ence of centuries.
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CONDITIONS OF PEACE, 178S.
641
fell into the hands of Great Britain in the next war. Some
unimportant redistribution of trading-posts on the west coast
of Africa was also made.
Trivial in themselves, there is but one comment that need
be made upon these iurrangements. In anj coming war their
permanencj would depend whoUj upon the balance of sea
power, upon that empire of the seas concerning which noth-
ing conclusive had been established bj the war.
The definitive treaties of peace were signed at YersailleSt
September 8, 1788.
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INDEX.
Alherotd, Cardinal, minister to Philip
v. of Spain, 283; naval and general
poUcj of, 284-286; failnre of hb
•cliemet, 288 ; ditmiated, 289.
Anton, Britiili Admiral, expedition to
the Pacific, 261 ; captures a French
squadron, 271.
ArMnU, British Admiral, engage-
ment with Frencli fleet off the Chessr
peake, 88&-887.
Armed Neutralk^, the, of the Baltic
powers, 406.
Arnold, Benedict, tresson of, 882 ; ex-
pedition to James River, 885.
BarbadoeSf strategic value of, 848,
898, 518 ; Ineflectual attempt of the
French against, 469.
Barrinffton, British Admiral, energy of,
865; takes Ste. Lucia and resists
an attack by superior French fleet,
866 ; second in command at battle of
Grenada, 868 ; refuses the command
of tlie Channel fleet, 404; a whig in
politics, 600.
BouUb, Land, Ansterlitz, 24, 47; Blen-
helm. 218; Boyne, 41, 185-187;
Camden, 882, 884; Ciudad Bodrigo,
storming of, 475 (note) ; Jena, 47 ;
Meuurus, 10, 20; PUwsey, 806;
Savannah, assault on, 876; York-
town, capitulation of, 890.
BattUB, Naval {the list, of the principal
naoal battloa, with pkuu, will be found
on pp, xxlii, xxiv), Actinm, 18;
Agosta, 165; Boscawen and De U
Clue, 209; Byng off Minorca, 286,
plan 265; Cape Psssaro, 68, 287;
Chesapeake, 872-874, 880, 891;
Copenhagen, 861 ; Jm Hovgne, 180-
101, plan 188; Lepanto, 18, 60;
Lowestoft, 106; MaUga, 110, 211,
220; Mobtte, 287, 854, 855, 861;
Navarino, 18 (note) ; New Orleans,
854-856; NUe, 10. 11, 80, 81, 858,
861, 866, 588; Pocock and D'Ach^,
WJSlO^plan 162; Port Hudson, 855,
861; Kio de Janeiro, expedition
against, 280; Rodney and Langara,
404, 600 (and note); Schoneveldt,
152; Sta. Lucia, 866, 425, 478; St.
Vfaicent, 11, 856, 858^ 476 (note), plan
146; Snffren and Hughes, flfth ac-
tion, 468; Trafklgar, 0, 11, 12, 28
(note), 24, 47, 85, 858, 854, 857, 488;
Vigo galleons, 207.
Benbow, British Admiral, sent to West
Indies, 207 ; treason of his captains,
207; killed in battle. 207.
Bickerton, British Admiral, conducts a
powerful convoy to the East Indies,
452} arrived in India, 458; activity
of. 458. 520; effects of arrival of,
459, 461.
Blane, Sir Gilbert, physician to British
fleet, letters of,497,499,500(note).501.
Blockade, of French ports by English
fleets, 28 (note), 80, 210, 296, 207, 888.
807. 402 (and note), 418, 525-527, 582,
638; of Southern coast of United
States, 48, 44, 87 (note); Napoleon
forces England to, 81 ; with conso'
quent effect on American privateer-
ing, 187; deflnltion of efficient, 85;
dangers to United States from, 86.
87; oflhnslve and defensive use of,
87 (note) ; declaration of the Armed
Neutrality concerning, 405; position
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644
INDEX.
taken off an enemy's port not neces-
•arily a blockade in strict tense of
ttie word, 638.
Boieawm, Britisli Admiral, expedition
to India, failure of, 277 ; intercepts
French ships off the St. Lawrence,
284 ; takes Looisburg, 294 ; disperses
or destroys French fleet from Toulon,
206.
^wyoyiM, British General, expedition
from Canada, 848; eflect of his su^
lender, 840.
Buuy, French General, second to Du-
pleix hi India, 806; intrigues with
nabob of Bengiil, 806 ; invades Orissa, >
807 ; agabi sent to India during Amer-
ican RcYolution, 469; delayed sa
route, 480; readies IndU, 461; be-
sieged in Cttddalore by the English.
462; relicTed by Suflren, 468.
Sir George, British Admiral,
sent to Mediterranean, 286 ; destroys
Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, 287 ;
policy at Messina, 288.
Bjfng, John, British Admiral, sails to
relieve Port Mahon, 280 ; action witli
tlie French fleet, 280-288 { returns to
Gibraltar, is relieved, tried, 290^ and
shot, 291.
Byroii, British Admiral, commander-in-
chief at Battle of Grenada, 867-871.
Cape of Good Hope, a half-way naval
station, 28, 614; discovery of pas-
sage round, 87, 88, 141 ; acquired by
Holland, 97; acquired by Bngland
during the Napoleonle wars, 827;
Snglish expedition against, 421;
saved by 8ufl*ren, 422-426, 427;
ntUity to France, 400, 620 ; Suifren's
reception at» 464, 406.
Carloi ni.. King of the Two Sicilies,
248, 249 ; enters hito Bourbon Family
Compact, 249; forced to withdraw
his troops by a British commodore,
268, 264, 804; succeeds to the Span-
ish throne, 804; enters into secret
alUanoe with France, 812, 818 ; losses
In Seven Tears' War, 816, 817 ; again
enters alliance with France against
Bngland, 401, 402.
Chariee, Archduke, cUimant to Spanish
throne aa Carlos III., 206 ; lands at
Ltobon, 206; Unds In CatalonU and
takes Barcelona, 218 ; takes and loses
Madrid, 214 ; antipathy of Spaniards
to, 214, 810; inherite empire of Aus-
tria and elected Emperor Cliaries YI.
of Germany, 817 ; makes, as king of
Spahd, secret commercial treaty with
Enghmd, 821; discontented with
Treaty of Utrecht, 222, 284; re-
nounces daim to Spanish throne,
886; Joins Quadruple Alliance, 280;
obtains Naples and Sicily, 289; loses
Naples and Sicily, 248; dies, leaving
no son, 208; succeeded by MarU
Theresa, 202.
CAar2et II., naval policy of. 00, 61;
restoration of, 90; political motives,
100; cedes Dunkirk, 106; policy of
oommerce^estruying, 181 ; bargains
with Louis XIV., 148; decUres war
against Holland, 144; makes peace
with HoiUnd, 168; forms alliance
with Holland, 160; dies, 176.
CkoUeid, minister to Louis XV., 207 ;
plans for invading England and Scot-
land, 297, 800; makes close alliance
witli Spain, 811-818; policy alter
Seven Tears' War, 880-886; naval le-
forms, 881-888; supports Spain in
dispute with England over the Falk-
Und Islands, 880; dUmissed, 880.
Clerk, John, work on Naval Tactics,
77 (and note), 108-166, 289.
Clinton, Sir Henry, British General,
expedition up llie Hudson, 848;
commanderin-chiaf In America, 860,
866, 401 ; opinions as to influence of ^ ,
sea power, 886, 401 ; sends detach-
ments to the Chesapeake, 886,887;
directs Corowallis to occupy Tork-
town, 887 ; outwitted by Washington
and Boohambeau, 887.
Clive^ Robert, afterward Lord, letter
of, 276 (note) ; Indian career begins,
282; retakes Calcutto, 806; defeaU
nabob of Bengal, takes Chander^
nagore, and wins battle of Plassey,
800; reduces Bengal, 806.
Cotbeti becomes minister under Louis
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XIV., 70; oommerdal luid mtaI
poUcj, 70-74, 106, 106, 160, 174;
thwarted by the king, 170; hit tniet
io the reeoaroet of Fimnoe, 10&
Cottiitgwood, British AdminJ, kads a
oolamo at Trafalgar, 868; hie oon-
dact at batUe of Cape 8t. Vincent,
866, 866; roTeraet Kebon'e order*
after hie death, 868 ; loes in hie ahip
at Trafalgar, 488 (note) ; blockading
duty off French ooaat (letters), 686.
CeUmint: origin of, S7; character of,
28; effect on England of, 89^ 82, 88,
266^ fte6-828, 802-804, 806^ 414;
weakneM of Spain through, 80, 41,
42, 202, 261, 812. 827, 846, 846 ; effect
of national cliarmcter on, 66-^, 256,
266 ; growth of English colonial sjs-
tem, 60, 62, 64, 217, 220, 228, 261,
201, 805-807, 810, 821, 827 ; Colbert's
policy, 70, 71, 106; navy essential to
security of, 41, 42, 74, 76^ 82, 820,
867, 878, 401, 416, 424, 484, 611, 629,
541; support to sea power by, 88,
212, 820, 416. 610, 611, 614, 620, 621;
Dutch, 06, 07, 268; New York and
Kew Jersey seized by English, 107,
182; loss of French colonies, 210,
201, 294, 206, 804, 814, 821, 822 ; loss
of Spanish colonies, 219, 816-317,
821; Frendi colonhil policy* 242,
264, 266. 267, 268, 278-278, 282; 288»
806; Spanish colonial policy, 245-
247, 260; colonial expansion the
characteristic motlTO of the wan
lh>ni 1789 to 1788, 254, 281-284, 201,
608-510 ; value of smaller West In-
dhi Islands, 266, 874, 612, 618; the
English in India, 267, 282, 806, 807,
848, 849, 410, 420, 460; Vernon's and
Anson's expedition against Spanbh,
261 ; Florida and the Bahamas re-
covered by Spain, 617 (note). Brit-
ish North American, character of,
265, 288; extension over all the con-
tinent east of the Mississippi, 65,
821; quarrel with mothet^untry,
884, 841; military situation of, 841-
844 ; alliance with France, 860; effect
of sea power upon their struggle,
807, 624 ; object of, 607, 608 ; poUcy
35
of France in their struggle, 860, 511,
612; distribution of colonial posses-
siooi at peace of 1788, 540.
ComwumUr-in^ki^, position of a naval,
in battle, 868-868$ Question raised
by action of the Duo de Chartres,
862 ; illustrated by practice of Howe,
Nelson, Farragut, 868-858 ; orders of
French government, 868.
Comsisref, attenpti io control by force,
1, 62, 68, 100, 101, 107, 246, 247;
trade routes, 26, 82, 88, 87, 88, 141,
142 1 water carriage easier and
cheaper than land, 26; advantages
of rivers and hilets to, 26, 86, 86;
secure seaports and a navy neces-
sary to security of, 26-28, 74-76, 82,
83, 134, 186; the basis of a healthy
navy, 28, 46^ 46, 82; war upon (see
commerce-destroying); Inilnence of
Baltic trade upon sea power, 82, 62,
230, 240, 406 ; effect of Central Ameri-
can Canal on, 88, 825 ; eflbct of phys-
ical conditions on, 86-30; decay of
Spanish, 41, 60-52 ; effect of national
character on, 60-56; solicitude of
English government concerning, 60»
62, 68, 66» 66, 148, 206, 218, 220^ 240,
241, 247, 260, 270; the Navigation
Act, 60; influence of the wealth of
Enghind on history, 64, 187, 197, 214,
218, 227, 279, 205 ; commercial spirit
of the Dutch, 40, 52, 65, 67, 68. 60,
08 ; Colbert's policy for developing,
70, 71, 101, 102, 105, 106, 169; decay
of French, under Louis XIV., 78,
107, 167, 169, 170, 198, 199, 210, 226-
228 ; improvement of French, under
Louis XV., 74. 242, 248; government
influence on, 70, 71, 82, 101, 106, 106 ;
dangers io United States, by block-
ades, 84-67; commercial policy of
United States, 84, 88 ; French, in
1660, 98 ; Dutch, in 1660, 95-97, 181 ;
rivahy of English and Dutch, 100,
107; Leibnitx'B proposition to Louis
XIV. to seize Egypt, 141, 142; in-
fluence of Dutch wealth, 167, 176.
187, 197, 270, 270; sufferings of
Dutch, 88, 160, 167, 168; gains to
English, by poli^ of Louis XIV,
Digitized by
Google
INDEX.
167, 170 ; effect t>r ii^ory to, in bat-
tening war, 176, 177 ; bearing of» up-
on War of Spauiab SucoeMion, 201-
m. W, 209; Methnen Treatj of,
Witb Portugal, S00» 2)28; ooncettion
to £nglau«l of tbe Atiento, or eUye
trade, 217. 220. 245; growth of Eng.
lish, during eighteenth century, 220,
22S-226, 228, 229, 238, 241, 246, 810.
828, 828 ; secret treat/ of, made with
England b/ claimant to Spanish
throne, 221 ; decay of Dutch, in early
part of eighteenth century, 60, 220-
222, 224; English, contraband with
SpanUh America, 240, 241, 246-247 ;
sufferings of, 1740-1748, 270. 280;
sufferings of, 1766-1768, 811, 812,
817-810 ; prosperity of English com-
. roerce, 1758-1768, 297. 818. 819, 828;
f ffect of commercial interests on the
results at Yorktowu, 892 ; great cen-
tre of English, 589 (note) ; policy of
Great Britain as to neutral, 640.
Commarc^-Deutrojfing ( Cruising Wal^
fare), a strategic question, 8; de-
pendence on geographical position,
81 ; diffusion of effort, 81 ; disadvan-
Ugeuus position of United SUtes,
81, 540 (note); Spanish treasure-
ships. 41. 51. 207, 262, 818, 810 ; Eng-
lish and Dutch commerve defy. 51,
188, 184. 186. 206. 229, 297, 817. 818,
819. 589, 540; Charles IL resorts to
it as a substitute for great fleets, 181 ;
disastrous results, 182 ; discussion of,
as a principal mode of warfare, 182-
186 ; dependent upon a near base or
upon powerful fleets, 182, 196, 280.
814; illustrations, 1662-1788. 188-
186 ; injurious reaction on the nation
relying upon it, 186; illustrations,
186-188 ; mistaken condusions drawn
from American privateering in 1812,
and ttom the Confederate cruisers,
187, 188 ; effect of great navies, 188 ;
Illustrations, after battle of Solebay,
148; after battle of Texel, 154; de-
cline of Dutch navy, 160, and conse-
quent increase of commerce-destroy-
ing by French privateers, 167 ; in the
war of 1689-1097, discufsion, 198-
196; In the war of 1702-1718. 22S-
280; in war of 1789-1748. 280; ia
Seven Years' War, 295, 297, 811, 814.
816, 817-819 (discussion). 820 (note);
in American Uevolution, 844. 88^
892, 400, 404, 408 (aud note). 400;
448, 445, 452, 460. 580, 680, 540 (and
note) ; French privateering. 188, 186.
107, 195, 190, 229, 280, 814, 817-819;
peculiar character of French priva>
teering, 1689-1718, 194-190. 229, 28a
Cofi/Iaiw, French Admiral, commands
fleet intended for invasion of Eng*
laud, 800; sails from Brest. 801 ; en-
counters Hawke and is defeated by
blm. 102-804.
GstnacW/if. British General, wins battle
of Camden, 882 ; overruns Southern
States, 884; marches into Virginia,
885; Ukes position at Yorktown,
867; surrounded by enen ies, 889}
capitulates, 800.
ComwaUii, Captain British navy. gal.
Unt conduct in Uood's action at St.
Christopher, iV^
Conim, island of, naturally Italhin,82;
a dependency of Genoa, 201 ; Genoa
cedes fortified harbors to France,
292; whole island ceded to France,
884 ; strategks value. 885.
Cromwdl, Oliver, naval policy of. 00;
issues Navigation Act, 00 ; condition
of navy under, 60. 61, 101, 127 ; ukes
Jamaica, 60; ukes Dunkirk, 105.
I/Adi€, French Commodore, readies
India, 807; first and second battles
with Pocock, 808; iU will to the
French governor, Lally, 807. 809;
goes to the Isle of France, 809; re-
turn to the peninsula, and third bat-
tle witli Pocock. 810 ; abandons the
penlnsuU^ 810.
Dt Barras, French Commodore, com-
mands French squadron at Newport,
and takes part In operations against
Comwallls, 889-892.
Ik la CluB, French Commodore, sails
from Toulon to Join Brest fleet, 298 ;
encounters and beaten by Boacawen.
299.
Digitized by
Google
inAbx.
iyEstmnf, Fimch Admlnil, tnuMfemd
from the armj to the narj, 871 ;
long pMMfa tnm To«lon to the
Delaware* 869; faila to attack the
British fleet io Mew Tork» 861 ; rant
Britteh batterlcf at Newport* 801 ;
aaUs in partnlt of Uowe'e fleet, and
reoeiTee li^oriet in a gale* 808 ; goea
to Boston, 808 ; foiled hf Howe on
all pointi. 808, 804; goes to West
Indies, 806; fallora at Sta. Laeia*
860; eaptore of 8t . Vincent and
Grenada, 807 ; action with Bjrron's
fleet, 807-4171; profrsslonal charac-
ter, 871, 876 ; ineffectual assanit on
SsTannah, 870; ratam to France,
870.
lyEgtrSu, French Admiral, commands
French contingent to the aliied fleet
at Solehaj, 147; at SchonoTeldt,
161 ; at the Texel, 162 ; aqnivocal
action at the hattle of the Tezel,
163, 166; noUceoM70.
De Gmtm, French Admiral, salb from
Brest for West Indies, 888 ; partUi
action witli Mood off Alartiniqne,
388, 884; takes Tobago, and goes
thence to San Pomingo, 884 ; detei^
mines to go to Chesapeake Bay,
888 ; tlioronghness of his action, 88^
802; anchors in Ljrnnhaven Bay,
888; skilAtI management when op-
posed by Grares, 889 ; share la re-
snits at Torktown, 899 ; declines to
remain longer in the United States,
400, 418, 409 ; return to West Indies,
and expedition against 8t Kitt's
Island, 400; ontgeneralled by fiood,
470-470 ; criticisms upon his actions,
892, 470-478, 488. 489, 404; return
to Martinique, 479 ; in command of
combined fleet in expedition against
Jamaica, 479 ; sails from Martinique,
480; partial action of April 9, 1782.
481-488; battle of the Safaits, 480^
490; surrenders with his flag-ship,
489 ; later career tad death, 601-608 ;
flndings of the court-martial on, 608.
D% Gmeken, French Admiral, wary
tactics of, 7, 418, 488; takes com-
mand in West Indlei^ 870 1 actions
with Rodney, 878-881; tetome to
FMoe, 881, 406 ; chief command of
alUed fleets in Europe, 407, 406;
abortive action at Torliay, 406 (and
note) I iq|nries to couToy under his
care, 408; Rodney's opinion of» 499;
difllcnl^ In manning his fleets 680
(note).
D*OrmUimr$t French Admiral, instmc
tiotts to, 889, 840; appointed to
command Braet fleet, 889; eom-
mande^ln•ehlef at battle of Ushant,
860-862; commands allied fleets in
English Channel, 1779, 402 (and
note) ; retires from the navy, 408.
D$ Riom$, d'Albert, Captafai in French
navy, leads in the attack on Hood's
position at St Kitt's, 474; Suffren's
opinion of, 474 ; gallantry at time of
De Qrasse's defeat, 602 (note).
D$ Ternojf, French Commodore, com-
mands fleet which couToys Ro-
chambeau to America, 882; posi-
tion occupied in Newport, 894-890 ;
Washington's memorandum to, 897.
£)€ VaudrmtU, French Commodore, ■ec-
ond in command to De Grasie, 404 ;
conducts partial attack of April 9,
1782, 482, 494; assumes command
after De Grasse's capture, 407.
Derfry, British Admiral, relieTCS Gib-
raltar, 407, 414 (note) ; retreats be-
fore superior allied fleet, 406.
Detlmid^, French Commodore, en-
gagement with English fleet off the
Chesapeake, 886-887.
Douglai, Sir Charles, Captain British
nary, chief of staff to Rodney, 486
(note); letters of, 486 (and note),
400, 498; credit of breaking French
Ihie claimed for, 490; opinion as to
Rodney's failure to pnnue his suc-
cess, 490.
DuboiM, Cardinal, minister of Philippe
d'Orieans, 288; his policy, 238, 286,
287,280,241; death, 241.
Dyguaf-Tnuin^ French priTateer, ex-
pedition against Rio de Janeiro, 280.
Dipleix, adrances the power of France
in India, 248; his ambition and
policy, 268, 274, 282 ; problem before
Digitized by
Google
injJex.
him in India, 276; foUed hy lack of
lea power, 276, 278; quarrel with
La Dourdonnais, 276 ; aeizes Madras,
276; BiicoeMful defence of Pondi-
cherry, 277 ; extendi hit power in
the peninsula, 282; la recalled to
France, 282.
DuquMiM, French Admiral, compares
French and Dutch officers, 129;
commands at battle of StramboU,
160-162; uctics of, 168-166; com-
mands at battle of Agosta, 166.
Egjfpi, Napoleon's expedition to, 10,
11 ; Leibnltx proposes to Louis XIV.
to seise, 141 ; commanding com-
mercial and strategic position of,
141, 142 ; occupation of, bj England,
22, 828; Unportance of, to India,
828.
Elliott, British General, commands at
Gibraltar during the great siege, 411.
England. See under Colonies, Com-
merce, Commerce-Destroying, Geo-
graphical Position, Gk>Yernment, In-
habitants, character and number of,
NaTal Policy, Naval Tactics, Sea
Power, Strategy.
Extent of Torriioq/, its effect upon the
sea power of a country, 42-44.
Falkland ItUmds, dispute oonoemhig,
886.
Farragut, American Admiral, at Mobile,
164, 287, 861 ; at Port Hudson, 861 ;
at New Orleans, 864, 866; practice
of, as to his position in order of
battle, 864-866.
Flmri, Cardinal, minister of Louis XY.,
241; peace policy, 241, 248, 268;
commercial expansion of France un-
der. 242, 248; accord with Walpole,
241, 244, 262; policy, continental
rather than mariUme, 248, 244. 261,
268; supporU dairoant to Polish
throne, 247 ; arranges Bourbon Fam-
ily Compact with Spain, 244, 248 ; ac-
quires Bar and Lorraine for France.
249; allows the navy to decay, 244,
249, 262, 268 ; death, 263.
France. See under Colonies, Com-
merce, Commerce-Destroying, Geo*
graphical Position, Government, In*
habitants, character and number of
Naval Policy, Naval Tactics, Sea-
Power, Strategy.
Frederiek,King of Prussia, seises Silesia,
262; Silesia ceded to, 278; opens
Seven Years' War, 292; desperate
struggle of, 296, 806 ; losses in the
war. 824 ; results of the war to, 824 ;
partition of Poland, 886.
Gardiner'e Bay, Long Island, useful as
a base of operations to an enemy of
the United Sutes, 212 ; sUtlon of
Boglish fleet* 880.
Geographical Poeition, its effect upon
the sea power of countries, 29-86.
GibraUar, strategic question, 12 ; taken
by Booke,2l0; strategic value, 212;
value to England. 29. 82, 220, 296,
828, 414 ; offers to restore to Spahi,
286,298; attacks on, 212, 246, 411;
siege of, 408-412.
Gooemment, character and policy of,
eilbct upon tlie sea power of coun-
tries, 68-88; English, 69-67 ; Dutch,
07-69; French, 69^; United States,
Graoet, British Admiral, commanding
in New York, sails to relieve Corn-
wallis, 889; out-manoeuvred by Do
Grasse. 801 ; criticisms on, 800, 891.
Gravee, British Captain, afterward ad.
miral. urges Rodney to attack French
squadron anchored In Newport, 896 ;
second to Nelson at Copenhagen,
896 (note); blockading on French
coast, 626.
Great Britain. See England.
BamubcL See Second Punic War,
18-21.
Havana, strategic value of, 816, 617,
619; taken by the English. 816; re-
stored at Peace of Paris, 821. 822.
Hawke, Sir Edward, afterward Lord.
British Admiral, distfaiguishes him-
self at the battle of Toulon, 266;
captures a French squadron. 271-
278; seizes French shipping in Mie
Digitized by
Google
INDEX.
Atlantic, 285; relieTes Bjng In the
Mediterraoean, 290; blockade of
Brest, 800, 527; brilliant action in
Qaiberon Baj, 800-804; maxim as
to strength of English fleet, 528.
Hmry /F., of France, poUcy of, 60, 09,
92, oa
Htrhert, British Admiral, commands
allied Bnglish and Dntch fleets at
battle of Beaclij Head, 182.
Holland, See under Colonies, Com-
merce, Commerce-Destrojing, Geo-
graphical Position, Oovernnient, In-
habitants, character and number of.
Naval PoUcy, Naral Tactics (Ruy-
ter's). Sea Power, Strategy.
Hood, Sir Samael, afterward Lord,
British Admiral, trait of subordina-
tion in, 856 (note) ; action with De
Grasse off Martiniqae, 888 ; sent by
Rodney to America with fourteen
ships, 889, 890 ; second In command
in action off Chesapeake, 891 ; tem-
porary chief command In West In-
dies, 409; brilliant action at St
Christopher's Island, 470^76 ; Junc-
tion with Rodney, 470 ; partial action
of April 9, 1782, 481-488; at battle
of the Saints, 486-490, 491-498 ;' De
Grasse's flag-ship strikes to his, 489 ;
opinion as to Rodney's failure to
pursue his advantage, 496 ; captures
four French ships, 498 ; later career
and death, 604.
Boste^ Paul, work on naval tactics, 77,
147, 182, 184.
Howe, Lord, British Admiral, naral
policy of, 9; at Philadelphia, 860;
at New York, 860 ; at Newport, 861 ;
energy and skill of, 868, 864 ; com-
mands Channel fleet, 406; relieves
Gibraltar, 412; a whig in politics,
600 ; opinion as to blockades, 626.
Eowo, Sir William, British General,
commander-in-chief in America, 848 ;
expedition to the Chesapeake, 848,
468, 529, 580 ; Indolence of, 864.
Hvgheg, Sir Edward, British Admiral,
arrives in India, 849; takes Negapa-
tam and Trincomalee, 849 ; flrst meet-
ing with Snifren, 427 ; task in India,
428; flrst battle with Snffren's squad-
ron, 480-484; second battle with
Suffren, 487-441 ; contemporary crit-
icisms on, 442; third batUe with
Suffiren, 446-448 ; tactics of, 481, 449,
458, 456, 462; slowness of, loses
Trincomalee, 460, 451 ; fourth battle
with SuflVen, 461M55; praise be-
stowed by, upon his captains, 466;
goes to Bombay from Coromandel
coast, 468 ; returns to Madras, 461 ;
supports English siege of Cuddalore,
462 ; fifth battle with SuflVen, 468 ;
abandons the field, 468 ; death, 467.
Hifder AU^ Sultan of Mysore, 419 ; war
upon the English, 420; denied the
aid of the J^nch squadron, 421;
Suffren communicates with, 448;
visited by Suffren, 460 ; negotiations
of Suffren with, 469, 460; death of,
461.
Inhabitantt^ diaracter of, effect upon the
sea power of a countty, 60-58.
IfJiahitafiU, number of, effect upon the
sea power of a country, reserve
strength, 44-49.
ludtf, geographical position of, 82;
physical conformation of, 89, 40;
necessity for a navy, 40; Sicilian
revolt against Spain, 1674, 159;
Spanish possessions in, 1700, 201;
Sardinia taken by allied fleets, 215;
disposition of Spanish provinces in,
at peace of 1718, 219; Sicily trans-
ferred to Austria, and Sardinia to
House of Savoy, 1719, 289 ; Spanish
expedition Into, 248; foundation of
Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
248 ; Spanish operations against Aus-
tria, 1741, 268, 264 ; King of Naples
forced to withdraw troops ft-om Span-
ish army by English fleet, 268 ; dis-
position of provinces of, at peace of
1748, 278; transfer of Corsica to
France by Genoa, 292, 884 ; acquisi-
ti<m of Malta by England, 827.
Jamaieat taken by English, under
Cromwell, 60; wish of Spain to re-
cover, 845, 510, 512; strategic value
Digitized by
Google
650
INDEX.
ot, 891, 617, 618; oombined expe-
dition against, 479; frustrated bj
Bodnejr's victory over De Grasse,
496; Rodney repairs to, after his
victory, 601, 617.
Jamet 12,, a seaman by profession, 61,
116 ; commands at battle of Lowes-
toft, as Duke of York, 109 ; com-
mands at the battle of Solebay , 147 ;
depriTed of the command, 161 ; suc-
ceeds to tlie throne, 176 ; interest in
the navy, 176, 177, 178; flight from
England, 178; iands in Ireland, 179;
defeated at the Boyne, 186 ; at Cape
La Hougue, 188; death, 206.
Jenkini, captain of a merchant brig, the
story of his ears, 260.
Jervis, Sir John, afterward Earl St.
Vincent, British Admiral, naval pol-
icy of, 9 ; tactics at Cape St. Vincent,
11, 147, 167,470 (note) ; testimony at
Keppel's ooort-martial, 862.
Johnstone, British Commodore, sails for
Cape of Good Hope, 421; commis-
sioner to American Congress, 421
(note) ; attacked by SuHren at tlie
Cape Verde Islands, 421-426 ; antid-
pated by Suffren at tlie Cape, 427 ;
returns unsuccessful to England, 427.
Kempenfddt, British Admiral, cuts off
part of De Guichen's convoy, 408,
414, 417, 476.
Kq^, Lord, Britbh Admiral, ap-
pointed to command Channel fleet,
841 ; batUe of Ushant, 360-862 ; bead
of admiral^ and disapproves treaty
of peace, 499; a whig in politics,
600.
King, British Commodore, stubborn
defence of the '* Exeter," 449; visits
Snffren at the Cape of Good Hope,
406.
La BovrdonnaU, governor of the Isle of
France, 248, 278; his active admin-
istration, 278; prepares to attack
English commerce in the East Indies,
278; takes and ransoms Madras,
quarrels with Dnpleix, squadron
wrecked, returns to IVanoe, and
dies, 270.
L'£tendukn, French commodore, brill-
iant defence of, 272.
La/a^te, Marquis de, arrival In Amer-
ica, 846 ; operations in Virginia, 886 ;
expressions of Washington to, as to
necessity of naval help, 897, 400;
associations of his name to Ameri-
cans, 601.
La OaliMmmikn, French Admiral, com-
mands the fleet in tlie expedition to
Minorca,286; defeats Byng'sattempt
to relieve Port Biahon, 286-288.
Lattg, French governor of India, reaches
India, 807; quarrels with Commo-
dore D'Achtf, 807; Ukes Fort St.
David, 808; besieges Madras, but
fails, 810 ; fall of French power un-
der, 810.
Langara, Spanish Admiral, defeated
and captured by Rodney, 408, 404,
499 ; action at Toulon in 1798, 166.
LtibnitM, proposes to Louis XIV. the
occupation of Egypt, 106, 107, 141,
142.
Louii XIV,, growth of French navy
under, 72 ; enmity to Holland, 78 ;
policy of, 78, 103-106, 140, 148. 206 ;
naval policy of, 72,74, 107, 188, 141-
148, 166, 169, 166, 174, 17a-181, 194-
196; assumes personal government,
90; initiates general wars, 91 ; con-
dition of France at accession of, 03 ;
commercial policy of, 64, 106, 167,
109, 170, 170; aggressions of, 180,
178; declares war against Holland,
144; campaign in HolUnd, 149-161 ;
evacuates Holland, 168; Sicilian
episode, 169-166; peace with Hol-
Und, 168 ; decbures war agahist Ger-
many, 177; against Holland, 178;
supports invasion of Ireland, 179-
186 ; plans invasion of England, 188-
191 ; concessions by, at peace of liys-
wick, 197 ; effect of policy of, on
sea-power, 198-200 ; acoepU bequest
of Spanish throne to his grandson,
208; reduced to extremities in War
of Spanish Succession, 216, 216 ; hu-
miliating concessions at peace of
Digitized by
INDEX.
Utrecht, 810-221 ; exhamtloii of
France under, 227 ; prirateeriiig un-
der. 188. 184, m, 280 ; death of, 282.
Limii XV., aaoends throne, 282; Condi-
tion of French commerce under, 74,
242-244,279, 280, 811, 818; condition
of French narjr, 74-77, 244, 262-264,
260, 276, 270, 280, 288, 291, 811;
restoration of the nary, 76> 881-888;
defenitre alliance witli Spain, 248,
208-268; offensive alliance with
Spain, 818, 888; death, 886.
Louii XVL, begins to reign, 886 ; naval
policy of, 78-80, 887-^, 402, 408,
462; general policy of, 886, 887, 846,
860, 882, 410, 609-612, 686-640;
treaty with the United States, 846 ;
breach with England, 860.
LouMwrg, Cape Breton Island, strategic
importance of, 28, 294, 828 ; retained
by France at Peace of Utrecht, 219 ;
taken by New England colonists, 269 ;
restored to France at peace of Aix-
la-Chapelle, 277 ; taken by Boscawen,
204.
Madras, capital of a British presidency
in India, 257 ; taken by French, 276 ;
exchanged for Lonisburg at peace of
1748, 277 1 besieged by French in
1760, 810 ; danger from Hyder All
In 1780, 420; principal British naval
station daring the struggle, 1781-
1788, 420, 487, 444, 460, 461 ; danger
of roadstead. In northeast monsoon,
468, 618, 619.
Makrattas, the, position in India of,
and war with English, 410, 420;
peace with the English, 460, 461.
Maria ThertMa, ascends Anstrian
throne, 262; war with Prussia,
France, and Spain, 262, 268; war
with Prussia, in alliance with France
and Russia, 202.
Ifartifu^iM, Frencli West India Island,
base for commerce-destroying, 81,
186, 814; taken by the English, 186»
814; effects of this conquest, 818;
restored to France at peace of Paris,
821; principal base of French navy
in West Indies, 848, 866, 460, 470;
actions near, 878, 888; strategie
poiltion of, 480, 617, 618, 628.
Mattkew$, British Admiral, commander-
in-chief in the Meditfurranean and
ministei^ to Sardinia, 268; action
with combined French and Spanish
fleets, 266-267 } oourt-martialled and
casliiered, 268.
Matarin, Cardhial, policy of, 70, 03;
death, 00.
MtdUtrroMon Control of, influence
on Second Punic war, 14-21 ; strate-
gic points in, 18, 20, 22, 28, 82, 62, 68,
82, 141, 142, 202, 208, 216, 220, 286,
. 298, 827, 828, 886, 808, 616; advSn-
tage of strategic study of, 88 ; anal-
.ogy to Carribean Sea, 88; increase
of English power In, 206, 210, 212,
216, 210, 220, 220, 286, 280, 268, 822,
827, 828; Austria esUblished in,
289; Sardinia given to House oif
Savoy, 289; foundation of Boar-
bon Kingdom of Two Sicilies, 248,
strengthens France In, 249 ; English
navy In, 108, 206, 208, 210-216, 263-
268, 286-201, 206, 208, 412, 616, 682,
683; France acquires Corsica, 834,
886; England loses Minorca in
American Revolution, 400, 640.
Monk, British Qeneral and Admiral,
saying about Dutch trade, 107 ; com-
mands English fleet in the Four
Days' Battle, 117-126; tActics of,
121, 124 ; merits of, 126; opposition
to laying up the heavy ships, 181;
death, 127.
Morogueg, Bigot de, work on Naval
Tactics, 10, 77, 288.
Napoleon /., recommends itudy of rail*
itary history, 2; Egyptian expedi-
tion, 10, 107; Trafalgar campaign,
11, 12, 28, 24 (note), 110, 682, 683;
favorite objective, 47 ; naval policy,
81, 606 ; influence of French navy on
American privateering In 1812, 187.
Naval Pcliof, value of rteerve force,
48; colonial, 66;; In peace, 82; In
war, 82 ; soldiers commanding ships,
127 ; commerce-destroying and priva-
teering (see Commerce-destroying);
Digitized by
Google
652 INDEX.
Bourbon Familj comptct, 84a, 818;
significance of the wan from 1789 to
17«8, 264; Dutch, 06-99, 108,
. 109, 126, 174. 201-204, 217, 218, 222,
: 406; EngUth, 69-67, 78, 100, 101, 106,
107, 181, 140, 148, 174, 176, 192-196,
201-204, 206, 224, 226, 229, 288-241,
244, 246, 284, 293. 826-828, 406, 417,
442, 461, 462, 606, 640; French, 29,
64. 69^1, 93, 104, 106-107, 166, 167-
170, 177, 187, 197, 199, 212, 226, 238,
242-244, 262, 282. 287-290, 291. 809,
811, 822, 881-834, 837, 840, 869, 882,
408 (and note). 461, 462, 469, 460,
606, 610, 611; maritime Inscription,
46; Leibnita's proposition to Louis
. Xiy., 141, 142; Italian, 89,40; Span-
. ish, 41, 61, 94, 166, 246. 812, 888, 848,
401, 407, 610, 617 (note), 686, 636;
United Suies, 28, 88, 84. 38, 89, 42,
. 49, 8a-88, 826, 826. 689, 640 (note).
Hawd Tactics, unsettled condition of
. modern, 2; qualities of gallejs.
steamers, and saUing-ships. 8-6;
windward and leeward positions, 0 ;
change of, from age to age, 9, 10, 22.
130. 606; flresliips, 100. 110, 118,
114 ; torpedo-cruisers, 111 ; group
formation. 112 ; dose-hauled line-of-
battle. 116; breaking the line. 124.
147, 266, 268, 286, 880, 881. 488. 401 ;
refusing the Tan, 148, 162, 167, 188.
. 100. 266, m, 484 ; concentration by
defiling, 308, 887. 470, 492; concen-
tration by doubUng. 126, 147, 188,
272, 878, 879, 482. 438, 488-441 ; gen-
eral chase with milOs, 8. 4, 184. 287,
271. 299, 802, 803. 867-869. 404, 481,
482. 486; French, in eighteenth cen-
tury, 79, 80, 114. 168, 164, 287-290.
888, 840, 861, 872. 888, 426, 426, 481.
474 (and note). 476, 478. 482, 488,
486-488, 494, 688 j English. In eigh-
teenth century, 127-129, 168. 211,
287, 266. 268. 271. 286. 287, 299. 808.
807. 860, 862, 860, 877-881. 886, 889,
891. 404, 412. 442. 447. 449, 468-466,
462, 468, 470-478, 476 (and note),
486-490 i Monk's, 121 ; Ruy ter's, 146,
147, 148. 162, 164, 167, . 161; Du-
quesne's, 161-168, 166; Herbert's,
182; Tourvaie's, 182, 184, 186. 187,
189; Rooke's, 211; Byng's, 286;
Hawke's, 271, 272, 808 ; Keppel's
and D'OrTlliieis, 861 ; Barrlngton's,
866, Byron's, 867-869; D'Estaing's,
869, 870; Rodney's, 877-879, 404,
488, 491 ; De Gmwe's, 888. 889, 471-
474. 481-488. 486-489; Arbuthnot
and Destouclies's. 386; Qraves's,
389, 891; Suffren's, 426, 426. 482.
483, 489, 466, 466; Hood's, 472,
478 ; Clerk's work on, 77, 168, 211 ;
Hoste's work on, 77 ; Morognes' work
on, 77; position of commander-in-
chief in battle, 868-868; eflect on,
of changes In naval material, 2-6, 9,
10, 22. 109, 116, 884 (note), 886
(note), 498-406.
NavUt, condition of:
Brituk, under Cromwell, 62 ; under
Charles 11.. 61, 101 ; character of
vessels, 1660, 101; qualities of offi-
cers, 1660. 126-129; decUne of, under
Charles II.. 174; improyement of. by
James II.. 176; numbers in 1691,
187; deterioration under William
ni., 192 ; improvement under Anne,
209. 220. 224. 226, 229 ; numbers and
condition of, in 1727, 1784. and 1744,
269, 260; inefiiclenoy of officers,
1744, 266-269; numbers of. 1766-
1768, 291 ; numbers of. In 1778, 887,
841; professional skill of officers
in American Revolution, 879 (and
note). 401. 412. 449, 466, 497 ; admin-
istration of, 417, 462, 628, 627.
Dutch, prior to 1660, 68, 98, 99;
character of ships, 102 ; professional
qualities of officers, 109, 126, 127,
129. 167; Duquesne's estimate of
Dutch officers, 129 ; decline of, after
1676, 160, 174; decline of, during
War of Spanish Succession, 221,
222 ; practical disappearance of, after
1718, 222.
French, 68; numbers in 1661,70;
numbers in 1666, 72; numbers. 1688-
1690, 72, 178, 179, 180; administra-
tion of, 1660-1696, 72 ; condition of.
at end of Louis XIV.'s reign. 74, 191 1
character of vessels In 1660, 101;
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Google
INDEX.
668
profesdoaal qualitlet of offlcera in
■eTenteenth and eighteenth oentn-
ries, 129, 161, 170-172, 185; decaj
in namber and condition, 1718-1700,
74-76, 209, 216, 244, 252, 260, 200,
279, 280, 288, 291, 811, 812; reTiral
of, 1700, 76-78, 881 ; numben of, in
1761 and 1770, 881 ; discipline daring
war of 1778, 832, 888; numbers in
1778, 45, 887 ; superior to British in
size and batteries of ships, 888, 498,
494; professional sldll of officers,
865, 412. 485, 486, 447, 457, 484, 497,
527, 586 (note); administration of,
402 (and note), 408, 452, 686, 587;
numbers of, in 1791, 888; numbers
of, in 1814, 81.
Spanish^ condition of, anterior to
1660, 41, 50, 94, 95 ; in 1675, 160,
165; restoration by Alberoni, 284;
destruction of ships at Cape Passaro
and of dock-yards, 287, 288 ; numbers
of, 1747, 259; numbers of, 1756,
291 ; numbers of, in 1761, 881 ; num-
bers of, in 1779, 887 ; superior to
British in size and batteries of ships,
888; administration of, 402 (and
note), 408, 586 ; character of the
personnel, 527.
Ndton, Horatio, afterward Lord, Brit-
ish Admiral, Uctics at the battle of
the Nile, 10; Trafalgar campaign,
11, 28 (note), 527, 582, 538; tactics
at Trafalgar, 12, 854, 459 ; enforces
Narigation Act, 60, 251; orders at
Trafalgar, 112, 481; at battle of
Cape St Vincent, 157,855,868; cele-
brated sayings of, 185,862,485,525,
527, 582 ; attachment of subordinates
to, 267 ; position assumed by him in
battle, 858-358.
NiU, Battle of the, tactical principles.
10 ; strategic effect, 11 ; ITrench rear
at, 80; Nelson at, 858.
Opdam, Dutch Admiral, commands at
battle of Lowestoft and is killed, 108,
109.
OrlSam, Philippe d', Regent of France
during mittcrity of Louis XV., 74,
282; insecurity of position, 282; con-
cessions to England, 288 ; policy of »
285; alliance with England against
Spain, 285-288 • death, 24L
Peace:
AMa-ChapeUe, 1748, 277.
Breda, mi, 182.
NimegmH, 1678, 168.
Aystocff, 1721,240.
PariM, 1768, 821.
Rffiwick, 1697, 197.
Utreehi, 1718, 219.
VenaiUee, 1788, 541.
Philip, Duke of Aigou, afterward
Philip V. of Spain, Spanish throne
bequeathed to, 202; war declared
against, by England, Holland, and
Germany, 205 ; loses Gibraltar, 210;
besieges Gibraltar, 212; loses Bar-
celona and Catalonia, 218; driren
from liadrid, 214 ; recorers all Spain,
except Catalonia, 214; acknowl-
edged King of Spain by Treaty of
Utrecht, 219; deprired of Netlier-
lands and Italian dependencies, 219;
enmity to the regent Orl^ns, 282;
seizes Sardinia, 285 ; attacks Sicily,
286; brought to terms by France
and the Sea Powers, 289; makes
alliance with the Emperor Charles
VL, 244; attacks Gibraltar, 245. .
Phyiieal Ccn/brmaiion, its effect upon
the sea power of countri^, 85-42.
PiU, William, dislike of George IL to>
270; becomes prime minister, 298;
policy of, 295, 296; prosperity of
commerce under, 297; offers to re*
store Gibraltar to Spain, 296 ; respect
for Portuguese neutrality, ^IS9, 800 ;
declines medlaHon of Spain, 804;
waningofhis inflnence,805; purposes
war against Spain, 818 ; resigns his
office, 818 ; his plans adopted by suc-
cessors, 814, 817 ; opposes the peace
of Paris, 822 ; effect of his policy on
the history of England, 82B.
Poeoek, British Admiral, commanda
British fleet in Indiaand flghts three
battles with French fleet, 807-310;
commands fleet in combined ezpr
dition against Harana, 314^ 815.
Digitized by
Google
664
INDEX.
Port Makm and Minorca, lost to Spain
froquentljr tlirougli maritime weak-
neM, 42, 216» 641 ; ceded to England
in 1718, 02, 219; etrategio impor-
tance of, e2, 220, 808, 616 1 Frencli
expedition against, 286; Byng de-
feated in liis attempt to relieve, 285-
288 ; surrender of, to France, 2U1 ;
Pitt's offer to exdiange Qihraitar
fbr, 298; restored to England at
peace of 1768, 822 ; taken firom Eng-
land In 1782, 407, 409; ceded to
Spain in 1788, 640 ; again uken b/
England, 641.
Por^t^jdecajin sea power and wealth,
62; cedes Bombay and Tangiers to
England, 104; dependence on Eng-
land, 106, 208, 816, 820,821 ; Methuen
treaty, 206 ; alliance with SngUnd
and Holland, 1704, 208; adyantage
of, to England, 208, 218-216. 220,
2293; French and Spanhurds invade,
816, 818, 821 ; England lepeU the
invasion, 81tf ; benevolent neutrality
of colonUl ports to England, 620,
. 621.
BamatudU, work on Naval Tactics, 287,
290, 871-874.
Bhode Island, occupied by the English
In the American Revolution, 846;
attack upon by French and Ameri-
cans, 861-864; English evacuate,
876, 680; French occupy, 882, 894;
French position in, 804; strategic
Talne of, 619, 629, 680 (note).
Rickdiiu, Cardinal, policy of, 69, 70, 92,
98 ; alliance with Spain, 94.
Bockambeau, French General, arrival in
. America, 882; despatches to De
Grasse, 884, 888 ; consultation with
Wasliington, 887, 899; marches
against Comwallls, 889.
Rodney, Sir George B., afterward Lord,
British Admiral, commands squadron
In reduction of Martinique, 814;
oommander-in-chief in West Indies,
877; Ukes or disperses a Spanish
squadron, 877, 404, 600 (and note) ;
personal and military character, 877,
878, 880, 897, 498-600; actions with
l>e Gttichen, 878-881; divides bU
fleet and goer to New York, 882;
•elses Dutch West India islands,
882 ; sends Hood with fourteen ships
to New York, and returns to England,
889; returns to West Indies, 479;
sails hi chase of De Grasse, 480;
action of April 9, 1782, 481-488;
battle of April 12, 1782, 486-490;
criticism upon his Uctics, 490-498 ;
criticism upon his (kilure to pursue
the beaten enemy, 496, 497 ; his suc-
cesses, 600 ; rewards and deatii, 608 ;
opinion as to evacuation of Khode
Ishmd, 680 (note). .
Rpoke, Sir George, British Admiral,
relieves Londonderry, 180; bums
French ships at Cape La Hougue,
190 ; unsuccessful expedition against
Cadix, 207 ; destroys the galleons at
Vigo Bay, 207 ; takes Gibraltar, 210 ;
commands at the battie of Malaga,
211.
Rupert, Prince, at Four Days' Battle.
124, 126; commands English fleet
at battles of Sohoneveldt and of the
Texel, 161, 162.
Ruisell, British Admiral, commands
allied English and Dutch fleeu hi
1691, 187 ; at battle of La Hogue,
189.
Aiyter, Dutch Admiral, greatest naval
officer of seventeenth century, 117 ;
commands at battle of the Four Days,
117-126 ; badly supported by his offi-
cers, 122, 126, 127; tactics of, 180,
144-148, 162, 167, 161, 164; destroys
English sliipphig in the Thames, 182 ;
strategy of, 144, 161, 162; commands
at the battles of Solebay,146, Schone-
veldt, 162, Texel, 162-164 ; military
character, 167 ; sent to Meiliierra-
nean with inadequate force, 100;
commands at batrle of Stroniboli,
160-102; killed at battie of Agosta,
166.
Sea Power, a history of confficts, 1 ;
elements of, 26. Affected by geo-
graphical position of countries, 29-
86 ; by physical conformation, 86-42 ;
Digitized by
INDEX.
hy eitent of territctiy, 49^ i hj
. namber of popalation, 44-^; bj da-
tkmal ohmncter» 60-68; poUej of
gorerniiieiit, 68. Pol^j of England
M to, 68-67; policy of Holland, 87-
89 ; of Fnnoe, 69-81. Influenco oC
coloniot oot 8i (mo also Coloniet) ;
weaknaM of tha UnlCad Statat in,
88; depandent upon oommarca, 87,
226 (wa alto Cominaroe); strataglo
bearing, 88 (tea alto Strategy) ; pot
iej oC mohaliaa, 88; Spanlth, In
1680, M; Dntch, in 1680, 06; Eng.
lith, in 1660, 101 ; mittaket of Loait
XIV., 104; Colbart't maatnret, 70,
106 ; effeott of commaroa^ettroying
on. ia2, 179, 198, 229, 817, 844, 400,
408 (note), 689. (See alto Commerce-
dettroying.) Inflaenoe of, upon Na-
poleon't expedition to Egypt, 10;
upon Second Pnnlo War, 14; npon
Third Anglo-Dntch War, 148, 164;
npon Engliih Rerolation, 177, 178,
180, 181, 191, 197; npon France,
108, 199; npon War of Spanlth Sno-
cettion, 206, 206, 209» 218, 214, 228-
829 ; npon Alberoni't ambitiont, 287,
280; upon Peter the Great, 289; in
India, 248, 268, 278-278, 806. 800, 810.
816, 8*28, 849, 424, 428, 446, 468, 460-
464, 466, 618, 620, 621 ; npon War of
Austrian Succettion, 268, 264, 279,
280; npon Seren Tean' War, 291,
298-296. 804, 811, 814-817; upon
Portugal, 820, 821 ; atPeaceof Parit,
821 ; in remote and ditordered coun-
tries, 824-826; upon Britith policy
since 1763, 826-828. Watliington't
opinions at to, 897-400; American
ReTolntion, 817, 488; influence of,
upon conditions of peace, 1788, 498.
Spain, geographical position, 82; re-
tultt of maritime weakness of. 41, 42,
193, 813-317, 827, 846, 846, 641 ; de-
pendence of finances npon treasure-
ships, 41, 244, 313. 846, 689; effect
of national character upon sea power,
60-62, 64; unify of aim with Aus-
tria, 91, 92; policy of Richelieu
toward, 93 : condition of, In 1660,
94, 96 ; condition of nary, In 1660,
94 ; aggreitlont of Loult XIT. on»
loi 180; faUura of the Auttrian
Una of klngt, 140» 901, 909 ; aUianoe
with Holland and Qermany againtt
France, 168; roTolt of Sldly againtt,
169 ; territory lott at Peace of Nime-
guen, 168; Joins League of Augs-
burg, 176 ; dependence upon Dutch
and English fleets, 198 ; possessions
In year 1700, 901; throne of, be-
queathed to Philip, Duke of Anjou,
902; war of the succettion, 901-281 ;
Bourbon Una of kingt attabllshed,
219; lostet of territory at peace of
1713, 919; Alberoni't ministry In,
238-289; grievances against Eng-
land, 1720-1789, 240, 241, 244-261 ;
conquen the Two Sidliet in War
of Pollth Succettion, 248; Family
Compact with France, 248, 311, 813;
war with England, 260 ; potsessions
in 1789, 266; Peace of Aix-Ia-Clia-
pelle, 278 ; lack of results from war
with England, 978; enters Seren
Teart' War at the ally of France
againtt England, 313; lott of colon-
let and treatures, 814-817; loss of
pottettlont by Peace of Parit, 1768,
821, 322; political relatlont with
France, 388; ditpute with England
orer Falkland Itlandt, 836 ; objectt
in the war of 1779-1782, 847, 848,
609, 610. 618 ; rapture with England
and alUance with France, 401; In-
efiiclenoy of nary, 402 (and note),
407-409. 411, 412, 606, 627; policy
In war of 1779, 617 (note), 686-688 ;
territorial gains by peace of 1788.
(See alto Colonies, Commerce, KaTal
PoUcy.)
Sta, Luda, West India bland, taken
by Englith, 314 ; ceded to France at
Peace of Parit, 321 ; ttrong harbor
and itrategic petition, 348, 866, 877,
803, 416, 618. 616, 618, 628 ; taken
by Admiral Barrington. 848, 366.
866. 612, 681 (note) ; Rodney watchet
De Gratte from, 479, 480; an ad*
Tanced ttrategic petition, 618, 628 ;
rettored to France at peace of 1788^
640.
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Google
666
INDEX.
Strattgi/, permuieiice of its principles,
7-9, 88, 89; iUustntioDS, 10-22;
. defioitioD of Davsl, 22; TnlUgar
csmpaign, 28 (note); beariog of
geographical position on, 29-88;
MeditemtDean and Carribean Seas,
83-36; bearing of physical confor*
mation of coast on, 86-42 ; bioclcade
of coast of Confederate States, 48,
44; Talne of commerce-destroying
(see Commerce-destroying) ; word
''defence" two distinct ideas, 87
(note) ; naral, of the British, 6, 9, 2*2;
24, 30, 118, 126, 186. 148, 182, 206,
298, 210, 212, 224, 229, 289, 260, 209,
284, 286, 296, 814-817, 820, 826-828,
839, 342, 348, 868, 876, 876, 386, 890-
897, 412-417, 426-430, 468, 628-686 ;
naval, of tlie Dutch, 144, 146^ 161,
164 ; naTal, of the Frencli, 0, 12, 28
(note), 179-181, 191, 347, 871-874,
883, 888. 892. 401, 438, 469, 460, 476,
483, 686-639; features of War of
Spanish Succession, 201-206 ; silent
action of sea power, 209; general
miliUry situation, in 1740. 266 ; Eng-
land in Seyen Years' War, 296 ; mu-
tual dependence of seaportsand fleets,
81, 88, 182, 212, 829, 480, 463, 620;
value of colonies, 27, 66, 83.
186. 136, 610, 611 ; importance of
coal, 31, 329 (note), 640 (note) ; mil-
itary situation in America in 1777,
841-;M8 ; general strategic situation
in 1778, 347-840; BritUh difflcuUies
in American Revolution, 392-897,
412^19. 622-638; Snffren's naval.
424, 425.433, 460. 406; situation in
India, 349, 428-480; Hood's naval,
476; Rodney's naval. 881, 892.496-
498, 623 ; influence of trade-winds and
monsoons, 316, 468, 617, 618; ele-
ments essential to all naval wars,
614 ; diflioulty of procuring informa-
tion at sea, 621 ; general discussion
of war of 1778, 606-640. (See aUo
Naral Policy and Sea Power.)
Sufflrm, French Admiral, criticism on
D'Estaing's conduct at 8ta. Lucia,
866, 426, 478; commands leading
French ship in D'Bstaing's battle off
Grenada, 871; criticism on D'Bs-
taing's conduct in the battle, 371:
sails from Brest in company with
De Grasse's fleet, 883, 421; parts
company, off the Acores, for India,
888, 407, 421 ; orders to secure Cape
of Good Hope, 421 ; acUon, with
British squadron at the Cape Verde
IsUnds,422.423; military discussion
of his conduct, 423-426 ; arrival in
India, 427; lack of seaports on
which to base operations, 349. 429 ;
first battle with squadron of Sir
Edward Hughes, 480-482 ; tactics in
the action, 482^36; estimate of tlio
strategic situation in India, 424, 438,
444, 446, 464, 466; second battle
with Hughes, 487-489 ; tactics in it,
489-441 ; strategic action, 443, 446,
446, 460-468, 468-460, 462-464. 466,
622; mUitary character, 446. 446,
460, 460. 466. 466; third battle with
Huglies. 446-448; takes Trincoma-
lee, 460; activity of. 450, 461.466,
402,466 ; fourth batUe with Hughes,
468-466 ; wreck of two of squadron,
4^7; goes to Sumatra. 460; returns
to Trincomalee, 461; relieves Cud-
dalore besieged by the English, 462;
fifth battle with Hughes. 468; con-
clusion of peace, 464; return to
France, 466; rewards, 466; later
career and death, 466.
TourviUe, French Admiral, commands
at the battle of Beachy Head, 181 ;
sluggbh pursuit of the enemy, 184 ;
military character, 186; celebrated
cruise in 1691. 187; commands at
battle of La Hougue. 189 ; tactics
and brilliant deibnce at La Hougue,
190; destruction of French ships,
190 ; supports the army in Catalonia,
198; destroys or disperses a great
English convoy, 194; death. 210.
Trafalgcar, Battle of, final act of a
strategic oombination, 11. 28 (note) ;
tactics at, 12, 864, 469; effecta of,
47; Nelson's position at, 863. 857;
Collingwood's action after Nelson's
death, 86&
Digitized by
INDEX.
TrimnmalH, tn Cejlon, DaUdi inflaenoe
in, 07 ; {Mtaet into tlie bandt of the
Englisli, 849, 428 1 effect upon tlie
contest in India, 849, 497 (note), 439,
430 (note), 488, 487, 442, 461, 468,
468, 462 ; ttrmtegic velne of, 428, 429,
486, 444, 461, 468, 618, 619, 620;
Uken by Snflren, 460; restored to
HoUand at peace of 1788, 640.
Two SieiUei, the, aoqaired bj Austria,
289; foundation of Bourbon King-
dom of, 248 ; forced by British fleet
to withdraw troops from Spanish
army, 204, 804.
Umied Prooincei. See HolUnd.
Femon, British Admiral, talces Porto
Bello, is repalsed from Cartagena
and Santiago de Cnba, 201.
ViUtneuve, French Admiral, Trafalgar,
campaign, 28, 24 (note), 626 ; at the
batUe of the Nile, 80 ; suicide, 408.
Walpoie, Sir Robert, prime minister of
England, 289, 241 ; peace policy of,
241, 248, 244 ; nayal demonstrations,
244; struggle witli the war party
in EngUnd, 247»249, 260; neutrality
causes Austria to lose the two
Sicilies, 248; forced into war with
Spain, 260; accord with Fleuri, 241,
248, 244; confidence betrayed by
FleuH, 248 ; driren from office, 268,
262; death, 268w
War, Second Punic, Influence of sea
power upon, 18-21.
Wan, American Rerolution, 841-897 ;
Atiglo-Dutch, second, 107-182; An-
glo-Dutch, tidrd, Englsnd In aUiance
with France, 144-168 ; Austrian Suc-
cession, 262-277; France against
Holland, Germany, and Spain, 1074-
1678,168-168; Great Britain agafaist
Spain, 260-277) League of Augs-
burg, 176-197) Maritime war of
1778, 860-640; Polish Succession,
247 ; Russia and Sweden, 281 ; Seven
Tears', 291-821 ; Spanish Succession,
1702-1718, 206-218.
Wathingion, George, at Pittsburg and
in Braddock's expedition, 284 ; opin-
ion as to tlie line of the Hudson, 842
(note) ; comments on D'Estalng's
cruise, 864 (note) ; despatches to De
Grasse, 884; meeting with Rocham-
beau, 887 ; result of their delibera-
tions, 888 ; marches from New York
to Virginbi, 889; opinions as to tlie
Influence of sea power on tlie Ameri-
can Rerolution, 897-400.
William IIL, naval policy of, 68, 192 ;
Incomes ruler of Holland, 160 ; gen-
eral policy, 68, 167, 168, 174, 176,
177, 191, 202-204, 207; expedition
to England, 178 ; becomes King of .
England, 61, 178; difficulties of his
position, 179 ; goes to Ireland, 181 ;
wins the battle of the Boyne, 188;
(liep, 2D5.
THE END.
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CAPTAIN MAHAN'S WORKS ON SEA-POWER.
1. The Influence of Sea-Power upon History. i66o-
1783. With 25 Charts of Grett Naval Battles. 8vo. Cloth, gilt
top. $4.oa
II. The Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Rev-
olution and Empire. With 13 Maps and Battlfr-Pians.
2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. 16.00.
Caftain a. T. Mahan's great Usioricat works on the '* Influence of See-Power.**
the importance of which was conceded at the time of their publication, are now In
constant demand, and several editions for America and England have been printed
within a few months. The hte Admiral Tryoa, of the British Navy, pronounced them
simply gnat, ^ikt itsi things tvsr wrUUn, He is now universally admitted to be
one of the great modem historians ; and his books are recognized everywhere for thdr
originality, power, and lucidity of style, and as historical contributions of the highest
importance.
Captain Mahan's works on the " Influence of Sea-Power '* have received official
reoognition from the governments of dte United States and Great Britain. — the War
and Navy Departments of the United States having purchased a krge editkm for use
in the service and ship libraries, and the British dovemment having supplied the
books to the cruising ships of the Royal Navy.
The Influence of 8ea-Power upon HIetory.
Extracts from Rrvirws.
Tke WtslmhuUr Gmattis,
Captain Mahan, whose name it fsmeos all the worid over as that of the author of "The
Influence of Sea- Power apon History/* a work, or rather a itries of works, which may fairly
be said to have codified the laws or naval strategy.
Magnnim ^ A mtrkan Hitiety.
An instructive work of the hwheat valoe and interest to students and to the readioK publics
and should find its way into all the libraries and homes of the land.
Captain Mahan has been recognised by all competent Judges not merely as the most
distmguished bring writer on naval strategy, but as the originator and firat exponent of what
may b« nllad the philosophy of naval history.
The .l^ateat of living writers on naval subjects. . . . Captain Mahan is the author of
books which mark a new era in historical literature. They are to sailors of every navy in the
world what Napier's '* History of the Peninsdar War** was to British soldiers, and some-
thnig more. Capuin Mahan is a bom historian.
No book of recent poblication has been received with such an enthusiasm of grateful
admirarion as that written by an officer of the American Navy, Captain Mahan, upon Sea
Power and Naval Achievements It simply suppUnts all other books on the subject, and
Ukes ito place in our libraries ss the ttandard worL
Tht F^Hnigkify Rtvitw,
Possessed of a charming style ; precise and dear faistead of verbose ; completely oonsdoos
of what he intends to convey and perfectly competent to convey h ; and dowered with a per-
spicadoos breadth of view which dwells on all that is important and passes over all that is
irrelevant, Captain Mahan has given ue twe very remarkable books.
The distinguished author of some of the most important books on naval history and strategy
which have ever been published, and which serve as text4x>oks for neariy every naval lecture
or artide of the present day.
C. H. Damis, Cpmrnarndtr mmd CMUf InUOig^mct Offietr, U.S.N.
tofthe
Captain Mahan*s book should be reed by all who are interested in the development c
f, and who believe In the importance of me navy as the prindpal fector of defence.
Tkt Critic.
1 altogether ezoBptiooal work ; there b nothing like It in the whole range of naval literal
. . The work is entirdy original fa conception, masterful in construction, and scholaiiy
An all
ture* ...
in execution.
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The Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution
and Empire. JPr9$9 NqHc^s,
Ctl^mtl Mimriet ^tkt Brituk Arw^ in Tk§ UniUd Strvkt Mt^goMme.
A book ibat mtut b« r«ad. First, it must bo read by all Kbooluiaaten from tbo bgadmarter
of Etoo to tb« head of tbo humblett board-acbool io tho oououy. No mao ia fit to tnin
Eof Hsb boys to AiUU tbair dutiea aa EnKludkineD who baa oot marked, learnad, and inwardly
dkeatcd it Stcmdfy, it muat be read dv evenr Engliabinan and Engliahwooan who wiahci
tobe wonhy of that name. It ia no hard or irfcaome taak to which I call them The writmg
ia ihrough<Mii dear, vigorouii and iuciaivt. . . . '11m book deaarvea and muat attain a world-
wide reptttalioo.
Delightful reading. . . . The rouet exciting and among the beat written naval battiea ever
dcacribed, for iu cteameai, ia the battle of the Nile, fought in the darkncaa and upon
atrauge waieia.
itf<Tfiwiy/im*i fifitifntint.
Remarkable volumea . . . Captain Mahan haa for the fint time made dear to the
upproftieional reader how much the plana of Napoleon were influenced by the auccettea of
the Britiah aqnadrona and the oonaequent failure of hb ** Continental SyAem."
TM4 F^t^inifkify Rtvitw.
Do not contain a page that cannot be read with pleaaure aa well aa with profit by any roan
for whom foreign pohtioa, the hiatory of the riae and fiUl of natioua, aud tlie at^urcea of national
greatnaaa poaaaii the alighteat aitractioaa.
SprimgfiM Rti^Uicam {SdUmHtUV
No other writer haa told the infiuenoe of Britiah naval power upon the career of Napoleon
with the akiU and lucidity chaiacterising Captain Mahan'a account.
Tks Naii^.
Of great permanent value and exceptional intereat, and in a high degree orediteble to our
naval icrvice and to the country
Maatcriy and comprehenaive. . . . 11m drama of the great war uafolda itaelf in theae pagea
in a manner at once novd aud engroeaing.
rk4 Ckrixtian Unim,
Hia literary atyle b moat aatiafoctory.
BaUim^rt A mtricam%
A permanent addiUon to the literature of the worid.
TAs Ntw y^rk Sum.
A work of remarkable intereat and abiding value.
yprk Triktttu.
A highly intereeting and an important work, havinf( leaaona and auggeationa whidi are
calcubted to be of high value to the people of the United Statea. Hia pagea abound with
apirited and careful aocounta of the great naval battiea and manoeuvrea which occurred during
tne period treated. We have before had occarion to inraiae Captain Mahan' a liierery atyle^
whicD ia fiexible, nervoua, and auAdentIv dignified to aatiafv every reasonable demand. It ia.
moreover, full of energy, and marked by a fielidloua choice of hnguage, and ita tone and
qualitiea an auatained ateadily tbrouglioui.
Of the way in which thb great theme b treated we need aay Ihtlei no livtiw writer ia ao
well qualified to do it Justice aa Captain Mahan, and cerUmly the true aipificance of the
treroendoua evenU of theae momentoua yean haa never been mon luminously or mon
inatructivelydbplayed. .
He penetretea to the nal meaning of the roaaa of hooka, diplomatic, political, naval, and
hbtoricaTwhich have been written to deacnbe the atote of thinga m Europe dunag the Uat
depkde 01 the eighteenth century.
We do not heaiute to aaaert that, m treating thb theme, he haa eaaily aurpaaaed all
pnvioua writera. _^ ^ j ^
Two great worka aa fiudnatiag and inatructive to bndlubben aa to aeamen.
LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, PubUshers,
je54 WamUingio^ Street, Boetofu
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1993
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